Today’s Zaman, Turkey
Jan 4 2009
Saakashvili pulled the trigger: Turkey between Russia and Georgia
Turkey has been involved, historically and demographically, with many
of the regions of `frozen conflict’ in post-Soviet space. At this
point, one might consider the position of Turkey as being at the
epicenter of Euro-Atlantic and Russian extremes concerning the frozen
conflicts.
Georgia, since 1991, has been considered a valuable `strategic
partner’ by Turkey for several reasons. Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip
ErdoÄ?an’s Caucasus Pact idea is a good opportunity to create an
inclusive (Russia, Turkey, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) new
foreign policy approach at this stage. This approach should be merged
with the representation of all the frozen or unfrozen conflict areas,
peoples, ethnic groups and regions included under the roof of such an
alliance.
Turkey and the `frozen conflicts’ in former Soviet space
Turkey has been involved, historically and demographically, with many
of the regions of `frozen conflict’ in post-Soviet space. The Gagauz
question in Moldova, the status of Crimea and the resettlement of
Crimean Tatars to their homeland in today’s Ukraine, the Chechen
problem, the Abkhazian and South Osetian questions, the issue of
Ajarian autonomy, the relocation of Ahıska Turks in Georgia,
the problems of Borchali Azeris in Georgia, the dispute over Nagorno
Karabakh, and many other frozen conflicts concern not only the
representatives of these ethnic groups within Turkey but also Turkish
governments, due to the activities of lobbyists acting on these ethnic
groups’ behalf. In Turkey, many such lobbyists are well organized
around advocacy and civil society organizations. They usually have a
direct influence on both the Turkish public and on Turkey’s
administrations. Beyond the agitations of the lobbyists, the frozen
conflicts themselves represent potential instability in the region, as
was recently seen in the latest South Osetia (5 Days) War. The status
of these regions as `instabilizers’ is one of the reasons why Turkey,
and probably the rest of the world, has had difficulty engaging in the
economics and politics of the region. Another issue that characterizes
the frozen conflicts is the existence of the former hegemon, Russia,
as an integral part of all of them. This latter point is the reason
why all these frozen conflicts have long been considered the major
obstacle to Euro-Atlantic interests in post-Soviet space.[1] At this
point, one might consider the position of Turkey as being at the
epicenter of Euro-Atlantic and Russian extremes concerning the frozen
conflicts.
Turkey and Georgia
Georgia, since 1991, has been considered a valuable `strategic
partner’ by Turkey for several reasons. The first reason really is
strategic; having a weaker, friendly country between gigantic Russia
and Turkey as a `buffer zone’ makes good tactical sense. It is assumed
that to be a neighbor of a superpower, old, new or reborn, is
risky. Second, especially after the invasion of Azerbaijani
territories by Armenia, and in the wake of the Nagorno Karabakh
problem, Georgia was valued again as the only direct corridor by which
Turkey could reach Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea, and the rest of the
Turkic republics. Thirdly, Georgia provides the best option for the
transportation of Caspian energy riches to international markets via
Turkey, bypassing both Russia and Iran. For a good part of the 1990s,
the Georgian economy survived thanks to shuttle trade between Turkey’s
Black Sea provinces and its own. The Turkish military helped its
Georgian counterparts in their ambitious effort to meet NATO standards
in their military and defense infrastructure. In some cases, Turkey
trained Georgian military officials, and some basic, non-sophisticated
equipment was transferred by Turkey to Georgia. The
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan crude oil pipeline, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural
gas pipeline, and Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railway projects were all aimed to
strengthen Turkey’s ties with the Caucasus and the Caspian
Basin. Georgia was seen as a key player in all these projects; the
need to support Georgia has thus rarely been questioned, even during
the Georgian civil war and the Abkhazian and South Osetian wars.
The Ajaria Experience and Osetia Fiasco
The general perception in the Turkish press is that Georgia’s
Saakashvili administration has failed to calculate the extent of the
Russian reaction to its attempt to crack the self-declared South
Osetian Republic.[2] But before considering the reverberations of
Saakashvili’s present actions, it may prove important to consider
their political precedent. Many Turks have not even heard about
Saakashvili’s similar actions in Ajaria a couple of years ago. Ajaria
was given to the Soviets in 1921 by the Kars Treaty between the
Turkish Grand National Assembly and Soviet representatives from
Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. Article 6 of the treaty explicitly
guaranteed the autonomy of the Muslim majority in Ajaria, which is why
an Ajarian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was established in
1921. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ajaria was ruled by
an authoritarian former communist, Aslan Abashidze. Although Abashidze
was not a separatist, he achieved a high degree of autonomy from
Tbilisi, especially after the Georgian Civil War of 1992-1993.
One of the first consolidation attempts on the part of Saakashvili
administration in the spring of 2004 was to liquidate Ajaria by
military means and force Abashidze to flee Moscow via the Turkish town
of Trabzon. Although this development agitated some discussion among
the Turkish intelligentsia about the rights of ` and guaranteurship of
Turkey over ` the autonomy of Ajaria, Turkey took no steps and raised
no vocal criticism of the issue. Since then, it is a well known fact
that the Georgian cross was inserted into Ajaria’s sovereign
flag. Some might consider the success of the Saakashvili
administration in `re-uniting Ajaria’ with Georgia as an inspiration `
or view it as a model for the current attempt to liquidate Osetian
defacto independence.
On the present occasion, Saakashvili’s timing was quite perfect. The
international arena was full of other matters. The very opening of the
Olympics was a showcase for world leaders to meet each other and to
appear before world public opinion. Unable to understand the timing
and the use-of-force motives of Saakashvili, some major columnists in
the Turkish media have started to make some analogies. One of them was
quite extreme indeed. Ferai Tınç, in her column in
Turkish daily Hurriyet asked Saakashvili: `Have the ones who shed a
green light to Saddam for the invasion of Kuwait said to you that the
Olympics are excellent timing?’3 The US and its allies were quite busy
in Afghanistan in their search for more military manpower from NATO
allies. They have asked Turkey repeatedly to increase the number of
Turkish forces in Afghanistan and to send some major combat
troops. Iraq still poses a major challenge for the US and her allies,
including Georgia, a former troop contributor. The Georgian attack on
Tskhinvali comes at a time when Iran-US nuclear disaccord is obvious
and the international community is on the verge of taking new
sanctions to force Iranians to give up their current position. The
Georgian leadership might have calculated their attack against the
separatist South Osetia as a new fait accompli just like their
experience in Ajaria.
Ahıska (Meskhetian) Turks and Turkey
Quite unknown to the international public, the situation of the
Ahıska Turks has been one of Turkey’s major concerns in its
relations with Georgia since 1991. The Ahıska Turks were one of
several ethnic groups subjected to mass (and in some cases quite
murderous) exile/deportation to Central Asia in 1944. Along with
Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans, and Chechens, they were exiled to
Central Asia and dispersed to more than four thousand locations in the
former Soviet Union. In 1989 and 1990 the Ahıska Turks were
targets of local ethnic violence in Central Asia and many of them left
Uzbekistan for Azerbaijan, Kazakstan and Russia.[4] Vatan Society, the
only representative institution of this very widely dispersed and
impoverished population, spent a good deal of the 1990s and 2000s
searching for ways to resettle the Ahıska Turks in their
homeland in Georgia. Georgian authorities had one condition for this:
Ahıska Turks were required to declare that they were ethnic
Georgians.
