ANKARA: Rethinking Turkish-Greek Relations Post Gaza Crisis (2)

RETHINKING TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS POST GAZA CRISIS (2)
By Christopher Vasillopulos

Today’s Zaman
Jan 21 2009
Turkey

What does Gaza have to do with all this? First, the Israeli massacre
of Palestinian civilians has made it clear to Turks, as it has long
been understood by Greeks, that Israel, at least since 1967, wants
to drive Palestinians from Gaza and the West Bank.

Within Israel the only serious dispute is what the borders of Greater
Israel should be. It should be remembered that Israel is the only
nation-state that refuses to declare what its borders are. Statements
regarding a two-state solution cannot be taken seriously under any
conditions that Israel has been willing to discuss. Unless pre-1967
borders are seen as the only realistic basis of a viable Palestinian
state, all other issues are meaningless propaganda. One recalls Adolf
Hitler’s repeated protestations of peace, as he changed one fact on the
ground after another, while requiring impossible-to-accept conditions
from his rivals. Secondly, the image that Israel tries to sell to
the world is believed by no one. Israel is the only nuclear power in
the region. It has the best equipped military. It is supplemented,
not just supported, by the US, militarily and economically. Third,
Turkey is beginning to realize that almost no matter what it does,
it cannot depend on the Jewish or Israeli lobbies to carry Turkish
views to Washington. When the Justice and Development Party (AK Party)
refused to allow US forces to use Turkey as a base for the invasion of
Iraq, both lobbies launched attacks on Turkey as a bad NATO ally and
as a tool of Iran. It was made clear to Turkey that if it wishes have
the support of these lobbies, it will have to condone every American
or Israeli initiative in the region, regardless of what the Turkish
people want or what Turkish interests might be.

Supposing all the above is true, what is the connection with
Greek-Turkish relations? Let it be said that we do not believe that
Turkey needs any other power or group to make its case in Washington
or elsewhere. Turkey is blessed with an expert, professional foreign
policy elite. At the same time, Turkey has tended to believe that
intermediaries with Washington could help deliver its messages. Hence
its reliance on the powerful Jewish and Israeli lobbies. Our suggestion
is, why not use the Greek lobby to the same effect? Although nowhere
nearly as powerful as the Jewish and Israeli lobbies, the Greek lobby
comes without the baggage of the Semitic lobbies. Greeks are not
slaughtering anyone. Greeks are not committing war crimes. Greeks
are not oppressing anyone. Greeks are not the perpetrators of
multi-billion dollar financial frauds. Greeks are part of the EU and
adhere to the European Charter of Human Rights. The Greeks, along with
Greek-Americans, have effective connections in the State Department
and in Congress.

Moreover, the use of the Greek lobby by the Turks would send many
welcome signals regarding stability in the Balkans and the Middle East,
economic development and openings to the Arab world. All of these
possibilities would be welcomed by the world and should be welcomed
by Americans, except for neocons or others under the control of the
Jewish and Israeli lobbies. Although extreme nationalists in Greece
and Turkey, along with reactionary diaspora populations, would be
horrified by closer relations between Greece and Turkey, none would
regret less dependence upon Israelis and their accomplices in the
US. The only justification of close ties with Israel has been their
influence in Washington. We believe that argument loses force every
day, with every Israeli atrocity, with every Israeli rocket and tank
and with every duplicitous statement from Israeli and Jewish spokesmen.

On the other hand, closer relations between Turks and Greeks can
call upon hundreds of years of cultural interpenetration and common
interests with respect to Europe, the US, the Middle East and Central
Asia. We have discussed the obstacles to the pursuit of closer ties
between Greeks and Turks. They are real. Yet with each day they become
more of the past.

How many Turks, whose population is the youngest of any European
nation, remember the Ottoman Empire? For how many Greeks is Ottoman
rule more than a story told by grandmothers? Would Mustafa Kemal
Ataturk or Eleftherios Venizelos allow grandmothers’ tales to determine
foreign policy? Of course, suspicions remain. Are they so powerful
as to make all confidence building projects impossible? Turkey and
Greece are NATO allies. Surely, as alliance partners, they could
engage in mutual security exercises in a multitude of ways. Does not
each nation have similar interests in controlling human trafficking,
drug smuggling, piracy and terrorism? Does not each nation have
energy needs that could be enhanced by a positive approach to the
oil-producing nations in the Middle East and Central Asia? What can
the Israeli or Jewish lobby do to match these common interests?

Let us discuss some thorny issues by asking questions. Would closer
Greek-Turkish relations help the Turks deal with the Armenian genocide
issue? Would closer relations help with Turkey’s bid to join the
EU? Would closer relations give the Palestinians more powerful support
in their struggle for independence, and thereby provide Greeks and
Turks better relations with the Arab and Muslim worlds? Would closer
relations lower the noise level of diaspora populations? Would closer
relations provide a more powerful front when dealing with the US? Would
closer relations help reconcile the Cyprus dispute?

We believe the answer to all these questions is "Yes." While it
would be foolish to expect immediate solutions to decades-old, or
even centuries-old, problems, change does occur. Who in 1945 could
have reasonably expected France and Germany to become the driving
force of European unity? Who in 1989 expected the Soviet Union to
implode? Who expected in 1919 that Ataturk would found the modern
Turkish state? Who expected the Greeks to run a superb Olympics? All
worthwhile projects take time and effort. This is what our grandmothers
told us, when they were being sensible and not ideological. In the
meantime, a unified, cross-cultural, bilingual and bi-religious
voice in the Eastern Mediterranean might have equally unanticipated
positive effects. Certainly, such a voice unequivocally condemning the
oppression of Palestinians is sorely needed. Surely there is something
to be said for that, as both Christianity and Islam proclaim their
inheritance from the Hebrew Bible: "Let Justice flow down like waters."

[*] Christopher Vasillopulos, Ph.D., is a professor of international
relations at Eastern Connecticut State University. Sema Emiroglu,
M.A., is a New York-based diplomatic correspondent.

[**] Editor’s note: In the first half of this article, published
yesterday, the authors expressed hope that the Gaza crisis would
encourage a rethinking of Turkish-Greek relations, emphasizing the
similarity in the strong Greek and Turkish reactions to the Israeli
assault on the people of Gaza and asserting that the similarity is not
based solely on mutual sympathy for the plight of the Palestinian
people. Despite the persistence of problem issues like Cyprus,
similarities in the role of spirituality and morality in society and
politics — presumably the basis for the strong public and official
condemnation of Israel’s actions in both societies — as well as
their tempering by secularism in both states, are compelling reasons
to give Turkish-Greek relations across the board another look, the
authors argued.