"RUSSIA HAS EVERY RIGHT TO REACT AND INVESTIGATE"
by Ivan Sukhov

WPS Agency
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
October 8, 2008 Wednesday
Russia

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP VICE PRESIDENT ALAIN DELETROZ ABOUT THE
FUTURE RUSSIAN-EU RELATIONS FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE GEORGIAN CRISIS
RESOLUTION; An interview with Alain Deletroz, Vice President of the
International Crisis Group.

The first round of international consultations over Abkhazia and South
Ossetia stipulated by the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan begins in Geneva
on October 15. Alain Deletroz, Vice President of the International
Crisis Group (a conflict-prevention non-governmental organization with
headquarters in Brussels and missions in more than 140 countries,
it analyzes conflicts and offers recommendations to the involved
governments), met with this correspondent and answered some questions
on future relations between Russia and the European Union from the
standpoint of the Russian-Georgian crisis resolution.

Question: Your opinion of the debates at the Parliamentary Assembly
over the situation in Georgia?

Alain Deletroz: The Parliamentary Assembly is an important organization
but rather symbolic. I’m convinced that all principal issues will
be handled and settled at the meeting in Geneva. What happens there
will be of paramount importance for the security of the southern part
of the Caucasus and for the future relations between Russia and the
European Union.

Question: What will the format of the meeting be?

Alain Deletroz: There is no saying at this point. I’ve completed
three-day consultations in Moscow, mostly with the Foreign
Ministry. I’m scheduled to discuss it with the French in several days
and I hope that Paris being the locomotive force behind the whole
process will have some ideas on that score.

The way I see it, the stand Moscow takes at the consultations will be
decisive. If Russia comes to Geneva with a constructive suggestion of
some sort of international mechanism for crisis resolution in Georgia,
then everything will be all right. If, however, it comes with its mind
firmly set, with the attitude that there is nothing more to discuss,
that Russia will cope, thank you very much for the 200 observers… it
will be different, of course. Then the deterioration of the relations
that is setting in may last years.

Question: What constructive discourse can we expect from the two
concerned parties with polar opinions on the situation? Russia
recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as sovereign states and the
European Union did not. What kind of compromise is possible here?

Alain Deletroz: If the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is
what we begin with, then the negotiations will be as good as over
before they really begin. We should start with discussing the actual
situation and the problems. Russia for example tends to draw parallels
with Kosovo. In Kosovo, however, a great deal of human, military,
and financial resources are expended by NATO, the EU, and the UN to
preserve Serbians in their enclaves there. In South Ossetia on the
other hand, not a single surviving Georgian is to be found anymore.

Question: And yet, reports made by independent observers paint a less
bleak picture from the conflict area. They say for example that some
Georgians did remain in the villages and hamlets the conflict spared,
the ones where neither side had outposts. Though a great deal of
Georgians did escape, of course. Who do you mean when speaking of
refugees? Just the Georgians from South Ossetian villages or also
those who had been driven out of their households in Abkhazia in 1993?

Alain Deletroz: I mean them all. I mean refugees. The International
Crisis Group has never advocated recognition of sovereignty of these
two republics. It follows that the term "refugee" applies to every
person who found him- or herself out of Georgia. It applies to the
Georgians, Ossetians, and Abkhazians living beyond the territory
of Georgia. Mostly in Russia, that is. All the rest are displaced
persons. Anyway, we should be talking about all of them, both refugees
and displaced persons. That’s a colossal problems. The Ossetians who
fled inner Georgia in the early 1990s encounter colossal difficulties
and problems with recognition of their ownership rights. The same
goes for the Georgians from Abkhazia and South Ossetia. If Russia
and the European Union really want a solution to this problem, then
they should pool efforts in seeking a way out. Relations between the
European Union and Russia are different from the relations between
the United States and Russia. We live on one and the same continent,
so it all affects us equally. So, if we have the will to develop
new relations, then we should be focused on specific mechanisms and
solutions to the problems that plague a specific region.

Question: Leaving the matter of the status aside?

