SOCCER DIPLOMACY AND THE ROAD NNOT TAKEN
KHATCHIG MOURADIAN

Asbarez
article=41812_4/23/2009_1
Thursday, April 23, 2009

An alternative perspective for building peace between Turkey and
Armenians

In this article[1], I examine the recent heightened diplomatic
activity between Armenia and Turkey and the reasons behind the lack of
progress in the negotiations despite the confidence with which they
started. After providing the context and highlighting the inherent
problems with the current state of affairs, I recommend accounting
for power asymmetries and addressing the root causes of the problem
during the dialogue between the two states.

The context

On Aug. 7, 2008, Georgian forces attacked South Ossetia’s capital
Tskhinvali triggering military intervention by Russia. By the time
a ceasefire was reached on Aug. 12, Russia had made it clear that it
would resort to all necessary measures to maintain the status quo in
the region. Georgia’s southern neighbor, Armenia, felt the effects
of the confrontation. During the conflict, traffic was disrupted on
an important highway connecting the two countries, stopping vital
supplies from reaching Armenia.

The standoff between Russia and Georgia gave a new urgency to a problem
Armenia has been facing since its independence in 1991. Landlocked
between four countries–two of which, Turkey and Azerbaijan, have
imposed a de-facto blockade–Armenians had Georgia and Iran to rely
on for exports and imports. And now, with the Georgia-Russia standoff
unresolved, official Yerevan seems to have felt it had to give new
impetus to dialogue with Turkey, aiming at establishing diplomatic
relations and opening the border between the two countries.[2]

There might have been another, less dignified, reason behind the
urgency in which Turkey-Armenia dialogue was pushed forward by the
Armenian authorities. Serge Sarkisian had been elected president only
a few months before, and the elections were not only tainted with
irregularities and fraud, but on March 1, the Armenian government’s
crackdown on the opposition had caused 10 deaths, including two
security officers, and dozens of injuries. The international community
was very critical of the presidential election[3] and its aftermath,
and many experts argued that Sarkisian was hoping he would gain
legitimacy abroad by giving impetus to dialogue with Turkey. After
all, both Europe and the U.S. had been pushing for better relations
between Turkey and Armenia for years.[4]

An important development had preceded the Russia-Georgia conflict–and
launched what was later called "Soccer Diplomacy." Armenian president
Serge Sarkisian had invited his Turkish counterpart, Abdullah Gul,
to visit Armenia and watch with him the Armenia-Turkey World Cup
qualifier soccer match.

After the Russia-Georgia conflict, both the Armenian and Turkish sides
gave new impetus to behind-the-scenes meetings at the level of foreign
ministry officials, which culminated in Gul accepting the invitation a
few days before the match. On Sept. 6, Gul’s plane landed in Yerevan,
making him the first Turkish president to visit the Armenian Republic.

I believe one word describes amply the reasons Turkey enthusiastically
welcomed the initiative: genocide.

For several decades now, Turkey has been struggling against
resolutions in parliaments around the world recognizing the Armenian
Genocide. Twenty countries, including Russia, France, Switzerland,
the Netherlands, Canada, and Argentina, have already recognized
the Armenian massacres and deportations as a genocide, citing the
overwhelming consensus of historians and genocide scholars on this
subject. On the other hand, official Ankara continues to vehemently
deny that there was any genocidal intent towards the Armenians
in the last years of the Ottoman Empire and it spends millions of
dollars in its denial campaign, in which it lobbies politicians,
entices support from journalists, funds academic denial efforts,
suppresses education efforts on the Armenian Genocide, and presents
denial assertions to the general public in North and South America,
Europe, and the Middle East (Israel especially).

The main battlefield for genocide recognition in recent years has
been the United States, where a majority of Members of Congress
support passing a resolution recognizing the Armenian Genocide, but
at least twice in recent history, voting on such resolutions has been
postponed/put on hold at the last minute.

With a Democratic majority in Congress, and with the prospects of an
Obama/Biden victory high, there seemed to be a growing realization
in Turkey that it would only be a matter of time before the
U.S. officially recognized the Armenian Genocide.[5]

Under such conditions, a discussion about rethinking Turkey-Armenia
relations started within the Turkish political and military
establishment and was reflected also in the media. The hardliners
argued that Ankara should not establish formal relations with Yerevan
until the latter stops pursuing international recognition of the
genocide and withdraws its forces from Nagorno-Karabagh.

