Russia Blog, WA
Jan 3 2009
Pipeline Politics: How Georgia Influences Israel and Iran
Charles Ganske
Since the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, many
geopolitical analysts have tried to understand the origins of the
conflict, and explain both U.S. support for the Georgian President
Mikheil Saakashvili and Russian support for his opponents, the
separatist governments of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In doing so,
geopolitical thinkers around the world have sought explanations for
the conflict that go beyond the personalities of the individual
leaders involved, such as the Russian President Dimitry Medvedev,
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, and the Georgian President Mikheil
Saakashvili.
A New Great Game?
In seeking deeper underlying explanations for the sudden outbreak of
war in the Caucases, some analysts have pointed to an alleged "New
Great Game" between Russia, China, the U.S., and European Union, all
competing to acquire access to natural resources in the Caspian Sea
and Central Asian regions of the former Soviet Union. These analysts
claim that the U.S. became involved in supporting the Georgian
government with foreign aid and diplomacy in the last several years
primarily due to the construction of the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BKC) oil
pipeline, which pumps oil from Azerbaijan overland through Georgia to
the major Turkish port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean Sea and
circumvents Russian territory.
During the war, the Georgian government repeatedly alleged that Russia
was trying to topple Saakashvili’s government and attack the BKC
pipeline in order to maintain a monopoly over the flow of oil and gas
to the West from the former Soviet Union. The Russian government
denied these allegations, pointing out (correctly) that there had been
no structural damage to the pipeline whatsoever, and that its forces
chose not to advance on Tblisi when Georgian Army resistance crumbled
and the road to the capital was open. At any rate it, the BKC pipeline
had been shut down by its operators for allegedly routine maintenence
not long before the outbreak of hostilities on August 7.
The Prelude to War:
Disregarded Warnings
Since coming to power in the 2003 "Rose Revolution" in Tblisi, the
young and ambitious Columbia University-educated Georgian President
Mikheil Saakashvili had sought to cement his small country’s energy
ties with the West by bringing Georgia into the NATO military
alliance. However, this was a step the Kremlin warned many times that
it would not accept, having foreign troops and a military alliance on
its southern border. The Russian government was further aggrieved in
early 2008 by U.S. and NATO support for the independence of Kosovo, an
ethnic Albanian-majority province that had once belonged to Serbia,
Moscow’s former "little brother" ally in the Balkans. Russia warned
the U.S. that recognition of the de facto NATO protectorate of Kosovo
within Serbia would trigger similar declarations of independence by
the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which were
under Russian military peacekeeper protection.
What Exactly Was Saakashvili Thinking?
There is some reason to believe, based on internal discussions leaked
by Erosi Kitsmarishvili, a former Georgian ambassador to Moscow who
was later sacked by the Georgian President, that Saakashvili wanted to
eliminate the Russian-backed South Ossetian separatist movement in
order to head off a Serbian-style breakup of Georgia. Saakashvili may
have also wanted to clear the way for his country’s entry into NATO,
an alliance whose rules nominally prohibit entrants from having
ongoing border disputes. In any case, after a crushing military defeat
and the permanent loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, NATO membership
for Georgia now appears to be a far more distant prospect than it did
in July 2008.
The Biggest Miscalculation of 2008
It remains unclear why Saakashvili, or those who supported him abroad
who were hoping his planned offensive would succeed, believed that
Russia would simply stand by and allow its client state in South
Ossetia to be crushed. Every indication prior to the war was that
Russia was eager to draw "a line in the sand" against NATO expansion
somewhere, and a new untested Russian President in Medvedev would
react with a show of force rather than meekly back down.
Repeated Russian military exercises just across the border in North
Ossetia in the weeks before August 2008 suggest that the Russian
security services had at least some awareness of Georgian war plans,
either from its sources inside the Georgian government or from
intercepted signals intelligence, and made at least some preparations
to respond. Perhaps the biggest mystery of all, and the question that
historians will be asking for years to come, is why Saakashvili
thought the U.S. would risk war with Russia and ride to the rescue of
his overmatched forces, when America was already engaged in two wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan.
American Boots on the Ground in Georgia
When direct combat began between Georgian forces and Russian
peacekeepers in South Ossetia in the early morning hours of August 7,
the Georgian troops were wearing their U.S. Marine issued BDUs, with
small Georgian flag shoulder patches, Soviet-style helmets and
Kalashnikov rifles as the only way to distinguish them from their
previous trainers. There were a few score U.S. Marine trainers and
American security contractors on the ground in Georgia when the war
started, and the risk of inadvertent contact between American and
Russian forces was real. At any rate, all Americans were quickly
evacuated to the U.S. Embassy in Tblisi as Russian tank columns came
within twenty miles of the Georgian capital in August 2008.
The Marines were in Georgia to train Georgian troops for their ongoing
peacekeeping mission in Iraq. American special forces had reportedly
been cooperating with the Georgian military since 9/11 to hunt
international jihadists in Georgia’s mountanous Kodori Gorge
region. Thus, it was no major news story when the U.S. military
formally notified the Russian military about an American C-17
transport plane flying Georgian troops back to Tblisi from Iraq during
the war, in order to avoid any provocations between American and
Russian forces.
Postwar Tit for Tat Between the U.S. and Russia
The presence of an American warship, the USS Mount Whitney, in a
Georgian Black Sea port during the war irritated Russia. The Russians
responded in kind last month by sending the warship Admiral Chelabenko
to the Soviet Union’s old Cold War ally Cuba, as well as to Venezuela
and to the Panama Canal — all Latin American locales traditonally in
Washington’s sphere of influence. The response of the State Department
and White House to these "show the flag" Russian Navy junkets was
essentially one big yawn. At any rate, Russian sailors enjoyed some
nice shore leave in Havana as a result of the geopolitical posturing
of their leadership.
