TURKEY’S GENDARMERIE: REFORMING A FRONTLINE UNIT IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM

Jamestown Foundation
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Nov 26 2008
DC

Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 22November 25, 2008
06:13 PM Age: 1 daysCategory: Terrorism Monitor, Turkey, Featured,
Global Terrorism Analysis, Home Page By: Andrew McGregor

Turkey’s paramilitary Gendarmerie, a frontline unit in the War on
Terrorism, is about to undergo some of the greatest changes yet
in its long history. The reforms call for a radical restructuring
of the organization, designed to generate greater efficiency in
counterterrorism efforts as well as assist Turkey in its efforts to
join the European Union.

The Gendarmerie (Jandarma Genel Komutanlıgı – JGK) was founded as
part of the 1839 Ottoman Tanzimat reforms. In 1909 it was brought
under control of the Ministry of War. The Gendarmes handled interior
security during the First World War and played an important part in
the War of Independence that followed the Ottoman collapse. Several
reorganizations followed before the Gendarmerie became involved in
the Cyprus conflict of 1974 (jandarma.tsk.mil.tr). When the struggle
began against PKK militants, the Gendarmerie, as the security body
responsible for the rural regions of southeast Turkey in which the
PKK operated, was naturally involved. Currently, the Gendarmerie has
responsibility for security in 92 % of Turkey’s area, containing over
one-third of the nation’s population.

As a law enforcement agency, the Turkish Gendarmerie falls under the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior, with responsibility
for securing public order in areas outside municipal boundaries. The
gendarmerie has special responsibilities in the areas of combating
smuggling, border control, corrections, enforcing conscription
and criminal investigations, as well as being available to perform
duties to be determined by the General Staff. In wartime, however, the
organization comes under the command of the Turkish General Staff and
falls directly under the command of the millitary. This arrangement
is supposed to make the Gendarmerie a more effective entity during
times of crises. In practice, however, the Gendarmerie has little
interaction with civilian agencies and tends to act as a department
of the Turkish military even during times of peace. The reforms
intend to eliminate this impractical two-headed command structure,
bringing the paramilitary under complete civilian control.

The Gendarmerie is composed of six branches, operating in 13 regional
commands spread over Turkey’s 81 provinces:

â~@¢ Gendarmerie Headquarters and subordinated units â~@¢ Internal
Security Forces Command (including Gendarmerie commando and aviation
units) â~@¢ Border Forces Command â~@¢ Training Forces Command â~@¢
Gendarmerie Schools Command â~@¢ Logistics Command

The Gendarmerie is designed to be mobile and is well equipped
with armored personnel carriers (APCs), helicopters, and light
artillery. The APCs include old but upgraded East German BTR-60PBs,
American-designed Cadillac-Gage vehicles, Turkish-built Otokar Akrep
and Cobra models, and the Shorland S55, originally designed for service
in Northern Ireland. A small force of helicopters includes Sikorsky
S-70A28 and S-70A17 Blackhawks, Agusta-Bell AB205A1s, and Russian
designed Mi-17 transports. During operations, gendarmerie forces may
be transported by helicopter or call in air support from the Turkish
Air Force when necessary. The Ozel Jandarma Komando Bolugu (OJKB) is
the Gendarmerie’s highly-trained Special Forces unit. It specializes
in counterterrorism operations (particularly those against the PKK)
and public security activities.

Most members of the Gendarmerie are conscript servicemen with only a
short training period. NCO’s are selected from those soldiers with at
least one year of military service. Officers are recruited while still
cadets at the Military Academy and take additional gendarmerie training
after finishing their infantry and commando training. They will usually
stay with the Gendarmerie for the rest of their career. Gendarmes
are typically posted away from their home regions to avoid conflicts
of interest. Funerals of gendarmerie conscripts killed fighting the
PKK are typically attended by thousands of angry mourners, but their
slogans and invective remain directed towards the PKK rather than the
government. For the government, this is a useful display of continued
public support for a civil conflict that has survived a succession
of governments and prevailing ideologies.

Reforming the Gendarmerie

Based on decisions taken by the Higher Counterterrorism Board (Terorle
Mucadele Yuksek Kurulu – TMYK) and the National Security Council
(Milli Guvenlik Kurulu – MGK), the new Gendarmerie will focus on
border security and the maintenance of order in rural areas. The force
will lose its last areas of responsibility in towns and cities. The
command structure will also be reformed, with civilians assuming most
of the administrative positions. Both police and gendarmerie will be
part of a new Domestic Security Under secretariat of the Interior
Ministry (Hurriyet, October 23; Today’s Zaman, November 10). The
Gendarmerie commander will no longer be listed among the top four
generals of the Turkish armed forces (Turk Silahli Kuvvetleri – TSK)
and will become subordinate to the Interior Minister, a reversal of
the current protocol (Today’s Zaman, October 25).

While the TSK General Staff appears to have given its consent to the
changes (or has at least decided not to oppose them publicly), there
has been opposition from within the Gendarmerie command. A letter from
General Mustafa Biyik, on behalf of the Gendarmerie command, demanded
a reversal of the reforms, accusing the government of ignoring the
wishes of the Gendarmerie general command and the organization’s
150 year legacy of service to the state (Taraf, October 26). The
Gendarmerie is also proving reluctant to transfer command in urban
jurisdictions to the national police.

In August, General Avni Atilla Isık, former staff commander of the
Turkish Land Forces, became the new commander of the Gendarmerie. While
General Isik has shifted to the Gendarmerie from the army, the new
Gendarmerie Chief of Staff is Lieutenant General Mustafa Biyik, a
career Gendarmerie officer, having joined the organization in 1975
(jandarma.tsk.tr). Commanders are frequently drawn from the army,
returning there after a period with the Gendarmerie.