After 2003-2004, with the Saakashvili administration in power, there
appeared to be new hope for the Ahıska Turks. Turkey had
already received minor numbers of Ahıska Turk refugees since
1991. However, the major point for Turkey was to assure over half a
million Ahıska Turks that Turkey would help finance their
relocation. In due course, numerous conferences and official
gatherings were held concerning the situation of the Ahıska
Turks. Saakashvili, during his May 2004 visit to Turkey, accordingly
met with most of the representatives of the Ahıska Turks and
promised to do everything possible in order to secure their
resettlement.[5] Since then almost nothing has been achieved and no
steps have been taken by the Georgian administration on the part of
the proposed resettlement, a situation which continues to cause
resentment in Turkey. Moreover, in accordance with Georgia’s
commitments to the European Union, the Ahıska Turks were
obliged to apply for resettlement by the end of 2008. There have been
very few applications to date, due both to the bureaucratic
difficulties imposed by the Georgian administration and also to
uncertainties regarding the recognition of the ethnic and religious
identities of the applicants. Especially after the August 2008 South
Osetia war, the near future appears to hold few prospects of any
progress toward the resettlement of Ahıska Turks in their
homeland.[6] This gridlock naturally places further anti-Georgian
pressure on Turkish governments domestically through the mobilization
of civil society organizations working on behalf of the Ahıska
Turks.
The Caucasian Diaspora in Turkey
Both Abkhazians and Osetians are a part of greater
Causasian/Circassian diaspora in Turkey. Circassians in particular are
quite famous for their solidarity and public spirit. After fighting
against the Tsarist armies for a century, they found refuge in the
Ottoman Empire throughout the 1900s in several waves of immigration,
and were settled in disparate regions all over the Empire. The
descendants of the Ottoman Circassians are to be found in Israel,
Jordan, Syria, Greece, Macedonia, and even Bulgaria. But the bulks of
the Circassians have remained within the borders of Anatolia and have
taken important initiatives throughout the republican era.
Especially during the first Chechen War (1994-1996) the Circassians
showed their solidarity to a great extent. Immense aid and media
campaigns bombarded the Turkish public. Governments during this period
felt the pressure of this public barrage acutely, and took action both
by accepting Chechen refugees and by declining to impose strict
control over the type of `aid’ going through Turkey to Chechnya. But,
during the second Chechen War, with multiple factors (i.e., the
appearance of a visible `Jihadist’ influence there, changes in the
international dynamiycs, and the different governments both in Russia
and Turkey), Circassian solidarity with Chechnya waned. In contrast,
the solidarity concerning Abkhazian and South Osetian causes has
maintained its strength since the beginning of the 1990s. One of the
major civil societal platforms of the Circassian diaspora in Turkey is
called as the Federation of Caucasian Associations. The memorandum
this group published on the 9th of August concerning the South Osetia
war was entitled `Memorandum Concerning the Invasion of South Osetia
by Georgia’. The title alone serves to explain the stance of the
Turkish Circassian community on the issue. A similar protest was
published by another group, the Friends of Abkhazia in Turkey. Of
course, the stance reflected in these documents is expected to have an
impact on the government and political parties; it should also be
expected that Turkish public opinion will be shaped in part by the
lenses of such an approach.[7]
Georgians in Turkey
There is a tiny Georgian minority in Turkey. Although politically
quite active over the years, it is difficult to argue that they have
shown a similar solidarity to that enjoyed by the Circassians. Turkish
Georgians are Muslim descendants of Ajarians who stayed or preferred
to stay on this side of the border during and after the 1921
delimitation. Probably for the first time in Turkish history, Turkish
Georgians have organized a protest meeting in Istanbul in support of
Georgia. Although outnumbered by the Circassians, they are expected to
have an influence over politicians of Black Sea origin, probably
including the prime minister himself. Given the long-standing
historical and demographic concerns raised by both sides, Turkey needs
an approach that will satisfy Turkish Georgians as well as the
Ahıska Turks.
Kosovo’s Impact and Saakashvili as a Leader
Although Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize the
independence of Kosovo, none of the Turkic republics followed suit. In
this respect they have chosen to stick with Russia. Both the Kosovo
War of 1999 and Kosovo’s independence in 2008 were considered
important backlashes against Russian diplomacy and power politics. If
one includes Tbilisi’s `unequivocal geopolitical choice in favor of
the West’ and NATO[8] it might be easier to understand how Georgia
could become the very fragile target of Russian `diplomacy.’
