Dynamics Of Azeri-Armenian-Turkish Relations: A Three-Legged Chair

DYNAMICS OF AZERI-ARMENIAN-TURKISH RELATIONS: A THREE-LEGGED CHAIR
By Harut Sassounian

AZG Armenian Daily
04/10/2008

Regional

All indications are that Armenian and Turkish leaders have agreed
in recent weeks to improve their long frozen relations based on
the following terms: Turkey will open its border with Armenia,
establish diplomatic relations with Yerevan, and set up several
inter-governmental commissions, one of which would deal with
Ottoman-Armenian relations, including the issue of the Armenian
Genocide.

Many Armenians both in Armenia and the Diaspora have serious
problems with the apparent willingness of Armenian authorities to
participate in a historical commission specifically devoted to the
Genocide. Turkish officials have repeatedly stated that their intent
in involving Armenians in a joint commission is to discourage other
countries from adopting resolutions on the Armenian Genocide.

Another serious obstacle to Armenian-Turkish rapprochement is the
Artsakh (Karabagh) conflict. For years, Ankara had made the withdrawal
of Armenian forces from Artsakh a pre-condition for normalizing
relations with Armenia.

Last week, the Presidents of Armenia and Turkey as well as the Foreign
Ministers of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey were in New York to attend
the General Assembly of the United Nations. While it is not known
what the three Foreign Ministers discussed in their private meeting,
one can gain an insight into their discussions from remarks delivered
at the U.N. by Turkish, Armenian and Azeri officials.

Turkish President Abdullah Gul addressed the General Assembly on
Sept. 23 and gave a glowing report on Turkey’s recent diplomatic
initiatives. His aim was to lure U.N. members into supporting Turkey’s
candidacy for a non-permanent seat at the Security Council next month,
as well as facilitating his country’s eventual entry into the European
Union. In contrast to previous U.N. appearances, when Armenian
and Turkish officials would get involved in acrimonious debates,
Pres. Gul concentrated on his visits in early September to Armenia
and Azerbaijan and expressed the hope that frozen conflicts in the
region, "including the occupied Nagorno Karabakh," would be resolved,
"on the basis of respect for the principle of territorial integrity."

Pres. Serzh Sargsyan addressed the General Assembly two days
later, recalling his invitation of Pres. Gul to Yerevan to watch
with him a football match between the national teams of the two
countries. Pres. Sargsyan stated that he was "pleased with the Turkish
President’s bold decision to accept my invitation which made him the
co-author of my ‘football diplomacy’ initiative." The President also
said, "I am confident that the time has come to solve Armenian-Turkish
problems, and on that issue I observed a similar determination by
Pres. Gul. I am convinced that it is necessary to move fast and
resolutely in that direction."

In contrast to his courteous words toward Pres. Gul, Mr. Sargsyan
was very critical of Azerbaijan. He discussed at length the status
of Artsakh and its right to self-determination, even independence. He
castigated the 39 U.N. members who had voted earlier this year for a
pro-Azerbaijan resolution on Artsakh which encouraged Azeri leaders
to become more belligerent. Pres. Sargsyan concluded his statement
by describing Armenians as "a people who had survived genocide."

Interestingly, Pres. Sargsyan delivered his remarks in Armenian –
a first in U.N. history. Despite his fluency in Russian, he chose
to speak in Armenian, not one of the six international languages
spoken at the U.N. Unfortunately, the circulated English text of
the President’s remarks, while generally well translated by Armenian
personnel, deviated occasionally from the Armenian original, altering
the meaning of some of his words.

Two days later, the Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan, Elmar Mammadyarov,
addressed the General Assembly and called for "the withdrawal of
Armenian troops from occupied lands and restoration of full sovereignty
of Azerbaijan over these territories." Devoting a major portion of
his remarks to the Artsakh conflict, Mammadyarov praised the states
that had sided with Azerbaijan in the earlier General Assembly vote.

It is abundantly clear that while Armenian and Turkish leaders are
treating each other with courtesy and respect in their U.N. remarks
— indicating that they are making headway in their rapprochement,
this does not seem to be the case between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The
officials of the two countries used the U.N. podium to publicize
their disagreements.

Since Turkey has made the resolution of the Artsakh conflict a
pre-condition to normalizing relations with Armenia, it remains to
be seen how the on-gong war of words between Armenia and Azerbaijan
would impact the improvement of Armenian-Turkish relations.

Here is a possible scenario for regional developments in the upcoming
weeks or months: After Turkey de-links the Artsakh conflict from
Armenian-Turkish relations, it would open the border with Armenia and
establish diplomatic relations with Yerevan. In return, Armenia would
participate in a historical commission with Turkey and the government
of Artsakh may make a face-saving gesture to Turkey and Azerbaijan
by withdrawing from a small portion of the buffer zone that has no
particular historic or strategic significance for Armenians. However,
when Turks and Azeris realize that Armenians are unwilling to make
further territorial concessions on Artsakh, Turkey could then break
its newly established relations with Yerevan and once again close
its border with Armenia.

It is difficult to predict if such a scenario would actually
materialize. Would Turkey’s leaders be willing to place their country’s
interests ahead of those of Azerbaijan? Would Armenians accept to
withdraw from some of the buffer zones around Artsakh?

After the upcoming presidential elections in Azerbaijan and
parliamentary elections in Turkey, it would be more apparent if the
budding relationship between Armenia and Turkey survives the lack of
progress in the resolution of the Artsakh conflict.