GEOPOLITICAL DIARY: A DEATH IN AZERBAIJAN
Stratfor
litical_diary/20090211_geopolitical_diary_shadowy_ motives_azerbaijanis_death
Feb 12 2009
Azerbaijan’s air force commander, Lt. Gen. Rail Rzayev, was killed
outside his home in Baku on Feb. 11. He reportedly was shot once in
the head as he entered his car to leave for work, about 8 a.m. local
time. The circumstances of the killing indicate that it was planned,
and it certainly was carried out smoothly — suggesting that a
professional killer, rather than a random thug, pulled the trigger.
To understand what forces might have led to Rzayev’s demise, some
background information on Azerbaijan is important. The former Soviet
republic on the Caspian Sea is wedged between Russia to the north and
Iran to the south. It is a hotbed for Western energy supermajors:
They have spent a few tens of billions of dollars tapping oil and
natural gas reserves there, shipping energy to global markets through
Georgia and Turkey to the west.
Azerbaijan has tried to stay out of spats among Iran, Turkey, Russia
and the United States over who ultimately will hold sway in the region,
and for the most part has succeeded in maintaining a low profile. But
between U.S.-Iranian talks on Iraq, U.S.-Russian hostility over missile
defense, Russia’s war with Georgia last August, Turkey’s return to
prominence and an ever-hostile Armenia next door, Azerbaijan won’t
remain a sleepy authoritarian backwater for much longer.
At present, very little is known about Rzayev’s assassination, aside
from the fact that it bears all the hallmarks of the professional
contract killings that have become common since the Soviet Union’s
collapse. According to the Azerbaijani military’s general staff,
Rzayev’s car had been under surveillance for several days.
Stratfor has no specific intelligence at this time as to the culprit,
and internal political wrangling tensions cannot be dismissed as a
potential factor in the killing. Nevertheless, the victim’s identity
raises some interesting possibilities.
Azerbaijan itself is not exactly known for a no-nonsense attitude
toward law and order. Organized crime is a potent force, and
there are a series of clannish cartels — one of which controls the
government. In his position as air force chief, it would be surprising
if Rzayev were not affiliated with the cartels in some way. His
death could have been the result of a business deal gone bad or an
apology gone wrong; either way, when dealing with organized crime,
it is not hard to come up on the business end of a revolver.
As air force chief, one thing Rzayev was in charge of was a military
modernization program. Courtesy of newfound oil revenues, Azerbaijan’s
annual military spending now totals more than the entire budget of its
primary rival, Armenia. For any state that is nervous about a more
powerful Azerbaijan — Russia, Armenia and Iran all come to mind —
throwing a spanner into Baku’s military modernization effort could only
be a good thing. And of course, the shadowy world of arms procurement
in the former Soviet Union introduces all kinds of possibilities for
motives in the murder.
Just before its independence, Azerbaijan became locked into a war
with Armenia over the separatist Nagorno-Karabakh enclave. That war
dragged on for several years, and skirmishes continue to this day. The
conflict is a grounding memory for most Azerbaijanis and Armenians
alike, and Rzayev is a veteran of that war. That fact, combined with
his continued role in the Azerbaijani military, made Rzayev a potential
target for the Armenians, who are basking in a recent surge in Russian
support and feeling more confident about sticking it to their rivals.
Then there are the Russians themselves. Russia has been stepping up its
military presence in Armenia and flooding the place with cash. This is
meant partly to limit opportunities for Turkey and the United States
to gain influence in the country, and partly to keep Azerbaijan —
whose oil income has skyrocketed over the past five years — boxed
in. It’s also meant to flank Georgia, which is trying to break away
from Russia’s orbit. As a military official in Azerbaijan, Rzayev
could have been inconvenient to the Russians for any number of reasons.
Finally, there is the fact that Rzayev brokered U.S.-Russian talks in
2007 that could have seen U.S. forces integrate a Soviet-era radar at
Gabala, Azerbaijan, into the budding U.S. ballistic missile defense
network. (In the end, the talks collapsed because the Russians wanted
Gabala to serve as a substitute for the network, while the Americans
wanted the radar to be a supplement to it.)
A preliminary intelligence sweep hints that Rzayev might have been
beholden to the Russians in some way — arguing for the purchase
of Russian weapons systems, and even pushing the Russian viewpoint
in talks with the Americans over Gabala and with the Armenians
over Nagorno-Karabakh. This could have made him a foe of Russia’s
opponents — including his own potentially angry countrymen — in
any of these issues.
Or, in the Russians’ minds, Rzayev simply might have known too much
about too many things.