‘CYPRUS ISSUE MUST BE SOLVED TO GET RESULTS IN EU-TURKEY NEGOTIATIONS’
Today’s Zaman
Dec 22 2008
Turkey
Dorothee Schmid, head of the Turkish studies program at Institut
francais des relations internationales (Ifri), has said the
European Commission is concerned that the Cyprus issue may block the
bureaucratic pace of the accession negotiations with Turkey.
"They want to have it solved one way or another but will offer no
solution themselves," she said, adding that the European Union’s
main mistake was not to solve the problem before admitting Cyprus
into the EU in 2004 as a representative of the entire island even
though the island has been divided into a Greek Cypriot south and
a Turkish Cypriot north. Additionally, the Greek Cypriots rejected
the UN-mediated Annan plan to reunify the island just prior to
EU accession. Turkish Cypriots supported the same Annan plan in
a simultaneous referendum, but the EU has not delivered what it
promised, which was to reduce the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots
and, as a result, Turkey has refused to open its air and sea ports
to Greek Cypriot traffic.
The EU suspended accession negotiations on eight chapters in 2006
because of Turkey’s stance and agreed to review the situation in
2009. France alone has refused to open talks on five chapters that
it says are directly related to accession.
The issue was discussed extensively at a conference titled "Turkey
and Europe after the French Presidency of the EU" and organized by
Ifri and the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV)
in Paris. Schmid elaborates on the subject for Monday Talk.
How would you evaluate French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s EU term
presidency in relation to European Union-Turkey and France-Turkey
relations?
At the bilateral level, the relationship has improved. At the EU level,
France stated from the beginning that it would proceed normally and
that it had no interest in antagonizing the Turks.
Please elaborate on how bilateral relations have improved and why
you think France chose not to irritate Turkey?
At the Franco-Turkish level, there have been a number of meetings and
contacts between the two sides. [Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip]
Erdogan and Sarkozy met several times. The foreign affairs ministries
of both sides have held regular consultations and worked on a number
of projects together in the Middle East and the Caucasus. Two French
ministers also visited Turkey in the last two months. In fact, despite
a strained bilateral political climate between the two countries,
there were significantly more French ministerial visits to Turkey
in 2008 than in the previous year. It was clear from the outset that
France could not afford to antagonize the Turks during its presidency
of the EU because it had to cope with a number of hard European
issues and it was necessary to prioritize them over a short period of
time. In this rather tense context, battling over the Turkish accession
process lost any sense of urgency. Then during the presidency itself,
there were two major crises to deal with at the EU level; one was the
Russian-Georgian crisis and the other is the financial crisis. In the
long run, the French administration’s strategy is determined by the
evolution of the public’s mood both in Turkey and in the EU. Currently,
the public is not in favor of accession on both sides. So there is
no emergency when it comes to dealing with that issue.
What is the next strategy going to be?
We are dealing with the financial crisis now, following which
we have to solve the institutional problem on the EU side. And
then, maybe, comes dealing with the political issue of Turkish
accession. Bureaucratically, negotiations are going on and the opening
of [negotiation] chapters proceeds more or less at the same pace every
year. The European Commission started to stress getting out of the
Cyprus deadlock as soon as possible so that the pace of opening two
chapters a year can continue. Also, the EU’s progress report on Turkey
was quite moderate. We are in a better situation than last year. We
can see that by comparing this year’s and last year’s conference at
Ifri on Franco-Turkish relations and its EU extensions. Last year’s
meeting was more of a diplomatic exercise than this year’s outspoken
tone. Apparently, the level of mutual trust has improved. People were
more personal, maybe even more worried and more critical, but they
could do it because it is easier to talk to each other.
But as the anti-Turkey camp in the EU continues to block the opening
of chapters over the Cyprus issue, how can it be possible to continue
with negotiations at the same pace?
We have to rely on the diplomatic efforts of both sides of the island
in the Cyprus issue. The commission is concerned that the Cyprus issue
is going to block the bureaucratic pace of the negotiations. They
want to have it solved one way or another, but they will offer no
solution themselves.
There has been talk of suspending the negotiations…
Partial suspension already occurred for eight chapters in 2006
precisely because of the Cyprus issue. Apparently, suspension was again
mentioned informally after the opening of a closure case against the
Justice and Development Party (AK Party). EU Enlargement Commissioner
Olli Rehn issued an awkward statement when he said the closure case
could hurt democracy in Turkey and that if things evolve in a negative
way, the EU could consider suspension. Later, the commission realized
that they were going much too far and that this kind of a statement
falls on EU member states to make and not on the commission. Although
the member states were cautious on this issue, they never took sides.
As you said, the EU blocked eight chapters because of the Cyprus
issue. Turks do not think that it is fair to tie the issue to Turkey’s
membership and insert obstacles.
Cyprus is a problem in the background of the EU-Turkish relationship
that has to be solved anyway if we want negotiations to get anywhere
in the end. We know the main mistake was not solving the problem
before admitting Cyprus into the EU. Now the Turks tend to consider
the Cyprus case as a political variable in a process of bargaining
with the EU while the commission is stuck in a legal approach and
some member states envisage it as a test of the normalization of the
Turkish political system.
France alone blocked five chapters that have no direct link to
Cyprus. Why?
The official position of France is that we want to discuss chapters
that are at the core of the accession process not now but later,
at the end of the schedule. Turkey holds the opposite view.
