CAUCASIAN TRIANGLES
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21 – 27 May 2009
The Arabs could learn much from watching Iran, Turkey and Russia play
their cards in the struggle for influence and power in the Caucasus,
writes Mustafa El-Labbad*
Iran and Turkey are locked in a neck-to-neck contest over regional
roles not only in the Middle East but in the Caucasus as well. An
analysis of the dynamics of their rivalry in that region is important
from the Arab perspective, as it sheds light on the means and tactics,
and skills and resources that they bring to bear on their contest in
this region. This applies all the more so in view of the resemblance
between the ways the two powers conduct their rivalries in the two
regions. In both areas, they steer well clear of direct military
involvement and, instead, build networks of alliances through which
they can extend and consolidate their regional presence. A second
common denominator is the involvement of a third and senior party
in the business of policy design and role assignation: the US in the
Middle East and Russia in the Caucasus.
The Caucasus — the crossroads between Europe, Asia and the Middle
East — consists of two major political regions. The southern Caucasus
consists of the three fully independent republics of Georgia, Armenia
and Azerbaijan.
The northern Caucasus, by contrast, is located entirely within the
borders of the Russian Federation and is made up of the autonomous
republics of Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, Adyghea, Kabardino-
Balkaria, Karachai-Cherkessia, North Ossetia, Krasnodar Krai and
Stavropol Krai. As Russia has long since established its dominant
influence in North Caucasus, Iran and Turkey remain uninvolved in
whatever tensions that erupt there. It is, therefore, to the South
Caucasus that we must turn to examine the Russian- Turkish-Iranian
regional rivalry since the emergence of the three independent republics
there following the break-up of the Soviet Union.
Geographical and historical factors combine to establish the influence
of the three powers in the Caucasus. Not only do Iran, Turkey and
Russia form the region’s natural boundaries, but the Persian, Ottoman
and Russian empires have had long histories of control over it. One
could say that for three centuries, at least, the Caucasus has been
the thermometer for gauging power balances in the Iranian-Turkish-
Russian triangle. Caught in the middle, the small, relatively sparsely
populated and weaker republics are ultimately dependent for their
survival upon their alliances with one of the three powers. We find,
therefore, that since its independence from the former Soviet Union,
Azerbaijan has allied with linguistically, ethnically and culturally
similar Turkey, while Armenia allied first with Russia and more
recently with Iran. Although Georgia has attempted to cast its sights
further afield, forging ties with the West in general, and the US in
particular, it failed to escape the Russian grip, to which testify
the events of summer 2008.
The alliances between the three regional powers and the
Caucasian countries are as intricate as the Caucasian terrain
and linguistic/ethnic make-up. The conflict in the early 1990s
between Armenia and Azerbaijan, leading to Armenia’s occupation
of the Azerbaijani province of Nagorno-Karabakh, exemplifies the
ironies. Although Iran and Azerbaijan share a common Shia Muslim bond,
Tehran sided with Christian Armenia because of Azerbaijan’s alliance
with its regional adversary Turkey. Similarly, predominantly Christian
Georgia has maintained warm relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, and
relatively cool relations with Armenia. As these examples indicate,
political-strategic considerations override religious and sectarian
allegiances in the patterns of alliances. And these same patterns
repeated themselves since the mid-1990s whenever the three southern
Caucasian republics quarrelled.
Most recently, Obama’s visit to Turkey marked the official opening of
a more proactive phase in Turkey’s policies towards its neighbouring
areas, even if it began around a year ago. Turkey is currently involved
in intensive negotiations with neighbouring Armenia over normalising
relations between them. Reopening the common border between the
two countries, closed since the mid-1990s, will facilitate Turkey’s
land access to Azerbaijan and Central Asia, while Armenia will have
greater land access to Europe. Also, the planned Nabucco pipeline
for transporting natural gas from the Caspian Sea through Turkey to
the EU would be able to pass through Armenia, which would give the
latter a much needed boost to its strategic value and chronically
suffering economy. In terms of pure interests, therefore, there
is nothing to stand in the way of normalisation. However, several
impediments continue to hamper the prospect of Armenia changing its
pattern of alliances. Prime among them is the history of the hundreds
of thousands of Armenian civilians who were killed or died in forced
marches in 1915.
Whereas Yerevan insists that Ankara officially recognise the Armenian
"genocide" at the hands of Turkish forces, Ankara refuses to go so far.
While expressing its deep regret over these events, Ankara maintains
that this was wartime and that it was not a one-sided affair. Another
major sticking point in Turkish-Armenian negotiations is Armenia’s
occupation of the Azerbaijani area of Nagorno-Karabakh. As long as
this problem remains unresolved, the common linguistic, cultural and
ethnic bonds between Turkey and Azerbaijan will impede normalisation
between Ankara and Yerevan.
Moscow has been keeping a close eye on the Turkish-Armenian
negotiations.
Their success would usher in the Nabucco pipeline, which would
break Moscow’s monopoly with regards to the overland flow of energy
supplies to Europe. In addition, with the Armenian barrier removed,
Turkish influence in the Caucasus would outstrip that of its Russian
and Iranian rivals, as Ankara would be on good terms with all three
South Caucasus republics, in contrast to Russia’s and Iran’s good
relations with only one of them, Armenia.
Iran, for its part, has little to offer to dissuade Yerevan from moving
ahead in its negotiations with Ankara. It certainly cannot vie with
either Moscow or Ankara in offers of military or economic aid. The
most it has been able to do, so far, is to supply Armenia with cheap
energy in exchange for Armenia’s support against Azerbaijan, which has
voiced territorial claims to northwest Iran, which Baku refers to as
"South Azerbaijan".
Azerbaijan fears that Ankara is preparing to sell it out on the
question of the return of Armenian occupied Nagorno-Karabakh,
which has not been made a point in the Turkish-Armenian
negotiations. Capitalising on Baku’s dismay, Russia invited Azerbaijani
President Ilham Aliyev to Moscow for talks. That Turkish Prime Minister
Recep Erdogan subsequently asked to attend that meeting as well may
mean that Moscow could regain control over the pace and direction of
developments in that region. It is hardly surprising therefore that
Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan should choose precisely this time for
a visit to Iran in order to meet with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,
Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani and National Security Adviser Said
Jalili. If the Armenian move was motivated by shifting balances in
the Caucasus, Tehran needs to maintain a broader perspective. Above
all, it would refrain from doing anything that might jeopardise its
strategic relations with Moscow merely in order to placate Armenia,
as important as the latter is to Tehran in the Caucasus region. Given
this plus the abovementioned fact that Tehran has little more to
offer Yerevan beyond cheap energy supplies, the current round of
Armenian-Iranian talks will lead to nothing.
The Iranian-Turkish-Russian interplay in the Caucasus is instructive on
the dynamics of international power politics. It teaches us, above all,
that national interests prevail over ideology and sectarian or ethnic
allegiances in the forging or dissolution of bilateral alliances. We
learn, secondly, that the primary tools that the three regional
powers bring to bear in their rivalries are diversification and
consolidation of alliances through the creation of new and concrete
areas of economic and strategic common interest, as opposed to the
bluster and bravado that blares across the airwaves in our part of
the world. As the balances of power currently stand in the Caucasus,
Russia leads, with Turkey edging closer in second and Iran in third
place. However, against that shifting background we learn, thirdly,
that the hierarchy of regional power status does not change from one
day to the next and that what it takes to change them is a long and
complex process in which economic, political and strategic assets
are deployed realistically, rationally and resolutely.
* The writer is director of Al-Sharq Centre for Regional and Strategic
Studies.