THE WAR FOR SOUTH OSSETIA
Daniele Scalea (Italia)

en.fondsk.ru
05.10.2008
Eurasia

Georgia declared its independence on the 9th April 1991 and its first
President (appointed in 1990 when the country was still USSR-federate)
was Zviad Gamsakhurdia, former leading dissident in the communist era.

The independence proclaimed through the "Georgia to Georgians"
slogan couldn’t but concern the several ethnic minorities living
around the administrative entity of Tblisi which Gamsakhurdia and
his nationalistic supporters wrongly regarded as being a monolithic
national bloc. Namely, the regions of Azarija and Abkhazia (that
were annexed to Georgia by the Russians who had taken them away from
the Turks), as well as South Ossetia (whose inhabitants are alike
those from the Russian province of North Ossetia) claimed the same
right to independence from Russia Tblisi itself wanted (and put into
practice). Already in 1989, South Ossetia, autonomous province of
the socialist soviet republic of Georgia, was scene to violent fights
between the Ossetians, loyal to Moscow, and nationalistic Georgians.

The Ossetian regional council came to declaring secession from the
Socialist Soviet Republic of Georgia but this one reacted by lifting
Ossetia’s autonomy status, thus prompting further fights.

Newly-born Georgia’s internecine clashes weren’t inter-ethnic only
but also political: on 6th January 1992 Gamsakhurdia-led government was

overthrown by a bloody coup d’etat that was anything but quick since
it was started two weeks before.

Gamsakhurdia found shelter in Chechnya (after a brief stay in Armenia),
under the rebel government of General Dzochar Musaevic Dudaev. The coup
leaders proclaimed Eduard Shevarnedze as new president, former Soviet
Foreign Minister at the time of Gorbacev. The fights between the new
President’s supporters and the partisans of the removed one went on for
two years. On September 1993, then, an outright war burst between the
Georgian army and the Abkhazians who refuse still today to be subdued
to Tblisi’s authority since they are the majority in the north-western
part of the country. There were dreadful fights and the Abkhazians
came off successful since they fought off Tblisi’s troops and drove
out some thousand Georgians living in Abkhazia. Gamsakhurdia snapped
up the chance and, already on late September 1993, he returned to
his homeland, leading his armed followers in an revolt attempt. The
rebellion seemed likely to be successful but Shevarnadze, by approving
to let Georgia join the Independent States Community, received the
support by the neighbour countries, not least Russia which provided
him with men and weapons: within November the rebels were defeated
and on the following month their leader Gamsakhurdia died under
circumstances that were never completely cleared up.

Meanwhile, the long time of disorders and internecine fights cost
a high price to the newly-born Georgian republic: alongside with
Abkhazia, also South Ossetia managed to achieve the independence:
oddly enough, many Chechnyan separatists have fought for the freedom
of the former, whereas the Russian aid was decisive for the latter.

The "Rose Revolution": Saakashvili President of Georgia President
Shevarnadze, during the following decade, got two acknowledgments from
the people, by winning the elections on 1995 and 2000. The elections
held on 2nd November 2003, that were allegedly rigged according to the
pro-US media and organizations, embodied the fuse for a new political
violent reshuffle, the so-called "Rose Revolution". Shevarnadze
has often repeated that those who wanted and led that coup were the
US; and, needless to say, the deposed Georgian President can’t be
suspected of anti-Americanism. For example, suffice it to remind that,
in the capacity of Russian Foreign Minister, during a meeting with the
American President of that time, George H. W. Bush, he asked him for
an advice about what kind of foreign policy Russia was to maintain,
since he wanted to refrain from pursuing any ambition of defence
of the national stakes. Yet, as President of Georgia, Shevarnadze
proved to be too independent and, above all, too prone to keep good
relations with Moscow. It was probably because of this that the US
hatched one of the most success ful "coloured revolutions", bringing
back to power a racist and strongly anti-Russian nationalistic leader:
the new Gamsakhurdia is called Michail Saakavshili, a jurist who was
trained at the American universities.

Saakashvili served as Minister of Justice under Shevarnadze’s
government, well-known for its repressing character (partly accounted
for by the Gamsakhurdian insurrection and by the fight against
separatist tendencies). As President, albeit the incessant emphasis
on "democracy", Saakashvili has not proven any better in respecting
his people’s civil rights: appointed by "Bulgarian" percentages (96%
of votes in 2004), he has often accused his rivals of being criminals
or Russian spies, treating them accordingly.