The Georgia Conflict and the Middle East
The connection, however thin, between events in Georgia and in the
Middle East has not been lost on many global observers of U.S.-Russia
relations this year. In a bizarre example of media globalization, Alex
Jones, an Austin, Texas-based American talk radio show host and
professional conspiracy theorist, has been a regular guest on Russia
Today TV since the Georgia War in August 2008.
Mr. Jones regularly warns his listeners about the imminent danger of
"New World Order Globalist Government" and the collapse of the
U.S. dollar while urging them to buy gold from his radio show
sponsors. Mr. Jones has claimed that America supported Georgia against
Russia in order to create a future base for military operations
against Iran. The fact that there appears to be no real signs of a
military buildup against Iran prior to President George W. Bush
leaving office on January 20, 2009 does not seem to deter Mr. Jones
from making such pronouncements. Russia Today, an English language TV
channel set up in 2005 as a Russian equivalent of the Qatar-based Arab
television channel Al-Jazeera, often gives Mr. Jones a platform to
expound his fringe views on a regular basis.
However, it isn’t just conspiracy theorists who have wondered whether
U.S. policy towards Georgia has at least been partially influenced by
events in the Middle East. Mark N. Katz, a a professor of government
and politics at George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia,
published an article about how the Georgia conflict influenced Mideast
politics, particularly the actual triangular relationship between
Russia, Israel and Iran, on December 22, 2008.
Quid Pro Quo between Moscow and Jerusalem
Among Katz’ most interesting claims are that Israel suspended its
relatively minuscule arms and military equipment sales to Georgia,
which consisted mainly of a few unmanned aerial drones and camoflage
nets, several months before the war started in August 2008. Jerusalem
also rejected Georgian requests for more advanced weaponry such as the
Merkava tank in an act of quid pro quo with Moscow, which reportedly
cancelled or delayed its own sale of S-300 surface to air missiles to
Israel’s enemy Iran.
How Israel and Russia Are Connected
Jerusalem rewarded Moscow for these steps by creating visa-free travel
between the two countries, which have strong ethnic and language
ties. Over one million Israelis speak Russian or have family ties to
the former Soviet Union, and many Israeli cities feature road and
street signs in English, Hebrew, Arabic and Russian. Post-Soviet
Russia has long had the economic and foreign policy goal of reversing
at least some of the "brain drain" caused by over a million Jews
leaving the country between the 1960s and 1990s.
Russia and Iran Are Not Really Allies
Katz also dispels the myth, widely promoted by some hawks in
Washington D.C., that Russia and Iran are allies against the U.S. and
Israel. "Frenemies" would be the more accurate description,
parrticularly since Iranian oil and gas may some day compete with
Russian energy for European markets, though most of Iran’s current
output goes to consumers in India, China, Japan and the rest of
Asia. Katz also surveys the Persian (Farsi)-language media to discover
relatively cool attitudes towards Russia, and the recognition that
historically Russia (previously the Soviet Union) and Iran have often
been rivals in the Caspian Sea and Persian Gulf regions.
In light of Israel’s ongoing military campaign against the
Iranian-backed Hamas militia in the Gaza Strip, Katz’s essay has added
importance.
The Implications of the Georgia Crisis in the Middle East
by Mark N. Katz*
The Meria Journal
December 22, 2008
The August 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia has not only had a
strong impact on the United States and Europe, but also on Israel and
Iran. This article examines Israeli and Iranian reactions to the
crisis, as well as its broader impact on regional energy and security
concerns.
The conflict that took place between Georgian and Russian forces in
August 2008 has clearly had a strong impact on Russia’s relations not
only with Georgia, but also with Europe and the United States. It will
be argued here, though, that what happened in Georgia has also had
important consequences for two Middle Eastern countries in
particular`Israel and Iran`as well as for the international security
environment concerning them.
This article will briefly discuss the broad impact of the Georgian
crisis on Russia’s relations with the West, examine Israeli and
Iranian reactions to the crisis, and then explore the broader
implications of the crisis both in terms of its impact on Western
energy concerns and on Israeli security concerns about Iran. First,
though, something needs to be said about the crisis itself.
GEORGIA AND RUSSIA`WHAT HAPPENED?
The August 2008 crisis occurred so recently and was reported on so
widely that a detailed account of what happened need not be provided
here. What follows is a summary of how the crisis emerged.
