SOCCER DIPLOMACY AND THE ROAD NOT TAKEN
By Khatchig Mouradian
er-diplomacy-and-the-road-not-taken/
April 11, 2009
An alternative perspective for building peace between Turkey and
Armenians
Truth and Mercy have met together;
Peace and Justice have kissed.
Psalm 85
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I-
I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference.
"The Road Not Taken"
By Robert Frost
In this article[1], I examine the recent heightened diplomatic
activity between Armenia and Turkey and the reasons behind the lack of
progress in the negotiations despite the confidence with which they
started. After providing the context and highlighting the inherent
problems with the current state of affairs, I recommend accounting
for power asymmetries and addressing the root causes of the problem
during the dialogue between the two states.
The context
On Aug. 7, 2008, Georgian forces attacked South Ossetia’s capital
Tskhinvali triggering military intervention by Russia. By the time
a ceasefire was reached on Aug. 12, Russia had made it clear that it
would resort to all necessary measures to maintain the status quo in
the region. Georgia’s southern neighbor, Armenia, felt the effects
of the confrontation. During the conflict, traffic was disrupted on
an important highway connecting the two countries, stopping vital
supplies from reaching Armenia.
There might have been another, less dignified, reason behind the
urgency in which Turkey-Armenia dialogue was pushed forward by the
Armenian authorities. Serge Sarkisian had been elected president only
a few months before, and the elections were not only tainted with
irregularities and fraud, but on March 1, the Armenian government’s
crackdown on the opposition had caused 10 deaths, including two
security officers, and dozens of injuries. The international community
was very critical of the presidential election[3] and its aftermath,
and many experts argued that Sarkisian was hoping he would gain
legitimacy abroad by giving impetus to dialogue with Turkey. After
all, both Europe and the U.S. had been pushing for better relations
between Turkey and Armenia for years.[4]
An important development had preceded the Russia-Georgia conflict-and
launched what was later called "Soccer Diplomacy." Armenian president
Serge Sarkisian had invited his Turkish counterpart, Abdullah Gul,
to visit Armenia and watch with him the Armenia-Turkey World Cup
qualifier soccer match.
After the Russia-Georgia conflict, both the Armenian and Turkish sides
gave new impetus to behind-the-scenes meetings at the level of foreign
ministry officials, which culminated in Gul accepting the invitation a
few days before the match. On Sept. 6, Gul’s plane landed in Yerevan,
making him the first Turkish president to visit the Armenian Republic.
I believe one word describes amply the reasons Turkey enthusiastically
welcomed the initiative: genocide.
For several decades now, Turkey has been struggling against
resolutions in parliaments around the world recognizing the Armenian
Genocide. Twenty countries, including Russia, France, Switzerland,
the Netherlands, Canada, and Argentina, have already recognized
the Armenian massacres and deportations as a genocide, citing the
overwhelming consensus of historians and genocide scholars on this
subject. On the other hand, official Ankara continues to vehemently
deny that there was any genocidal intent towards the Armenians
in the last years of the Ottoman Empire and it spends millions of
dollars in its denial campaign, in which it lobbies politicians,
entices support from journalists, funds academic denial efforts,
suppresses education efforts on the Armenian Genocide, and presents
denial assertions to the general public in North and South America,
Europe, and the Middle East (Israel especially).
The main battlefield for genocide recognition in recent years has
been the United States, where a majority of Members of Congress
support passing a resolution recognizing the Armenian Genocide, but
at least twice in recent history, voting on such resolutions has been
postponed/put on hold at the last minute.
With a Democratic majority in Congress, and with the prospects of an
Obama/Biden victory high, there seemed to be a growing realization
in Turkey that it would only be a matter of time before the
U.S. officially recognized the Armenian Genocide.[5]
Under such conditions, a discussion about rethinking Turkey-Armenia
relations started within the Turkish political and military
establishment and was reflected also in the media. The hardliners
argued that Ankara should not establish formal relations with Yerevan
until the latter stops pursuing international recognition of the
genocide and withdraws its forces from Nagorno-Karabagh.