The moderates, on the other hand, argued that the best strategy for
Turkey would be to disrupt the harmony between the Armenian state,
which has made genocide recognition one of its foreign relations goals,
and the Armenian Diaspora–mostly comprised of the descendents of the
victims and survivors of the Armenian Genocide–which has been pursuing
genocide recognition worldwide for decades through lobbying and other
forms of activism. By starting negotiations with the Armenian Republic
and receiving concessions from it on the genocide recognition front,
Turkey would create a schism between the diaspora and Armenia and
undermine the passage of the Armenian Genocide Resolution in the U.S
and other countries, they argued.

It is in this context that negotiations between Turkey and Armenia
gained new momentum.

During the negotiations, one of the main issues Turkey was adamantly
pursuing was the formation of a commission of historians to study
the events of 1915-16 and decide whether or not they constituted
genocide. In return, it offered the opening of the border and the
establishment of diplomatic relations.

The conceptual context of Soccer Diplomacy

Here, it is important to highlight the fact that in general, Turkish
diplomats and commentators do not view Armenians as a single monolithic
block, but as three supposedly homogeneous blocks. The Armenians living
in Turkey[6] (mainly in Istanbul) comprise the first group. These
are, mostly, the descendents of the thousands of Armenians living in
Istanbul during the genocide who were spared deportations and killings,
because they lived in a metropolitan city, right under the nose of
Western embassies, consulates, and missionaries. These Armenians today
cannot even commemorate the genocide. In Turkey, these Armenians are
regarded as "our Armenians" or the "good Armenians," as long as they
do not speak out about the genocide and the continued discrimination
they face. A prominent Turkish-Armenian journalist, Hrant Dink,
was assassinated in 2007 because he was an outspoken critic of the
Turkish establishment and called for the recognition of the suffering
of the Armenians. The citizens of Armenia, the second group, are,
according to the dominant rhetoric in Turkey, the "neighbors" who are
under difficult economic conditions and do not mind forgetting the
past and moving on, if the Armenian Diaspora leaves them alone. The
Diaspora Armenians, the third group, are the "bad Armenians." They
are Turkey’s sworn enemies. They level accusations of genocide against
Turks and try to undermine Turkey. These three stereotypes essentially
describe the perception of most Turks. There is absolute ignorance
and disregard to the plight of the genocide survivors and their
descendents who were scattered around the world and rebuilt their
communities after living in camps and in abject poverty, facing the
threat of disease and death years after the genocide. In discussions
in Turkey, the Diaspora Armenians–the descendents of genocide victims
and survivors–need to be isolated and ignored. This is yet another
example of official Turkey’s reluctance to face the past and address
the roots of the problem.

Soccer diplomacy: a misnomer

The exchange of ping-pong players in the early 70s between China and
the U.S. that paved the way for President Richard Nixon’s visit to
Beijing in 1972 became known "Ping Pong Diplomacy." When the Armenian
president in 2008 extended an invitation to his counterpart to visit
Yerevan and attend the soccer match, the media started referring to
the Turkey-Armenia dialogue as "Soccer Diplomacy." While such a term
could be fitting to rapprochement between two powerful countries like
the U.S. and China, a similar description for Turkey and Armenia is
misleading, because it assumes that Turkey and Armenia are "competing"
on a level playing field. In the latter case, not only is there a
glaring power asymmetry, but that power asymmetry is largely a result
of genocide perpetrated by one of the sides against the other.[7]

Here is how Prof. Peter Balakian explains the power asymmetry during
and in the aftermath of the Armenian Genocide:

First, the asymmetry of power is a key element in the act of
genocide. In 1915 the perpetrator used its military, its state
bureaucracy, and an unequal social structure to enact a plan of
extermination against a people who were a defenseless, Christian
minority. The Turkish government’s subsequent denial became a
further manifestation of such radical asymmetry in which a large,
strategically important nation-state uses all of its political and
military means–including blackmail, coercion, and cajoling–to get
third parties to cooperate with it in delegitimizing the history of
the Armenian Genocide. The goal is to absolve Turkey of responsibility
for the events of 1915 and to undermine its moral definition. The
main power that the Armenians of the diaspora have is the truth of
the ever-growing discourse about the history of 1915.[8]