Alain Deletroz: Leaving the matter of the status for later. Russia
recognized the sovereignty of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, we all
know it. This is, however, what I believe. There were provocations in
conflict areas. They happen every summer as we all know, and not in
Georgia alone. In Nagorno-Karabakh, the situation takes a definite turn
for the worst every summer, and there are but six foreign observers
posted along quite lengthy a front there. It is always difficult in
conflicts such as these to find out who did what and who did not do
anything. There is, however, one important nuance. Reaction of the
Georgian government on August 7 and 8 was disproportional. Russia
with its peacekeepers in South Ossetia had every legitimate right to
react and investigate. We cannot understand why Russia didn’t bloody
the Georgian nose right away but within the administrative borders
of South Ossetia and not a step beyond them. Or why it wouldn’t
follow with convening a special meeting of the UN Security Council or
OSCE Council to launch an international process… But Russia went
beyond the conflict areas, right to the towns of Poti and Senaki
in Georgia and to Gori in South Ossetia. Russia established buffer
zones there. That’s why we keep saying that Moscow’s reaction was
disproportional too.

Besides, the unilateral recognition of sovereignty, all on one’s own
and without international processes paid even lip service to… it was
another move we of the European Union cannot understand. Moreover,
some EU members, particularly former Socialist states, took it as a
frightening development.

Question: Do you advocate evolution of NATO’s mission into that of
civilian and humanitarian cooperation rather than military?

Alain Deletroz: Yes. Among other considerations, it would have made
obsolete NATO’s expansion practically to the Russian borders. Actually,
Russia would have been directly involved as a participant in this
case. After all, we live in a fairly chaotic world where being together
with others is preferable to standing all alone.

Question: Yes, it is, but the subject of NATO’s expansion with Russia’s
participation became history years ago…

Alain Deletroz: And what shall we do then? The Russian president and
prime minister plainly says that Russia does not want to see NATO on
its borders. People in the West therefore ask why NATO should include
Russia then and invest in it the veto power in internal affairs of the
Alliance… These are two visions and two truths. Meanwhile, is there
a point to the escalation of tension and confrontation? Wouldn’t it be
better for all concerned if we launched a different discussion instead,
one over what kind of security we wanted on the continent? Your
President Dmitry Medvedev suggested it already, and so did you Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov.

Question: The impression is that this discussion is unlikely to be
constructive in the light of the Georgian situation…

Alain Deletroz: It may be made constructive. Sure, Europe is strongly
distrustful and suspicious of the Russian leadership these days. Europe
is as distrustful of the Kremlin – or perhaps even worse than that
– as it was of Bush’s Administration in 2003 and 2004. So, it’s up
to Russia really. It may emulate Bush and say "to hell with these
midget Europeans" the way he did then. But consider what happened
then, consider the situation in which Bush found himself in Iraq. He
discovered to his dismay that America was all alone in Iraq, with
allies like Nicaragua standing by it. Well, perhaps, not exactly like
Nicaragua. Argentine did dispatch some ship or other there… We all
have approached the moment when it is still possible for Russia to
say: OK, it’s difficult for us to accept what you did in Kosovo. Same
thing with acceptance in Europe of what Russia did in Georgia. Let
us then look for constructive factors to develop.

Question: It is hard to find a constructive solution when Georgia’s
firm determination to join NATO was one of the factors that decided
Russia to interfere in the Georgian situation. Russia decided that
it needed South Ossetia and Abkhazia to station its military in…

Alain Deletroz: Come on. You probably know better. Russia has its
embassies throughout the world. Russia cannot help knowing of the
heated debates taking place within NATO over expediency of granting
membership to Georgia and Ukraine. Yes, Bush would dearly like to
throw NATO doors open for them. Most serious NATO members in the
meantime have a different opinion. I’m talking NATO countries that are
prepared to send their military hardware and soldiers into harm’s way
when it is necessary, not the countries with regular armies 10,000
men strong. (And that does not mean neophytes alone, there are NATO
veterans with countries like that.) We all know that Bush’s time is
up and that he has bare weeks. In other words, his opinion carries
weight of course but it is not decisive at all.

Question: But Russia’s behavior in Georgia altered the positions
even of some of its traditional partners in Europe. Like Germany,
for example. NATO veterans are no longer unanimous.