The moderates, on the other hand, argued that the best strategy for
Turkey would be to disrupt the harmony between the Armenian state,
which has made genocide recognition one of its foreign relations goals,
and the Armenian Diaspora-mostly comprised of the descendents of the
victims and survivors of the Armenian Genocide-which has been pursuing
genocide recognition worldwide for decades through lobbying and other
forms of activism. By starting negotiations with the Armenian Republic
and receiving concessions from it on the genocide recognition front,
Turkey would create a schism between the diaspora and Armenia and
undermine the passage of the Armenian Genocide Resolution in the U.S
and other countries, they argued.
It is in this context that negotiations between Turkey and Armenia
gained new momentum.
During the negotiations, one of the main issues Turkey was adamantly
pursuing was the formation of a commission of historians to study
the events of 1915-16 and decide whether or not they constituted
genocide. In return, it offered the opening of the border and the
establishment of diplomatic relations.
The conceptual context of Soccer Diplomacy
Here, it is important to highlight the fact that in general, Turkish
diplomats and commentators do not view Armenians as a single monolithic
block, but as three supposedly homogeneous blocks. The Armenians living
in Turkey[6] (mainly in Istanbul) comprise the first group. These
are, mostly, the descendents of the thousands of Armenians living in
Istanbul during the genocide who were spared deportations and killings,
because they lived in a metropolitan city, right under the nose of
Western embassies, consulates, and missionaries. These Armenians today
cannot even commemorate the genocide. In Turkey, these Armenians are
regarded as "our Armenians" or the "good Armenians," as long as they
do not speak out about the genocide and the continued discrimination
they face. A prominent Turkish-Armenian journalist, Hrant Dink, was
assassinated in 2007 because he was an outspoken critic of the Turkish
establishment and called for the recognition of the suffering of the
Armenians. The citizens of Armenia, the second group, are, according
to the dominant rhetoric in Turkey, the "neighbors" who are under
difficult economic conditions and do not mind forgetting the past and
moving on, if the Armenian Diaspora leaves them alone. The Diaspora
Armenians, the third group, are the "bad Armenians." They are Turkey’s
sworn enemies. They level accusations of genocide against Turks and try
to undermine Turkey. These three stereotypes essentially describe the
perception of most Turks. There is absolute ignorance and disregard
to the plight of the genocide survivors and their descendents who
were scattered around the world and rebuilt their communities after
living in camps and in abject poverty, facing the threat of disease and
death years after the genocide. In discussions in Turkey, the Diaspora
Armenians-the descendents of genocide victims and survivors-need to be
isolated and ignored. This is yet another example of official Turkey’s
reluctance to face the past and address the roots of the problem.
Soccer diplomacy: a misnomer
The exchange of ping-pong players in the early 70s between China and
the U.S. that paved the way for President Richard Nixon’s visit to
Beijing in 1972 became known "Ping Pong Diplomacy." When the Armenian
president in 2008 extended an invitation to his counterpart to visit
Yerevan and attend the soccer match, the media started referring to
the Turkey-Armenia dialogue as "Soccer Diplomacy." While such a term
could be fitting to rapprochement between two powerful countries like
the U.S. and China, a similar description for Turkey and Armenia is
misleading, because it assumes that Turkey and Armenia are "competing"
on a level playing field. In the latter case, not only is there a
glaring power asymmetry, but that power asymmetry is largely a result
of genocide perpetrated by one of the sides against the other.[7]
Here is how Prof. Peter Balakian explains the power asymmetry during
and in the aftermath of the Armenian Genocide:
First, the asymmetry of power is a key element in the act of
genocide. In 1915 the perpetrator used its military, its state
bureaucracy, and an unequal social structure to enact a plan of
extermination against a people who were a defenseless, Christian
minority. The Turkish government’s subsequent denial became a
further manifestation of such radical asymmetry in which a large,
strategically important nation-state uses all of its political and
military means-including blackmail, coercion, and cajoling-to get
third parties to cooperate with it in delegitimizing the history of
the Armenian Genocide. The goal is to absolve Turkey of responsibility
for the events of 1915 and to undermine its moral definition. The
main power that the Armenians of the diaspora have is the truth of
the ever-growing discourse about the history of 1915.[8]
Philosopher Henry Theriault has been at the forefront of the discussion
on this power asymmetry.[9] He says: [T]he result of genocide is not
a neutral disengagement of the perpetrator and victim groups, but the
imposition of an extreme dominance of perpetrator group over victim
group. If prior to the Armenian Genocide, Turks and other Muslims as
a group were formally and practically dominant over Armenians as a
group, the genocide maximized this, to give Turks and other Muslims
absolute dominance to the level of life and death over Armenians. Often
we mistake the end of a genocide for the end of the harm done to the
victims. It is the end of the direct killing, perhaps, but the result
of that killing and all other dimensions of a genocide is to raise
the power and position of the perpetrator group high above that of
victims, in material terms-political, economic, etc. Resolution of
the Armenian Genocide requires reversing this domination.