After seizing power, Saakashvili has purged the Georgian leadership
through mass arrests both of former ministers of Shevarnadze’s
government (that is to say his former peers, in controversy with
which he had stepped down) and of simple local administration
representatives. In 2004, a group of Georgian intellectuals wrote an
open letter to denounce the intolerance against political opponents.

An emblematic case of the dreary situation and of the rampant violence
in Saakashvili’s Georgia was the murder of Sandro Girgvliani. He was a
28 year old bank manager and on the night between 27th and 28th January
2006, in a Tblisi’s bar, he had a quarrel with some high officers=2
0from the Interior Ministry, who were there to celebrate the birthday
of one of them, Inspector General Vasil Sanodze. Girgvliani and his
friend Levan Buchaidze, after leaving the bar, were shoved into a
Mercedes and brought to the outskirts of the town: Buchaidze managed
to escape but Girgvliani was beaten to death and his body was found
the following morning,.

The investigation from the "Imedi" tv station managed to shed light
upon the case, denouncing the Interior Ministry’s responsibilities. The
alleged murderers were arrested and sentenced seven to eight years,
yet whoever gave the order has still gone unpunished: in spite of the
popular protests, all of the high officers from the Ministry retained
their charge.

Badri Patarkatsisvili, owner of the "Imedi" station that not only
reported the authorities’ responsibilities in Girgviliani affair but
also other similar cases, underwent several fiscal investigations
and political pressures so that he would be induced to curb his
journalists’ autonomy.

Irakli Okruasvili, former Georgian Defence Minister, accused his former
ally Saakashvili of wanting to attempt the life of Patarkatsisvili
himself who, meanwhile, entered politics as the rival of the
President: two days later, Okruasvili was arrested with the charge
of corruption and money laundering, and only after having disavowed
the accusations against Saakashvili he was released. Expelled to
France, where he got asylum, on 5th November 2007 he appeared on
"Imedi" tv where he confirmed the authenticity of the accusation
against Saakashvili while accounting for the disavowing due to the
forced imprisonment. Few months later, he was convicted with final
judgment by the Georgian magistracy, the same one which abstained
from investigating over the alleged murderous will of Saakashvili
against Patarkatsisvili. Incidentally, on 12th February 2008 Badri
Patarkatsisvili was found dead in his British residence, few hours
after having a meeting with Boris Berezovskij, Russian "oligarch"
and Putin’s implacable enemy. The Georgian businessman, who was only
50 years old and had never suffered of heart problems during his
lifetime, died from heart attack. The local police classified his
case as "suspicious".

Saakashvili has regularly adopted the iron fist against any opposition.

During the second half of 2007, the government reacted by putting
down the demonstrations sponsored by his political adversaries:
on November 7th, after repeated attacks from the police, a group of
protesters decided to resist the institutional violence and thus the
fights took place.

Saakashvili quickly exploited the pretext in order to proclaim the
state of emergency for nearly ten days while imposing, amongst other
things, the censure on the national media.

Yet, the mass protests forced Saakashvili to step down and face,
on Januar y 2008, a new electoral test: he won, notwithstanding the
strong criticism both from the OCSE (generally much acquiescent
towards US-sponsored candidates) and from the opposition, which
denounced systematic fixing and manipulated opinion polls.

Mikhail Saakasvili has never forgotten the crucial support from the
US for his violent seizure of power. During his mandates, he has
always been a staunch ally to them, emerging also for his nationalism
liable to rash actions and for his visceral Russia-phobia, that is
after all widely shared by his fellow countrymen. Georgia entering
the NATO is Saakasvili’s main target and he has dispatched a hefty
amount of troops following the US all over the main theatres of war
and occupation: Iraq, Afghanistan and Kosovo.

[…] When Saakashvili became President, South Ossetia was living in
peace for about a decade: in 1992 Tblisi, Moscow and Tskhinvali (South
Ossetia’s capital) agreed upon a ceasefire, setting up in the area a
mixed peacekeeping force made up of Georgians, Russians and Ossetians.

