SAAKASHVILI SAVED GEORGIA FROM COUP, FORMER PUTIN AIDE SAYS
Valentina Pop

EUobserver.com
14.10.2008 @ 12:58 CET
Belgium

EUOBSERVER / TBILISI – The Georgian president had no other option
than to attack South Ossetia in order to save his country from a
Russian coup, Andrei Illarionov, former advisor to Vladimir Putin has
said in an interview with EUobserver on the margins of the "European
Resource Bank" conference which took place in Tbilisi last weekend
(9-12 October).

The official explanations of the Russian authorities, that they
defended the "life," "health" and "dignity" of Russian citizens –
regardless how these people were granted citizenship in the first
place – "do not hold water," since there were many other conflicts
like in Chechnya or Beslan where they did not care about the Russian
citizens, Mr Illarionov said.

Currently a senior fellow with the Washington-based Cato Institute,
Putin’s former senior economic advisor in 2000-2005 said that contrary
to how it is being portrayed, the conflict did not begin on 7 August
2008, but was carefully planned and built up since the spring of 2004,
when the Russian authorities started supplying South Ossetia and
Abkhazia with military equipment and training their military forces,
building military bases and strategic highways and railroads.

"The build up culminated with the amassing of 80,000 regular troops
and paramilitaries close to the Georgian border, at least 60,000 of
which participated in the August war," he explained.

"On 7 August it is estimated that 20,000 to 25,000 Ossetian and
Russian troops and 240 tanks were in South Ossetia," he said, adding
that the Georgian army has altogether 29,000 troops and 200 tanks,
with the main part being stationed to the west facing Abkhazia.

"In the proximity of South Ossetia there were perhaps only 4,000 to
5,000 troops and 42 Georgian tanks," Mr Illarionov said, reminding
that president Mikhail Saakashvili declared unilateral ceasefire on
7 August, only to see unprecedented shelling of the Georgian villages
in South Ossetia that night.

"All of a sudden they understood that if the Ossetian-Russian troops
move, it could be a matter of hours for them to get to Tbilisi."

President Saakashvili’s decision to move against Tskhinvali "was
self-defense, though it was quite a risky self defence," Mr Illarionov
said.

"Saakashvili had received a very clear signal from the West – that
America and Europe would not help. Even if the US would have decided
to help, it was completely unrealistic, because it would have taken
at least two weeks to deploy the very first troops. And it was very
clear that 2 weeks was too late to defend Georgia. That is why he took
this decision, clearly understanding that he would be left alone in
front of Russia," he explained.

While conceding that it must have been a "painful" decision that
would damage the president’s reputation and credibility in his own
country, especially after making the public pledge of a ceasefire,
"imaginatively replaying the events, it looks like this was the only
possible decision that actually saved the independence and statehood
of Georgia," Mr Illarionov said.

In regards to the Georgian opposition raising its voice against the
war, Mr Illarionov said that "the very fact that this opposition
continues to exist and express its views, is to high extent thanks
to this decision to self-defense."

"If Saakashvili wouldn’t have counter-attacked, there would be
probably no much opposition here. There would be Igor Giorgadze [a
Georgian politician who attempted to kill former Georgian president
Eduard Shevardnadze in 1995] sitting here in Tbilisi. It would be a
different story."

Russian frustration over failed coup

The unilateral recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by the Russian
authorities seems to be a "plan B" that Moscow is not genuinely happy
with, Mr Illarionov says.

"It appears that plan A was to disorganize the Geogian government
and society with some kind of civil war, coup d’etat or revolution,
with the participation of Ossetians and Georgians within Georgia to
change the regime."

"But since Georgian troops went into Tskhinvali and were able for
a number of days to keep the Russian army from moving into Georgia,
it was enough time to relocate the rest of the army from the West of
the country to defend Tbilisi, to attract world-wide attention, to
‘wake up’ the public and politicians around the world and to mobilise
international support."

"After a few days it became evident that plan A, to organize a
revolution or civil war failed. The Russian authorities were forced
to move to plan B. But it was a big frustration for the Russian
authorities. When you hear bad words used by the Russian officials
for Mr Saakashvili, it is just expression of their deep frustration
that Mr Saakashvili was able to destroy their well-prepared plan A."

"Plan B was that Russia is trying to defend the independence of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This was made public only a few days
after the war and ultimately they have chosen to pretend that they
are in favour of their independence. But it is in deep contradiction
with the position the Russian authorities have kept for so long,
on non-recognition of Chechnya, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Northern
Cyprus, Transdnistria."

"The last thing that Russia needs is these [Georgian] breakaway
regions. It’s a big problem for the Russian government. It’s a
serious financial drain, they’re not quite sustainable and there’s
a big criminal problem as well … All of a sudden you have tens of
thousands armed people who can easily enter Russian territory. It’s
an incredible headache."

Georgia’s democracy, a threat to Moscow

As for the reasons for Moscow to invest "billions of dollars" for these
military operations and to be ready to face "such heavy diplomatic
losses and isolation," Mr Illarionov said there is no other explanation
"but the existential threat" that Georgian democracy poses to the
Russian regime, because it shows that a culture with a very similar
background can reform and integrate with the West.

"This model of integration with the world, of modernizing, opening
society, with an accountable government – is quite different from the
model that is been built in Moscow. Georgia and Ukraine as countries
and societies play a special role in the internal Russian debate,
because both countries share the same ‘cultural background.’ These
are Orthodox Christian countries that have been long time part of
the Russian empire, and the Soviet Union.

"On countries with different religious traditions like Poland or
Estonia, some Russian commentators would be ready to say that there
is something really different about them when they choose genuine
democracy, accountable government and integration with the West."

EUMM a better security guarantee for Georgia than MAP

The EU monitoring mission (EUMM) in Georgia has a very positive impact
on the country’s security, Mr Illarionov said, to some extent even
more than if the country had been granted offical NATO candidate status
(MAP) at the Bucharest summit in April.

"At the moment EU observers appear as the first line of the the
protection of Georgia’s security, in some sense probably even slightly
better compared to MAP. MAP without observers does not provide any
guarantees for defence. But people on the ground are a very serious
constraint from any aggression," he explained.

Putin’s former advisor added that in some sense "it is even better than
it was three months ago when there was neither serious international
interest, no international observers on the ground."

"Only history will judge whether this is correct or not. If you compare
the intensity of provocations in July on the internal Ossetian-Georgian
border, with regular shelling, burning, and attacks – and today –
with almost no provocations – you can make your own judgement which
situation in reality is better," he concluded.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress