WPS Agency, Russia
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
December 31, 2008 Wednesday

FOUR POST-WAR MONTHS

by Ivan Sukhov

RUSSIA’S POSITIONS IN THE CAUCASUS WEAKENED IN 2008; Positions of the
Russian Federation in the Caucasus weakened in 2008.

Russia began 2008 with quite enviable positions in the region. The
early election of the president of Georgia on January 5 disappointed
whatever experts had been predicting destabilization of Mikhail
Saakashvili’s government, but the statements made in both capitals
right after the election allowed the hope for certain improvement of
the bilateral relations rapidly approaching the freezing point. The
task Russia was facing was ambitious but not in the least
impossible. It was possible for Moscow to lift the transport blockade
off Armenia.

Armenia is traditionally regarded as Russia’s number one ally in the
southern part of the Caucasus. Neither Georgia salivating over what it
perceives as a chance to integrate into the European and Atlantic
community and licking the wounds made by conflicts in South Ossetia
and Abkhazia nor Azerbaijan aspiring to a more independent role in the
global framework of hydrocarbons production and export meet the
requirements. Armenia’s discord with Turkey and conflict with
Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh all but boxed it in. Its two largest
borders with neighbors are closed for the movement of individuals,
shipments, and capitals.

Resolved to support the Armenian political elite in the presidential
election there on February 19, became concession manager of Armenian
Railroads. Had Moscow agreed to discuss a gradual weakening of the
border and customs regime on the Russian-Georgian border with
Saakashvili following his reelection, Armenia Railroads would have
been part of the Russian railroad framework by now.

Transport corridors north to south would have "opened" Armenia and
facilitated prosperity and stability in the southern part of the
Caucasus. Recognition of Kosovo and Metohia by the Western community
on February 17 (and election of the president of Russia on March 2
that distracted the political establishment) disrupted this political
solitaire.

Medvedev’s state visits t Baku in July and Yerevan in October and
diplomatic activeness in general (the Meyendorf Declaration)
notwithstanding, Russia’s clout with the southern part of the Caucasus
weakened.

What Russia ended up with are two repressive regions that block
transport arteries leading south. Their strategic value comes down to
deployment of Russian troops totalling 7,600 men on the way of NATO’s
eastward expansion (not that the Alliance has made the decision to
expand yet).

Political cost of the escapade more difficult to live down. The former
empire has done it once again and sent its army abroad for the first
time since Afghanistan. Neither are indirect costs to be
dismissed. All of the northern part of the Caucasus wonders why
Abkhazia and South Ossetia are permitted to bend the rules (the
territorial integrity principle, that is) but Chechnya and Ingushetia
are denied this privilege.

Unfortunately, Russia’s positions in the Caucasus weakened in
2008. They are no more precarious than they were when the year was
beginning.

Source: Vremya Novostei, December 29, 2008, p. 3