Addressing a Controversial Legacy

For a force seeking to prove it has adopted European Union standards,
the Turkish gendarmerie is facing an embarrassing assortment of
court cases related to abuses of power. A court in Trabzon has ruled
that the case of two Gendarmerie sergeants accused of having prior
knowledge of the 2007 murder of Armenian journalist Hrant Dink can
now go to trial. A gendarmerie Colonel is facing similar charges
(Today’s Zaman, November 12). Former Gendarmerie commander Sener
Eruygur is among those charged with participation in the Ergenekon
plot (Yeni Safak, November 9; NTV November 11). Gendarmerie men are
among those implicated in the beating death of a detained protestor
last month (Anatolia, November 17; Hurriyet, November 17).

The most controversial branch of the Gendarmerie does not appear
on the command chart. This is the Jandarma Istihbarat ve Terorle
Mucadele (JITEM), the Gendarmerie’s intelligence and anti-terrorism
department. Long-maintained official denials of JITEM’s existence are
now collapsing in the courts, as ex-members of Turkey’s "deep state"
security apparatus testify to their participation in covert and
illegal activities over the last few decades as part of the ongoing
"Ergenekon" investigation. Without any kind of civilian oversight,
JITEM appears to have descended into violence and criminality, and
are often only tenuously related to the security of the state. A
recently-published book by a former JITEM officer, Abdulkadir Aygan,
describes a force for which assassinations were normal business and
even attacks on the state itself were considered permissible. [1]

As part of the Ergenekon investigation, retired general Veli Kucuk
admitted to being the leader of JITEM after taking over from founder
Arif Dogan in 1990 (Zaman, January 30). JITEM appears to have been
composed largely of ex-PKK members and NCOs of the Gendarmerie,
operating in small, largely autonomous cells specializing in false-flag
operations. According to Aygan, torture was common and detainees were
often killed.

A May 2008 study produced by Istanbul’s Turkish Economic and Social
Studies Foundation addressed the problem of the lack of oversight of
gendarmerie activities related to national security. According to
author Ibrahim Cerrah, a professor at the Turkish Police Academy,
institutional reforms are needed to raise the ethical standards
of Turkey’s gendarmes and police, which have often resorted to
extra-judicial means in countering threats to internal stability:

Legal and ethical violations by some security personnel may occur in
the name of perceived higher ideals, such as the protection of the
higher interests of the state and the nation, without consideration
for any personal interest. However, it has been observed in the past
that legal and ethical violations for short-term benefits can in the
long run cause more harm than good to the principles defended and to
the country… It is a fact that the problem of illegal and unethical
acts committed by some security sector personnel is not sufficiently
addressed. The most important reason for this is professional
solidarity resulting from professional socialization… Members
of the security profession are in a kind of unwritten agreement to
protect each other and not to speak out against each other, outside
of exceptional and compulsory situations. [2] Independent inspection
of the Gendarmerie as required by EU regulations has so far foundered
because of the organization’s dual allegiance – its connection to
the General Staff makes any outside inspection impossible without the
approval or even participation of the General Staff itself (Turkish
Daily News, May 14). The EU’s November progress report on Turkey
stated; "no progress has been made on enhancing civilian control over
the Gendarmerie’s law enforcement activities". [3]

The JGK Commandos

Other reforms directed at Turkey’s commando forces will have an
impact on the Gendarmerie, which maintains one brigade of commandos
to the army’s five. The reforms are designed to professionalize
the commandos, with only officers and volunteer NCOs of the rank
of sergeant and above being allowed to join the force. (Hurriyet,
May 8). The move to professional troops will solve the problem of
conscripts leaving the armed forces once their term of enlistment is
up, giving the commandos the benefit of experience and continuity in
their efforts. The new commandos will receive hazard pay for serving
in southeast Turkey, the focus of fighting with the PKK.

Conclusion

Professionalization of the gendarmerie is being imposed by
necessity. As law enforcement techniques become more sophisticated,
a lack of education common to many conscripts is beginning to
hamper operations, especially those done in conjunction with the
generally better-educated police services. Changes in personnel
recruitment are being matched by improvements in equipment, with
ongoing modernization programs aimed at command and communications
systems, weaponry, vehicles and other equipment. With unification
under Interior Ministry command, the police and the gendarmerie
are being encouraged to carry out greater intelligence cooperation,
an ongoing problem in the Turkish security services.

An important indication of the Gendarmerie’s new field of
responsibility may be found in Ankara’s recent approval of the
construction of 118 new posts along the border with Iraq, along
with the construction of roads linking the posts to urban centers
and other necessary infrastructure (Today’s Zaman, November 14). The
Gendarmerie is about to become a frontier force, with long postings in
sparsely populated and largely inaccessible regions. In this sense,
the Gendarmerie’s resistance to losing its last urban areas of
responsibility is understandable. The important reforms to Turkey’s
internal security structure may be seen as part of a general trend
in Europe away from paramilitary Gendarmerie-type security services.

Notes

1. See also Ferhat Unlu’s extensive interview with Abdulkadir Aygan,
Sabah, August 25.

2. Ibrahim Cerrah, Police Ethics and The Vocational Socialization of
the Security Personnel in Turkey, Turkish Economic and Social Studies
Foundation (TESEV), Istanbul, May 2008, p.40.

3. Turkey 2008 Progress Report, Commission of the European Communities,
November 5.

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