FORUM 18 NEWS SERVICE, Oslo, Norway
The right to believe, to worship and witness
The right to change one’s belief or religion
The right to join together and express one’s belief
========================================== ======
Tuesday 21 October 2008
TURKEY: TURKISH NATIONALISM, ERGENEKON, AND DENIAL OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
A trial has begun in Turkey of influential people alleged to be part of an
ultra-nationalist group, Ergenekon. Otmar Oehring of the German Catholic
charity Missio
< lturen/themen/menschenrechte>
notes, in a commentary for Forum 18 News Service <;,
that opposition to religious freedom is widespread. Ergenekon members are
alleged to have maintained deathlists of people, including Christians with
a missionary background. The Malatya murder trial is revealing plausible
links between Ergenekon, the "deep state" and the murders. But local
officials – who are almost certainly not in an Ergenekon-type group – are
also hostile to religious freedom. The Ergenekon case is part of a
power-struggle between the "deep state" and the AKP government, but it is
unclear whether the current trials will advance freedom of religion and
belief. Given the threats to the day-to-day security and religious freedom
of non-nationalist Turks, whether the government effectively addresses the
roots of these threats will be crucial.
TURKEY: TURKISH NATIONALISM, ERGENEKON, AND DENIAL OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
By Otmar Oehring, Head of the Human Rights Office of Missio
<;
A court case in Turkey has pointed to the existence of a secretive
underground ultra-nationalist organisation Ergenekon, though this might
merely be another name for the "deep state". The trial began near Istanbul
on 20 October of 86 alleged members – from the police, army, business,
politics and the mass media – on charges that they were plotting to
overthrow the current Justice and Development Party (AKP) government by
2009.
The "deep state" is the term used in Turkey for nationalist circles in the
army, police, National Intelligence Organisation (MIT) secret police and
state administration, which regard themselves as the custodians of the
secularist legacy of the Republic’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (see
F18News 28 June 2007 < 983>).
The MIT closely monitors religious minorities, and some MIT officers do
indeed believe in protecting religious minorities. But other MIT officers
are staunch nationalists and fully part of the "deep state" (see F18News 10
July 2007 < 990>).
Opposition to religious freedom is widespread among the "deep state" and
wider sections of political life and the general public. This hostility has
resulted in deaths and violent attacks, and has not been effectively
addressed by the government (see F18News 15 April 2008
< e_id=1115>).
The anti-religious minority views of ultra-nationalist circles and the
"deep state" were no secret, especially to the religious minorities
themselves. But reports in the Turkish media about Ergenekon have, perhaps
for the first time, given the wider Turkish public the details of the
conspiracies. Many Turkish analysts think that the allegations made so far
will turn out to be true.
Members of Ergenekon are alleged to have maintained lists of people –
including Christians with a missionary background – targeted for killing.
The involvement of Ergenekon has been alleged in the murders of Catholic
priest Fr Andrea Santoro in Trabzon in February 2006 and three Protestants
– Necati Aydin, Tillman Geske and Ugur Yüksel – in Malatya in April 2007.
The MIT secret police is known to have maintained observation of the places
where all four of these Christians were killed (see F18News 10 July 2007
< e_id=990>).
The trial of those accused of the Malatya murders is revealing that there
may be links between Ergenekon, the "deep state" and the murders. As
Christian news service Compass Direct reported on 21 October
(< ay.php?page=news&lang=en&length=long&i delement=5658&backpage=summaries&critere=& amp;countryname=&rowcur=>),
the lawyer Orhan Kemal Cengiz, who leads the legal team representing the
victims’ families, states that there is a "very dark, complex,
sophisticated web of relations behind the scenes."
Indeed, the Ergenekon people not only seem to be the masterminds of the
Santoro and Malatya murders (and of the murder of ethnic Armenian
journalist Hrant Dink), they even had a plan to kill the Ecumenical
Patriarch – or at least to incite his murder in a way that could not be
traced back to them.
Among those arrested in the investigation against Ergenekon was
ultranationalist lawyer Kemal Kerincsiz. As well as filing complaints
against numerous writers for "insulting Turkishness" under the notorious
Article 301 of the Penal Code, he also brought a high-profile case of
"insulting Islam" under the same Article against Hakan Tastan and Turan
Topal, Turks who joined a Protestant church.
Even the so-called Turkish Orthodox Church – which has almost no followers
and was apparently designed by its founders as an irritant to the Greek
Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarchate – is revealed to have been closely linked
with such circles. This "church" has been publicly supportive of
Kerincsiz’s claims that Turkish Christians "insult Turkishness". Ergenekon
is said to have used "Turkish Orthodox Church" buildings, and to be closely
liked with those who run this "church".
Ergenekon-style nationalists are certain that almost everyone is against
the Turks and Turkishness. Particular enemies of Turkey are thought by
these circles to be all of Turkey’s ethnic minorities, particularly Kurds
(some of whom are Alevi Muslims), as well as non-Muslim minorities. These
views have long been widespread even outside Ergenekon-type circles (see
F18News 29 November 2007
< e_id=1053>).
