TURKEY’S NEW POLITICAL LANDSCAPE – CAN THE KURDS STILL BE IGNORED?

Kurdish Herald
cle01.php
June 11 2009

The land that comprises present-day Turkey has reinvented itself many
times over the centuries, undergoing a number of extreme changes which
yield today’s Republic and all of its inherent contradictions. In past
incarnations, the ancient city of Istanbul (formerly Constantinople),
has been the capital of a number of officially Christian empires
(beginning with the Roman Empire under Theodosius I) and the capital
of a Muslim empire that also functioned as a caliphate (the Ottoman
Empire). Today it is the business and cultural center of Turkey,
a state founded on staunchly secular principles which officially
places limitations on public expressions of religious belief.

More than ever, Turkey today is a land in flux. It’s imperfect
democratic system, complete with various measures that help insure
that the military has some measure of control over the policies of the
country, has yielded a number of interesting and noteworthy changes
over the past few decades. On a number of occasions, Turkish citizens
have cast their votes and overturned the existing political system,
and, on a number of other occasions, the Turkish military has stepped
in to enforce its will upon the democratically-elected government.

Results of the 2009 nationwide local election in Turkey.

Over the past few years, we have witnessed the rise of a new
powerhouse in Turkish politics, the Justice and Development Party
(AKP), a party which by definition as an Islamist party contradicts
the founding ideology of the secular, Western Turkish Republic. Indeed,
the AKP rose to power democratically by receiving votes not only from
religious voters but also from those looking for a protest vote and
finding it in a party that preached moral values. Even many Kurds,
motivated by either religious fervor or anger at the establishment
reflected by the Republican People’s Party (CHP), cast their votes
for the AKP.

Since it’s founding in 2001, the AKP has solidified its role as
Turkey’s dominant political party. The AKP is no longer a curious
newcomer to the world of politics, it is a major part of the Turkish
political framework. And while dominant, it is but one player in the
complicated, high stakes game that is Turkish politics. The results of
the recent municipal elections in Turkey explain the current state of
Turkey’s political system, and, in many ways, are the culmination of
a number of interesting developments in the Turkish political scene
over the last few years.

Whole swaths of Turkey are now firmly in the camp of one political
party or another. While the AKP received far more votes than any of
its opponents, it failed in its stated goal of breaking into the
old strongholds of other political parties, such as Izmir for the
CHP (where the CHP won 55% of votes for greater municipal mayor)
or Diyarbakir for the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP)
(where they won 66% of votes for greater municipal mayor). The CHP
came out in control of much of the western coast of Turkey, spanning
all the way from Icel to Edirne. This reflects a strong backing from
Turkey’s Kemalist elite, who have traditionally been staunch adherents
of the Republic’s founding ideology and, in keeping with this ideology,
are generally Western-leaning and secular. Many in this group are
fairly wealthy, relatively speaking, and are genuinely alarmed
and even dismayed by the rise of the AKP, a group that they fear is
steering Turkey dangerously far from its founding principles. The more
right-wing Nationalist Action Party (MHP) won a number of provinces in
the west and, together with the CHP and CHP offshoot DSP (Democratic
Left Party), controls much of Turkey’s northern border.

Meanwhile, much of the rest of Turkey, throughout Anatolia, cast
their votes for the AKP, demonstrating a clear division between
the secular elite of certain regions who have been members of the
Kemalist establishment for decades and a newly resurgent class of more
traditional Turkish citizens who, over the past decade, have become
more educated and more mobilized. While the CHP and MHP represent
certain regions on Turkey’s borders, the Anatolian heartland is
dominated by the AKP.

The one exception to this general rule is the predominantly
Kurdish southeast, a land which many Kurds identify as northern
Kurdistan. Despite the best efforts of the AKP, the poorly-funded
but well organized DTP emerged as the voice of the southeast, scoring
victories by large margins in certain strongholds such as Diyarbakir
and capturing others previously held by other parties, such as Igdir
near Turkey’s border with Armenia. A cursory glance at Turkey’s new
political map makes it difficult to deny that the DTP is the voice
of the Kurds of Turkey.

The various factions that comprise the Turkish establishment,
including the government (AKP), the Kemalist political establishment
(CHP), and the military, have, in the past, taken great pains to
ostracize members of the DTP, accusing them of being complicit in
"terrorism", a reference to the activities of the Kurdistan Workers
Party (PKK). Many MPs, including the Prime Minister, refused to
shake hands with DTP parliamentarians and military generals refused
to appear at events attended by DTP members. Now that the DTP has
truly established itself as the voice of Turkey’s Kurdish citizens
and the dominant power in a whole section of the country, it is a
lot more difficult to ignore. Slowly but surely, it seems that some
of the larger factions in the Turkish establishment are realizing
this as recently CHP Deputy Secretary General Mesut Deger met
with DTP chairman Ahmet Turk to discuss the Kurdish issue. Almost
concurrently, a report which stated that Prime Minister Erdogan
himself was preparing to meet representatives of the DTP. At nearly
the same time, the Turkish newspaper Milliyet published an interview
with PKK military leader Murat Karayilan following journalist Hasan
Cemal’s visit to the Qendil mountains with the headline, "Karayilan:
we have hope for peace." In another interesting development, following
the publication of this interview, Cemal was reportedly contacted by
the offices of several of Turkey’s most influential policymakers to
discussions – President Gul, Prime Minister Erdogan, and Minister of
Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu, though his meetings with all three
were apparently postponed.

The results of this year’s municipal elections were no surprise
and were not revolutionary. Rather, they were an accurate snapshot
of the new political map of Turkey, a summary of the complex and
ever-evolving reality of one of the world’s more curious democratic
systems. As the heirs of the legacy of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and the
powerbrokers of Turkey’s political world react to these developments,
it seems that they may indeed be forced to address Turkey’s Kurdish
question in a more direct manner than ever before. Indeed, this may
already be happening.