Philosopher Henry Theriault has been at the forefront of the discussion
on this power asymmetry.[9] He says:

[T]he result of genocide is not a neutral disengagement of the
perpetrator and victim groups, but the imposition of an extreme
dominance of perpetrator group over victim group. If prior to the
Armenian Genocide, Turks and other Muslims as a group were formally
and practically dominant over Armenians as a group, the genocide
maximized this, to give Turks and other Muslims absolute dominance
to the level of life and death over Armenians. Often we mistake the
end of a genocide for the end of the harm done to the victims. It
is the end of the direct killing, perhaps, but the result of that
killing and all other dimensions of a genocide is to raise the power
and position of the perpetrator group high above that of victims, in
material terms–political, economic, etc. Resolution of the Armenian
Genocide requires reversing this domination.[10]

It is this very requirement to eliminate this domination, and bring
some amount of symmetry to the power relations, and address the
core issues of the problem that is lacking in the current dialogue
between Turkish and Armenian officials, facilitated and encouraged
by the West. Not only does Turkey continue to vehemently deny the
Armenian Genocide, it is also exerting pressure on Armenia to agree
to the idea of a commission to examine what happened to the Armenians,
disregarding the scholarly consensus on the matter. Acknowledgment of
past horrors–let alone the readiness to engage in the long process
of restitution–is not even on the table.

Moreover, Turkey wants to stall the recognition of the genocide by
countries worldwide by pushing for the formation of a historical
commission, and hence be able to argue that the Armenian Genocide
is far from being a historical fact, and that historians are still
discussing what happened to the Ottoman Armenians from 1915-18.

Where to go from here

The Turkish-Armenian conflict cannot be transformed through traditional
diplomacy. Instead, I recommend an alternative approach championed
by John Paul Lederach[11] who highlights the importance of addressing
the root causes of conflict and engaging all segments of the affected
populations in the process. These premises have been ignored in the
so-called "Soccer Diplomacy."

Lederach argues that "the place called reconciliation" is the meeting
point of Truth (which, he says, involves Acknowledgement, Transparency,
Revelation, Clarity); Mercy (which involves Acceptance, Forgiveness,
Support, Compassion, Healing); Justice (which involves Equality, Right
Relationships, Restitution); and Peace (which involves Harmony, Unity,
Well-being, Security, Respect). The current Turkey-Armenia dialogue
stands in complete disregard of all these principles: The Truth is
set aside. There is no readiness from the Turkish side to acknowledge
the Armenian Genocide and be transparent in the evaluation of past
and continued actions.

There is no room for Mercy, because the Turkish side continues
to assert there is nothing to forgive, because there was
no genocide. Nowhere in the dialogue do Justice, Equality, and
Restitution have a place–on the contrary, the dialogue is based on
the very tenets of the power asymmetry and ignoring justice.[12] And,
as a consequence, Peace is nowhere in sight.

Theriault talks about the shortcomings of the theory of magically
"resolving" the Turkish-Armenian problem: [T]here is;the assumption
that there can be a single, decisive transition from "unresolved" to
"resolved" through an act or set of acts. This assumption shared by
antagonists from Turkish deniers to committed Armenian activists is
curiously Christian, echoing the notion of instantaneous absolution for
sins through supplicant entreaty and clerical pronouncement. Resolution
is not an event or outcome; it is a process, a very long-term
process. Armenian-Turkish relations are not a simple all-or-nothing
proposition, either "in tension" or "worked out perfectly." They
are better or worse along a continuum of fine gradations, with no
bold line between "good" and "bad" relations. Likewise, they are not
fixed, but can fluctuate through time in trajectories of improvement
and deterioration.[13]

Theriault also argues that "[i]n the case where there is no
acknowledgment of the Armenian Genocide, it is trivially obvious that
no resolution can occur." However, recognition alone is not enough. It
has meaning only when it reflects the "material and social-structural
changes" or causes them. Furthermore, according to Theriault, "positive
relations between Turks and Armenians are not made permanent simply
by being enacted at a given point in time. They must be reproduced
and supported at every moment, or the relations will degenerate." The
fact that after a very dynamic start in August, "Soccer Diplomacy"
has, as of the writing of this paper, slowed down and is facing
impediments is a testament to the fact that "traditional" diplomacy
cannot go far in resolving protracted conflicts, because it ignores
the root causes and the power dynamics. A new model is necessary.