In 2004, after having subdued Azarija, Saakashvili made the tension
mount again with South Ossetia: yet, for years the clash has never gone
beyond a "creeping" and "dirty" war made up of kidnappings, dynamite
attacks and occasional fire exchanges between the opposite militias.

The outburst of the conflict In the summer of 2008, Georgia marked
a quantum leap in its war activism. If it has up to now limited
itself to fostering occasional border clashes and leading a strongly
anti-Russian diplomacy (suffice it to remind the strict alliance with
Ukraine of Jushenko and Timoshenko, the attempts to join the NATO,
the building of BTC pipeline conceived in order to leave Russia out of
the Caspian Sea source trade), in recent times Tblisi has multiplied
its provocations with the clear aim to bring about a war. It is hard
to imagine which plans Saakashvili and his staff have had in the past
and which ones they will have in the future: maybe to overcome the
political internal crisis by directing people against an external
enemy, thus making them gather closer to their President; maybe
they hoped to seize Abkhazia and Ossetia through blitzkriegs without
enabling Moscow to counteract; maybe the aim was and really is that
of embroiling Moscow in a new Caucasian war so as to both wear out
its military apparatus and to dim its international image with the
aid of the propaganda juggernaut handled by the US.

What’s obvious, knowing the strict alliance existing between Tblisi
and Washington, is that the US must have played some fundamental
role in the crisis bursting out: to say the least, they took no step
to prevent Saakashvili from setting off this war. Yet, let’s stick
precisely to the chronology of facts.

To avoid having to go back to older incidents and disputes, a
reasonable starting point can be fixed at the 20th of April of this
year when, according to the Georgian authorities, one of their drones
(a remote-controlled aircraft, part of a lot purchased from a private
Israeli company, with the green light of the Israeli Defence ministry)
was shot down in Abkhazia’s airspace by Russian crafts. Consequently
Tblisi demanded a compensation from Moscow which, instead, denied
the fact. The tension in the area was already high since Georgia
had started massing troops on the border with the breakaway region,
namely in the disputed area of Kodori gorge.

On May 29th a car bomb blasted in Tskhinvali during the independence
celebrations, injuring six passers-by: the Ossetian President
pinned the blame for the attack on the Georgian government. On May
31st three hundred Russian unarmed soldiers entered Abkhazia at the
local government’s demand, in order to help build a railway system:
at the same time, Moscow increased the amount of peacekeeping troops
in the province–as a reply to the Georgian mobilization–but without
exceeding the maximum number fixed by the agreement (that’s 3,000
soldiers): this induced Georgians to cry out against the "occupation
of Abkhazia", supported by the EU that calls for the Russians to
withdraw the additional troops.

On June 17th on the Ossetian border the Georgian troops arrested
four peacekeeping Russian soldiers accused o f smuggling weapons:
they are released after a nine-hour third degree.

In the meantime, drones start flying again over Abkhazia, even if
Tblisi denies. On the following day, two blasts took place along a
railway at Suchumi, Abkhazia’s capital: the target, according to the
investigators, were the Russian troops deployed there. On June 29th two
new dynamite attempts occurred, this time at the Abkhazian coast town
of Gagrij: six are injured. Two days later, a blast at the Suchumi’s
market mowed down further civilians. The repeated attacks lead the
Abkhazian authorities to shut the border with Georgia that is regarded
as being responsible for the terrorist attacks. On July 4th, during the
night, the Ossetian capital Tskhinvali (at the border with Georgia)
was briefly bombed by the Georgian artillery (at least 15 mortars,
according to the witnesses): 3 persons lost their lives and 11 are
wounded. The incident was confirmed both by the Russian peacekeeping
forces and by the OSCE envoys, yet the Georgians gave no account;
Moscow’s reply defined the fact as "an act of open aggression", and
a few days later it begun manoeuvres in the northern Caucasus. The
Abkhazian President Sergej Begaps claimed he has laid his hands,
thanks to his secret services, on an invading plan of Abkhazia by
Georgia which, meanwhile, has massed twelve thousand soldiers at the
borders, 2 thousand of which only at the Kodori gorge.