The Soviet Union was composed of 15 ethno-territorial `union
republics,’ which became independent when the USSR broke up at the end
of 1991. There were, however, also a number of `autonomous republics’
and other arrangements that had been created for smaller ethnic
groups. Most of the autonomous republics were located inside the
Russian Federation, but tiny Georgia contained three`South Ossetia,
Abkhazia, and Ajara. None of the union republics that seceded from the
USSR in 1991 was willing to allow any of the autonomous republics
inside them to secede. Russia fought two wars to prevent Chechnya from
seceding from it. From the time that the Soviet Union broke up,
though, Moscow has acted in support of Georgia’s autonomous republics
in resisting rule from Tbilisi.[1]
Abkhazia is in Georgia’s northwest, bordering the Russian
Federation. South Ossetia also borders the Russian Federation`and the
North Ossetian autonomous republic inside Russia. Ajara is in
Georgia’s southwest bordering Turkey (and not Russia). It is unclear
why Soviet officials chose to include the Abkhazian and South Ossetian
autonomous republics inside of Georgia instead of the Russian
Federation. In his narrative on the roots of the conflict he gave
during his interview with CNN, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin
suggested that Stalin`an ethnic Georgian`did this to benefit his
fellow Georgians.[2]
Moscow managed to contain ethnic tension during most of the Soviet
period. However, with the breakup of the USSR, it burst forth again in
Georgia as well as other former Soviet republics. Under its first
elected president, the ultra-nationalist Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Georgia
attempted to suppress Abkhaz and South Ossetian efforts to
secede. Georgia’s efforts failed, though, when Russian forces
intervened in support of the Abkhaz and South Ossetians. Civil war
broke out in Georgia itself, which led to the downfall of Gamsakhurdia
and the rise to power of Eduard Shevardnadze`who had been the
Communist Party boss of Georgia in the Soviet era before Mikhail
Gorbachev appointed him as Soviet foreign minister. During this
turbulent period (1991-1993), most Georgians were expelled from
Abkhazia (where they had been the majority), but many remained in
South Ossetia.[3]
During Shevardnadze’s authoritarian presidency, South Ossetia and
Abkhazia became `frozen conflicts.’ With Russian support, secessionist
governments ruled in both regions despite their self-proclaimed
independence not being recognized by any other government (including
Russia’s). Although it did not formally assert independence, an ally
of Moscow also ruled over Ajara with the support of Russian forces
stationed there. The Shevardnadze government claimed`and the
international community recognized`these territories as an integral
part of Georgia. Shevardnadze, however, did not attempt to regain
control over them as vigorously as his successor, Mikheil Saakashvili.
In the November 2003 `Rose Revolution,’ Shevardnadze was ousted by
Saakashvili who then went on to win a landslide election to become
president. Though Shevardnadze’s relations with Moscow were strained
and his ties to the West relatively good, the American-educated
Saakashvili was far more enthusiastically pro-Western as well as
openly anti-Russian. Yet in addition to claiming to be a democrat (a
claim that some of his subsequent actions would call into question),
he was also a strong nationalist who was determined to reassert
Georgian control over the three breakaway regions.[4]
By summer 2004, he succeeded in asserting Georgian control over
Ajara`the autonomous republic bordering Turkey and not Russia`through
organizing mass demonstrations there similar to the ones that led to
his own rise to power in the Rose Revolution. Moscow actually behaved
cooperatively in this instance and withdrew Russian forces from
Ajara. Saakashvili’s success in Ajara, though, only served to whet his
appetite for retaking Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well. Moscow,
however, was determined to prevent this`especially since Saakashvili
appeared (in Moscow’s eyes) distinctly ungrateful for its
cooperativeness in helping him gain possession of Ajara. Moscow
instead began to see Saakashvili as more of an adversary since Georgia
enthusiastically participated in pipeline projects for petroleum from
Azerbaijan (and potentially Central Asia) to reach Western markets
without passing through Russian territory, and as Saakashvili actively
sought NATO membership for Georgia.[5] The success of the `Orange
Revolution’ in Ukraine in 2004 appears to have convinced Moscow that
the United States was orchestrating pro-Western transitions in former
Soviet republics ultimately intended to culminate in one that would
oust the Putin regime in Russia.[6]
Russian-Georgian relations deteriorated further as Tbilisi pushed for
NATO membership and the reintegration of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
while Moscow stepped up its efforts to thwart these aims. Moscow
claims that the recent conflict began on August 7, 2008, when Georgian
forces launched an unprovoked attack against the South Ossetian
capital.[7] Georgia claimed that it was reacting to the massive influx
of Russian troops into the area.[8] Yet while how the conflict began
is disputed, there is now no doubt about how it ended: the Russian
military quickly routed Georgian forces, solidified Moscow’s hold over
both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and pushed into Georgia
proper. Moscow then extended diplomatic recognition to both
regions.[9]
In response to a French-led EU mediation effort, Moscow began to
slowly withdraw its troops from Georgia proper. Despite Western
demands, though, it has shown no signs of withdrawing its forces from
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Indeed, it has proclaimed its intention to
keep Russian troops stationed in both.[10]
IMPACT ON THE WEST
Russia’s quick victory against Georgia gave rise to concerns about a
newly aggressive Russia being both willing and able to assert itself
militarily not only here, but elsewhere in the former Soviet Union and
perhaps even beyond. Furthermore, the West’s inability to stop Russia
from doing as it pleased in Georgia was seen as evidence of its being
both unable and unwilling to prevent Russian expansion`and that this
weak reaction would only encourage the Kremlin to engage in it
again.[11]
Yet while President Bush declared that Moscow’s use of force against
Georgia was `disproportionate,’ it could be described as limited and
discreet. What Russia did in this conflict was solidify its hold over
two territories`Abkhazia and South Ossetia`that were already under its
control. Further, this was a move that appears to have been supported
by the Abkhaz and South Ossetians themselves.[12] Although Russian
troops also moved into Georgia proper where the local population
definitely did not support them, they did not overrun the entire
country or forcibly replace its government (though Moscow frequently
expressed its desire for Saakashvili to resign). Moscow completed its
troop withdrawal from Georgia proper on October 8, 2008, thus leaving
the situation much as it was before the conflict: Tbilisi in control
of Georgia proper and Moscow in control of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia.[13] Even Moscow’s extension of diplomatic recognition to
these two governments in August 2008 can be seen as less significant
than its having worked to set them up years earlier.
Yet while all this may be true, Russia’s successful intervention in
Georgia has far reaching implications. The United States and many
European governments have become increasingly concerned that Russia
will be able to extract concessions from Europe as a result of growing
European dependence on natural gas imports from and through
Russia. Western governments have sought to reduce this dependence on
Russia through promoting pipeline routes that do not run through
it. Azerbaijan possesses enormous quantities of oil and gas. During
the Soviet era, pipelines from Azerbaijan ran north into Russia. At
Western urging, pipelines have already been built running from
Azerbaijan through Georgia to the Black Sea coast (Baku-Supsa), and
more importantly, from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey’s
Mediterranean coast (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan). If they can be built across
the Caspian, pipelines from Turkmenistan and/or Kazakhstan to
Azerbaijan could also allow Central Asian oil and gas to flow through
Georgia to the West.[14]
Pipeline routes through Georgia are especially important to America
and the West since they bypass not only Russia, but also Iran`which
the United States has had hostile relations with ever since the 1979
Iranian Revolution, and which many European governments have become
increasingly uneasy about due to concerns that Tehran might be trying
to acquire nuclear weapons. With the construction of pipelines running
from Azerbaijan through Armenia to Turkey impossible so long as the
Azeri-Armenian dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh remains unresolved,
pipelines through Georgia are absolutely essential for Caspian Basin
natural gas to reach Europe without running through Russia or Iran.
What the August 2008 Russian military intervention in Georgia
demonstrated is that Moscow can quickly and easily disrupt the flow of
oil and gas through Georgia. Russian forces did not actually have to
seize control of the pipelines to accomplish this since the pipeline
operators themselves shut them down. What this showed is that while
pipelines through Georgia may be vital to the West, they are also
extremely vulnerable. Nor did Moscow appear particularly concerned
that the West would consider Russian behavior in Georgia as
threatening to European energy security concerns. If anything, the
Kremlin seemed intent on conveying the message that it was Russia, not
Georgia, that the West needed to have good relations with in order to
ensure cooperation on energy as well as other issues of importance to
the West. Indeed, Russian officials warned that it would be foolish
for the West to impose sanctions against Moscow for what happened in
Georgia since the West would lose more than Moscow would.[15]
THE ISRAELI DIMENSION
Israel had had good relations with Georgia before the August 2008
conflict broke out. Indeed, Israeli firms were important suppliers of
weaponry to Georgia. An individual with close ties to Israel, Temur
Yakobashvili, serves as Georgia’s minister of reintegration (i.e., for
Georgia’s reacquisition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia).[16]
Israel also had relatively good, albeit complex, relations with Russia
at this time. Moscow had ended diplomatic relations with the Jewish
state during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Ties between them were
restored only in October 1991 at the end of the Gorbachev era. When
Moscow pursued a pro-Western foreign policy in the late Gorbachev and
early Yeltsin years, Russian-Israeli relations were quite
friendly. However, they were strained in the late 1990’s when the more
anti-American Yevgeny Primakov served as the ailing Yeltsin’s foreign
minister (1996-1998) and later as prime minister (1998-1999).[17]
Russian-Israeli relations, though, improved after Putin became
president. Several factors appear to account for this, including a
growing trade relationship, a shared view that Russia and Israel were
both beset by Islamist terrorists, the close relationship that sprung
up between Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon (whom Putin
appreciated for being one of the few world leaders to express support
for Russian intervention in Chechnya), and (most unusually for a
Russian leader) Putin’s positive regard for Jewish people, which he
reportedly developed during his childhood.[18] Putin even visited
Israel in April 2005.[19]
Russian-Israeli relations, though, grew distant after Moscow announced
a major arms sale to Syria in 2005,[20] and even more so when (just
after Ariel Sharon became incapacitated and Hamas won the Palestinian
parliamentary elections in January 2006) Putin decided to allow a
Hamas delegation to visit Moscow even though the Quartet (the United
States, EU, UN, and Russia) had resolved not to talk with it until it
recognized Israel, renounced violence, and adhered to previous
Israeli-Palestinian agreements.[21] Israel was also unhappy about
Moscow’s continuing support for the Iranian nuclear program as well as
its acting to soften UN Security Council sanctions against Iran for
failing to comply with the IAEA and the Security Council on this
issue. Despite their differences, however, Russian-Israeli relations
remained relatively good.[22]
The United States and most NATO members expressed strong support for
Georgia and criticism of Russia after the outbreak of the conflict in
August 2008. Israel, by contrast, distanced itself from Georgia and
sought to placate Russia instead. When Russia asked Israel to stop
providing military support to Georgia just prior to the conflict, `The
Russians noted that they periodically accede to Israeli requests not
to provide weapon systems to countries that threaten Israel. The
foreign ministry in Jerusalem decided that it was time to put an end
to the weapons sales fete, which was threatening relations with
Russia.'[23] Georgian officials first tried to link Israel to their
cause by noting that Georgian forces using Israeli weapons had
performed effectively against their Russian opponents. Later, though,
they expressed outrage at Israel distancing itself from Georgia `at
Russia’s behest.'[24] The Russians, of course, criticized Israel for
having provided any military assistance to Georgia at all.[25]
A report that Moscow had signed a new arms agreement with Syria on
August 21, 2008 was followed in early September by a statement from
the Israeli ambassador to Russia noting that Israel had refused a
Georgian request to buy 300 Merkava tanks (i.e., Israel refrained from
helping Georgia to a greater extent than it actually did), and
stressing that Israel wanted close relations with Russia.[26] The
Russians themselves acknowledged that Israeli arms sales to Georgia
were limited when the deputy chief of the Russian General Staff noted
what Israel had sold to Tbilisi: eight drone planes, 100 mine clearing
charges, and 500 sets of camouflage nets. He also noted that there had
been no resumption of Israeli-Georgian military cooperation.[27] The
Russian newspaper Kommersant reported approvingly that Israel had
banned its arms dealers from visiting Georgia. `Of interest,’ it
noted, `is that the Israeli government ordered the freeze because of
objections from Russia. In Israel, they apprehend that the Kremlin may
set to large-scale supplies of sophisticated weapons to the states of
the Middle East that are hostile to Israel, including Iran.'[28]
Israeli concern about the prospect of a nuclear Iran is particularly
intense. Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad has called frequently
for Israel’s destruction. In addition, conservative Israelis believe
he sees himself as having `a mystical connection to the last Shi’a
Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, and appears to believe that a cataclysmic
event, such as a nuclear war with Israel, might bring about his return
to earth.'[29] Unlike `normal’ nuclear states, in other words, a
nuclear Iran might not be deterred by the threat of massive
retaliation from launching a first strike. As Robert O. Freedman has
explained, this Israeli fear about the intentions of a nuclear Iran is
so intense that Israel may well be willing, despite U.S. objections,
to launch a military attack against Iran in order to prevent Tehran
from acquiring nuclear weapons.[30]
Iran, though, could limit the damage from any such attack with
sophisticated Russian air defense weapons`if it could get them from
Moscow. Given Moscow’s threats of retaliation against any party aiding
Georgia, Israel’s distancing itself from Tbilisi is clearly aimed at
not provoking Moscow to supply Tehran with them.
THE IRANIAN DIMENSION
Though Moscow and Tehran are both hostile toward the United States and
the West, this has not made them friends with each other. Prior to the
conflict in Georgia, there have been serious differences between
Moscow and Tehran over several issues. Further, since the outbreak of
the conflict in Georgia, Iranian press commentary has revealed that
there is a debate going on concerning whether Russian actions in
Georgia have helped or hurt Iran, as well as what Iran’s interests are
in light of it.
The history of Iranian animosity toward Russia is quite long`far
longer than that of Iranian animosity toward the United
States. Incidents Iranians resent Russia for include the latter’s
seizure from Iran of the South Caucasus (including the northern part
of Azerbaijan) in the early nineteenth century, expansion into Central
Asia at Iran’s expense, intervention in northern Iran in the early
twentieth century and during World War II, and attempts to promote
separatism in Iran’s northwest both after World War I and World War
II. Soviet backing of the Tudeh (Iranian communist party) during the
Shah’s era as well as during the Iranian Revolution, when it competed
with Khomeini’s forces for power, was seen as an attempt to support a
group that would serve Moscow’s interests. In the post-Soviet period,
though, Russian-Iranian relations improved significantly.[31]
The United States (as well as Europe and Israel) have become
increasingly concerned about Russian-Iranian cooperation, especially
in the nuclear realm. What must be borne in mind, though, is that on
three highly important issues that Washington is displeased with
Moscow about for helping Tehran, Tehran is also displeased with Moscow
over for not helping Iran sufficiently.
Washington is unhappy that Moscow has worked to soften UNSC
resolutions imposing sanctions on Iran for not cooperating with the
IAEA and 5+1 on the nuclear issue. Tehran, for its part, is upset with
Moscow for voting in favor of any UNSC sanctions against Iran at all
and for even allowing the issue to be dealt with by the UNSC when it
could prevent this.[32] Washington is also disappointed that Moscow
has been building a nuclear reactor for Iran at Bushehr. Yet Iran is
unhappy with Moscow for constantly delaying the completion of this
project, originally scheduled for 1999 but which, despite its latest
promises, may not be operational before the end of 2008`or even
later.[33] Both Moscow and Tehran opposed the Bush administration’s
plan to deploy a ballistic missile defense system to Poland and the
Czech Republic aimed at Tehran. Tehran, though, was deeply displeased
in mid-2007 when Putin attempted to prevent it through offering to
share with the United States the Russian radar station in
Azerbaijan.[34]
There are other issues that also divide them, including how to delimit
the Caspian, and Moscow’s proposals for resolving the Iranian nuclear
crisis through enriching uranium for Iran, which Tehran doesn’t fully
accept because it insists on enriching at least some of its own.[35]
It is with this background in mind that the Iranian reaction to the
August 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict must be understood.
The Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman articulated a cautious
response, calling for a cease-fire and a peaceful end to the
conflict.[36] Some Iranian press commentary, though, predicted that
the deterioration in Russian-American relations resulting from the
conflict would benefit Iran, because it anticipated that Russia would
become less willing to cooperate with the United States and the EU-3
(Britain, France, and Germany) in pressuring Iran on the nuclear
issue.[37] President Ahmadinejad, true to form, blamed the outbreak of
the conflict on Zionists when he was in Bishkek to attend the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit.[38] However, commentary warning
against Iran moving too close to Russia soon sprang up.