A %u218welcome’ initiative

While "Soccer Diplomacy" was already in progress, an important
initiative was launched by intellectuals in Turkey, who signed a
petition apologizing to Armenians for the "Great Catastrophe that
the Armenians were subjected to."[14] The apology, together with the
list of initial signatories, was posted online on Dec. 15, 2008, and
already within a few days, thousands of other citizens of Turkey had
signed it. Despite the fact that it fell short of properly referring
to 1915-16 as "genocide," and did not even mention who exactly
"subjected" the Armenians to the "Catastrophe," this initiative by
Turkish intellectuals created a cautiously positive response among
Armenians both in Armenia and the diaspora, where it was generally
welcomed as a good first step.[15] Gul’s visit, on the other hand,
had received mixed reactions, and was not welcomed as warmly by many
Armenians exactly because it did not involve any attempt, however
meager, to acknowledge the root causes of the problem.

Official Ankara’s position regarding the apology campaign initiated
by 200 intellectuals was clear from the very beginning: The apology
campaign for the Armenian Genocide is bad for Turkey and will also
harm Turkey-Armenia dialogue, which has been making strides recently.

Statements to this effect were made by Turkish Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan, Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan, and Turkish
army generals.

When the apology campaign was launched, Erdogan said it amounted to
"stirring up trouble, disturbing our peace and undoing the steps
which have been taken." He added, "If there is a crime, then those
who committed it can offer an apology. My nation, my country has no
such issue."

Babacan, in turn, said, "This is a sensitive issue for Turkey. There
is a negotiation process going on [with Armenia]; This kind of debate
is of no use to anyone especially at a time talks continue and it
may harm the negotiation process."

"We definitely think that what is done is not right. Apologizing is
wrong and can yield harmful consequences," said General Metin Gurak,
the spokesperson for the General Staff, during a press conference.

Gul first spoke in defense of the initiative when it was first
launched, saying that it was proof that democracy was thriving in
Turkey. Yet, this simple statement was harshly criticized by the
opposition in Turkey, and accusations flew from left and right. One
parliament member "accused" Gul of having an Armenian mother. The
president was quick to deny the allegation and start legal action
against the person who threw it.

He didn’t bother to say, "My mother is not Armenian, but what if
she were?" By taking the accusation as an insult, he essentially
reinforced the racist prejudice in Turkey against Armenians.

Apparently, Gul could not hold his good-cop routine for more than
two weeks. In early January, during an interview on the Turkish
television channel ATV, Gul said the apology campaign would have a
negative effect on the diplomatic efforts between the two countries.

According to Gul, "When we examine the latest debates in terms of
their results, I do not think they make a positive contribution."

He also said his previous statements were presented in a distorted way.

So within a few weeks of the launching of the apology campaign, there
was consensus among the ruling party, the opposition, and the army in
Turkey that the apology campaign will have negative consequences on
Turkey-Armenia dialogue. This might be an indication that Ankara has no
intention to address some of the core issues anytime soon. Moreover,
it is opposed to any civil society initiative to address–even in
part–these issues. Instead, Ankara wants to put heavy make-up on
its face, hoping to hide its century-old scars. The calls by Turkish
intellectuals for official Ankara to wash its face and get plastic
surgery are yet to be heard.

Conclusion

True transformation of Turkish-Armenian relations cannot take
place without involving all sectors and levels of the affected
population. "Soccer Diplomacy" was not Turkish-Armenian dialogue–as
it was portrayed in the Western media. It was Turkey-Armenia dialogue
and ignored the diaspora, which has been a major source of support
for Armenia since its independence. Also, a great amount of creativity
is necessary to address the power asymmetries that are so inherent to
this conflict–especially since these asymmetries are the product of
the genocide perpetrated by one side, followed by denial and continued
hostile attitudes towards the victims and their descendents.

Notes:

[1] This article is based on the text of several lectures I have
given in late 2008 and early 2009, as well as several opinion pieces
I have written during the same period, including "The Genie is Our
of the Bottle," ZNet, Dec. 27, 2008; "Ankara Interested in Make-up,
not Plastic Surgery," The Armenian Weekly, Jan. 10, 2009; and %u218?z?r
diliyorum’ futbol diplomasisinden daha ?nemli bir ad?m" (English title:
Soccer Diplomacy vs. I Apologize), Radikal, Jan. 26, 2009.

