NK: FROZEN, BUT NOT STILL
By Richard Giragosian

ISN
-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?coguid=A647C846-E3 F9-CF68-A317-42373E9ED3FB&lng=en&id=95151
Jan 9 2009
Switzerland

With the ripple effect of the Russian-Georgian conflict still apparent
and Turkey inching closer to Armenia, the Nagorno-Karabakh issue
seems no closer to being resolved, writes Richard Giragosian for ISN
Security Watch.

Nearly five months after the August 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict that
culminated in Moscow’s recognition of the self-declared independence
of Georgia’s two separatists regions, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
remains as the last "frozen conflict" in the South Caucasus. While
international mediation of the Karabakh conflict continues to pressure
the rival Armenian and Azerbaijani sides to maintain the peace process,
the new post-August geopolitical landscape in the region suggests
that a resolution to this conflict remains a long way away.

The outlook for progress in mediating this conflict is only further
complicated by Russia’s newfound consolidation of power and influence
in the region, as well as by Azerbaijan’s threats to settle the
conflict by force, a militant rhetoric that has been only bolstered
by a massive increase in defense spending in recent years. But with
the EU now directly engaged in the region – with monitors deployed
in Georgia – and an incoming US administration eager to make its mark
on a new post-Bush foreign policy, this region may very well devolve
into an arena for strategic competition.

Conducted through the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe’s (OSCE) tri-partite Minsk Group, co-chaired by the US,
Russia and France, this ongoing mediation effort has only increased
in the wake of the Georgian war, even driving the three disparate
powers into a closer alignment on the Karabakh issue.

But commenting on the US view of the new post-August landscape in
an 29 December interview 29 December with Armenia’s Hetq Online, US
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza noted that "Russia’s
invasion of Georgia has had a major impact on regional developments,"
with Russia demonstrating that it was "willing to use overwhelming
force" and "take military actions that threaten the flow of Caspian
energy to global markets and of vital goods to Armenia via Georgia."

Yet Bryza also asserted that the war in Georgia also "showed that the
international community is willing and able to impose serious costs
on Russia for such belligerent behavior." Tracing Russia’s current
"constructive response to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict" as at least
in part due to those "costs," the US officials stressed that Russian
President Dmitri Medvedev’s November summit meeting in Moscow with
his Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts "made an important and
positive contribution to the Minsk Group peace process."

Weighing volatility

Pointing to the need for even greater coordination between Moscow and
Washington, Bryza was optimistic, adding that the signing of a joint
statement by the three leaders during the Moscow summit reaffirmed
"the need for a political and, therefore, peaceful settlement of
the conflict."

Somewhat ironically, prior to August, the three so-called "frozen
conflicts" in the South Caucasus were commonly viewed as irrefutable
elements of the post-Soviet regional landscape. Although the unresolved
conflicts over South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh were the
subject of institutionalized international mediation, the lack of open
hostilities fostered a sense that despite the need for resolution,
none of these conflicts posed an insurmountable impediment to stability
or security in the region.

While such a view tended to promote a seemingly stable process
of conflict management over conflict resolution, one of the more
significant lessons from the conflict in Georgia this past August
was the demonstration of the inherent danger of underestimating the
volatility of such lingering and unresolved issues. And although
the Russian recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia has effectively
imposed a one-sided resolution to those conflicts, Nagorno-Karabakh now
stands as not only the region’s sole remaining frozen conflict, but may
emerge as the most serious threat to regional stability and security.

Moreover, the potential for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to emerge
as a new threat to regional security stems from two key factors.

First, Russian policy toward the Karabakh issue is markedly different
from its approach to the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. For
Moscow, Nagorno-Karabakh is unique and reflects a very different
correlation of interests. Unlike the Georgian conflicts, Russia’s
ever-close relationship with Armenia, the only country in the region
to host a Russian military presence, prevents Moscow from seeking any
real resolution, maintaining the unresolved nature of the conflict
as a very effective means of leverage.

In this way, Russia favors the "status quo" of active mediation, but
always well short of the pressure needed to push the parties toward
a lasting solution. But at the same time, again unlike the Georgian
model, Russian preference for the status quo also necessitates close
cooperation with the US within the OSCE mediation process.