Saakashvili has given the best opportunity to Russia for challenging
the new world order.[9] Without any short-term prospects for EU
membership, decorating or furnishing almost all state institutions in
Georgia with EU flags not only demonstrates Georgian leadership’s
commitment to this cause: it sends a message to Russia. But this
gesture is tragicomic as well. The author, just a couple of months
ago, saw many ruined schools and hospitals in the Georgian countryside
with brand new Georgian and EU flags in front of them. Russia is
exactly ready to do anything possible to see a more pro-Russian or a
more `independent’ administration in Georgia.
The Turkish media, especially those sources closest to the government,
are full of accusations against Saakashvili. There is almost no doubt
among the Turkish public that he is responsible for all these
messes. One writer queries, `Do you see how an irresponsible,
ambitious, hasty [person], no statesmen at all, employing nationalism
and religious symbols without any control, a clamorous leader, has
forced his country, his allies and his enemies into huge turmoil? He
has taken one of the most sensitive regions of the world to the brink
of a major war.’ [10]
These accusations are not without basis in fact. Moreover,
Saakashvili’s chauvinistic policy against the Muslim population
(Ajaras, Azeris, Ahıska Turks and others), Abkhazians and
Osetians also raises concerns in Turkey.[11] The one major promise
made by the Saakashvili administration to the Georgian people was to
enter into the EU and NATO quickly. For this purpose, Saakashvili
needed to eliminate South Osetian and Abkhazian demands and he was
also asked by the EU to help the Ahıska Turks resettle their
homeland. But he preferred to allocate approximately 70% of the
national budget to military build-up. While the countryside was quite
miserable economically, Tbilisi started to look like a surreally
reborn historic city. Perhaps even more troubling, Saakashvili did not
hesitate to use disproportionate police force against democratically
demonstrating opposition members last year. Saakashvili has failed to
create civilian jobs, preferring to invest in the military and the
state. Not surprisingly, Saakashvili lost support from his people
during last winter’s presidential elections and during the May 2008
parliamentary elections. It was the Saakashvili administration that
opened Pandora’s Box by beginning to bomb South Osetia as a result of
a search for a fait accompli or a miscalculation.
Saakashvili, until now, has not behaved with the dignity of a
president of a great people but rather has acted as a war
correspondent for CNN. One day sees him declaring war, the other
declaring ceasefire, and the following day begging the international
community for help. He might once have secured the full-fledged
support of poor Georgians in this catastrophe by employing his
extremely religious and nationalistic slogans. He is a caricature
now. Failing to consult his allies, his neighbors and his own domestic
opposition, Saakashvili is now the target of nearly everyone. This
situation marks a total discreditation of his leadership qualities. It
should not be forgotten that it was Saakashvili who pulled the
trigger.
Turkey in this Equation
Turkey has close historical, strategic, economic and ethnic linkages
to all parties in the confrontation. Therefore, Turkey has to take all
of these into consideration. The following points could be relevant
for Turkish crisis management and the reformulation of Turkish foreign
policy concerning the region:
Turkey should refrain from taking the initiative or in fact any direct
action toward mediating the conflict. Any involvement stands to have
important results in both the domestic and international politics of
the country. A Turkish initiative might alienate Russia, an important
economic and energy partner internationally. It would definitely
alienate members of the domestic Circassian diaspora and the political
elites in the country who support their cause. Any expression of open
political sympathy with the Georgian administration would alienate the
nationalist civil society and political powers in Turkey that are in
close contact with the Ahıska Turks and Borchali Azeris in
Georgia.
Turkey should bring the humanitarian side of the current catastrophe
to the forefront. War-torn Georgian regions, devastated South Osetia,
and economically backward Abkhazia should be the direct recipients of
Turkish aid campaigns and investment. Humanitarian support would
satisfy domestic lobbies and Russia alike. Turkey should accept
refugees from Georgia’s war-torn regions in the short run and should
establish direct economic relations with Abkhazia and South
Osetia. This should include direct flights from Istanbul to Sokhumi
and Tskhinvali. The future of these regions should be liberated from
the decisions of chauvinistic and irresponsible parties’ personal
decisions.