In the reformist daily Aftab-e Yazd, Majlis member Mostafa Kavakebian
wrote, `[W]e must not put all our eggs in the basket of the bilateral
ties with Russia’ and even argued that Iran should not have a negative
view of the American ballistic missile defense agreement with Poland
since this was preferable than such a system being based in Azerbaijan
(as Russia had proposed).[39] In an example of Iranian worst case
analysis, another reformist daily, E’temad-e Melli,declared that
Russian-American discord could lead Russia to be more helpful to Iran,
but predicted that the United States would soon tone down its rhetoric
against Russia, and that Russia `might well rejoin America in its
attempts against Iran’s nuclear program.'[40] The conservative Fars
News Agency noted one benefit to Iran from the Georgia conflict: the
disruption of Azerbaijan’s oil export routes through Georgia resulting
in some Azeri crude (5-10,000 bpd) going through Iran.[41]
While many in the West decried Putin’s remarks during his CNN
interview implying that Russia would stop cooperating with the West on
the Iranian nuclear issue, the conservative Keyhan noted the limits of
Putin’s willingness to help Iran:
Putin had openly said that a change in Moscow’s stance towards Iran
depended on an absence of change in the stance of the West towards
Georgia and Ossetia. And this implicitly means that the Russians,
immediately after obtaining adequate concessions, would be ready to
resume their past conduct and cooperate with the West against
Iran. Naturally, this is a fact which would never remain concealed
from the eyes of the strategic decision-making body in Iran.[42]
He further noted: `In the West there is a serious viewpoint which
maintains that dealing with Iran and accepting a nuclear Iran is an
easier option than making a strategic concession to Russia in war-time
conditions.'[43] Aftab-e Yazd continued this theme, urging Iran to use
the Caucasus crisis to warm up to the West and move away from Russia:
`And try as the Russians have to prove their `unfriendly’ attitude to
Iran, some Iranian statesmen have simply refused to see this.'[44]
Putin’s statement that the Russian position on the Iranian nuclear
issue coincided with those of Europe and the United States was also
decried. Indeed, Russia was seen as going along with America over Iran
even at the height of Moscow and Washington disagreeing over
Georgia. The article called attention to the Russians’
`misperception¦ that Iran has no choice but to put up with their
unattractive conduct.'[45]
E’temad (reformist) appeared to criticize Ahmadinejad’s SCO summit
remarks, noting that:
At exactly the moment when Iranian officials were treating the
Shanghai summit as an opportunity for allying themselves with Moscow
in the Caucasian game, Vladimir Putin’s remarks about Russia’s
commitment to cooperation with America over Iran’s nuclear case threw
all anticipations into disarray and once again, the hope that Russia
would take Iran’s side in the Security Council was diminished more
than ever before.[46]
In addition, while many in the West see Russia as having won out in
Georgia, the pro-government Abrar declared that the `Russians are the
big losers of Georgia War’ since Russian actions had only resulted in
pushing Georgia even further toward the West.[47] Dr. Ali Majedi,
Iran’s former ambassador to Japan, told the conservative Jomhuri-ye
Eslami that, `The Russians’ behavior is so complicated that I believe
if, with some degree of flexibility, we manage to maintain our
contract with the Western companies it would be much better for us
than having any partnership with Russia.'[48]
The strongly conservative Javan (believed to be close to the
Revolutionary Guard Corps) reacted with great suspicion to the Russian
offer of increased support to the Iranian nuclear program:
In this connection the Islamic Republic of Iran¦ will certainly
approach this stance of the Russians in a cautious manner because
nuclear assistance to Iran would be tantamount to Iran’s entry into
the camp of Russia¦. And now it is very difficult to believe
whether the claim by Russian officials in this respect ought to be
construed as an [attempt to provide] assistance or seen as a tactical
ploy. This is because the Iranian nuclear card would only help to turn
the Russia-West crisis in the Caucasus region into an Iran-West
crisis¦[49]
This press commentary, of course, may not be indicative of Iranian
government policy. Still, the fact that it is occurring in a country
where freedom of the press is circumscribed indicates that there is
deep concern in Iran over what Russian behavior in Georgia means for
Tehran.
SYRIA AND HAMAS
The reaction of Syria and Hamas to the Georgian crisis was very
different from that of Iran. Damascus came out squarely in favor of
Russia in the August 2008 conflict. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad
stated, `I want to express support to Russia in the situations around
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. We understand the essence of Russia’s
position and believe its military reaction was a response to a
provocation by Georgia.'[50] He appears to have expressed these
sentiments as part of Syria’s overall effort to obtain advanced
weapons from Russia, especially the Iskander short-range missile,
which could strike targets throughout most of Israel from Syria.[51]
According to the Russian military newspaper, Krasnaya Zvezda, Damascus
has even signaled that it is `ready to consider’ a proposal by Moscow
to deploy Iskanders to Syria in response to U.S. air defense
plans`even though Moscow has not yet made any such proposal.[52]
While these plans have yet to come to fruition, Moscow and Damascus
have agreed to resume their naval cooperation. During the 1970s and
1980s, the Soviet Navy made use of the Syrian port of Tartus, but
abandoned it at the time that the USSR collapsed. In September 2008,
Russian and Syrian naval leaders met, and the Russian Navy was
`engaged in restoring the moorage in the Syrian port of Tartus for the
Russian Navy.'[53]
Hamas has gone one better than Syria by actually recognizing the
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[54] It appears to have
made this move not only to curry Moscow’s favor vis-Ã -vis
Israel but also vis-Ã -vis its Palestinian rival, Fatah.
The enthusiastic support of Syria and Hamas for Russian action in
Georgia compared to Iranian wariness regarding it suggests that Syria
and Hamas did not coordinate their policies with Iran on this issue,
but pursued them independently. This may be an indicator that Tehran
has less influence over Syria and Hamas than some fear or than Tehran
itself might like.
Damascus’s expression of support for Moscow’s position
vis-Ã -vis Georgia was followed by signs of deepening security
cooperation between Russia and Syria. The latter, though, may have
already been in process when the former occurred, and not caused by
it. Nor does this increased Russian-Syrian cooperation signal the end
of Russian-Israeli cooperation.
Further, it is not at all clear whether Hamas will receive any reward
from Moscow in return for its recognition of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. In late September, Hamas criticized the Quartet (which
includes Russia as well as the United States, EU, and UN) for
allegedly displaying a `pro-Israeli bias.'[55]
BROADER IMPLICATIONS
Russian intervention in Georgia has heightened U.S. and European
concerns about the re-emergence of a Russian threat, particularly with
regard to the security of petroleum pipelines running through
Georgia. It is also clear that, unlike Syria and Hamas`which expressed
their approval for Russian actions in Georgia`Iran has reacted far
more ambivalently. Tehran certainly has not endorsed Moscow’s
intervention in Georgia. Indeed, this appears to have reinforced
Iranian concerns and suspicions about Russia.
