POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ROUTES OF NABUCCO
Karine Ter-Sahakyan
PanARMENIAN.Net
16.07.2009 GMT+04:00
The essential thing to do is to bring the pipeline into Turkey, and
there are two ways to do it: to bring it from Turkmenistan through
Azerbaijan and Georgia, or from Iran through Armenia.
On July 13 the long-awaited agreement on beginning the realization
of the Nabucco gas pipeline was signed in Ankara, which immediately
gave rise to numerous commentaries and predictions by all interested
parties. Quite naturally, the gloomiest forecasts apropos of the
realization of the project were made by Russia. But it’s fairly
explicable, because in case of exploitation of the gas pipe, Moscow
loses a very and dreadfully important lever of pressure on Europe and
the Caucasus, which in no way pleases her. Accustomed to the policy
of threats, Russian authorities will do everything in their power to
hinder the realization of Nabucco.
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ It is necessary to note that Russia has specific
levers to hit the target. Moscow thinks she somehow solved the
problem by buying up all the Azerbaijani gas and promising Baku a
spice-cake in the form of the Karabakh conflict "regulation". Not by
chance, indeed, were the Madrid principles, whose essence was long
a widely known secret, promulgated especially these days. However,
hardly can Azerbaijan seriously believe that the resolution will be
quite pleasing for Baku. As a matter of fact, Russia is not the one
to make resolutions, no matter how much she seeks it, because she
definitely does not match the role of a mediator-peacemaker. The same
spice-cake is stored up also for Armenia, but with some reservations
and conditions.
However, Moscow forgets one essential matter: the isolation of Iran is
not eternal, changes in the region occur very frequently and who can
assert that tomorrow Iran will not be allowed to the gas pipe? She
will be allowed for one simple reason: the Azerbaijani gas, even if
it is completely pumped into Nabucco, is not sufficient anyway. So,
the Turkmen or Iranian gas will be necessary. Iran, which holds the
second place in the world with its gas deposits, can easily fill up
Nabucco. As far as the Turkmen gas is concerned, Teheran can simply
buy it up and deliver it to China and the Far East countries, which
would be both cheaper and faster.
Actually, everything at present depends on the choice of the gas
pipe route. The essential thing to do is to bring the pipeline into
Turkey, and there are two ways to do it: either to bring it from
Turkmenistan through Azerbaijan and Georgia, or from Iran through
Armenia. The first route is political and economic, while the second
is purely economic and profitable. To all appearances, the story of
the oil pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan repeats itself: it would have
been economically more profitable for it to pass through Armenia,
but Baku with the support of Turkey and Georgia did everything in her
power to obstruct the realization of this project. However, things
are much more complicated with Nabucco. First, it is longer and,
hence, more expensive. Second, it is essential for Europe, because the
latter needs to finally reject the delivery of the Russian gas. Well,
for the same purposes Nabucco is also necessary to the region. In any
event Russia will not be able to control the gas pipe, irrespective
of which country it passes through, because she will have to manage
to close the valve in two countries simultaneously, and no one has yet
succeeded in doing it. Sure, Moscow will try to impede the construction
process and to dictate conditions. Moreover, she will do it by way of
Armenia, which in the West is considered to be the chief pro-Russian
country in the South Caucasus. And again the Iranian factor comes to
the fore. It is possible to come to an agreement with three Caucasian
countries (by hook or by crook), but Iran, who claims to the role of
the regional power, will definitely carry out her own policy. The
USA still says that Nabucco can be filled with the Russian gas,
but never with the Iranian. However, it is said only now, but as
we have already noted, there is one more possible scenario. After
the presidential elections there began cleanings on the very top in
Iran, and Leader of the Iranian nuclear program Gholamreza Aghazadeh,
who supported main oppositionist of the country Mir-Hossein Mousavi,
retired. Moreover, if Europe has to choose between Iran and Russia as
gas suppliers, most likely she will give preference to Iran: in spite
of the "irreconcilability of ayatollahs" it is always possible reach
understanding with Teheran. And though it is also possible to reach
an agreement with Moscow, it is too costly. It’s no less difficult
to negotiate with Iran or Iraq, who are ready to contribute their
mite into Nabucco, but there will clearly be no blackmail on their
part. Although, who knows? But, in any event, under equal conditions,
the East gives preference to expediency and not to instantaneous
political or economic gains.
As far as the two supposed branches are concerned, here, unfortunately,
almost everything depends on Russia, or, to be more accurate, on her
power in resolving her regional problems. Nabucco may become that
point of no return, after which Moscow will have great difficulty in
controlling not only the conflict situation in the Caucasus, but also
the relations with seemingly friendly countries: Iran, Azerbaijan
and Armenia. Georgia, naturally, is not counted – relations with it
have been damaged for long. In a broader sense, the project is yet
beneficial far only for Turkey as the basic transit country. Armenia
can earn dividends only if she becomes the second transit county. But
truly serious geopolitical changes are necessary for this.