In the medium and long term, Turkey should take the initiative to
re-build Georgia with huge grants. However this time the grants should
concentrate on building the country’s civilian infrastructure, such as
schools, hospitals, and electricity and water investments. The
humanitarian-centered approach should also be valid for this
re-building attempt. Within this context, Turkey and Western allies
should allocate funds to invite thousands of Georgian, Abkhazian,
Osetian, Azeri, Ahıska, Mingrealian all other ethnic students
to complete their higher education in the liberal democracies of the
West.
In the post-war re-formulation of Turkish foreign policy, the
Tbilisicentered approach should be replaced by a multi-faceted
approach, including the creation of political ties with Abkhazia,
South Osetia and Ajaria. If Turkey fails to make such connections,
those regions are destined to establish ties only with the Russian
Federation, currently the only country in the world struggling to
explain the problems of the region’s people. This burden should be
lifted from the shoulders of Russia. Power politics and Russia’s
ambitions for hegemony arguable shadow Russia’s humanitarian aid to
those regions.
Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip ErdoÄ?an’s Caucasus Pact idea is a
good opportunity to create an inclusive (Russia, Turkey, Georgia,
Armenia, and Azerbaijan) new foreign policy approach at this
stage. This approach should be merged with the representation of all
the frozen or unfrozen conflict areas, peoples, ethnic groups and
regions included under the roof of such an alliance. ErdoÄ?an’s
approach could be productively supported by economic and energy
concerns and, perhaps more importantly, with more humanitarian and
inter-ethnic dialogue patterns.
If Turkey could develop such an inclusive approach, not only
establishing relations with the `centers’ of the nation states but
also with the `problematic regions’ by capitalizing on its historical
and ethnic heritage, it would succeed in establishing secure links
between its allies in the West and those regions without alienating
any regional power.
—————————————— ———————-
SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research
[1]Vladimir Socor, `The Frozen Conflicts: A Challenge to Euro-Atlantic
Interests,’ Report prepared by the German Marshall Fund of the United
States, on the occasion of the NATO Summit 2004.
[2] Semih Ä°diz, `Türkiye’yi Batı’ya iten
Rusya’dır,’ Milliyet, 11 August 2008.
[3] Ferai Tınç, `Gürcü Lideri Kim
Ä°tti?’ Hürriyet, 11.8.2008.
[4] Calep Daniloff, `The Exile of the Meskheti Turks: Still Homesick
Half a Century Later,’ Azerbaijan International, Spring 1997, (5.1)
pp. 12-16.
[5] The speech of Turkish MP Ensar Ã-Ä?üt at the
Turkish Grand National Assembly, 22nd term, 2nd legislative year,
110th session, July 6, 2004.
[6] Ã?aÄ?rı Erhan, `Gürcistan’daki Durum
Ahıska Türklerinin
Dönü& #xC5;?ünü İmkansız
KılÄ ;±yor,’ ASAM Analysis, 11 August 2008.
[7] This point of view has a long precedent: the Federation has
declared that the inclusion of South Osetia and Abkhazia in Georgia in
the first place were criminal acts on the part of Stalin, who acted in
order to promote his home country Georgia within the Soviet Union. See
Kafkas Dernekleri Federasyonu, `Gürcistan’ın
Gün ey Osetya’yı Ä°Å?gali Nedeni Ä°le
Yayınladı 4;?ımız Bidiridir,’
9.8.2008. However the historical background of the inclusion of these
two regions into the lands of Georgia is a bit different.
[8] Igor Torbakov, `New Caucasus War: All Sides are Likely to Lose,’
Upcoming article by Dr. Torbakov sent to the author in 11.8.2008.
[9] Fehmi Koru, `Dikkatle ve Ä°htiyatla,’ Yeni Å?afak, 12
August 2008.
[10] İbrahim Karagül, `Bir Delinin
BaÅ?ımıza AçtıÄ?ı
Bela ya Bakın,’ Yeni Å?afak, 12 August 2008.
[11] Hakan Albayrak, `SaakaÅ?vili ve Å?ovenist Siyasetin
Ä°flası,’ Yeni Å?afak, 11 August 2008.
[*] PhD International Relations, Bilkent University,
Ankara. karasar@bilkent.edu.tr
26 August 2008, Tuesday
HASAN ALI KARASAR