As Ellen Knickmeyer reported in The Washington Post, `The United
States has tried to discourage European countries and Turkey from
turning to Iran for oil and gas. With Russia demonstrating its ability
to control supplies through Georgia and the rest of the Caucasus,
Iran’s supplies are going to look more attractive to U.S. allies in
Europe, analysts noted.'[56] Indeed, in late September 2008, Iranian
deputy oil minister Akbar Torkan offered to build a gas pipeline from
Iran to Europe.[57]
There are two strong incentives for Iran to compete with Russia in
supplying gas to Europe. First, Tehran would not only gain much needed
revenue from its own exports, but also through serving as a transit
corridor for Caspian Basin petroleum that is less subject than Georgia
to Russian disruption. Second, to the extent that Europe does become
(or even hopes to become) more reliant on Iran for its gas imports, it
is more likely to seek accommodation with Iran and not confrontation.
At the same time, however, Europe, the United States, and Israel have
an ongoing concern about the prospect of Iran acquiring nuclear
weapons. The level of concern among them about this, however,
varies. Israel, understandably, is the most acutely concerned. Israeli
politicians and military officials have openly discussed the
possibility of bombing Iran in order to prevent it from acquiring
nuclear weapons. The United States also is very concerned that Iran
not acquire nuclear weapons. Yet as Robert O. Freedman has pointed
out, Washington increasingly does not see either an American or
Israeli attack as the way to prevent this. Such an attack might only
retard, not eliminate, the Iranian nuclear program. It might also lead
Iran to take steps that would weaken the U.S. positions in Iraq and
Afghanistan.[58] While European governments differ somewhat, it is
fair to say that Europe opposes the use of force against Iran for
three reasons: 1) European opposition to the use of force generally,
2) opposition to U.S. or U.S.-sponsored (i.e., Israeli) unilateralism,
and increasingly, 3) fear of how an attack on Iran might harm Europe’s
hopes for importing gas from and through Iran.
One of the most important results, then, of Russia’s intervention into
Georgia may well be to ignite tension within the West between those
who see Iran and those who see Russia as the primary security threat
which it is essential to enlist the other for support against.
Mark N. Katz, a professor of government and politics at George Mason
University (Fairfax, Virginia, USA), is a specialist on Russian
foreign policy toward the Middle East. His most recent articles
include `Russia and Algeria: Partners or Competitors?’ Middle East
Policy (Winter 2007); `Russia and Qatar,’ Middle East Review of
International Affairs(MERIA) (December 2007); `The Emerging
Saudi-Russian Partnership,’ Mideast Monitor (January-March 2008);
`Russian-Iranian Relations in the Ahmadinejad Era,’ Middle East
Journal (Spring 2008); and `The Russian-Libyan Rapprochement: What Has
Moscow Gained?’ Middle East Policy (Fall 2008).
NOTES
[1] Dmitri Trenin, The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between
Geopolitics and Globalization (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2002), pp. 167-86.
[2] `Transcript: CNN Interview with Vladimir Putin,’ CNN.com/Europe,
August 29, 2008,
utin.transcript/#cnnSTCText.
[3] Trenin, The End of Eurasia, pp. 181-3.
[4] Lincoln Mitchell, `Georgia’s Rose Revolution,’ Current History,
Vol. 103, No. 675 (October 2004), pp. 342-48.
[5] James V. Wertsch, `Georgia as a Laboratory for Democracy,’
Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Fall 2005), pp. 523-28.
[6] For a discussion on how Moscow has reacted to democratic
revolution in former Soviet republics, see Thomas Ambrosio,
`Insulating Russia from a Colour Revolution: How the Kremlin Resists
Regional Democratic Trends,’ Democratization, Vol. 14, No. 2 (April
2007), pp. 232-52.
[7] `Transcript: CNN Interview with Vladimir Putin.’
[8] `Busting the Myths: Whose War Was It Anyway?’ SOS Georgia,
September 1, 2008,
yths-just-whose-war-was-this/.
[9] `Russia Recognizes Abkhazia, South Ossetia,’ Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, August 26, 2008,
es_Abkhazia_South_Ossetia/1193932.html.
[10] `Russia Signs Treaty to Defend Georgia Separatists,’ Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, September 17, 2008,
eaty_To_Defend_Georgia_Separatists/1200807.html.
[ 11] See, for example, Stephen Blank, `Russia Is Dizzy with Success,’
EurasiaNet, September 26, 2008,
t/articles/eav092608a.shtml.
[12] `Abkhazia, South Ossetia Begin Joint Calls for Independence,’
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, August 21, 2008,
Ossetia_Begin_Joint_Calls_For_Independence/1192777 .html;
and Liz Fuller, `What’s Next for South Ossetia and Abkhazia?’ Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, August 26, 2008,
_Ossetia_Abkhazia/1194045.html.
[13] Russia, though, has not returned previously Georgian-controlled
enclaves inside Abkhazia and South Ossetia. See `Russia Pulls Back
Troops, Georgia Demands More,’ RFE/RL, October 8, 2008,
y_Pulls_Back_In_Western_Georgia/1294896.html.
[14] `Caspian Basin: Russia Uses its Georgia Position to Enhance its
Energy Leverage,’ EurasiaNet, August 25, 2008,
t/articles/eav082508a.shtml.
[15] See, for example, `Russian President Shrugs Off Western Threats,’
International Herald Tribune, September 2, 2008,
rope/EU-Russia-Medvedev.php.
[16] `Jewish Georgian Minister: Thanks to Israeli Training, We’re
Fending Off Russia,’ Haaretz, August 11, 2008,
html; and Tony Karon,
`What Israel Lost in the Georgia War,’ Time, August 21, 2008,
,859 9,1834785,00.html.