On July 7th, a new bomb shocked Abkhazia again: four people injured
by a blast in a café and the local authorities have no doubt in
holding the Georgian security forces as responsible. The following
day also South Ossetia protested against Saakashvili’s expansionistic
aspirations: the proof is claimed to be the evacuation started by
Tblisi of some thousand Georgians living in South Ossetia. On July 9th
it was Georgia’s turn to denouncing an attack at one of its outposts
along the border with Abkhazia, an operation carried out by about
ten armed men but with no casualties.

Oddly enough, the same day the Abkhazians claimed they have suffered
an identical attack at one of their outposts.

The focus of the fighting, in the first half of July, seemed
to be directed more towards Abkhazia than North Ossetia, and the
Abkhazian President Sergej Bagaps rushed to Moscow to ask the Russian
aid; there he met also with the South Ossetian colleague Eduard
Kokojty. Meanwhile, the American Secretary of State Condoleeza
Rice arrived in Tblisi: Washington’s envoy expresses full support
to Tblisi’s warlike policy while warning Moscow from trying to
defend the freedom of Abkhazians and Ossetians. On July 10th Georgia
called back its own Moscow-based ambassador due, officially, to "the
outrage over the aggressive Russian policy". Sergej Lavrov, Russian
Foreign Minister, tried to restore the dialogue while demanding,
yet, the precondition of the Georgian evacuation of troops deployed
in fighting trim at Kodori gorge; Tblisi’s reply is a litany of the
same old anti-Russia rhetoric, the accuse of an alleged "aggression"
by Moscow and the closing to any mediation (Abkhazia and Ossetia are
outspokenly defined, leaving no room to negotiations, "inalienable
parts of Georgia"). The Georgians oppose a clear refusal to Lavrov’s
offer to hold talks in Moscow, preferring to use July for joined
military manoeuvres with American, Azerbajian and Ukrainian troops and
to get a Presidential decree approved by the Parliament to increase
of 5,000 units the number of recruits, thus raising Tblisi’s armed
forces to 37,000 soldiers.

On July 16th, the 76th Russian airborne division arrived in northern
Caucasus, officially to take part to the military manoeuvres that
in all involve 8,000 men, 700 fighting vehicles and 30 crafts. While
President Saakashvili turned down the idea about a Moscow-sponsored
non-aggression agreement with Georgia and Abkhazia, it was Suchumi to
refuse the mediation plan proposed by the Germans which is considered
as questioning of Abkhazia’s independence status. The following week
there was a succession of new incidents between Georgia (always active)
and South Ossetia: four Ossetians arrested by the Georgian police; the
infringement of the Ossetian space by Georgian air forces; finally, on
0D July 29th, Georgian troops opened fire over two Ossetian villages.

The night between August 1st and 2nd some fire exchanges came about
along the Georgia-South Ossetia border, with at least 6 dead and 15
wounded amongst the Ossetians and 10 casualties amongst the Georgians
(but the Ossetians claim 29 dead Georgian soldiers): it was the
beginning of the present war, even if on August 7th a formal truce
is proclaimed by both the fronts. Yet, few hours later, the Georgian
would break it in order to launch their own attack.

Before analyzing carefully the details of the conflict, let’s look
at the set of facts schematically reported so far and which embody
the prelude to war, as a whole . What we can detect is the obvious
concentration of Georgian troops at the borders with Abkhazia and
Ossetia, accompanied by continuous provocations that range from the
warlike rhetoric to mortar shells and outright terrorist attacks
(the bombs in Abkhazia the local authorities charge Tblisi with).

On the other hand, the reaction is the mobilization of the breakaway
forces in both the regions, as well as the massing of Russian troops
both in northern and southern Caucasus.

At this point, we have to go back to the hypothesis made at the
beginning of the paragraph as regards the Georgian leadership’s
hidden aims. If Tblisi’s plan were that of seizing Abkhazia and
Ossetia through quick and sudden attacks, thus20forestalling the
Russian reactions, then we should draw the conclusion that all this
has been arranged and carried out in the worst possible way: the even
too obvious preparations and the continuous provocations couldn’t but
alert the enemies who, as a matter of fact, were poised to fight off
the Georgian offensive as soon as it was eventually set off. The way
of approaching to the conflict makes us think of other hypothesises
as well.

