ANALYSIS: THE DANGER OF ‘LOSING TURKEY’
By Claude Salhani
Middle East Times
Dec 1 2008
Egypt
WASHINGTON, Dec. 1 (UPI) — Is it possible to lose something you
haven’t yet found?
That is a question being asked by two scholars from the Brookings
Institution in Washington, and what would happen in the event that
Turkey got tired of waiting to be accepted as a full partner by
the West.
Philip H. Gordon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution
and former director for European affairs on the National Security
Council, and Omer Taspinar, a professor of national security studies
at the U.S. National War College, as well as a director of the Turkey
Project and a non-resident fellow at Brookings, just released their
thoughts on the matter in a publication put out by Brookings, titled
"Winning Turkey."
They start off by asking, "Who lost Turkey?" and play off the following
scenario: The year is 2012, and a televised presidential debate is
under way in the United States. Following a coup by Turkey’s military,
the elected Islamist-leaning government is overthrown after being
accused of "promoting a hidden Islamic fundamentalist agenda and
selling out Turkey’s national interests."
As might be expected, Europe and the United States impose strict
economic sanctions on Turkey. The new government in Ankara responds
by declaring it would pursue a more independent foreign policy.
Turkey’s military government withdraws Ankara’s more than 10-year-old
application to join the European Union, suspends its membership in
NATO, bars the United States from the use of military bases on its
territory and announces that henceforth Turkey would pursue a more
independent foreign policy in which it would seek to develop closer
diplomatic, economic and energy relations with Russia, China and
Iran. Furthermore, Turkey orders its military forces into northern
Iraq to act against the Kurds.
The questions in this hypothetical presidential debate being asked
by the moderator are the following: How could the United States let
this happen to a relationship with such an important American ally? As
president, the candidates in the debate are asked what they would have
done to prevent this foreign policy disaster. Who lost Turkey? And
how can we win it back?
Indeed, there is a growing feeling among many Turks of being fed up
with the way they are currently treated by the West, and particularly
by the Europeans. In addition to the current problems facing
Turkey in foreign policy, the Islamist-leaning government of Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is accused of pursuing a hidden Islamist
agenda. However, as the authors point out, Turkish secularists believe
Western observers tend to underestimate what is really transpiring
in Turkey and to see the country more as a "moderate Islamic country."
A monumental mistake being made by the West is falsely believing that
Turkey has no other option but to align itself with the West. Turkey’s
love affair with Europe and the United States is a result of a policy
set out by Mustafa Kemal, the founder of modern-day Turkey. Kemal,
also known as Ataturk, saw the future of his country after the demise
of the Ottoman Empire, when Turkey retrenched itself within its borders
after having lost all its territories in World War I with Europe.
While the vast majority of Turkish politicians since Ataturk have
followed his ideas and remained faithful to the Kemalist principle,
there are no ironclad guarantees that this will remain the same in
the years to come. It is not impossible to expect future Turkish
governments — either through elections or, as the two Brookings
scholars point out, through a military coup, something modern-day
Turkey has already experienced several times — to alter the course
of Kemalism. Yes, this is unthinkable today, but who could have
predicted the sudden turn of events in Iran, for example, when the
shah, a staunch U.S. ally, was overthrown by an Islamic revolution?
Turkey represents an important ally in the Levant for a number of
reasons. The country counts more than 70 million Muslims, and despite
its paradoxes it remains the most advanced democracy in the Islamic
world. It straddles far more than just Europe and Asia; but with
borders with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Iran,
Iraq and Syria, it also straddles the Caucasus and Europe, as well
as the Middle East and Europe, the Arab world and Iran.
It should not be ruled out that Turkey one day might decide enough
is enough and turn away from Europe and Kemalist ideas, and seek
alliances with the Central Asian republics, with some of whom it even
shares a similar language, not to mention religion.
In conclusion, the authors point out that at this time Turkey is not
"lost." Of course, it could become so, unless current trends are
quickly reversed and Turkey is given a reason to believe its future
is well assured as part of the Western world.
With almost certain guarantees that the situation in Afghanistan
will get much worse before it gets any better, and with tensions
between India and Pakistan rising to dangerous new levels, "losing"
Turkey would be more than a monumental mistake. It would border on
outright stupidity.