OUTSIDE VIEW: SHOULD GEORGIA JUST LET GO?
By Bennett Ramberg
Middle East Times
Sept 18 2008
Egypt
LOS ANGELES, Sept. 18 (UPI) — Moscow’s brutal military action to
bring Tbilisi to heel should not excuse Georgia’s own use of force
to reassert control over South Ossetia. Clearly the Georgians learned
little from recent history: In today’s world, countries that attempt
to hold on to rebellious provinces with longstanding grievances
risk a long, bloody resistance and/or outside intervention by more
powerful opponents.
This begs the question, not only in the Transcaucasus but elsewhere:
Is letting go the better course? The cumulative evidence since
World War II suggests that ethnic or national groups that cannot
live together are better off living apart. Successful application
of this principle to the Georgian-Ossetian conflict not only would
resolve this confounding thorn but also would encourage resolution
of struggles elsewhere.
South Ossetia’s claim to autonomy or more springs not simply from its
own history but from international convention and practice. In 1945 the
U.N. Charter laid the foundation, promoting the "self-determination
of peoples." In the early years this encouraged the ethno-religious
partition of colonies.
The division of British Palestine and India marked two
results. However, by 1960 the General Assembly stepped back. In its
landmark decolonization Resolution 1514 it called the "disruption
of national unity and the territorial integrity of a country
… incompatible" with the Charter. And, because the Charter excluded
U.N. intervention into matters of domestic jurisdiction, this left
populations that could not integrate politically out on a limb.
No matter. Rather than live with the unacceptable, many revolted. Some
governments crushed rebellions — the fate of Biafrans and
Chechens. Others, after long-hurting stalemates, reached
power-sharing agreements — the denouement of Northern Ireland’s
long "Troubles." Then there were the partitions, often after bitter
conflicts, that gave birth to Bangladesh, new Balkan states, divided
Cyprus, Eritrea and Timor-Leste — the first three instances midwifed
by India, the United States and Turkey, respectively.
Russia’s military action and recognition of South Ossetia repeats the
history of interventionist partition. And while this has generated
the outrage of Tbilisi and the West, South Ossetia has a legitimate
claim to self-determination as envisioned under the U.N. Charter. An
ethnically defined region that Czarist Russia annexed in 1801, the
territory fell under Soviet Georgian administration following the
Russian Revolution. Ossetians continued to promote their cultural
identity, and, with the end of the Soviet Union looming, their regional
council petitioned Georgia’s Supreme Council to become an "autonomous
republic." The 1991 denial inspired civil conflict resulting in nearly
1,000 deaths and displacement of thousands who took refuge in Georgia
and the Russian republic of North Ossetia.
The following decade saw a peacekeeping force of Ossetians, Russians
and Georgians, monitored by the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, maintain the peace. But as the years passed,
so did Georgia’s dissatisfaction with Moscow’s growing influence
over the province, rising South Ossetian nationalism punctuated by
sporadic border violence. Tbilisi mounted a political campaign to get
European and American support to regain control over the province,
but the efforts failed to generate tangible results, laying the ground
for current events.
Georgia could have avoided its travail had it learned from recent
European experience that letting go is something countries can adjust
to. Serbia’s assent to Montenegro’s 2006 exit from their union, the
1993 dissolution of Czechoslovakia and the breakup of the Soviet Union,
which opened the door to Georgia’s own independence, provide examples.
Despite the opportunity lost to peacefully resolve South Ossetia’s
drive for more secure autonomy, Georgia can still salvage regional
settlement by taking a leaf from what other war-torn regions promise
through the ballot box.
Following bloody civil wars with Sudan and Papua New Guinea, Southern
Sudan and Bougainville, respectively, achieved autonomy with the
promise to settle final status through referenda. Tbilisi should
concede the same. A vote managed and legitimized by the OSCE —
the international community refused to endorse a 2006 South Ossetian
nationalist referendum for independence — would permit the population
to decide among four options: reintegration into Georgia, semiautonomy,
independence or union with North Ossetia in the Russian Federation. In
the likely case of endorsement of partition, agreement should grant
ethnic Georgians the option to resettle in Georgia proper. Prior to
the election, U.N. peacekeepers could replace Russian forces to keep
law and order.
The proposed settlement brings at least one other advantage:
Successful, it could encourage other regions that risk or confront even
more difficult strife today to follow suit. Sri Lanka, Indian Kashmir,
Israel/Palestine, Nagorno-Karabakh, Sudan/Darfur, Moros/Philippines,
Iraq/Kurdistan, China/Taiwan and China/Tibet could well be the
beneficiaries.