For instance, Tblisi might have tried to provoke the Russians pushing
them into carrying out the attack as first in order, then, to play
the victim and to win international support. Actually, this hasn’t
completely turned out well since the Georgians had to launch the
first attack and only thanks to the huge and effective US-managed
propaganda machine they have succeeded in slanting the American and
western European public opinions to their own advantage. At any rate,
what’s left is the problem whether NATO’s diplomacy can really force
the Russians to evacuate Abkahzia and South Ossetia, leaving them
at Tblisi’s mercy. This possibility looks extremely remote, if one
takes into account that Moscow enjoys the right of veto within the
UN Security Council. Economic pressures might be more effective,
yet it’s hard to think that Moscow will approve of a settlement
that be detrimental over the status quo ante of a conflict it is
definitely winning.

0D One can also suppose that Tblisi has overrated (at least in view of
the aforementioned considerations) its own military power, thinking
of maybe being able to overwhelm the Abkhazian, Ossetian and Russian
defences; or, at least, of being able to drive the Russians to trespass
its territory and to face them there through guerrilla warfare. But
in this case we should draw the conclusion that Mr Saakashvili is
pursuing stakes diverging from the ones of the country which he’s
called to answer to.

Anyway, the impression is that the Georgians have lost control over
the situation. It’s likely that they didn’t expect such a massive
and resolute reaction by Moscow and that they set too many hopes in
the effectiveness of its own military machine and in a more incisive
and quick intervention by the Atlanticist diplomacy (and maybe also
in greater military support).

The war On early August several shootings took place along the border
between Georgia and South Ossetia while Russian volunteers begun
flocking into the separatist region. After some days of preparations,
with mortar shells over Tskhinvali and the surrounding villages,
the night between August 7th and 8th the Georgian troops launched
the offensive against the South-Ossetian capital. Tskhinvali, on the
extreme southern limit of Ossetia, is located only five kilometres
(ca. 3 miles) from the Georgian border, along the main road of the
region that, from=2 0the Georgian town of Gori, crosses South Ossetia
and leads to Rokskij tunnel that can be considered the sole junction
with the Russian Federation.

The attack against the Ossetian capital was carried out with infantry
and armour while the Georgian Su-25 jet aircrafts dropped bombs over
Kvernet village (and even over a humanitarian convoy, according to
the Ossetians).

The Georgian advance immediately penetrated as far as 10 kilometres
(6.2 miles) the Ossetian inland along three fronts: South Ossetia’s
eastern border, Tskhinvali’s corridor in the south and a salient in
the west for what looks like a pincer movement. Yet, the offensive
stopped at the Ossetian capital: the breakaway troops resisted starting
violent fights from house to house during which Tskhinvali suffered
many damages and civilian casualties (some thousands): it’s worth
reminding that most of the South Ossetian inhabitants have Russian
citizenship. The South Ossetian Parliament and a couple of the Russian
peacekeeping forces’ barracks were also blown up: about ten Russian
soldiers were killed and the Russian Premier Vladimir Putin, from
Beijing, announced a response.

The reaction is immediate: while Russian aircrafts started bombing
Gori, the first big centre on the way to Tskhinvali (30 kilometres
is the distance between the two cities), the units from the 58th army
(comprising about one hundred tanks and heavy artillery) entered South
Ossetia: on the following day, also President Medvedev officially
announced the Russian counteroffensive.

On August 9th the Georgian troops are fought off from Tskhinvali
that, yet, has suffered huge material damages and human losses,
notwithstanding the brevity of fights.

Some of the 35 thousand Ossetian refugees who have fled to Russia
reported atrocities carried out by the Georgians: snipers wilfully
opening fire on the helpless, entire villages set ablaze, bombings
on civilian targets, tanks wilfully running over children. Those
testimonies made Putin and Medvedev state that they were dealing
with the attempt on the part of the Georgians to carry out a genocide
against the Ossetians.

