WALKING CAREFULLY FROM TRANSDNESTR TO YEREVAN
By Fyodor Lukyanov
The Moscow Times
Sept 17 2008
Russia
Following the tumultuous events in the Caucasus, the struggle for
influence in the former Soviet republics has turned into an open
confrontation. Moscow has clearly articulated its policy toward
its neighbors, calling those regions Russia’s exclusive sphere
of influence. By trying to create its own geographical sphere of
influence, Moscow is essentially pushing for a multipolar world —
a global system of competing power centers with each attempting to
strengthen and extend its reach.
The very idea of establishing an exclusive sphere of influence is
inherently confrontational since Russia’s international partners would
never agree to such a model. Western politicians’ oft-repeated refrain
is that it is inadmissible to apply 19th-century principles in the
21st century. At the outbreak of the current crisis, U.S. Secretary
of State Condoleezza Rice said Washington would not allow Moscow to
achieve its strategic goals. Of course, the United States does not
consider its own goals to be a return to the 19th century. After
all, it does not have a regional sphere of influence in the classic
sense. Its interests encompass the whole world.
The European Union categorically rejects the rhetoric likening
current events to the epoch of the Great Game, insisting that modern
international relations are built upon a different foundation. But
that has not stopped the EU from attempting to expand its model on its
neighbors. Thus, the EU is effectively increasing its own exclusive
sphere of influence.
China is the third major participant in post-Soviet politics. Beijing
views any discussion of spheres of influence as being attributes
of Western — including Russian — colonialism, characterized by
contemptuous and arrogant attitudes toward others. This is why it would
be futile to expect China to support Russia’s new course. Beijing
portrays its own ambitions for expansion in terms of a desire for
global harmony. In practice, this means the steady promotion of
China’s economic interests wherever and whenever possible. Central
Asia is the region in which both Beijing and Moscow have strong
interests. This region is the most valuable chunk of the post-Soviet
landscape. Its huge energy deposits make it the choice prize in the
larger geopolitical standoff.
It is not difficult to imagine that Central Asia could become the
focal point for future conflicts.
Russia is taking active diplomatic strides in the Transdnestr
territorial problem. The Kremlin wants to prove that it can resolve
crises through diplomacy and not only through military force.
In all likelihood, Moscow’s terms for resolving that situation
will involve neutralizing Moldova by forbidding it to join NATO and
insisting that Russia maintain a military presence on its territory. It
is hard to imagine that Washington would simply sit and twiddle
its thumbs were such a resolution imminent. If the United States
and Europe were unhappy with that possibility in 2003, they would
hardly agree to it now, especially given the prevailing competition
for influence in the region.
If the United States and the EU do step in and disrupt the agreement
again, it will prove that their motivation is not to preserve Moldova’s
territorial integrity, but to prevent Chisinau from falling under
Moscow’s sphere of influence.
But Russia’s frustration at seeing its efforts derailed for a
second time could complicate the situation. Of course, recognition
of Transdnestr’s independence is not likely to be in the offing. In
that case, it is unclear what to do with the territory Ukraine rudely
severed from Russia, and any resolution of the conflict would remain
only a theoretical possibility.
Belarus is the second object of potential rivalry. The more the
East-West conflict heats up, the more important Minsk becomes. For
Russia, Minsk is the only exception to the number of ill-wishers
that flank its western border. For Brussels and Washington, Minsk
represents an opportunity to snatch from Moscow its ally. Belarussian
President Alexander Lukashenko is a master at squeezing an advantage
out of any situation and now a huge opportunity has opened before him.
>>From the West, the Belarussian leader wants official recognition of
the legitimacy of his upcoming parliamentary elections, a thawing in
political relations with the United States and greater contacts with
the EU. From Moscow, it wants natural gas discounts and, if possible,
other economic perks.
Lukashenko has already made conciliatory gestures toward the West
by releasing political prisoners — including presidential candidate
Alexander Kozulin — and relaxed restrictions against the opposition
during the election campaign.
Belarus will probably offer Russia military cooperation and joint
opposition to NATO — for a price, naturally. Judging from the evasive
language Minsk has used in describing its position in relation to
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it is not planning to recognize their
independence. But rejecting such a possibility outright is also not
in its best interests.
The West has already indicated that it is willing to be
flexible. Washington anticipates a more democratic Belarus emerging
and does not rule out repealing sanctions against the country’s
leadership. For now, sanctions have been lifted from two Belarus
firms. The EU is likely to follow suit.
The third possible cause of disagreement concerns Georgia’s neighbors
in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan is walking a fine line, exhibiting
its readiness to cooperate with everyone, but being careful not to
move too close to any one particular partner. Yerevan finds itself in a
difficult position because of the Russia-Georgia conflict and not only
because its oil pipeline passes through Georgian territory. Armenia
worries that Moscow will require more concrete forms of support from
fellow Collective Security Treaty Organization member countries. But
if Yerevan were to spoil its relationship with Georgia — an important
economic partner and home to a significant Armenian population — it
would become more hopelessly isolated. At the same time, upsetting
Russia could be dangerous because a great deal is riding on that
relationship, including the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh.
A possible breakthrough in the impasse between Yerevan and Ankara
could change the situation. In this scenario, Turkey would become an
independent regional power with interests that often differ from the
United States and the rest of Europe. That would open up additional
opportunities for Russia, but could also intensify existing rivalries.
I have purposely avoided mentioning Ukraine. Nobody denies that
Ukraine will be the main battleground in the impending geopolitical
confrontation. The situation there is fraught with the possibility
of wide-scale destabilization and intervention by foreign powers. The
entire post-Soviet landscape increasingly resembles a minefield where
the slightest sudden movement could lead to yet another explosion.