WHY SHOULD TURKEY NORMALIZE HER RELATIONS WITH ARMENIA?
Birsen Goksu
Journal of Turkish Weekly
d-turkey-normalize-her-relations-with-armenia-.htm l
April 1 2009
Armenian and Turkish press has been recently talking about the
rapprochement and possibility of the normalization of relations between
the two countries. In spite of fifteen-year severed diplomatic ties,
closed border and tense relations, the winds of change have begun
blowing between Ankara and Yerevan with the visit paid by Turkish
President Abdullah Gul to Armenia, upon the invitation of Armenian
President Serzh Sarkisian, on the occasion of a soccer match. This
historic visit was followed by a series of gatherings held on several
occasions, such as the BSEC or Davos meetings, where the parties
voiced their willingness with respect to the settlement of existing
disputes between Turkey and Armenia. Considering the lack of dialogue
between the two states since early 1990s, it is obvious that Turkey
and Armenia have entered an unprecedented period in their history
as two independent and sovereign states. It is currently a serious
point of concern in Turkey and Armenia whether or not these steps
will enable the parties to come out of the fifteen-year deadlock in
their relations. However, instead of asking whether parties will be
able to normalize their relations, a more important point that has
to be discussed is why parties should normalize their relations.
The conflicts between Turkey and Armenia gradually emerged when
newly-independent Armenia attempted to define Eastern Anatolia as
"Western Armenia" and not to officially recognize the borders it
has with Turkey. Following this, genocide allegations poisoned the
relations between the two as they began to be voiced more loudly by the
Armenian government and as the diaspora intensified its initiatives to
have the 1915 events recognized as genocide in national parliaments
all around the world. Nevertheless, the landmark event causing
Turkey to close her doors completely to Armenia was the conflict
over Nagorno-Karabakh breaking out between Armenia and Azerbaijan as
a territorial and administrative dispute from 1988 to 1992 and as a
full-fledged war from 1992 to 1994. Moreover, even though the term of
Levon Ter-Petrosian can be considered as more moderate with respect
to the genocide allegations in particular, the hawkish discourse
of Robert Kocharian, a Karabakh native and the region’s former
president, sharpened the tone utilized by Armenia from late 1990s
onwards. Finally, resolution of the disputes, reopening of the borders
and establishment of diplomatic ties with Armenia have been linked to
the resolution of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over
Nagorno-Karabakh, bringing about nothing but turning the situation
into a "mutually hurting stalemate"[1] for both Turkey and Armenia.
The nature of the conflicts between Turkey and Armenia is a perfect
example of hurting stalemate inasmuch as that both sides are damaged
by the continuation of conflicts to a certain extent. From the Turkish
side, stalemated conflicts with Armenia means facing the gradually
increasing international pressure with respect to the recognition of
genocide allegations, waiting the remarks of US Presidents with a bated
breath every 24 April and perceiving the threat of being obliged to
pay compensation and give some parts of Eastern Anatolia to Armenia,
causing Turkey to suffer from Sèvres Syndrome even 90 years after
the signing of the treaty, which feeds the "foreign enemies" discourse
of ultra-nationalists in Turkey.
>From the Armenian side, on the other hand, insistence on the
continuation of conflict points with Turkey costs the embargo imposed
by Turkey and Azerbaijan on this state, including exclusion from
energy transit routes passing through the region, limited diplomatic
relations with neighbours and dependence on the money poured into
the country by the diaspora because of lacking trade relations with
neighbouring countries, inefficient investments and young population
leaving the state, which turns Armenia into an old people’s home.
It is unequivocally true to say that associating the conflicts between
Turkey and Armenia with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and pushing the
resolution of this conflict as a prerequisite for the normalization
of relations between the two states only increase the severity of
stalemate both parties suffer from. Given the fact that Azerbaijan
has lost ground regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and support
of the third parties has tilted towards Armenia since early 1990s,
the support extended by Turkey to the Azerbaijani side is beyond
price and intensely needed. However, for a number of reasons, Turkey
should normalize her relations with Armenia not despite Azerbaijan,
but for also Azerbaijan.
First and foremost, there is no doubt that, in contrast to Turkey’s
expectations, thinking the conflict points with Armenia in the same
basket with Nagorno-Karabakh issue and confining this state to economic
and political isolation in the region did not drive her into a corner
but, instead, caused the hawks to come to power in 1998 and led the
diaspora to sharpen its tone through intensifying genocide allegations
and accelerating pro-Armenian campaign regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh
issue. It is true that Robert Kocharian pursued a totally different
policy from Ter-Petrosian in that he tried to turn the isolation
imposed by Turkey and Azerbaijan on his state into an advantage
through attracting the attention of diaspora to send more financial
aid to Armenia and through depending on Russia and Iran further and,
thereby, constituting a second axis in regional equation vis-a-vis
the axis consisting of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia.
Moreover, with a view that it is the diaspora underscoring the
genocide allegations much more and taking an irreconcilable stance
regarding the resolution of existing disputes, Turkey must make a
clear-cut differentiation between the diaspora Armenians and Armenian
residents. The main motive pushing the diaspora to put emphasis on
genocide allegations so intensely is the need for an argument which
will bring Armenians all over the world together and maintain their
identity and integrity through serving as cement. What is more,
compared with the initial years of newly independent Armenia, the
influence of diaspora on the Armenian state and her foreign policy as a
whole has become much more decisive from late 1990s onwards. From this
point of view, it is undoubtedly true to argue that the shared policy
pursued by Turkey and Azerbaijan to isolate Armenia in the region
was one of the basic reasons for the hardening of the tone used by
the diaspora and its increased impact on Armenia. As a result, given
the fact that it seems impossible to establish an immediate dialogue
with the diaspora due to its irreconcilable stance and decentralized
character, normalization of relations with Armenia is in the interests
of Turkey in that it can find a counterpart to defend her point of
view and to come to a common point with respect to the disputed issues.