It is this very requirement to eliminate this domination, and bring
some amount of symmetry to the power relations, and address the core
issues of the problem that is lacking in the current dialogue between
Turkish and Armenian officials, facilitated and encouraged by the
West. Not only does Turkey continue to vehemently deny the Armenian
Genocide, it is also exerting pressure on Armenia to agree to the
idea of a commission to examine what happened to the Armenians,
disregarding the scholarly consensus on the matter. Acknowledgment
of past horrors-let alone the readiness to engage in the long process
of restitution-is not even on the table.
Moreover, Turkey wants to stall the recognition of the genocide by
countries worldwide by pushing for the formation of a historical
commission, and hence be able to argue that the Armenian Genocide
is far from being a historical fact, and that historians are still
discussing what happened to the Ottoman Armenians from 1915-18.
Where to go from here
The Turkish-Armenian conflict cannot be transformed through traditional
diplomacy. Instead, I recommend an alternative approach championed
by John Paul Lederach[11] who highlights the importance of addressing
the root causes of conflict and engaging all segments of the affected
populations in the process. These premises have been ignored in the
so-called "Soccer Diplomacy."
Lederach argues that "the place called reconciliation" is the meeting
point of Truth (which, he says, involves Acknowledgement, Transparency,
Revelation, Clarity); Mercy (which involves Acceptance, Forgiveness,
Support, Compassion, Healing); Justice (which involves Equality,
Right Relationships, Restitution); and Peace (which involves Harmony,
Unity, Well-being, Security, Respect). The current Turkey-Armenia
dialogue stands in complete disregard of all these principles: The
Truth is set aside. There is no readiness from the Turkish side to
acknowledge the Armenian Genocide and be transparent in the evaluation
of past and continued actions. There is no room for Mercy, because the
Turkish side continues to assert there is nothing to forgive, because
there was no genocide. Nowhere in the dialogue do Justice, Equality,
and Restitution have a place-on the contrary, the dialogue is based
on the very tenets of the power asymmetry and ignoring justice.[12]
And, as a consequence, Peace is nowhere in sight.
Theriault talks about the shortcomings of the theory of magically
"resolving" the Turkish-Armenian problem: [T]here is…the assumption
that there can be a single, decisive transition from "unresolved" to
"resolved" through an act or set of acts. This assumption shared by
antagonists from Turkish deniers to committed Armenian activists is
curiously Christian, echoing the notion of instantaneous absolution for
sins through supplicant entreaty and clerical pronouncement. Resolution
is not an event or outcome; it is a process, a very long-term
process. Armenian-Turkish relations are not a simple all-or-nothing
proposition, either "in tension" or "worked out perfectly." They are
better or worse along a continuum of fine gradations, with no bold
line between "good" and "bad" relations. Likewise, they are not fixed,
but can fluctuate through time in trajectories of improvement and
deterioration.[13] Theriault also argues that "[i]n the case where
there is no acknowledgment of the Armenian Genocide, it is trivially
obvious that no resolution can occur." However, recognition alone is
not enough. It has meaning only when it reflects the "material and
social-structural changes" or causes them. Furthermore, according to
Theriault, "positive relations between Turks and Armenians are not
made permanent simply by being enacted at a given point in time. They
must be reproduced and supported at every moment, or the relations
will degenerate."
The fact that after a very dynamic start in August, "Soccer Diplomacy"
has, as of the writing of this paper, slowed down and is facing
impediments is a testament to the fact that "traditional" diplomacy
cannot go far in resolving protracted conflicts, because it ignores
the root causes and the power dynamics. A new model is necessary.
A ‘welcome’ initiative
While "Soccer Diplomacy" was already in progress, an important
initiative was launched by intellectuals in Turkey, who signed a
petition apologizing to Armenians for the "Great Catastrophe that
the Armenians were subjected to."[14] The apology, together with the
list of initial signatories, was posted online on Dec. 15, 2008, and
already within a few days, thousands of other citizens of Turkey had
signed it. Despite the fact that it fell short of properly referring
to 1915-16 as "genocide," and did not even mention who exactly
"subjected" the Armenians to the "Catastrophe," this initiative by
Turkish intellectuals created a cautiously positive response among
Armenians both in Armenia and the diaspora, where it was generally
welcomed as a good first step.[15] Gul’s visit, on the other hand,
had received mixed reactions, and was not welcomed as warmly by many
Armenians exactly because it did not involve any attempt, however
meager, to acknowledge the root causes of the problem.
Official Ankara’s position regarding the apology campaign initiated
by 200 intellectuals was clear from the very beginning: The apology
campaign for the Armenian Genocide is bad for Turkey and will also
harm Turkey-Armenia dialogue, which has been making strides recently.
Statements to this effect were made by Turkish Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan, Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan, and Turkish
army generals.
When the apology campaign was launched, Erdogan said it amounted to
"stirring up trouble, disturbing our peace and undoing the steps
which have been taken." He added, "If there is a crime, then those
who committed it can offer an apology. My nation, my country has no
such issue."
Babacan, in turn, said, "This is a sensitive issue for Turkey. There
is a negotiation process going on [with Armenia]… This kind of
debate is of no use to anyone especially at a time talks continue
and it may harm the negotiation process."
"We definitely think that what is done is not right. Apologizing is
wrong and can yield harmful consequences," said General Metin Gurak,
the spokesperson for the General Staff, during a press conference.
Gul first spoke in defense of the initiative when it was first
launched, saying that it was proof that democracy was thriving in
Turkey. Yet, this simple statement was harshly criticized by the
opposition in Turkey, and accusations flew from left and right. One
parliament member "accused" Gul of having an Armenian mother. The
president was quick to deny the allegation and start legal action
against the person who threw it. He didn’t bother to say, "My mother
is not Armenian, but what if she were?" By taking the accusation as
an insult, he essentially reinforced the racist prejudice in Turkey
against Armenians.
Apparently, Gul could not hold his good-cop routine for more than
two weeks. In early January, during an interview on the Turkish
television channel ATV, Gul said the apology campaign would have a
negative effect on the diplomatic efforts between the two countries.
According to Gul, "When we examine the latest debates in terms of
their results, I do not think they make a positive contribution." He
also said his previous statements were presented in a distorted way.
So within a few weeks of the launching of the apology campaign, there
was consensus among the ruling party, the opposition, and the army in
Turkey that the apology campaign will have negative consequences on
Turkey-Armenia dialogue. This might be an indication that Ankara has no
intention to address some of the core issues anytime soon. Moreover,
it is opposed to any civil society initiative to address-even in
part-these issues.
Instead, Ankara wants to put heavy make-up on its face, hoping to hide
its century-old scars. The calls by Turkish intellectuals for official
Ankara to wash its face and get plastic surgery are yet to be heard.
Conclusion
True transformation of Turkish-Armenian relations cannot take
place without involving all sectors and levels of the affected
population. "Soccer Diplomacy" was not Turkish-Armenian dialogue-as
it was portrayed in the Western media. It was Turkey-Armenia dialogue
and ignored the diaspora, which has been a major source of support for
Armenia since its independence. Also, a great amount of creativity is
necessary to address the power asymmetries that are so inherent to
this conflict-especially since these asymmetries are the product of
the genocide perpetrated by one side, followed by denial and continued
hostile attitudes towards the victims and their descendents.