ANALYSIS: IRANIAN LOBBYING FAILED (GUEST VOICE)
Jonathan Spyer
The Moderate Voice
Jul 9th, 2009
President Shimon Peres’s landmark visit to Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan
this week represents a significant advance for Israeli ambitions in
Central Asia. In the wake of the recent decision to permit Israel to
open an embassy in the Turkmen capital of Ashghabad, the visit reflects
the importance Jerusalem attaches to this strategically significant
part of what is sometimes known as the "greater Middle East." Israel’s
stance reflects a series of hopes, interests and concerns. The most
important of these are: the desire to contain Iranian influence, and
joint opposition to radical Islam. Israeli technological expertise is
of particular interest to energy-rich, rapidly developing Central Asian
economies, forming the basis for growing economic relations. In turn,
Azerbaijan has emerged as a major energy supplier. The country supplies
just under 20 percent of Israel’s oil. Israel’s desire to build strong
connections with non-Arab Muslim countries in the region is of long
standing and reflects an obvious strategic interest. Yet in the past,
Central Asian states have preferred to keep their friendship with the
Jewish state far from the spotlight. Israel has maintained diplomatic
relations with both Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan since 1992. With regard
to containing Teheran, relations with Shi’ite Azerbaijan, which shares
a border with Iran, are of particular significance. Azerbaijan has
close ethnic links with Iran. Far more Azeris live in Iran than in
Azerbaijan itself. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is an ethnic
Azeri. Yet relations between Iran and Azerbaijan have grown tense
over the last decade for a number of reasons. The Islamic republic,
for strategic reasons of its own, tacitly supported Armenia in the
Azeri-Armenian war over the province of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Teheran dislikes the secular nature of Azerbaijani politics, and
has offered support and training to Azeri mullahs and organizations
preaching a pro-Iranian Islamist message. Iran and Azerbaijan also
have competing interests related to energy issues in the Caspian Sea.
As a result, Baku has drawn close to Jerusalem on the basis of a
shared threat. Israeli defense industries have made very significant
inroads. Israel played the central role in rebuilding and modernizing
the Azeri military after its losses in Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan
has also become one of the key arenas in the ongoing silent war between
Israel and Iran. Both countries are thought to possess major espionage
networks on Azeri soil. Israel is reported to maintain listening
and surveillance posts on the Azerbaijan-Iran border. The recent
foiling of a joint Hizbullah/Iranian plot to bomb the Israeli Embassy
by the authorities in Baku shows the depth of activity. Kazakhstan,
which has no border with Iran, has sought to develop strong trade and
strategic relations with the Islamic republic. Part of Peres’s mission
was to seek a firm Kazakh commitment that it would cease the sale
of uranium ore to Iran. Astana’s stance appears to reflect a desire
to play a part in diplomatic mediation in the region and beyond it,
on the basis of its image as a moderate Muslim state.
The more diffuse threat of radical Islam offers a further natural
basis for friendship. In the Shi’ite but secular-governed Azerbaijan,
this threat takes the form of Iran-supported local Shi’ite Islamist
parties, and the presence of Hizbullah. In largely-Sunni Kazakhstan,
meanwhile, Saudi-supported Islamic extremists and the pan-Islamic Hizb
al-Tahrir party constitute a significant irritant to the authorities,
making them more inclined to greater friendliness toward Israel. The
response to domestic Islamic extremism has been determined and
uncompromising. Kazakhstan’s commitment to purchase satellite and
surveillance technology from Israel reflects the growing role of
Israeli defense industries in the country – a role which was shaken
in April by claims that Israel had sold faulty military hardware to
Kazakhstan. Despite the extensive cooperation and common interest,
Jerusalem has been frustrated by the unwillingness of both Kazakhs
and Azeris to move toward a more open and overt relationship. There
has long been a sense that both countries preferred to benefit from
close links with Israel in a variety of areas, while keeping the
public profile of the relationship as low as possible. Such a stance
reflected the desire of both countries to maintain good relations
with the Arab and wider Muslim world. Israeli officials hoped that
Peres’s visit would be of importance in laying the basis for changing
this stance. The Iranian response to the visit suggests that Teheran
shared the sense of this possibility. The Iranians lobbied hard to
have the visit to Azerbaijan called off. Iran’s chief of staff visited
Baku two weeks ago in an attempt to persuade the Azeris to cancel the
trip. He was unsuccessful. In response to the Peres visit, Iran has
recalled its ambassador for consultations. In Kazakhstan, the Iranian
decision to walk out of an interfaith conference while Peres was
speaking represents an additional indication of Iranian displeasure,
and hence a further diplomatic point for Israel. The bottom line:
Iranian lobbying failed. Inducing Muslim countries with which Israel
has shared interests and firm connections to overcome the desire to
"camouflage" or downplay their relations with Israel represents a
perennial challenge for Israeli diplomacy. The latest developments in
Central Asia suggest that, in this region at least, real progress has
begun to be made. Jonathan Spyer is a senior research fellow at the
Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, Herzliya,
Israel. This is cross-posted on that site.