RECOGNITION PRACTICE AND GEOPOLITICAL RISK IN EASTERN EUROPE: GEORGIA, KOSOVO AND BEYOND
RGE Monitor
Sept 17 2008
NY
In recognizing the two Georgian enclaves – South Ossetia and Abkhazia –
Russia left no doubt that its decision was partly in retaliation for
Western recognition of Kosovo, Serbia’s breakaway province. Moscow
deeply opposed Kosovo’s independence and repeatedly warned recognition
could set a precedent for other separatist regions. In return,
western policy makers argued that Kosovo was a unique case, with no
implications for other conflicts. Similarly, following the Russian
recognition of the Georgian enclaves, western officials flatly
rejected any parallels and maintained that the Kosovo case was only
a convenient excuse for an increasingly assertive Moscow.That may be
true, but the blame games and theoretical and legal debates only divert
attention from the more serious point. Unilateral recognitions, whether
justified or not, could influence other separatist movements which
in turn could emphasize the exceptional nature of their own demands
for statehood. The cases of the Kosovo and Georgian enclaves do,
in effect, erode the international law of states’ sovereignty and the
sanctity of borders and could thaw the two remaining ‘frozen conflicts’
in the CIS region (Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan and Transnistria in
Moldavia), fuel tensions in Ukraine’s Russians populated Crimea and
again destabilize the region where the recent trend of violent state
fragmentations actually began – the Balkans. It is worth remembering
that the secessionist governments of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia
repeatedly called for international recognition following Kosovo’s
unilateral declaration of independence and argued that if Kosovo
could break away, so could they. So who is next?
South Ossetia and Abkhazia make only one half of the separatist
provinces in the CIS region. Russia was a principal player in
the outbreak and freezing of the two other ‘frozen conflicts’ –
Transnistria in Moldova and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. These
breakaway regions, along with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, emerged
after the collapse of the Soviet Union following brief conflicts in the
early 1990s. Moscow provided military, political and economic support
to all four separatist governments and deployed peacekeeping forces
on what have become de facto borders inside these states. Clearly,
the road to peace settlement or conflict resumption in Transnistria
and Nagorno-Karabakh leads through Moscow. This geopolitical fact
can hardly lower the political risk in a region where Russia has been
using ‘frozen conflicts’ to exert military or political pressures and
maintain leverage over its former satellites. Only a few days after the
Georgia incursion, Russian president Medvedev called Moldova to resume
peace talks with Transnistria in a move some analysts interpreted as
pressure on the Moldovan government to cut ties with NATO and accept
a peace plan that would allow Russian forces to stay indefinitely in
Moldova. Moscow’s similar initiative for settling the Nagorno-Karabakh
dispute is also seen as an attempt to woo Baku away from the West,
secure gas purchase deals for Gazprom and undermine the pipeline
projects that circumvent Russia. In theory, Moscow could also use
the presence of the large Russian minority in the Crimea region as
a pretext for conflict with NATO-aspirant Ukraine. It would be in
accordance with recently outlined Russia’s foreign policy concept
that envisages protection of Russian citizens ‘wherever they are’.
Nonetheless, it seems that the highest risk of violent conflict
resumption has been looming over Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan’s
breakaway region. In recent years, military spending has been on a
sharp rise in all Central Asian states, but the two leading countries
are Georgia and Azerbaijan. According to Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Georgia increased its 2007 defense
spending by $200m, to almost $600m, which is a 20-fold increase
since 2000. Supported by its oil-booming economy, Azerbaijan has
also been investing heavily in the defense sector ($667m in 2007
compared to $141m in 2000), raising concerns the government may try to
recover the breakaway region by force. The growing trend of clashes in
Nagorno-Karabakh in the first half of 2008 and the aggressive rhetoric
employed by the Azerbaijan central government is another disturbing
sign that very much resembles the pre-war dynamic in Georgia. In June,
the Azerbaijani president, Ilham Aliyev, stated that the government
will continue to explore political solutions for conflict resolution,
but will not dismiss military options if necessary. The Georgia crisis
only adds to the pre-existing security dilemma and could spark an
outbreak of the violent conflict. It would inflict high costs for the
economy of Azerbaijan which is named the top pro-business reformer
according to the recent World Bank report.
Finally, recent developments in Georgia could reverberate in the
Balkans again. Kosovo, whose Western-backed unilateral declaration
of independence infuriated Moscow and offered a convenient excuse
for its actions in Georgia, is facing the threat of ‘secession within
secession’. The Serbian populated northern part of Kosovo is the new
potential breakaway region that does not recognize Kosovo’s statehood,
has been under de facto authority of Belgrade and could eventually
seek to rejoin its kinship state. Russia has been a traditional ally
of Serbia and it is not hard to imagine Moscow throwing the northern
part of Kosovo in its own basket of sui generis cases that do not fall
under the international law of respecting borders. Meanwhile, border
disputes and the fact that not all EU member states have recognized
Kosovo, could further complicate EU integration process pursued both
by Serbia and Kosovo.