TURKEY IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Gallia Lindenstrauss
Right Side News
torial/turkey-in-the-security-council.html
Nov 7 2008
GA
Turkey’s election as a non-permanent member of the United Nations
Security Council by a considerable majority (151 out the 192 member
states) reflects Turkey’s importance in the current international
system. Among the members of the European group, Turkey was chosen
alongside Austria after both overtook Iceland. The last time Turkey
was elected to the Security Council was over 40 years ago, and it
appears that the current choice also indicates international support
for some of the diplomatic bridging activity that Turkey has been
involved in recently.
This diplomatic bridging suggests a unique mediating role for
Turkey in conflicts in the three regions it borders: the Middle
East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. Through this role as mediator,
Turkey attempts to prove that it need not identify with any given
international party and can maintain its good relations with the
West while it increases its involvement in the Middle East and the
Caucasus. Nevertheless, in view of Turkey’s domestic problems and
the instability of certain neighboring countries, some of the issues
that are expected to appear soon on the Security Council’s agenda
are liable to create some tough dilemmas for Turkish decision makers.
Of the diplomatic initiatives recently taken by Turkey, the most
prominent is the "football diplomacy" with Armenia, which peaked with
the first visit ever by a Turkish president to Armenia, to watch the
World Cup qualifying game between Armenia and Turkey. Armenia’s demand
that Turkey recognize the genocide committed against the Armenians
in 1915, and the conflict over the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, with
Armenia controlling around 15 percent of the territory of Azerbaijan,
Turkey’s ally, have strained relations between them.
Moreover, the absence of diplomatic ties between Turkey and Armenia
and concern over another round of fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh between
Armenia and Azerbaijan impact on the stability of the entire Caucasus
region. For example, Armenia -Russia’s ally – is wary of Turkey and of
Azerbaijan yet the oil pipeline between Azerbaijan and Turkey traverses
Georgia in order to bypass Armenia. Recent developments in Georgia
underscore that players looking to block Russia’s over-dominance in
the Caucasus should also take Armenia into consideration. Thus Turkey
recently launched a plan for advancing cooperation and stability in
the Caucasus region among Russia, Turkey, and the southern Caucasus
states, including Armenia.
Another diplomatic initiative by Turkey, mediation in the Israel-Syria
conflict, is of particular interest since one of the elements in the
strategic partnership between Israel and Turkey that evolved in the
90s was these countries’ confrontation with Syria. Israeli control of
the Golan and the Lebanon question divide Israel and Syria. Between
Turkey and Syria there were a number of disputes based on territory and
conflicts over the division of water resources. Moreover, at the end of
the nineties relations between Turkey and Syria reached a crisis point
following Syria’s patronage of elements from the PKK (the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party) who carried out terror attacks on Turkish soil.
Resolution of the issue of PKK presence in Syria and the events in
Iraq have helped relations between Syria and Turkey thaw in recent
years. Some claim that a new axis is currently evolving between
Turkey, Syria, and Iran based on a shared interest in the future
of Iraq. As part of Turkey’s focus on bridging, it takes pains not
to present these developments as a threat to its good relations with
the United States and Israel, although the question remains as to how
much it will maintain this policy. A related factor is Turkey’s favor
of the Palestinians in its mediating initiatives between Israel and
the Palestinians; this support that has even increased in recent years.
Despite these and other bridging initiatives, Turkey is hard-pressed
to deal with the Kurdish problem on its own territory. Since 2007,
when the Justice and Development party was reelected with a large
majority, reforms towards the Kurds were not extended, reforms that
were spearheaded by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo?an in his first
term of office as part of Turkey’s efforts to be accepted into the
European Union (EU).
Furthermore, frequent incursions by Turkish forces into Iraq in order
to chase PKK activists taking cover in northern Iraq, and Turkey’s
fierce opposition to the establishment of an independent Kurdish state
damage Turkey’s attempts to present itself as a stabilizing influence
in the international arena. Although it may be assumed that the United
States will labor to prevent Security Council discussion of issues
connected to Iraq, Turkey’s heavy involvement in Iraq will undoubtedly
cause it problems, at least vis-a-vis its dealings with the US in
the Security Council, and will challenge its potential for cooperation.
One of the issues expected to continue on the Security Council’s agenda
is the Iranian nuclear program. Turkey objected to the imposition of
sanctions on Iran and tried to mediate between Iran and the United
States. Iranian cooperation in Turkey’s fight against the PKK and
reciprocal high level visits even suggest a strengthening of ties
between Turkey and Iran. On the other hand, the United States will
look to Turkish cooperation in decisions over international sanctions
on Iran. The United States may link this issue with Turkey’s requests
regarding the Kurdish areas in Iraq, and possibly even subsequent
American non-recognition of the genocide committed against the
Armenian people.
With regard to the Israeli-Arab conflict and the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, Turkey will almost certainly adopt a position favorable
to the Arab and Palestinian sides in the Security Council. While
relations with Israel are still considered important, partly due the
support of military leaders for these ties, a number of parties will
probably encourage Turkey to adopt positions less comfortable for
Israel. Furthermore, support by the Justice and Development party
for Islamic principles joins Turkey’s traditional pro-Palestinian
stance. In the past, Israel accepted Turkey’s difficulties with
supporting it on issues that contradicted the Palestinian position,
and one may expect Israel to maintain this policy.
While the division into groups in the UN is not based solely on
geography, there were those who pointed out the irony of Turkey being
accepted as a non-permanent member of the Security Council as part of
a European group, even though full membership in the European Union
is not guaranteed. If Turkey manages to fulfill a constructive role
in the Security Council in the next two years this may help to soften
some of the resistance to its acceptance to the EU, for example from
leaders such as French president Nicolas Sarkozy.
It seems that Turkey’s current situation and recent bridging
initiatives may help it to contribute to stability in the regions
around it. Nevertheless, one can imagine scenarios in which Turkey is
faced with considerable dilemmas regarding the way it votes in the
Security Council, principally with regard to its desire to be seen
as part of Europe and the democratic Western world even though it is
an Islamic state with extensive ties to the Islamic world and key
countries such as Iran and Syria. The question is will its conduct
as a non-permanent member of the Security Council be similar to that
of Austria (or Belgium and Italy, which were replaced by Turkey and
Austria) or that of Indonesia. Turkey, however, will likely do its
utmost to mediate and thereby avoid having to take sides.
The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) is an independent
academic institute that studies key issues relating to Israel’s
national security and Middle East affairs.