[2] The border was closed by Turkey in complicity with Azerbaijan
when the Karabagh conflict erupted. For a detailed treatment of the
Turkey-Armenia border issue, see for example the study for the Foreign
Affairs Committee of the European Parliament entitled "The Case for
Opening the Turkish-Armenian Border" (2007), available online at
files/Turkish_Armenian_Border.pdf.

[3] Initial reports on the election evaluated the overall process
positively. See "Republic Of Armenia Presidential Election (Feb. 19,
2008) OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Report," available online
at However, many Armenian citizens have,
over the years, lost their faith in most of the reports prepared
by foreign observers. Moreover, the crackdown on protesters and the
arrest of dozens of opposition figures–several of whom are still in
prison as of the writing of this paper–resulted in a tougher stance
from the West. President Bush, for one, did not congratulate Sarkisian
on his election.

[4] Europe has wanted the establishment of diplomatic ties and the
opening of the border between Turkey and Armenia in the context of
Turkey’s integration into the EU, while the U.S. has wanted an Armenia
that is, among other things, less dependent on Iran and Russia.

[5] During his campaign, and on several occasions, Obama promised
that if elected president, he would acknowledge the genocide. Also,
Biden has a track record of staunchly supporting Armenian Genocide
resolutions in Congress. Armenian lobby groups in the U.S. have
continuously given Biden an "A" in their grading system for Members
of Congress.

[6] The number of Christian Armenians in Turkey today is estimated
to be somewhere between 50,000-70,000.

[7] The Armenian Genocide resulted not only in the decimation of
two-thirds of Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire, but also in
total dispossession. Armenians were driven out of their ancestral
lands, and their assets and possessions were confiscated. As German
genocide scholar Hilmar Kaiser says, "The Armenian Genocide is the
Ottoman government’s answer to the Armenian Question: Deportations can
only be analyzed in terms of expropriation. It was grand theft. It
was the surgical separation of Armenians from their movable and
immovable property. The Ottoman government was very careful of
not wasting any assets while being not concerned about the fate
of the Armenians. To make the expropriation permanent, you have to
replace the Armenians. The expropriation was part of a settlement
program; this process created a surplus population and this surplus
population was taken care of. The Armenians were mathematically a
surplus population. Killing or, in the case of children and women,
assimilating them solved that problem." (See "An Interview with Hilmar
Kaiser" by Khatchig Mouradian, Aztag Daily newspaper, Sept. 24, 2005.

[8] See Peter Balakian, "Progress, Obstacles, Hope, 92 Years Later:
Some Reflections," The Armenian Weekly, April 21, 2007.

[9] Henry Theriault’s first presentation on the topic, "Toward a New
Conceptual Framework for Resolution: The Necessity of Recognizing the
Perpetrator-Victim Dominance Relation in the Aftermath of Genocide,"
was at the 7th Biennial Conference of the International Association
of Genocide Scholars (Boca Raton, Fla.) on June 7, 2005.

[10] See Theriault, "From Past Genocide to Present Perpetrator–Victim
Group Relations and Long-Term Resolution: A Philosophical Critique"
in "Commemorating Genocide: Images, Perspectives, Research," The
Armenian Weekly, April 26, 2008.

[11] See Lederach, John Jaul, Building Peace: Sustainable
Reconciliation in Divided Societies (United States Institute of Peace
Press, 1997)

[12] The current dialogue tries to make a case based on mutual,
largely economic, interests. According to the Turkish side, the
Armenians are behaving irrationally. [13] Theriault, 2008.

[14] The apology reads as follows: "My conscience does not accept
the insensitivity showed to and the denial of the Great Catastrophe
that the Ottoman Armenians were subjected to in 1915. I reject this
injustice and for my share, I empathize with the feelings and pain of
my Armenian brothers and sisters. I apologize to them." The campaign
to collect signatures continues at

[15] Armenian newspapers worldwide as well as the two major Armenian
lobby groups that pursue genocide recognition in the U.S.–the ANCA and
the Armenian Assembly–welcomed the initiative as a good "first step."

Later, some statements made by the initiators of the campaign made many
Armenians and progressive Turks more cautious about the initiative.