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EU Must Intervene in Nagorno-Karabakh
Borut Grgic | June 16, 2009
STOCK – EU
It is now 17 years since Armenia and Azerbaijan began a full-scale war
over Nagorno-Karabakh, a south-western province of Azerbaijan. And it
is now 15 years since a ceasefire was agreed, with Armenian forces in
control of the territory. But it is a ceasefire that it is poorly
observed. There are regular shoot-outs across the line of contact,
regular explosions of mines, and more than 30,000 troops in
combat-ready mode.
The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is, then, far from frozen. Indeed,
Nagorno-Karabakh is probably a more dangerous frozen conflict’ than
those in Moldova and Georgia. Both sides continue to compete in an
arms race, making the region the most heavily militarised in
Europe. Azerbaijan is currently spending $2 billion (1.4 bn) on
military procurement, which is more than the state budget of
Armenia. In both countries, the animosity is very evident, and
hate-full propaganda appears each day. Peace remains a distant
prospect, with the Minsk Group’ talks being held under the aegis of
the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
producing no visible results.
Leaders in Baku want Nagorno-Karabakh to remain in Azerbaijan and they
want Armenian troops to withdraw from the seven occupied
regions. Yerevan is asking for the right to self-determination. And
although the August 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia should have
demonstrated that war is a bad solution, Baku is growing increasingly
impatient with diplomatic efforts, which are producing no results.
A role for the EU
A war over Nagorno-Karabakh would have devastating regional
consequences. It would destroy the region’s fragile stability and it
would undermine and seriously threaten the security of energy supplies
from the Caspian to the international markets, including the prospects
of the southern gas corridor connecting the EU gas market with Caspian
producers. Turkey and Russia might find themselves supporting opposing
sides, while Europe and the US would be hard pressed to intervene. The
price of a conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh would be extremely high for
the European Union, as it has been in the case of Georgia and so it is
surprising how little attention Europe is giving to the conflict.
While the EU is actively engaged in the breakaway Moldovan region of
Transdniester and now also in Georgia, through the Geneva process, it
has no direct role in Nagorno-Karabakh. Although there is an EU
Special Representative for the South Caucasus, Europe has taken a back
seat to the Minsk Group, where France has its own representative.
There is also a lack of knowledge about the conflict within EU
institutions and reluctance on the part of some member states to see
the EU become more deeply involved. At the same time, there is growing
recognition of the strategic importance of this region, not least in
terms of energy security and diversification the major pipelines from
the Caspian to the west are mere 15 km from the ceasefire line, and
several pumping stations are exposed and vulnerable to
attack. Furthermore, there is a good chance that, if hostilities
resumed, the EU would be asked to deal with the aftermath (as was the
case in Georgia last year). And, if a peace deal were struck, the EU
would be well placed to oversee the deal’s implementation, given its
experience in other conflicts. It would therefore make sense for the
EU to stake out a greater role for itself now. Tasks for the EU
Firstly, the EU needs to integrate itself into the Minsk Group. If
Europe is to become the main implementer and guarantor of a peace
deal, Europe also needs to be a part of the deal-making process. That
means France will have to trade in its seat, and the new EU
representative in the Minsk Process would need a clear and strong
mandate, with room to negotiate on behalf of the twenty-seven member
states.
Secondly, Europe needs to decide whether it supports Azerbaijan’s
territorial integrity or not. There will also come a time when
Brussels will have to ask the Armenian government to withdraw its
troops from the occupied territories, and use leverage including the
threat of suspending talks on a free-trade agreement and an
association agreement if Yerevan refuses. It is impossible, on the one
hand, to laud Azerbaijan as an indispensable strategic ally in the
quest to improve Europe’s energy security while, on the other hand, to
fail to support Azerbaijan in its efforts to regain control over its
territory. Countless UN resolutions, NATO declarations and Council of
Europe positions have reaffirmed Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.
Finally, the EU’s experience from the western Balkans can also be
relevant in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. Once the peace
framework is agreed, the EU could engage in de-mining projects, since
the region is one of the most heavily mined in the world; send a
mission to evaluate the security situation and damage on the ground in
the occupied territories; appoint a deputy to the Special
Representative who is a respected expert on the conflict trusted by
all sides and thereby able to facilitate contacts between the
communities of Nagorno-Karabakh and help identify solutions; bring
together youth groups to work on diverse projects such as restoring
historical monuments damaged during the war. The EU is also well
placed to take the lead in peacekeeping and reconstruction.
The EU’s new Eastern Partnership cites as its goal stability, security
and prosperity in the Eastern Neighbourhood. Without the resolution of
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict this will never be achievable and the
region will remain a ticking time bomb. Therefore the EU needs to show
that it has learned its lesson in Georgia and become an active
peacemaker in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Borut Grgic is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic
Council. Amanda Akkoca is a policy analyst at the European Policy
Centre.This article previously appeared in European Voice as "Another
Peace Role for the EU."
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