TURKEY AND TRANSATLANTIC TRENDS
Ibrahim Kalin
Sept 18 2008
Turkey
According to the 2008 Transatlantic Trends public opinion survey
recently released by the German Marshall Fund of the United States
(GMF) — available at — Turkey’s threat perception has
declined and its confidence has increased compared to a year ago.
Economic crisis, climate change, international terrorism, energy
dependency, Iran’s nuclear program and religious fundamentalism —
none of these seem to create a sense of urgency or fear among the
Turks surveyed. Considering the turbulent events Turkey went through
in 2007, this is an important indication of a reasonable degree of
stability. There are other indications, as well. The big economic
crisis many observers were expecting never came. The Russian-Georgian
war, at least so far, has not created a major political division
or regional crisis for Turkey. Turkey is handling the Middle East
as well as before — and even better in some areas. The fact the
Syrian-Israeli talks facilitated by Turkey (how is this different
from mediation?) have not collapsed is a sign of hope. The Iranian
nuclear issue is far from being as explosive as many feared.
On top of all these came something rather unexpected: a sign of
normalization for Turkish-Armenian relations. President Abdullah
Gül’s visit to Yerevan was a bold and historic move. The fact that
the Armenian side has agreed to the Turkish proposal to establish a
committee of historians to look into the events of 1915-1916 could be a
harbinger of much more to come. Some are even talking about some secret
energy and border deals between Ankara and Yerevan. I have no way of
confirming or denying such deals, but this much is clear: The Caucasus
crisis may turn out to be just another big opportunity for Turkey,
not a final countdown toward a choice between the West and Russia.
The threat perception of a society is extremely significant for its
understanding and handling of policy. It is also an extension of one’s
self-identity. For decades, one of the leitmotifs of the republican
state identity has been its exaggerated threat perception regarding
foreign powers, as well as its own population. Foreigners have been
seen as imperial powers bent on dividing and destroying Turkey. Their
alleged domestic collaborators, the "real traitors inside," have been
watched closely and their political activities monitored by Turkish
intelligence agencies. Leftists, nationalists, Kurds, Islamists and
non-Muslim minorities, including Jews, Greeks and Armenians, have
been seen as potential threats to the integrity and unity of Turkey.
Now this is changing. There is more self-confidence in the Turkish
people, as well as among the elites. And it works both ways: As Turkey
builds its internal self-confidence and trust, it thrusts itself into
the maelstrom of international affairs and sees much benefit in such
risk-taking. At the same time, Turkey’s increasing involvement in
its region and world affairs speaks to national pride and honor.
The 2008 GMF survey also confirms the findings of other surveys
conducted in Turkey; and they all point to a healthier political
development in Turkey. According to the survey, Turkey has become
slightly warmer to other nations. While people surveyed identify
themselves as religious, somewhat religious and non-religious,
these descriptions do not point to deep political divisions on key
issues. Certainly, this is a sign of maturity. About 70 percent oppose
the banning of the headscarf at Turkish universities; another sign
of increasing respect for religious freedom in Turkey. About half
believe that Turkey should act alone in international affairs. This
can be interpreted as reflecting an isolationist and even bullying
attitude. But this is more a reaction to the policies of unilateralism
of the US, Russia and others than a strong political opinion.
Finally there is the issue of how Turks and Europeans feel about
where Turkey belongs. Turks and Europeans agree that Turkey is not
part of the West. And the survey shows that this is a value-based
judgment. Seventy-six percent in Germany, 68 percent in France and
61 percent in Italy believe Turkey and Europe have such different
values that they cannot belong to the same culture and civilization.
To me, this seems to be the critical question: Do Turks have to be
like the Germans or the French to be accepted into the community
of EU countries? If assimilation is the only way to accept Turkey
(or any other country for that matter), what does this say about
European notions of cultural pluralism?
–Boundary_(ID_BQhNduHs56os/tGPPRZ4cg) —