Alain Deletroz: They are not unanimous, as long as the matter does
not concerned membership in NATO for Georgia. Yes, Germany has some
serious questions to Russia and its behavior. On the other hand,
public opinion in Germany and the German media are quite understanding
and sympathetic with Russia. German general public normally stands by
Russia because of a simple fact, namely that Russia withdrew from the
DDR when the Cold War ended. Yes, Germany has questions to Russia but
they are not restricted to its behavior in the Caucasus alone. There
are questions concerning Kosovo as well. It’s another side of the
matter, right? The contact group for Kosovo took its time to discuss
the matter. The debates were even extended on Russia’s request. So,
in the long run, Russia became the only country in the contact group of
six that objected to recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign state. Russia
impeded the process enormously. It killed the motion to turn Kosovo
over from the UN to the European Union. Why, when the UN is notoriously
short of funds and cannot even scrap up enough for missions elsewhere
was the European Union prepared to pay out of its own wallet? Some
observers believe that Russia views the international law and the
territorial integrity principle it includes as inviolate. It is
understandable. Russia itself is a federation. Other observers,
however, suspect that Russia refused to recognize Kosovo not because
it cared about the international law but because it was playing some
strategic game of its own, because settlement of this conflict in
the middle of Europe interfered with its strategic ends.

Question: I’d say rather it was quite consistent. After all, it went
public questioning the territorial integrity of Georgia (something
non-existent for over 15 years already) only after recognition of
Kosovo by a group of countries of the West.

Alain Deletroz: Yes, but the European Union remembers that there
was a draft resolution of the UN Security Council on Kosovo in 2006
plainly stating that Kosovo was not to serve as a precedent for
other regions. Its adoption would have voided separatist aspirations
elsewhere but Russia killed this document.

Question: And how would you have explained it to the population of
other regions? They’d have inevitably demanded to know why something
was all right for Kosovo but not for them.

Alain Deletroz: It would have been explained. Twenty-two EU members
out of 27 would have encountered no problems with explaining to
their respective population why it was done in Kosovo and not, say,
in Somalia or Chechnya. It was possible to explain what was making
Kosovo a unique case. But Russia interfered and had this phrase omitted
from the text of the resolution. It fomented suspicions that that was
what Russia intended to pull off in the Caucasus at some later date.

The way I see it, Russia should go to Geneva on October 15 with
some set of constructive proposals that will pose no threats to its
positions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Instead, they will show that
it cares for all victims of this conflict and not just Ossetians and
Abkhazians. I dare say that the Europeans will be happy to meet Russia
halfway then.

Question: Russia wants representatives of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
present at the consultations. What is the opinion of the European
Union?

Alain Deletroz: The European Union is understandably cautious. Russia
recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia an sovereign states. It
automatically raises the question of their delegations’ status. And
forms of address, and whatever else. I believe that representatives
of these republic should be there. I believe that the European Union
should advance its relations with these republics. Isolating them
will be wrong. The International Crisis Group is firmly convinced
that the new EU aid package to Georgia must include Abkhazia and
South Ossetia too, even despite Saakashvili’s displeasure. After all,
it is not Saakashvili who decides how the European Union should spent
its own finances.

Question: Your appraisal of the outcome of Russia’s interference in
the situation with Abkhazia and South Ossetia in August 2008?

Alain Deletroz: To be frank with you, Russia’s military operation was
no surprise. For me, that is. But the speed with which it recognized
sovereignty of these republics was. I thought Russia would be more
prudent because of the general situation in the Caucasus.

Question: Does it occur to you that the military operation all but
made it an inevitability?

Alain Deletroz: No, I’m convinced that this situation before
recognition was a much more formidable card in the Russian diplomatic
hand. Moscow chose to play this card, and did so without considerable
success. Look who recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Russia’s
wake – Nicaragua and Somalia. Had Kim Jong-il been all right, North
Korea might have recognized them too. As things stand, even Belarus
hesitates to recognize these republics, and so do Moscow’s neighbors
in the Commonwealth and partners in the CIS Collective Security Treaty
Organization and Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Did you see the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization declaration? President Medvedev
said he had encountered understanding at the summit, but when the
final text of the official document includes but a single phrase
concerning how the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was disturbed by
the situation in Georgia, then I cannot help start wondering… Well,
perhaps all that was done was great as an image-builder for the new
president. From the standpoint of international relations, however,
it looks like a diplomatic defeat of Russia.

Question: What do you think it may mean for the Caucasus?

Alain Deletroz: Russian autonomies as such might start wondering why
something is permitted Abkhazia and South Ossetia but denied them. The
situation in some republics of the Caucasus is quite volatile. In
Ingushetia, for example. When the matter of self-determination is
brought up, reaction of neighbor countries of the region is difficult
to anticipate. They are not particularly happy as we all know. What
if some irresponsible people get elevated to power there? How will
they react to a situation analogous to what happened in Chechnya in
the middle of the 1990s? God forbid we have to discover it the hard
way, of course.