TURKEY TRIES TO OPEN THE BORDER WITH ARMENIA TO HAVE SOME INFLUENCE IN THE REGION

ArmInfo
2009-05-20 07:28:00

Interview by David Stepanyan

Interview of Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the
Armenian National Academy of Sciences, a well-known turcologist,
Professor Ruben Safrastyan with ArmInfo

Mr. Safrastyan, do the preconditions by the Turkish party with regard
to Armenia play any part in the "Roadmap"?. If yes, then what?

Today we have a situation when there are official statements by
our Foreign Ministry and by representatives of the US Department
of State, according to which the preconditions earlier set by
Turkey, in particular, the Karabakh issue, do not work in with the
Armenian-Turkish negotiations. That is to say, having signed the ,
Ankara abandons these preconditions. It is difficult to judge about
the content of this document unless it is fully published. However,
I am inclined to believe in the statements by Armenia’s FM and US
Department of State. As for the issue of the Armenian Genocide and
the Kars Treaty, I do not believe in publications of "Sabah" Turkish
newspaper saying they have been included in the Map as preconditions.

Moreover, I am inclined to suppose that this was a special media leak
organized by Turkey’s Foreign Ministry for internal use, first of all,
for relief of the flared up passions in Turkey and Azerbaijan.

In that case,=2 0what is Turkey’s benefit if it abandons preconditions?

This is just the major issue. Even so, I am inclined to connect this
desire of Ankara with the geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus,
taking into account the fact that after the August war Russia has
scored great advantage in the region: it violated the previous status
quo and created a new one in its own benefit. Thus, Turkey has lost its
positions in the region. In particular, Ankara invested great amounts
in the economy and military infrastructure of Georgia, and after the
August war all this was actually lost. Based on this Georgia, as a
real geopolitical factor, is presently in a quite deplorable state. On
the other hand, there is Azerbaijan which was on Georgia’s side on the
first day of the war, and then it flopped over Russia. Now, Azerbaijan
is closer to Russia than to the West. At the same time, Turkey offered
to create a small alliance to comprise Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey,
which would be headed by Turkey. Actually, this was just the plan
which went to smash after the Russian-Georgian war. Therefore,
Turkey tried to respond to this advantage of Russia and advanced
the concept of the Caucasus Platform which was an attempt to balance
the geopolitical success of Russia at the political level. However,
we see that the Platform has actually no chances to succeed. That’s
why, Turkey is trying to open the border with Armenia and provi de
itself with an opportunity to have some influence in the region. I
think just these geopolitical considerations played their part here.

Does it turn out that Turkey makes concessions in its sole discretion
based on its regional ambitions only?

First of all, I am not sure that the negotiation process will have any
more or less real result. It is still early to say about it. However,
it was clear up to this day that Turkey prefers its interests to those
of Azerbaijan. I used to always say that Turkey is not a country to
sacrifice its interests for those of its "younger brother".

How will Azerbaijan respond if the Roadmap is nevertheless published
and the Karabakh conflict is not mentioned in it as a precondition?

I think Baku has already accepted this. I do not think the relations
between the Azerbaijanis and Turks are actually brotherly, Azerbaijan
needs Turkey more or less, and it should swallow this pill.

What is your vision of the chronology of events in the Armenian-Turkish
relations? Many analysts claim that the border will be opened at first,
but it is impossible without establishment of diplomatic relations.

I also think so. Diplomatic relations should be established,
some representations should be opened, certain representatives and
then ambassadors must be appointed. I would still abstain from any
predictions, I am not sure that this will happen – the time will
show. Perhaps, no diplomatic relations will be establishment at all.

Why do you think so?

First, because the "Roadmap" signed is a framework agreement, i.e. this
document has no real force. Second, it does not contain many important
and principle issues. There is just a list of steps to be taken, and
specific negotiations with Turkey will be held just on these steps. It
is typical for the case when a framework agreement is signed, and I
am not sure these negotiations will have some result. The negotiations
may have success or a zero result.

Turkey’s interest in the Roadmap is clear, like its signing just
on April 23 is clear, as Barack Obama spoke Armenian on the next
day. What is Armenia’s interest?