Ergenekon-type circles collected information on groups within these
populations – it helped that they had close ties to authorities with access
to the personal data registry which records individuals’ ethnic and
religious affiliation. It is not known if Ergenekon itself – if it existed
in the form that is claimed – sent spies into religious minority
communities.
However, all religious minorities – especially Christians – have long had
unknown people visiting their services. Sometimes these visitors say they
are there from the MIT secret police to "protect" them, though more often
they refuse to explain who they are (see F18News 26 July 2006
< e_id=817>).
Religious minorities doubt whether the police or MIT secret police would
really attend their places of worship to protect them: they are more likely
to believe they are there to listen, watch and take notes. Even this year
in 2008, believers leaving services are asked who they are and why they
have attended. The authorities want to know whether those attending
Christian churches are foreigners, local "foreigners" or possible converts.
Ergenekon could have played a part in such enquiries.
Many religious leaders have long been under surveillance by the MIT secret
police. "Walls have ears," is the constant refrain in religious minority
headquarters. Particularly close tabs were kept on Armenian Patriarch
Mesrop Mutafyan, who had two "bodyguards" from the secret police with him
constantly.
Again it remains unclear if this surveillance is to protect them or to
keep tabs on all their activity. That a grenade could have been thrown into
Patriarch Bartholomew’s office from a small street outside the Ecumenical
Patriarchate in Istanbul’s Fener district – which is under full and very
visible police surveillance – shows that any "protection" is at best
ineffectual. Those charged with protecting religious leaders have not
managed to stop threats against them.
Religious minority leaders live with threats constantly, whether through
the media or directly. Patriarch Mesrop would receive about 300 emailed
threats each day – whether from one individual or many is unknown. Unknown
people watch religious minority buildings, making sure they are seen and
noticed by the religious minorities.
Perhaps the biggest impact so far of this constant atmosphere of threats
is on the Armenian Apostolic Patriarchate, Turkey’s biggest Christian
denomination. Mesrop Mutafyan, who was elected Patriarch in 1998 against
the express wishes of the Turkish authorities, has been forced to retreat
into health-related seclusion. Many believe the severe health problems he
is suffering – which have affected him both physically and mentally – are
akin to post-traumatic stress disorder. They believe these have been
brought on by years of pressure from the media, the public and from the
Armenian diaspora, some of which has dubbed him a traitor. As well as
opposing his original election, the Turkish authorities also made trouble
for him over the restoration of the Patriarchate several years ago.
Should Patriarch Mesrop not recover and be in a position to take up his
functions again, this could threaten the future of the Armenian Church in
Turkey. The Turkish authorities are likely to insist – as they have done up
to now – that the head of the Armenian (as well as the Greek Orthodox)
Patriarchate must be a Turkish citizen resident in Turkey. The Armenian
Church may struggle to find a candidate with the diplomatic and linguistic
skills and the international experience for such a crucial role in such a
delicate and exposed position. This problem is of importance not just for
the Church but for the Armenian community as a whole.
However, it is clear that Ergenekon and the "deep state" are not the only
obstacle for freedom of religion or belief. Local officials – who are
almost certainly not in an Ergenekon-type organisation – continue to
obstruct the work of non-Muslim communities. This can clearly be seen when
it comes to property disputes.
Roman Catholics, for example, face several difficult property battles,
most notably in the southern coastal city of Mersin, where they have a
large compound which they have used since Ottoman times. The only document
the Catholics have confirming their ownership is a firman (decree) issued
by the Ottoman sultan, which the local authorities do not consider is
valid. Successive court cases brought by the local authorities in the 1980s
finally reached Turkey’s Supreme Court in Ankara in the 1990s, which ruled
in favour of the Catholics.
Such ownership problems are faced by all the minorities, despite their
widely differing legal status. As is the case with all non-Muslim minority
groups, Catholics do not legally exist. Furthermore, as their properties
are not organised as "community foundations", their properties have no
legal personality on their own. And as the Catholics do not legally exist,
the government at times argues that they therefore also cannot have
property. This shows that despite government claims, these property
problems have not been resolved by the latest Foundations Law (see F18News
13 March 2008 < 1100>).
In the case of the Catholics of Mersin, the local authorities re-started
the dispute through the courts, in a case that is now pending at the High
Court. Catholics fear a negative ruling, which would force them to take
their case to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg. This
would be extremely expensive and time-consuming, even though this may turn
out to be the only effective way for religious minorities to secure freedom
of religion or belief (see F18News 18 January 2007
< e_id=901>).
The authorities in Mersin argue that the Ottoman firman only allows
Catholic people to construct a specific building (a church) and did not
grant them ownership of the land on which it was built. Similar court cases
were brought in the past over the Assumptionist Church in Kadiköy, Istanbul
(ECHR case No. 26308/95).
The Mersin authorities’ desire to confiscate Catholic property would leave
the community with nowhere to worship, though it remains unclear how far
the authorities would go. They could take away legal ownership, while
allowing the Catholics to continue to use the church. In the past,
authorities elsewhere have used such methods to confiscate religious
property "legally".
