Ankara: Turkey’s ‘Multi-Centered’ Foreign Policy

TURKEY’S ‘MULTI-CENTERED’ FOREIGN POLICY

Hurriyet
Wednesday, July 08, 2009 11:15

Some columnists such as Erdal Þafak and Taha Akyol see the new Foreign
Minister Ahmet Davutoðlu as an extraordinary minister and praise
him every chance they have. So do I see Davutoðlu as an important
academic, a humble but principled personality and a man of patience,
and I remember his always-smiling eyes.

Davutoðlu makes the claim to bring new breath, an understanding to
Turkish foreign policy! Therefore, he claims to have a multi-centered
foreign policy that depends on direct mutual interest of countries
that we have bilateral relations with, aims to have zero problems with
neighbors, and makes Turkey a central country in the Middle East and
independent from the U.S. backwashes.

Davutoðlu paid a visit to the United States after Barack Obama
was elected president and made the following remarks to describe
Turkey-U.S. relations in the new period, "Turkey’s foreign policy
choices and priorities overlap with Obama."

*** I can only make an assessment on multi-centered foreign policy
through an approach based on conclusion.

I am of the opinion that if a multi-centered policy cannot be anchored
to anywhere, or rather clearly if it is not equipped with basic
principles, it will eventually transform into a policy that cannot
reach any conclusion anywhere and that can try to please everyone. If
I look at Turkish foreign policy from a conclusion-centered point
of view, I see the following picture: *** 1) On the eve of Apr. 24,
Armenian Day, Turkey approached Armenia and talked about opening the
border without preconditions.

2) Obama was pleased to hear the developments and did not utter the
word "genocide" on Apr. 24.

3) But Azerbaijan, on the other hand, got fumed and challenged
Turkey. Obviously, Turkey couldn’t convince Azerbaijan on the Armenian
initiative. And Turkey promptly made a U-turn to give a guarantee
to Azerbaijan.

4) As Russia assured Azerbaijan regarding the Upper Karabakh
issue, Azerbaijanis decided to sell natural gas to Russia in big
amounts. Therefore, the Western product Nabucco project, to paralyze
the Russian hegemony in the energy market, was harmed severely.

5) Turkey announced partnership with Russia in the "Blue Stream"
project and began to talk about a strategic partnership with Russia,
just about the time it had an anchor with Obama.

6) Since Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoðan offended Israeli
President Shimon Peres through his remark "You know how to kill"
in Davos, Turkey-Israeli relations have not been on track.

The number of Israeli tourists visiting Turkey has dropped radically
as sports events are being suspended.

But most importantly, Israel does not want to see Turkey as a mediator
in Israeli-Syrian talks.

7) Erdoðan fell into a serious trap on the "Mine Bill" issue (See:
the visits of Israeli ambassador to Ankara to southeastern Turkey and
to Parliament). Erdoðan, who became a hero in the Arab World with his
"One Minute" move against Peres in Davos, this time, lost prestige
among Arabs.

8) Turkey became the first country to congratulate incumbent Iranian
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad following the controversial presidential
elections, despite the United States and the European Union. However,
the very same Iranian administration wants to see Turkey neither as
a broker in Iran-U.S. relations nor in Iran-EU affairs.

*** 9) Neither Saudi Arabia nor Egypt accepts Turkey as a dominant
country in the Middle East. They are even disturbed by Turkey’s
approach to Iran.

10) In the last period, Turkey mediated between the West, which
refuses to have direct talks, and Hamas and Hezbollah. This is the
only solid improvement in hand!

In a conclusion-centered approach the multi-center foreign policy
does not look good!