To put it another way, considering that, in our period, public
diplomacy does not matter only at the margins any more, Turkey must
give weight to shaping the lenses through which Armenian people see
Turkey. Today, public opinion matters in the conduct of foreign policy
more than ever. For that reason, even if an immediate establishment
of diplomatic relations cannot be expected in the short and mid-run,
opening borders with Armenia, increasing the number of direct flights
to Yerevan and establishing more trade links between the two countries
would make a substantial increase in the interaction channels between
two societies and this would have a crucial impact on the point of
views through which both nations see each other. At the end, this
would make further dialogue possible between them, making it more
costly for Armenia to sustain her irreconcilable attitude and leading
a way to the settlement of conflicts between Turkey and Armenia.
Furthermore, as of today, the Nagorno-Karabakh issue seems to meet the
criteria for being called as an intractable conflict, i.e. long-lasting
conflicts that are protracted in nature and failed to be accommodated
despite the efforts exerted both by the adversaries themselves and
by the third parties[2]. What is more, it is difficult to deny that
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is full of failed third party mediation
attempts, which comprise the attempts of Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan
and the Minsk Group under the auspices of OSCE (then-CSCE). Needless
to say that, failure to settle the conflict mostly derives from the
nature of the conflict itself -inability to integrate the principles
of self-determination and territorial integrity in a way that both
parties would accept, identity considerations attributed to the
conflict by both adversaries and reluctance of the party having
military advantage to give concessions-[3]. Nevertheless, the role
of third parties plays an important part in turning Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict into a protracted one. Here, the most significant point
which has to be stressed is the conflict of interest between Russia
and the West in asserting their impact in the region. Given the fact
that a weak Azerbaijan would enable Russia to maintain her role in
energy markets and a weak Armenia means a loyal supporter of Russian
interests in the region, Russia, from its very beginning, has been
quite reluctant to accept Western-sponsored roadmaps for peace, which
was evident, for example, in Russian objection to the deployment of
an OSCE-led international peace-keeping force in the region, instead
of a Russian or CIS force.
When all these conditions under which the Nagorno-Karabakh issue
has evolved are taken into consideration, it would be pure optimism
for Turkey to wait for the settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
in order to normalize her relations with Armenia. Therefore, the
best thing that should be done on the way to the normalization
of relations with Armenia is to increase the dialogue with this
state through turning every occasion, including both official and
non-official ones, into advantage. Accordingly, the historic visit
paid by President Abdullah Gul to Armenia and other meetings held
by some lower-ranking government officials on several occasions,
like BSEC and Davos meetings, can all be thought as landmark steps
towards re-establishing relations with Armenia.
In effect, it should not be forgotten that Russian-Georgian war of
August 2008 played a part in paving the way for the rapprochement
between Turkey and Armenia. Indeed, considering severed diplomatic
and commercial relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan, Armenia sustains
her commercial relations with the world via Georgia’s Black Sea
ports, which were paralyzed during the war. This short period of
deprivation might have made obvious the catastrophic repercussions of
being depended on only one state and might have urged Armenia not to
mortgage her future on a controversial part of history, especially
in a period when the poor Armenian economy began facing the impact
of global financial crisis.
Moreover, the Russo-Georgian war was a wake-up call to the states
in Caucasus inasmuch as that it unveiled the extent to which frozen
ethnic conflicts in the region and Russian willingness to reassert her
influence over the region can pose a threat to the peace, security and
stability in Caucasus when there is no cooperation and coordination
among the neighbouring states of the region. For that reason, it
is clear that, since the war in August, Turkey and Armenia have not
been in a position to turn down the dialogue appeals any more, not
only for their own sake but also for the maintenance of peace and
stability in the region.
Maybe a more important thing, following Russia’s war in Georgia, is
the increasing contacts between Azerbaijan and Armenia. To be more
precise, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey came together in tripartite
meetings held in New York in September and, then, in Helsinki in
December and voiced their willingness for a solution. Moreover,
Azerbaijan and Armenia signed Moscow Declaration in November 2008,
following the talks hosted by Russia and under the auspices of Minsk
Group, OSCE. Although the Declaration was downplayed because of not
leading to any important result with respect to the resolution of
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it should be labelled as crucial when it
is considered in conjunction with other recent developments.
As conclusion, whether Turkey and Armenia will be able to turn these
steps into an advantage towards normalizing their relations depends on
the answer of the question to what extent parties are ready and eager
to move the relations ahead. If these steps are not to be followed by
additional demarches, then it means that they will be confined to the
dustbin of history like other steps remaining inconclusive. However,
if parties sustain their willingness to take the relations further
ahead and if they feed this willingness with concrete initiatives,
then, a warming in Turkish-Armenian relations will be righteously
anticipated in the mid-run.
Birsen Goksu, Marmara University
[1] The concept of "mutually hurting stalemate" was firstly used
by William Zartman to define a situation in which both sides of
a conflict end up in such a costly deadlock that there is no use
escalating the conflict to escape from it. I.W. Zartman, "Ripeness:
the Hurting Stalemate and Beyond," In Conflict Resolution After the
Cold War, ed. P.C. Stern and D. Druckman, (Washington, DC: National
Academy Press), pp. 225-250.
[2] Louis Kriesberg, "Nature of Intractability," Beyond
Intractability, eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess, Conflict
Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder, posted: October
2003. ntractability/
[3] David D. Laitin and Ronald Grogor Suny, "Armenia and Azerbaijan:
Thinking a way out of Karabakh," Middle East Policy, vol.7, no.1,
October 1999, p.158.
Wednesday, 1 April 2009
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