[17] Mark N. Katz, `Putin’s Pro-Israel Policy,’ Middle East Quarterly,
Vol. 12, No. 1 (Winter 2005), p. 51.
[18] Ibid, pp. 51-59.
[19] Greg Myre, `Putin Visits Israel and Tries to Allay its Security
Worries,’ New York Times, April 29, 2005,
nal/middleeast/29mideast.html.
[20] Mark N. Katz, `Putin’s Foreign Policy toward Syria,’ Middle East
Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 2006),
pp. 60-61.
[21] Mark N. Katz, `Policy Watch: Moscow’s Hopes for Hamas,’ United
Press International, September 1, 2006.
[22] For a relatively glowing Russian account of the state of
Russian-Israeli relations just prior to the August 2008 conflict in
Georgia, see V. Vorobiev, `The Herzliya Conference in Jerusalem,’
International Affairs (Moscow), Vol. 54, No. 4 (2008), pp. 76-86.
[23] Nadav Ze’evi, `Israel Freezes Military Exports to Georgia,’ NRG
Ma’ariv, August 5, 2008 (World News Connection).
[24] Karon, `What Israel Lost in the Georgia War.’
[25] Ibid.
[26] `Azari: Israel Hopes Caucasus Events Won’t Harm Relations with
Russia,’ ITAR-TASS, September 4, 2008 (World News Connection).
[27] `Russian Military Have No Info on Resumption of Georgia-Israeli
Military-Technical Cooperation,’ AVN, September 9, 2008 (World News
Connection).
[28] `Israel Bans Arms Dealers from Visiting Georgia,’ Kommersant.com,
September 10, 2008 (World News Connection).
[29] Robert O. Freedman, `Growing U.S.-Israel Gap on Iran,’ Middle
East Strategy at Harvard, September 5, 2008,
owing_us_israel_gap_on_iran/.
[30] Ibid.
[31] For a detailed discussion of this subject, see John W. Parker,
Persian Dreams: Moscow and Tehran since the Fall of the Shah
(Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2009).
[32] Mark N. Katz, `Russian-Iranian Relations in the Ahmadinejad Era,’
Middle East Journal, Vol. 62, No. 2 (Spring 2008), pp. 203-04.
[33] Ibid, pp. 204-05.
[34] Ibid, pp. 207-08.
[35] Ibid, pp. 202-16.
[36] `Iran Calls for Ending Conflict between Russia and Georgia,’
IRNA, August 12, 2008 (World News Connection).
[37] See, for example, `Commentary on US-Russia Conflict over Georgia,
Consequences for Iran,’ E’temad-e Melli, August 29, 2008 (World News
Connection).
[38] `Ahmadinejad Blames Zionists for Georgia Crisis,’ Fars News
Agency, August 31, 2008 (World News Connection).
[39] `Iran Must Take Advantage of the Recent Standoff Between the
U.S. and Russia,’ Aftab-e Yazd, August 24, 2008 (World News
Connection).
[40] `Commentary on US-Russia Conflict over Georgia, Consequences for
Iran,’ E’temad-e Melli, August 29, 2008 (World News Connection).
[41] `Azerbaijan Starts Oil Swap with Iran,’ Fars News Agency, August
31, 2008 (World News Connection).
[42] Mehdi Mohammadi, `Ossetia’s Crisis and the Issue of Iran,’
Keyhan, September 2, 2008 (World News Connection).
[43] Ibid. These observations appear especially important since, as
noted by World News Connection, the editor of Keyhan is the
representative of Supreme Leader Khamenei to the Keyhan Institute
which publishes it.
[44] `Daily Urges Iran to Use Caucasus Crisis to Warm to West, Move
Away from Russia,’ Aftab-e Yazd, September 2, 2008 (World News
Connection).
[45] Ibid.
[46] `Daily Downplays Iran’s Efforts to Win Russia’s Support in
Shanghai Summit,’ E’temad, September 3, 2008 (World News Connection).
[47] `Russians Are the Big Losers of Georgia War,’ Abrar, September 4,
2008 (World News Connection).
[48] `Iran: An Oil Partnership with Europe Is More Desirable than with
Russia,’ Jomhuri-ye Eslami, September 7, 2008 (World News Connection).
[49] `Iran: Nuclear Card Being Played by Russians, Says Columnist,’
Javan, September 10, 2008 (World News Connection).
[50] `Al-Assad: Syria Backs Russia Reaction to Georgia `Provocation,”
ITAR-TASS, August 21, 2008 (World News Connection).
[51] Ya’aqov Katz, `Syria Trying to Press U.S. to Sponsor Talks with
Israel,’ Jerusalem Post, August 24, 2008.
[52] Vladimir Kuzar, `Key Collaboration Factors,’ Krasnaya Zvezda,
August 26, 2008 (World News Connection).
[53] `Russia and Syria to Develop Cooperation in Naval Sphere,’
ITAR-TASS, September 12, 2008 (World News Connection).
[54] Paul Goble, `When `the Non-Existing Recognize the Unrecognized,”
Georgian Daily, September 22, 2008,
m_content&task=view&id=7902&Itemid=65.
[55] `Hamas Says Mideast Quartet Is Pro-Israel,’ Middle East Times,
September 27, 2008,
amas_says_mideast_quartet_is_proisrael/afp/.
[56] Ellen Knickmeyer, `Russian Offensive Hailed in Mideast,’
Washington Post, August 30, 2008, p. A18.
[57] Ladane Nasseri and Lucian Kim, `Iran Seeks to Build $4 Billion
Gas Pipeline to Europe,’ Bloomberg.com, September 25, 2008,
&sid=aez49fNjJoMU&refer=europe.
[58] Freedman, `Growing U.S.-Israel Gap on Iran.’
_politics_how_georgia.php