THE KARABAKH PROBLEM IN THE CONTEXT OF ‘GEORGIAN PRECEDENT’
Turan News Agency
22 Sep 08
Azerbaijan
By its military aggression against Georgia and its recognition of
the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia has created
a new and very dangerous situation throughout the post-Soviet space
and especially in the South Caucasus.
In the situation of escalating threats and growing confrontation,
none of the former Soviet countries (including Azerbaijan) can stand
aside and feel fully secure.
Russia sets dangerous precedent for post-Soviet space.
The dangerous precedent that Moscow has created in the post-Soviet
space of the crude violation of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial
integrity may fundamentally change the entire configuration of
mutual relations between states, condemning almost every state to
potential blackmail and the threat of separatism. There is no doubt
that Azerbaijan should also take such a threat into consideration.
In the context of the "Georgian events" some issues have become
especially topical in Azerbaijan: "Is it worthwhile counting on the
prospects for a peaceful settlement of the Karabakh problem within
the framework of the current confrontational format of the OSCE
Minsk Group?"
Is it possible to place hopes upon a military means of "peace
enforcement" and liberation of the occupied lands anytime in the
foreseeable future? From now on, whenever there is any weighty
reason for dissatisfaction, will Moscow blackmail Baku with threats
of repeating the "Georgian events" and the possibility of recognizing
Karabakh?
Can the West guarantee the security and territorial integrity
of Azerbaijan? Are there any resources left for continuing the
policy of maneuvering between the competing interests of Moscow
and Washington? Can such a policy and fresh mediation initiatives
facilitate the resolution of the Karabakh problem?
We have been assured for a long time that the "Kosovo precedent"
has nothing to do with the conflicts in the post-Soviet
space. Nevertheless, the military aggression of Russia against
Georgia, as a result of which the Kremlin unilaterally recognized the
independence of the separatist regimes in Abkhazia and South Caucasus,
showed the error of these optimistic assurances.
Now after the turbulent Georgian events, they again continue to calm
us down (especially in Moscow) that the "Abkhaz and South Ossetia
precedent" will not extend to the process of settling the Nagornyy
Karabakh problem and that Azerbaijan has nothing to worry about. How
long-lasting and firm will this optimistic pill prove to be? Anyway,
is it worthwhile for us to worry about this?
I assume we should. True, some of our experts who also did not take
the "Kosovo threat" seriously are now captives of a new political
illusion. It seems to them that Moscow, preoccupied with the problem
of its own rehabilitation, would not dare to repeat the "Georgian
events". Moreover, for the purpose of restoring its image and trust,
Moscow will assume the principle of territorial integrity as a basis
in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict and thus play up to Baku.
This is a strange logic. In particular, when the talk is about
today’s Russia, which has demonstrated by the example of Georgia
what its assurances are worth and how little it is concerned about
considerations of image, reputation or rehabilitation motives. By
the way, unlike Russian and some local experts who are in euphoric
expectation of a breakthrough in the Karabakh settlement, western
politicians and pundits are showing more concern over this issue. And,
it seems, there is reason for this.
USA fears Moscow may blackmail Baku
Given that 20 per cent of our lands are under occupation, keeping
the existing conflict in a frozen and suspended state has always
presented a serious problem and a potential threat for Azerbaijan.
In the current confrontational conditions, especially in the context
of the "Georgian precedent", the risk and threat of the conflict
being manipulated for the purpose of putting pressure on Azerbaijan
or destabilizing the situation in the region have grown significantly.
This concern explains the surge in US activity for a settlement of
the Karabakh problem. As the US co-chair in the OSCE Minsk Group,
Matthew Bryza, said in Baku: "The events in Georgia testify to the
need for a speedy settlement of the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict."
At the same time, he especially noted, "The settlement of the Karabakh
conflict will proceed from the principle of territorial integrity,
taking into account international experience and laws." We should also
underline that Bryza informed Baku about Vice President Dick Cheney’s
words that in the light of the regional threats and challenges,
"the USA will always be next to Azerbaijan".
The US concern has less to do with the fact that Russia may repeat
the Georgian scenario in one form or another in Azerbaijan than that
by constantly employing such threats, Moscow may significantly shape
or correct the geopolitical, regional and energy plans of Baku as
it requires.
With the Georgian separatist conflicts temporarily out of the active
game, the Karabakh conflict has turned into the key risk factor and
lever for manipulating the situation in the South Caucasus. At this
stage, some countries (Russia and Iran), despite positive rhetoric
and a demonstration of mediation efforts, are keen on preserving
this potential threat, while others (the USA, Europe and Turkey)
strive for a swift settlement in order to fully secure the region
and their interests.
After some reduction in tension in Georgia, all the key regional
subjects are gradually shifting their attention to the two most
significant and mutually connected factors in the struggle for
dominance in the south Caucasus: alternative energy projects
(in particular Nabucco) and the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. The
political fate of the Southern Caucasus republics and the geopolitical
prospects of the whole region will depend on the outcome of this
struggle.