In the meantime, the Russian counteroffensive got wider: airborne
troops were parachuted near Tskhinvali, thus raising to 10,000 the
number of effectives in the operation while the air force started
hammering new targets, mostly Poti, a harbour town on the Black Sea
from which Georgia is thought to get Ukrainian military supplies. The
Russian airforce losses were said to amount to four crafts, although
the Georgians claim to have shot down twenty of them. American planes
brought back to Georgia the contingent of 2,000 men Tblisi sent to
Iraq. On August 10th, a part of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea,
including the Moskva cruiser, after setting sail from Sebastopolis
base, got to the border with Georgian territorial waters (only a
Geor gian rocket-launching patrol boat tries to react but it will
be sunk); at the same time, the Russian bombings has reached Kodori
gorge, favouring an offensive by the Abkhatian militias against the
Georgian troops massed there with threatening purposes. On August
12th, after setting South Ossetia free from Georgian soldiers (many
of which are reported as having given in to the Russians), Moscow
announced the end of its counteroffensive, yet reserving the right
to intervene again in case of further Georgian attacks against the
separatist region. These are the words pronounced by Medvedev: "The
operation’s targets have been accomplished: the peacekeeping forces
and the civilians are now safe. The aggressor has been punished and
has suffered heavy losses as well".

As things stand, it’s impossible to foresee whether the truce will
last or not […]. Awaiting to know what is bound to happen, we can
draw a partial conclusion over this short conflict — or over this
first part of a longer conflict. In doing so, we are required to take
into account both the military factors and the strategic importance
of the events and the diplomatic context.

On the eve of the war, the Georgian armed forces could count on over
30 thousand men, two third of which organized in the army. The tanks
at Tblisi’s disposal were about two hundreds, all of them Soviet
Union-made: forty T-55 and one hundred six ty five T-72. The T-55 is a
mid-size tank (35,4 tons, 203 mm as maximum armour, a 100mm cannon),
is considered as being the most successful model in the history of
tanks, being it still used in 65 countries although its birth dates
back to sixty years ago which indeed represents its huge limit.

The T-72 is the more modern type yet it dates back to 1972. It’s
heavier (45 tons) than the T-55, better armoured (250mm) and more
equipped with fire power (125mm cannon), it’s faster and more provided
with fuel distance.

Whatever the conditions, the fact is that only one Russian motorized
infantry division would have been sufficient to stand up to the entire
Georgian army.

That’s why Tblisi should have planned the attack against South Ossetia
as a blitzkrieg: to occupy immediately Tskhinvali–capital and sole
big city of the province–and the main road leading to Russia, while
possibly reaching and making not practicable Rokskij tunnel before
Moscow’s reaction.

Mission not accomplished, since even before the Russian intervention,
the Ossetian forces alone have been sufficient to restrain the
Georgian advance.

It’s taken the Georgians a preliminary bombing with BM-21 "Grad"
(a Russian-made rocket launcher dating back to the 60’s, still used
due to its effectiveness) and two following waves of foot soldiers
and armour to penetrate into Tskhinvali, and yet the Ossetian capita
l has been able to resist until the Russian aid showed up. The D-30
howitzers, the 100mm cannon "Rapir" anti-tanks and, above all, the
less advanced remote-controlled 9M113 "Konkurs" rockets provided to
the Ossetian militia turned out to be sufficient so that the several
obsolete Georgian tanks would turn into wrecked vehicles decorating the
streets of a town half destroyed by the violent preliminary bombing.

After all, the "Konkurs", although they were projected in the 60’s
and they began being used in 1974, were successfully used also by
Hezbollah militia to stand up to the Israeli "Merkava" tanks.

The Georgian air force is insignificant and indeed it played nearly
no role in the conflict: only five Su-25 (Soviet land-covering
crafts whose production started in 1981) and fifteen L-29 and L-39
(Czech jet fighters respectively made in the 60’s and 70’s only
for pilot training). Too little even to overcome the South Ossetian
anti-aircrafts defence.

What’s more, the Georgian troops aren’t renowned at all for their
training, in spite of their (official) American and (private) Israeli
instructors’ efforts and, indeed, there are considered worse than
their Ossetian rivals.

Hence the Georgians are thought to have attempted a lightning
attack, yet running into the Ossetian resistance and, above all, a
surprisingly swift reaction by the Russians who, withi n few hours,
have sent their armour and paratroopers near Tskhinvali and started
heavily bombing Georgia’s strategic targets and troop massing.