Another example is in Adana. The town’s Jesuit-run Catholic church has
long faced harassment from local people attending a nearby wedding hall,
which was built close to it in defiance of regulations. The mayor’s office
has said that the wedding hall should be closed but has taken no action to
enforce this.
Ancient cemeteries where Christians are buried – such as in Samsun – or
Christian sections of bigger cemeteries – as in Ankara – are also not being
protected from vandalism, despite requests from the Christian Churches. In
the Black Sea port of Trabzon – where Fr Santoro was murdered – the
Christian cemetery is threatened with confiscation. Muslim cemeteries face
no such problems.
By contrast, spokespersons for the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate have
pointed to two positive developments. They welcomed the January 2008
statement in parliament by the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan that the
issue of whether its Patriarch, Bartholomew, is "Ecumenical" or not is an
"internal" matter for the Patriarchate and that the state should not
interfere. Previously the authorities have responded ferociously to any
claims that Bartholomew’s religious role extends beyond Istanbul’s tiny
surviving Greek Orthodox community.
Greek Orthodox spokespersons also welcome the July 2008 ruling by the ECHR
in Strasbourg over the Buyukada orphanage, particularly the finding that
not only does the property belong to the Orthodox Patriarchate but that the
Patriarchate is an existing legal person (application no. 14340/05
accessible at
< asp?sessionId=11514775&skin=hudoc-pr-en&ac tion=html&tableö9A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DE A398649&key=71604&highlight=14340/05%20|%2 014340/05>).
Erdogan’s statement about the title "Ecumenical" is likely to have little
immediate impact on the general public, which continues to regard the
Patriarchate with suspicion or hostility. The ECHR ruling should have an
impact on other religious communities which have so far struggled to assert
their right to a legal existence.
Meanwhile a new party, the Law and Equality Party (Hak ve Eşitlik
Partisi), was created on 4 September to promote a nationalist agenda. The
party, founded by a former general prominent in the war against the PKK
Kurdish rebels, is also aimed at getting rid of Christians and ending
Christian proselytism. The first sentence of the call to found the party –
published as a full-page advertisement in many newspapers – attacks what it
calls the "colonisation" of Turkey by missionaries, presumably Christian.
"Turkish nation – we know that you are fed up that your democracy is
treated like a child, that foreign representatives and missionaries run
around on our soil and boss you around," it reads.
Although the party seems to be well-organised in Turkey’s provinces, it
remains unclear how serious it is and how many votes it might be able to
gather in an election. Nevertheless, the party reflects more widely-held
chauvinist views, which see no place in Turkey for non-Muslim minorities
(see F18News 29 November 2007
< e_id=1053>).
Public opinion in Turkey is becoming more hostile to freedom of religion
or belief, and increasingly favours extreme nationalism of the Ergenekon
kind. The government’s actions are favourable to these kinds of views –
even if not to the Ergenekon group itself – and it does not seem to want to
act effectively to protect non-nationalist Turkish citizens. The ruling
Justice and Development Party (AKP) is not itself an extreme nationalist
party, but it could do much more to make it unambiguously clear that
religious and ethnic minorities are Turkish citizens with equal rights.
The AKP itself is under threat from Ergenekon-style views; indeed, those
associated with the "deep state" recently tried to have the AKP banned. A
fight is underway between the Army and the old Kemalist "deep state" on one
side and the AKP on the other. But it is not at all clear that the AKP is
necessarily in this fight to advance democratic values, including freedom
of religion and belief.
It also remains unclear whether the AKP will prevail. Visits by members of
the General Staff to Ergenekon prisoners ahead of the trial have been
interpreted as a warning to the AKP not to go too far.
The court case against alleged key leaders and members of Ergenekon is
merely the latest step in the power-struggle between the "deep state" (of
which Ergenekon appears to have been a part) and the AKP. That the
judiciary – quite obviously pushed by the government – has initiated the
court case can be seen as proof that the AKP government is fighting back
against those groups in society and state that are striving to drive the
AKP from power.
Whether the Ergenekon court case will prove to be a step towards real
democracy in Turkey – leading to improvements in the area of freedom of
religion and belief – is quite another question. It is not only the court
cases on Ergenekon and the Malatya murders which will decide this. Given
the undeniable threats to the day-to-day security and religious freedom of
Turks who are not nationalists, whether the AKP government effectively
addresses the roots of these threats will be crucial in deciding this
question. (END)
– Dr Otmar Oehring, head of the human rights office of Missio
< lturen/themen/menschenrechte>, a
Catholic charity based in Germany, contributed this comment to Forum 18
News Service. Commentaries are personal views and do not necessarily
represent the views of F18News or Forum 18.
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More analyses and commentaries on freedom of thought, conscience and
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< mp;religion=all&country=68>.
A printer-friendly map of Turkey is available at
< s/atlas/index.html?Parent=mideast&Rootmap=turk ey>.
(END)
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