But Armenian journalist David Petrosyan, writing for the
English-language Noyan Tapan weekly, also argues that Russia is key
and cites Azerbaijani analyst Arif Yunus as seeing Moscow’s assent
as a prelude to "the realization" of any negotiated resolution. Yet
Yunus is also quoted as expressing doubt over Russia’s sincerity,
adding that "if the Kremlin has some plan, for sure it does not
envisage a complete and final settlement of the conflict." Moreover,
Yunus is cited as arguing that in the event of a settlement, Armenia’s
"dependence on Russia will weaken" and "the issue of withdrawal of
the Russian military base from Armenia will be on the agenda."

Second, the danger for renewed instability is rooted in a misreading
of the lessons from the Georgia. Specifically, Azerbaijan’s steady
stream of threats of military action to retake the Karabakh enclave
reflects a very different view of the August war. For some in Baku,
the Georgian decision to resort to military means to resolve its
frozen conflict was not necessarily wrong. Rather, in this view,
the Georgian mistake was to launch military operations before the
Georgian forces were ready, reflecting an error in preparation that
some in Azerbaijan assert will not be repeated in Baku.

Such militant rhetoric of Azerbaijan’s leadership was renewed in
President Ilham Aliyev’s nationally televised New Year address, in
which he laid claim to Nagorno-Karabakh as "an ancient Azerbaijani
land" and vowed to "make every effort to restore Azerbaijan’s
territorial integrity," adding that "we can use political, diplomatic
and, if necessary, military means." And unlike his past posturing,
Aliyev went further, saying that "only the first stage of the war
ended, and we must be prepared to free our lands of occupiers by
any means and at any moment." He then noted that Azerbaijan has
"demonstrated our military might to everyone."

The Azerbaijani leader’s threats coincided with a visit to the
frontline by his Armenian counterpart just days after the new
year, although President Serzh Sarkisian made little reference to
the conflict in his televised New Year’s message to the Armenian
people. For his part, Sarkisian argued that Georgia’s ill-fated attempt
to restore its control over South Ossetia by military means had a
"sobering impact" on Azerbaijan.

This has, in turn, fostered a reaction in both Armenia and Karabakh,
driving militancy over moderation. In an interview with Armenpress
conducted on 27 December in the Karabakh capital Stepanakert,
Nagorno-Karabakh President Bako Sahakian said that the "aggressive
and anti-Armenian policy waged by the authorities of Azerbaijani,
sharp drastic increases in military spending, frequent violations of
the cease-fire regime require us to be more vigilant and purposeful
in strengthening defense potential of the country."

Sahakian also warned that although the military posture of Karabakh
forces was essentially defensive in nature, the "high level of combat
readiness and fighting strength" meant that the Karabakh armed forces
could, "if necessary," launch "military operations deep into the
territory of an aggressor state."

Turkey warms to Armenia

On a broader level, Karabakh also represents an even greater obstacle
to new opportunities for regional stability. As former deputy foreign
minister of Nagorno-Karabakh Masis Mayilian asserted recently,
the "Karabakh conflict is the key to any substantial progress
in ensuring security and achieving agreement on cooperation in
the South Caucasus." He further argued that "ensuring security
of the Karabakh people is the key issue in the settlement of the
conflict with Azerbaijan," claiming that "Karabakh’s security can be
provided for only by recognition of the independent statehood of the
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic."

Such a stance seems to diminish the recent promise offered by the
breakthrough in Turkish-Armenian diplomacy, however. After launching
this new diplomatic initiative, Turkey confirmed that its opening
toward Armenia has reflected a realization that its prior policy of
linking the Karabakh issue to any normalization of relations with
Armenia has failed. And in September, Turkish President Abdullah
Gul became the first-ever Turkish head of state to visit Armenia,
in a bold reversal of Turkish policy.

Turkey has also worked hard to reassure Azerbaijan, most recently
demonstrated in a press conference on 1 December in Baku, where
Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan defended Turkey’s diplomatic
efforts to improve ties with Armenia, arguing that "the normalization
of Turkish-Armenian relations would have a positive impact on the
Azerbaijan-Armenia talks over Nagorno-Karabakh."

Regarding this Turkish-Armenian breakthrough, US official Bryza
stated that "Turkey and Armenia have a chance to make an historic
breakthrough by normalizing their relations" that "would mark a
dramatic and positive development for the entire region." Such a
breakthrough would also "accelerate the Karabakh peace process by
helping to change the psychology from one of pressure and threats to
one of compromise and mutual gain."

Yet is seems more realistic to anticipate yet another missed
opportunity, with the promise for regional security and stability
remaining as elusive as ever.

Richard Giragosian is a Washington-based analyst specializing in
international relations, with a focus on security, politics, and
economics.