In this respect, the too obvious preparations by the Georgians
and their continuous provocations against Ossetians, Abkhazians
and Russians turned out to be a big mistake. The only fact that can
account for the behaviour of the Georgian political and military staff
is that they probably hoped to push the enemy to attack first. Even
if this hasn’t happened, the political aim has been partly achieved:
the American ally, setting off its propagandistic machine and allied
diplomacies, has managed to spread the Russia-aggressor/Georgia-victim
pattern; even if the Georgian initiative hasn’t gone unobserved
to anyone and the European diplomatic milieu has defined Moscow’s
reaction as "disproportionate" (the same expression used in 2006 to
mildly blame the Israeli invasion of Lebanon).

Nonetheless, Russia’s veto right within the UN Security Council has
spared Moscow serious backlashes. In consideration of the facts, for
the moment the Georgian "diplomatic victory" seems to be just in its
preliminary stages. Yet, it has been important for them to involve
Russia as an active and belligerent part in the dispute over the
two separatist regions, thus undermining its peacemaking role it has
played up to now. Not surprisingly, the EU has immediately welcomed the
idea according to which Moscow won’t be any longer allowed to act as
mediator in the Caucasus but, on the contrary, it will have to resort
to Brussels’ mediation in its clash with Tblisi. Hence it will be up
to Moscow and its resoluteness to ward off the possible diplomatic
backlashes of the conflict: Russia is historically a master in winning
wars on the ground and then losing them at the negotiation table.

Going back to the strictly military point, what’s left is the fact that
the Russians have kicked the Georgian troops out of South Ossetia
and have actually bombed Georgia’s military or military-related
infrastructures.

The merely military targets seems therefore to have been achieved with
a surprising rapidity and with little losses (the official report
speaks, at the moment, of 18 dead and 152 wounded): the Georgian
attack has been fought back beyond the starting-point (Tblisi has
lost its contingent stationed in South Ossetia and, seemingly, even
the northern part of the Kodori gorge) and the Georgian resiliency
for another attack has been seriously undermined, maybe even foiled
for months or years to come.

The Russian armed forces has demonstrated to be very fast in the
decision-making process at its highest ranks and in reacting at its
lowest ones; the only negative aspect is the high losses suffered by
the air force: considered the poorness of the enemy, four crafts are
undoubtedly=2 0too many, even if the undisputed control of air has been
achieved quite immediately. Moreover, the Russian counteroffensive has
brought some political advantages to Moscow, though a small deferment
in closing the operations might have optimized them. First of all,
Saakashvili has been destabilized. The Georgian can look at the
Russian aggressor pattern as much as they want (since they consider
South Ossetia as being part of the Georgian territory, so the Russian
one has been a violation of their sovereignty) but they surely don’t
ignore that the Russian alleged "aggression" could have been avoided
if their President hadn’t taken such venturesome decisions. Therefore
Saakashvili will have to bear responsibility for having set off a
conflict they have ruinously lost, even if he will try to politically
optimize the "victim" aura.

Secondly, the US’ prestige–and secondly EU’s one –has endured
remarkable backlashes in the region. Today facts have showed how much
the balance of military power in the Caucasus leans undoubtedly towards
Moscow. Washington has been able to counter the Russian offensive with
propaganda, with fulminating declarations, with word-only solidarity,
and it’s likely to do it also with hefty donations for the rebuilding
of Georgian infrastructures; yet the US hasn’t even been able to send a
single soldier to protect the supposedly "aggressed" Georgi an ally,
and Moscow has brought the operation to an end only after having
accomplished its own targets. The rash closing of the operations
by Moscow will certainly be exploited by Washington and Tblisi in
order to make it look like it depended on American pressures aiming
at preserving the White House’s prestige in the region.

Moscow’s third success lies in putting off Georgia’s admission to
the NATO. If Georgia had been a NATO member, today Europe and the
US should have either engaged in the third world war or lost their
face before the whole world. Reason for which Georgia’s entrance in
the NATO has always been dependent on settling the Abkhazian and
Ossetian problems. Now more than ever these problems are serious
and their possible consequences obvious. Paradoxically, the only
way for Tblisi to enter the NATO, at the moment, would seem to be
the annexation of Abkhazia and Ossetia to the Russian Federation:
as the saying goes, "off goes the tooth, off goes the ache". Maybe
that’s why Moscow will go on lingering, putting off the settlement
of both issues until doomsday.

–Boundary_(ID_BwxqZwyLj6BpnSDi73voXg)- –