ON THE POLICY OF RUSSIA ON POST-SOVIET TERRITORY
Sargis Harutyunyan
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27 January 2009
Though the new treaty, which was signed between Russia and Ukraine,
generally settled the matter of Russian gas supply to Ukraine and
its transmission to the EU, but the issue still remains open.
The point is that Moscow and Kiev have not come to an agreement about
long-term price on natural gas1. And this means that parties have not
also come to an agreement about long-term price for gas transmission
to Europe through the territory of Ukraine2. Hence, one thing is
clear that the causes of the crisis are not excluded yet. Though
the parties have clarified the rules of the game for this year,
the crisis may be repeated in the long term.
The question is why Russia have decided to use its energetic
capabilities for the first time since 20063 although Moscow and Kiev
had a contract of gas delivery to Ukraine and its transmission to
Europe and on this occasion situation did not differ essentially from
that of winters of 2006-2007 and 2007-2008.
Situational analysis The main innovation of this gas crisis between
Russia and Ukraine was that Moscow implemented an important change
in the energetic policy with Kiev.
Russia had never suspended gas delivery, particularly to Ukraine,
before. If in 2006 Russia had reduced gas delivery to Ukraine for
several days, then in this ca se they had completely suspended gas
delivery since January 7th.
If we try to formulate somehow all what happened, then we shall get
the following picture: Russia shifted from the threat of use of its
energetic capabilities to the implementation of that threat. We can
draw a parallel with the war between Russia and Georgia in August
2008. The threat of use of Russian military and political pressure
towards Georgia (this had been speculated for many years since 2003)
transformed into the implementation of that threat last summer and
it is for the first time since Saakashvili came to power (in 2003).
It is essential to see "the true value" of those changes. If those
corrections caused the change of status quo4 in South Caucasus, then
all above mentioned tells us that in the case with Ukraine Kremlin
is not going to be satisfied with the positional achievements. The
decision of Moscow to move from threats to a implementation of
energetic capacities or in other words to cross "the red line" means
that even on the back of Putin-Timoshenko gas agreements Ukrainian
issue remains open for Russia, and in this regard Russia has passed to
"warfare". There is almost no doubt that in the near future serious
developments expect Ukraine and in the mid-term it will be difficult
to implement its "balances policy", which has been formed after 1991.
The only question without res ponse is whether Russia will succeed
to bring Ukraine back under its control and if they cannot do that
on the whole territory of the country then which part of Ukrainian
territories Kremlin will recognize "independent".
One more remark. As in the case of South Caucasus, in the Ukrainian
direction Russia also tries to gain the assistance of one regional
leader.
If in South Caucasus Turkey tried to take over that role then in
the case with Ukraine that role was taken over by Germany5. And this
is not far from geopolitical solutions implemented by Moscow in the
first half of the 20th century6.
Conclusions Time factor plays great role in all above mentioned.
>From strategic point of view it is important for Russia to make the
most of the US involvement in Middle East, which consumes diplomatic,
military, economic and ideological resources. This circumstance not
only restricts capabilities of American policy on the post-Soviet
territory, but it also opens "the window of possibilities" for Russia
to regain their positions after the breakup of the Soviet Union. The
decision of the USA to "leave" Iraq and to initiate new strategic
projects in Eurasia (e.g.
in the line of India – Central Asia), may be a signal for Russia,
which shows that "the window of possibilities" may shut down soon. This
conditioned the resolute steps of Kremlin in the lines of Georgia a
nd Ukraine.
As for Ukrainian issue, time factor is also important here. It is
not a secret that in the end of 2009 presidential elections will be
held in Ukraine. The decision of Moscow to use their gas factor to
put pressure upon (for the first time since 2006) is supposed to be
connected with the elections in Ukraine. It is not a mere chance that
during the crisis Russian informational policy considered president
Viktor Yushenko to be the main person who was guilty for that,
and gas contract they have signed with his opponent, prime-minister
Yulia Timoshenko and this contributed to the growth of her authority
in the domestic policy. It is not excluded that Kremlin will support
the chairman of "Regions party" Viktor Yanukovich on the elections in
Ukraine, but today the main aim of Moscow is to except the reelection
of president Yushenko7.
1The following fact speaks in favour of that conclusion. The parties
do not tell the market price of natural gas for Ukraine, which is
going to be establish on January 1st, 2010. On January 18th after the
negotiations between Putin and Timoshenko the parties stated that they
would pass to the international, European high prices from January
1st 2010. The same prices will be established for the transmission
of gas to the EU. As for 2009, it was mentioned that Russia would
sell gas to Ukraine with 20% concession and the latest would let
Russia supply gas =0 D to Europe through the Ukrainian territory on
low prices. It is known that the EU countries bounded with Ukraine
pay $470 per one cubic meter of gas.
In 2008 Ukraine paid $179,5.
2It is known that Ukrainian party connects the price of Russian natural
gas they buy with the price for its transmission to the third parties.
3To be exact it was in 2006 when the first large-scale gas war between
Russia and Ukraine broke out.
4We also mean the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
independence, which means that Russia made definite changes in its
policy in South Caucasus and this is not quite clear for us yet.
5Our conclusion is not only based on the monitoring of German position
in the course of gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine, but also on
some significant change which can be noticed in the foreign policy
of Berlin. The latest illustrative example was the open letter
by vice-prime minister, the minister of foreign affairs and virtual
leader of one of the ruling coalition parties (Social-democratic party)
Frank-Walter Steinmeier to Barak Obama printed in the 13th issue of
German "Der Spiegel" magazine.
Steinmeier called the new president of the US to take into account
Russian interests in international policy.
6It is possible that the instability in the former Soviet Baltic
republics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) is caused by the same
solutions and some American and British sources blame20Moscow for it.
7The results of the opinion pole, held by on of the centers of the
National Academy of Science of Ukraine (January 13, 2009) show that
Viktor Yanukovich has 30,3%, Yulia Timoshenko 16,7%, and president
Viktor Yushenko 2,9%.