TURKEY AND ARMENIA: OPENING MINDS, OPENING BORDERS
Reuters Alert
April 14 2009
UK
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Istanbul/Yerevan/Baku/Brussels, 14 April 2009: Turkey and Armenia
should seize their best opportunity yet to normalise relations, work
on a new approach to shared history and open a European border that
for nearly a century has been hostage to conflict.
Turkey and Armenia: Opening Minds, Opening Borders,* the latest
report from the International Crisis Group, examines how a decade
of academic and civil society outreach laid the foundations for what
is now intense official engagement between the governments. The two
sides are now close to agreement on a package deal that will establish
diplomatic relations, open the border and set up bilateral commissions
to address a range of issues.
These commissions will include one on joint historical dimensions
of the Armenian-Turkish relationship, which will work to broaden
understanding of the Ottoman-era forced relocations and massacres of
Armenians, widely recognised as the Armenian genocide. Turkey contests
the term genocide, disputing its legal applicability and pointing to
mitigating circumstances as the Ottoman Empire fought on three fronts
in the First World War. But many Turks, including officials, now
publicly express regret over the tragic and high loss of Armenian life.
"Turks’ and Armenians’ once uncompromising views of history are
significantly converging, showing that the deep traumas can be
healed", says Hugh Pope, Director of Crisis Group’s Turkey/Cyprus
Project. "At this sensitive time, third parties should avoid statements
or resolutions in the politicised debate over genocide recognition
or denial that could inflame opinion on either side".
A separate but related issue, the stalemated Armenia-Azerbaijan
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, still risks undermining final agreement
on the Turkey and Armenia normalisation package. Azerbaijan opposes any
border opening until Armenia withdraws from its occupied territory. But
Turkey should not sacrifice this chance to move forward, and should
persuade its ally that détente which makes Armenia feel secure will
do more for a settlement than continuing a fifteen-year impasse. For
long-term normalisation with Turkey to be sustainable, Armenia,
together with Azerbaijan, should ultimately adopt the Organisation for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group basic principles
for settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict of the OSCE, and
Armenia should withdraw from Azerbaijani territories that it occupies.
"Turkey and Armenia should finalise their agreement and thus create
new momentum for peace and cooperation in the South Caucasus", says
Sabine Freizer, Crisis Group’s Europe Program Director. "They should
not wait until the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is settled. But outside
powers such as the U.S., EU, Russia and others should build on their
rare common interest to move both Turkish-Armenian normalisation and
the Nagorno-Karabakh process forward".
———————————- ———————————————-
Co ntacts: Andrew Stroehlein (Brussels) +32 (0) 2 541 1635 Kimberly
Abbott (Washington) +1 202 785 1601 To contact Crisis Group media
please click here *Read the full Crisis Group report on our website:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Turkey and Armenia are close to settling a dispute that has long
roiled Caucasus politics, isolated Armenia and cast a shadow over
Turkey’s European Union (EU) ambition. For a decade and a half,
relations have been poisoned by disagreement about issues including
how to address a common past and compensate for crimes, territorial
disputes, distrust bred in Soviet times and Armenian occupation
of Azerbaijani land. But recently, progressively intense official
engagement, civil society interaction and public opinion change have
transformed the relationship, bringing both sides to the brink of
an historic agreement to open borders, establish diplomatic ties and
begin joint work on reconciliation. They should seize this opportunity
to normalise. The politicised debate whether to recognise as genocide
the destruction of much of the Ottoman Armenian population and the
stalemated Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh should
not halt momentum. The U.S., EU, Russia and others should maintain
support for reconciliation and avoid harming it with statements about
history at a critical and promising time.
Turks’ and Armenians’ once uncompromising, bipolar views of history
are significantly converging, showing that the deep traumas can
be healed. Most importantly, the advance in bilateral relations
demonstrates that a desire for reconciliation can overcome old
enmities and closed borders. Given the heritage and culture shared by
Armenians and Turks, there is every reason to hope that normalisation
of relations between the two countries can be achieved and sustained.
Internal divisions persist on both sides. Armenia does not make
normalisation conditional on Turkey’s formal recognition as
genocide of the 1915 forced relocation and massacres of Armenians
under the Ottoman Empire. But it must take into account the views of
Armenians scattered throughout the global diaspora, which is twice as
large as the population of Armenia itself and has long had hardline
representatives. New trends in that diaspora, however, have softened
and to some degree removed demands that Turkey surrender territory
in its north east, where Armenians were a substantial minority
before 1915.
Over the past decade, Turkey has moved far from its former blanket
denial of any Ottoman wrongdoing. Important parts of the ruling AK
Party, bureaucracy, business communities on the Armenian border
and liberal elite in western cities support normalisation with
Armenia and some expression of contritition. Traditional hardliners,
including Turkic nationalists and part of the security services, oppose
compromise, especially as international genocide recognition continues
and in the absence of Armenian troop withdrawals from substantial
areas they occupy of Turkey’s ally, Azerbaijan. These divisions
surfaced in events surrounding the assassination of Turkish-Armenian
journalist Hrant Dink in January 2007. That the new tendencies are
gaining ground, however, was shown by the extraordinary outpouring of
solidarity with Armenians during the Dink funeral in Istanbul and a
campaign by Turkish intellectuals to apologise to Armenians for the
"Great Catastrophe" of 1915.