I do not think we were interested in signing of the Roadmap just
on April 23. I think some diplomatic laws and regularities of the
negotiation process played their part here. Personally for me, it
would be more comfortable if it happened not on the eve of April 24.

Are we ready for opening of the borders?

I think our government should treat this issue very seriously. First,
it should prepare a concept – a document marking possible benefits
from the border opening, as well as possible risks related to this,
and, above all, some specific measures due to which Armenia would
receive more advantages than risks. I think this is just what we have
to do first of all.

Does Armen ia play independently in its game with Turkey or everything
is reduced to the collisions between the USA and Russia?

I had an article even in 2005 – a speech at the international
conference on the Genocide. The article was dedicated to the problem
of the Genocide recognition as a geopolitical factor. Even then I
came to the conclusion that the problem of the Genocide recognition
is one of the small opportunities of Armenia to conduct its policy
more or less independently.

This is the issue where we have the right to take a decision based
solely on our and not on others’ interests, unlike the Karabakh problem
which partially depends on other countries. Unlike the Genocide issue,
considerable pressure is put on us in the Karabakh problem. I think
we play independently also in the issue of the Armenian-Turkish
relations. It proceeds from the common concept of Armenia’s foreign
policy, i.e. normalization of the relations with Turkey without
preconditions. Second, the Russian-Georgian war has shown how we depend
on Georgia. Third, the entry in the external world is of geopolitical
importance for us. So, we have to solve this problem.

What about the Kars Treaty?

The Kars Treaty was signed under pressure on October 13, 1921,
by the government of the Soviet Armenia. But the point is that the
section concerning Armenia and Turkey and the borders between them was
almost completely withdrawn from the Sov iet-Turkish treaty signed in
March. Under this treaty, we accepted the Turkish border in the form
it exists now. And we perceive this treaty as unfair and compulsive,
and I do not think that Levon Ter-Petrosyan or Robert Kocharyan or
Serzh Sargsyan would accept the Kars Treaty. However, if proceed from
the pure realities, all the treaties are just a piece of paper.

The force bears the right. That’s it. The meaning of our refusal is
to accept that the Kars Treaty concerns not only the border to Turkey
but also the status of Nakhichevan. Moreover, it is an unfair and
compulsive treaty.

We did not sign it in fact. So, I think another treaty will be prepared
if the real process of normalization of the Armenian-Turkish relations
starts.

What is the present internal political situation in Turkey, especially
in the light of the Cabinet shake-up by Erdogan?

As for the relations with Armenia, conventionally we can say about
existence of two groupings in Turkey which have somewhat different
assessment of the relations with Armenia. One of them has been
represented by Premier Erdogan, a populist who very seriously uses
different kinds of slogans saying, in particular, that Turkey will
not betray Azerbaijan, it is discontent with the United States and
Barack Obama’s speeches on April 24. There is also a conventional
grouping of President Gul, which advocates the real policy.

However, there is a consent between the m, i.e. the decisions are made
jointly, as both of them are the leaders of the Justice and Development
party. As for the Cabinet shake-up, I positively treat appointment of
Ahmet Davutoglu the foreign minister. I am acquainted with his book
"Strategic Depth" and the approaches it presents. Davutoglu advocates
more considerable role of Turkey in the region and movement of the
foreign political vector of Ankara from the West to the East. Davutoglu
is an architect of the new and closer relations with the Arab world,
he also played a part of a mediator during the negotiations between
Syria and Israel. Davutoglu’s approach is as follows: zero problems
with the neighbours. If he implements his approaches, we should
consider his appointment in a favourable context for normalization
of the Armenian-Turkish relations. Davutoglu is homely with Gul and
Erdogan, however, he has his own views.

Recently, the president of France claimed once again that Turkey has
no place in EU. Did the latter accept it?

I think it did not, as France does not represent EU singly. In
case the social-democrats in Germany, for example, come to power,
the position of Germany with regard to the prospects of Turkey’s
membership in EU will apparently change. Moreover, Turkey has chances
to join EU against the background of USA’s aspiration to push it in
it, although the majority of the Europeans are against this. I think
the highlight of the European policy with respect to Turkey is just
to keep it at the doors of EU on petitioner’s bench, opening the door
but not letting Turkey in.

Thank you.