Turks perceive the French position as harboring ill will against
Turkey.
During his presidential campaign Sarkozy openly spoke against Turkey’s
accession into the EU. Once in office he has realized that blocking
things needs unanimity and that France cannot act on this alone. One
could say that the French are now resorting to a variety of legal
tricks to maintain control of the accession process.
What would happen if France went ahead and removed its blockage of
those five chapters? Wouldn’t it be a way of showing good will toward
Turkey — especially during its presidency term?
Just opening chapters is the wrong way of envisaging the whole bulk
of bureaucratic work. The next concern of the commission is that
the pace of reform really stalled in Turkey. Turkish officials at
the conference said the EU blocks Turkey’s way but this view is an
exaggeration. Turkey has been extremely slow in the last couple of
years when it comes to reforms. And reforming is a long and heavy
process. That is why the EU said negotiations would last at least 10
to 15 years.
‘Davutoglu shares with Sarkozy a common understanding of international
relations’
Chief advisor to the Prime Minister of Turkey Ahmet Davutoglu said at
the Ifri/TESEV conference that Turkey is the only candidate country
with the same leverage that France, Britain, Germany and Spain have
in the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus and in Europe. What is
your view of this?
What struck me while listening to Davutoglu is that he apparently
shares with Sarkozy a common understanding of international
relations. The rehabilitation of geopolitics and reasoning in
terms of spheres of influence is very much in fashion in France at
the moment. The "three-leg" approach — bilateral, EU and regional
level — can certainly account for the way the Elysee envisages its
relationship with Turkey.
Do you think Sarkozy can envision acting together with Turkey in
areas where Turkey has been active diplomatically, such as in the
Middle East and in the Caucasus?
In fact, Turkey and France share some interests in the Middle East and
the Caucasus and can certainly work out ways together to deal with
crises in the region. It was important that Erdogan and Sarkozy met
before the Mediterranean summit in July because it showed that Sarkozy
officially recognized Turkey’s added value — at the time specifically
on Middle Eastern and Mediterranean political matters. Other topics of
interest for the French could be energy and advancing French business
presence in Turkey. At the same time, constantly reminding the French
public that Turkey’s neighborhood is so instable and riddled with
crises may not be the best argument to ameliorate its image as an
EU candidate.
Do you think France and Turkey sometimes react in similar ways and
that this is why the two sides clash easily, as Davutoglu suggested?
They probably share some basic psychological features when it comes to
framing a vision and behavior in international arenas. Yet we should
not forget that they are not in an equal position when it comes to
talking about the EU: France is inside, and thus in a position of
force. When the Turks suggest retaliating against the French or speak
of using their veto power in a multilateral framework such as NATO,
I don’t think Sarkozy likes it, but I don’t think he pays serious
attention to it either. Davutoglu’s final suggestion that Turkey
does not really need the EU is more interesting because it implicitly
modifies the balance of power between the two partners.
How has the campaign of some Turkish intellectuals to apologize for
the events of 1915, which Armenians claim constitute "genocide,"
been perceived here?
It has been received very positively by the Armenian diaspora and
the public at large in France. Any evidence that civil society in
Turkey is not monolithic and that it is mature enough to engage in
difficult debates is welcomed.
‘There is no common EU diplomacy’
"Most member states are worried about political instability in
Turkey. Turkey’s political instability has influenced the country’s
image in the eyes of the Europeans. The balance sheet of 2008 shows
that Turkey went through a serious political crisis. We don’t know the
balance of power between the actors. There is a political compromise
now but it has not stabilized institutionally so we don’t know how
it will evolve. However, we had a series of diplomatic crises in the
region and the Turks clearly demonstrated their good will. They were
a key element in helping monitor crises in their neighborhood. So
in some way it makes up for the first part of the picture, but not
completely because, at the end of the day, joining the EU first means
working internally as a member state of the EU, being a ‘reliable’
state internally. So selling the EU-Turkey relationship as a win-win
game as far as diplomacy is concerned is quite tricky because we don’t
have a common EU diplomacy at this stage. Turkey can be a very good
contributor in that respect even if it stays out of the EU."
Year of Turkey in France starts in July 2009
"This is an important event which might impact very positively the
image of Turkey in France. It is an official bilateral event organized
by the French and Turkish foreign ministries. The selection of projects
is extremely important and civil society’s involvement is crucial. The
scope of events programmed will go beyond culture; in addition to
exhibitions, concerts and dances, business encounters and academic
debates will also take place. Turkey will be the honorary guest of
the Paris Film Festival. It will start in July 2009 and end in March.
Dorothee Schmid
Head of the Turkish studies program at the Institut francais des
relations internationales (Ifri), she holds a doctorate in political
science from University Paris-II. As an expert on European foreign
policies, especially vis-a-vis the Mediterranean region and the Middle
East, she has worked for the risk analysis department of the bank
Credit Agricole Indosuez and as an adviser for a French federation of
local authorities, Cites Unies France. Her research interests presently
deal mainly with political economy and the democratization issue as
well as conflict management in the Middle East and the Caucasus. She
teaches European policies and Middle Eastern issues at the Ecole
speciale militaire de Saint-Cyr, the Ecole nationale d’administration
(ENA) and at the Institut des relations internationales et strategiques
(IRIS).