The unresolved Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh still
risks undermining full adoption and implementation of the potential
package deal between Turkey and Armenia on recognition, borders and
establishment of bilateral commissions to deal with multiple issues,
including the historical dimension of their relations. Azerbaijan has
strong links to Turkey based on energy cooperation and the Turkic
countries’ shared linguistic and cultural origins. Ethnic Armenian
forces’ rapid advance into Azerbaijan in 1993 scuttled plans to
open diplomatic ties and caused Turkey to close the railway line
that was then the only transport link between the two countries. For
years, Turkey conditioned any improvement in bilateral relations on
Armenian troop withdrawals. Baku threatens that if this condition
is lifted, it will restrict Turkey’s participation in the expansion
of Azerbaijani energy exports. While Azerbaijani attitudes remain
a constraint, significant elements in Turkey agree it is time for a
new approach. Bilateral détente with Armenia ultimately could help
Baku recover territory better than the current stalemate.
Outside powers have important interests and roles. The U.S. has long
fostered Armenia-Turkey reconciliation, seeking thereby to consolidate
the independence of all three former Soviet republics in the south
Caucasus and to support east-west transit corridors and energy
pipelines from the Caspian Sea. Washington was notable in its backing
of efforts that kick-started civil society dialogue between Turkey
and Armenia. The Obama administration is working hard at repairing the
damage done to U.S. relations with Turkey by the war in Iraq. Although
Obama repeatedly promised on the campaign trail to formally recognise
the 1915 forced relocation and massacres of Armenians under the Ottoman
Empire as genocide, he should continue to steer the prudent middle
course he has adopted as president. The U.S. Congress, which has a
draft resolution before it, should do the same. At this sensitive
moment of Turkish-Armenian convergence, statements that focus on the
genocide term, either to deny or recognise it, would either enrage
Armenians or unleash a nationalist Turkish reaction that would damage
U.S.-Turkish ties and set back Turkey-Armenia reconciliation for years.
U.S. support for Turkey-Armenia reconciliation appears to be
mirrored in Moscow. Russian companies have acquired many of Armenia’s
railways, pipelines and energy utilities and seek to develop them;
Russian-Turkish relations are good; and Moscow is looking for ways
to mitigate the regional strains produced by its war with Georgia in
August 2008. If sustained, the coincidence of U.S.-Russian interests
would offer a hopeful sign for greater security and prosperity in
the South Caucasus after years of division and conflict. All sides –
chiefly Armenia and Turkey but potentially Azerbaijan as well – will
gain in economic strength and national security if borders are opened
and trade normalised.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Government of Turkey:
1. Agree, ratify and implement a normalisation package including the
opening of borders, establishment of diplomatic relations and bilateral
commissions; continue to prepare public opinion for reconciliation;
cultivate a pro-settlement constituency among Armenians; and avoid
threatening or penalising Armenia for outside factors like resolutions
or statements in third countries recognising a genocide.
2. Avoid sacrificing implementation of the normalisation package to
demands for immediate resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and
withdrawal of Armenian troops from occupied territories in Azerbaijan;
and seek opportunities to show Baku that by easing Yerevan’s fears
of encirclement, normalised Turkey-Armenia relations may ultimately
speed up such an Armenian withdrawal.
3. Make goodwill towards Armenia clear through gestures such as joint
work on preserving the ancient ruins of Ani, stating explicitly that
Turkey will recognise and protect Armenian historical and religious
heritage throughout the country.
4. Encourage universities and institutes to pursue broader research
on matters pertaining to the events of 1915, preferably with the
engagement of Armenian and third-party scholars; modernise history
books and remove all prejudice from them; and increase funding for
cataloguing and management of the Ottoman-era archives.
To the Government of Armenia:
5. Agree, ratify, and implement a normalisation package including the
opening of borders, establishment of diplomatic relations and bilateral
commissions; continue to prepare public opinion for reconciliation;
and avoid statements or international actions relating to genocide
recognition that could inflame Turkish public opinion against the
current process.
6. Agree together with Azerbaijan to the OSCE Minsk Group basic
principles on a Nagorno-Karabakh settlement; then start withdrawals
from Armenian-occupied territories in Azerbaijan; and pursue peace
with Azerbaijan in full consciousness that only in this way can
normalisation with Turkey be consolidated.
7. Make clear that Armenia has no territorial claim on Turkey by
explicitly recognising its territorial integrity within the borders
laid out in the 1921 Treaty of Kars.
8. Encourage universities and institutes to pursue more research on
matters relating to the events of 1915, preferably with the engagement
of Turkish and third-party scholars; modernise history books and
remove all prejudice from them; and organise the cataloguing of known
Armenian archives pertaining to the events in and around 1915 wherever
they may be located.
To the United States, Russia and the European Union and its Member
States:
9. Avoid legislation, statements and actions that might inflame
public opinion on either side and so could upset the momentum towards
Turkey-Armenia normalisation and reconciliation.
10. Raise the seniority and intensify the engagement of the U.S.,
Russian and French co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group until Armenia
and Azerbaijan reach final agreement on Minsk Group basic principles
for a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
11. Back up Turkey-Armenia reconciliation with projects to encourage
region-wide interaction, heritage preservation and confidence building;
and support as requested any new bilateral historical commission or
sub-commission, development of archive management and independent
Turkish- or Armenian-led scholarly endeavours to research into aspects
of the 1915 events.
ICG/ec344a19864c6d8bd71c158143ac3028.htm
Read full report at
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From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress