MOSCOW SUMMIT ON KARABAKH FALLS SHORT OF KREMLIN’S GOALS
By Vladimir Socor

Eurasia Daily Monitor
Nov 4 2008
DC

Presidents Dmitry Medvedev of Russia, Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan,
and Serge Sarkisian of Armenia met on November 2 near Moscow to
discuss the current state of negotiations on the Armenia-Azerbaijan
conflict. With those negotiations moving slowly forward at several
levels and on their own momentum, Medvedev initiated this summit
hoping to lift Russia into the driver’s seat of the process.

The Kremlin hoped to capitalize on the political effects of its
recent invasion of Georgia and seizure of that country’s territories
through military occupation and diplomatic "recognition." The Georgia
crisis served to demonstrate that Russia can and does act decisively,
brutally, and with impunity in the South Caucasus, while the United
States was drifting toward strategic disengagement and the European
Union failed to fill the vacuum. The moment seemed ripe for Russia to
display "regional leadership" by taking the initiative in negotiations
to settle the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Moscow also hoped to display a capacity for conflict resolution
through diplomacy, not just through force. One major goal of this
exercise in diplomacy, however, is to deploy Russian troops in this
conflict theater as "peacekeepers" or "guarantors" at some stage of
the settlement.

The summit’s only apparent result, however, was a joint declaration
that fell clearly short of Moscow’s goals (, Arminfo,
, November 3, 4). The Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents
first held a two-hour, face-to-face session and were then joined
by Medvedev for finalizing the declaration. Signed by the three
presidents in front of TV cameras, then read out to the media by
Medvedev, the five-point declaration does not commit the signatory
parties to any specific approaches or actions within the continuing
negotiating process. If the Kremlin wished to show "forward movement"
after hosting this summit, its hopes were in vain.

The declaration’s preamble underscores the continuity of direct
dialogue between the two countries with the mediation of the three
OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs (Russia, the United States, and France).

Point 1 envisages a "political settlement of the conflict based on
the principles and norms of international law." This, however, neither
resolves nor circumvents the dilemma between territorial integrity of
states and the inviolability of internationally recognized borders
on one hand and national self-determination on the other hand. This
dilemma has been created and maintained artificially on the Armenian
side as a means to freeze the post-1994 situation, with Azerbaijani
territories occupied and the Azeri population forced out.

Point 2 reaffirms support for the ongoing and future mediation by
the OSCE Minsk Group’s co-chairs, "taking into consideration their
meeting with the parties on November 29, 2007." The reference is to
the three co-chairs’ joint proposals presented during the OSCE’s
2007 year-end ministerial conference in Madrid. The Armenian side
interprets that document as elevating the national self-determination
principle to the same level as territorial integrity and inviolability
of borders. Yerevan therefore prefers to cite "the Madrid principles"
as a point of departure for further negotiations. Azerbaijan, however,
argues for the primacy of the territorial integrity principle in OSCE
and other international documents of normative character. The Moscow
declaration downgrades the significance of Madrid to a mere "meeting,"
not principles and not even a document for further reference. This
undoubtedly comes as a disappointment for Yerevan.

Point 3 stipulates that the "peaceful resolution should be accompanied
by legally binding international guarantees in all aspects and stages
of settlement." Russia and Armenia insist on such guarantees: Yerevan
refers to the security of the Armenian population of Upper Karabakh
while Moscow needs an excuse for deploying Russian "peacekeeping"
or "guarantor" troops. For its part, Azerbaijan does not oppose
international guarantees but does insist that any such guarantees be
in line with Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.

Point 4 records Azerbaijan’s and Armenia’s intention to continue
their efforts for a political settlement of the conflict, at the
level of the presidents and ministries of foreign affairs, and through
cooperation with the OSCE Minsk Group’s co-chairs.

Point 5 "emphasize[s] the importance of creating conditions that will
contribute to the consolidation of trust, within the framework of
efforts aimed at settling the conflict." However vague, this point
clearly does not imply that Azerbaijan ought to agree to Armenia’s
inclusion in regional energy and transport projects in order to
facilitate the resolution of the conflict.

During the last few years, the European Union and even the United
States have attempted to persuade Azerbaijan to include Armenia
in regional projects before the Armenian forces withdraw from
occupied territories, presumably in order to advance efforts
for peace. Ideologically, this argument is a late legacy of the
classical liberal belief that trade in and of itself promotes
peace ("pipelines for peace" is a latter-day incarnation of that
belief). On a more mundane level, that argument reflects the influence
of political lobbies in Brussels and Washington, which has resulted in
withholding funds from projects of Western interest in Western-oriented
Azerbaijan. For its part, Azerbaijan is open to such cooperation with
Armenia after the Armenian forces vacate the occupied territories
and the refugees are free to return home.