Karabakh process leading to nothing is advantageous for both Russia and
the USA

2009-07-17 12:13:00

Interviewed by David Stepanyan, 16 July 2009, ArmInfo

Interview of ex-foreign minister of Nagorno-Karabakh Arman Melikyan
with ArmInfo news agency

Mr. Melikyan, what are the geopolitical prerequisites of the statement
on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict made by the presidents of the USA,
Russia and France during the L’Aquila summit?

Actually, the logic of the Karabakh negotiating process leads to
unsettlement of the Karabakh conflict. Undoubtedly, the negotiating
process is very much useful for several reasons which have the local as
well as global specification. For the external forces: Russia, the USA and
European Union the negotiations are important as the Karabakh conflict
is of a global significance for them. The reason is that the fact of
the unsettled conflict in our region creates extra risks for the
communications which run via its territory from the East to the Western
Europe. For this reason at present when the geo-political situation
changed after the USSR split, the relations between the main players
have changed too. Thus, today the USA and Russia are fighting for
having influence in Europe. In that fight the USA is trying to lobby
and fulfill construction of communications from the East to Europe,
which will bypass Russia. But the latter is trying to hamper it, having
monopolized the energy products delivery to Europe. That is to say, for
Russia as well as Europe communications and energy products are the
instruments to affect Western Europe. It is clear that without Western
Europe it will be difficult for the USA to organize and fulfill its
policy including the economical one at the Eurasian territory. For
Russia, which has no other chance and trump card to affect the policy
of the Western Europe than energy products delivery, preserving of
monopoly to energy products delivery is a matter of life and death,
i.e. the situation is very much difficult. Actually, Europeans may
admit both options. They may start strategic cooperation with Moscow or
make use of the opportunities given by the USA or China. But there are
negative moments in both options.

What role does the Karabakh conflict factor play in the geopolitical
alignment in the region?

The given factor is able to essentially change the geopolitical
alignment in the region in case of a new outbreak of the Karabakh
conflict. Currently, as the negotiation process is slowly going on, no
one needs this breakout. That is, the process leading to nothing is
advantageous today for both Russia and the USA, as it gives an
advantage to no one in the region. Some status-quo has developed in the
South Caucasus region, within the frames of which both parties try to
find some other ways to promote their interests. That is, a positional
game is going on, where Bulgaria, for example, has already refused to
take part in the , that will quite seriously complicate implementation
of the Russian project. In this situation, Russia does not seat on its
hands either. Availability of any negotiation process in this situation
is profitable for both the mediator-countries and participants in the
conflict which does not need to uselessly sacrifice their young people
sending them to the war. However, the postulates, which are used today,
lead to nothing, as it is impossible to resolve the Karabakh problem by
determinations.

According to your logic, the statement of the three presidents in
L’Aquila has actually changed nothing, has it?

It has changed nothing for now. But in general, I think we do not need
the Madrid principles at all. It is yet unclear what they envisage as
it is unclear how the notorious referendum on determination of the NKR
status will be held, and whether the parties will accept its results.
So, the referendum is a distant prospect, while the territories are to
be given today. In this context I advocate new initiatives and a new
parallel process, as the Madrid principles and, in general, the whole
negotiation process held up to now, contains somewhat asymmetric with
respect to the sides. They permanently say about the necessity of
return of the Azerbaijani refugees and the internally displaced persons
to their homes and nothing is said about the Armenian refugees. They
say the NKR Defence Army should cede the territories it liberated, but
there is no word about Shahumyan or Getashen. This means that Armenia,
as a negotiator, understands the necessity of ceding of the
territories, but it does not think it is necessary to protect the
rights of Armenian refugees. Moreover, Armenia does not care about the
territorial integrity of the NKR, not recognizing its independence. In
fact, the Madrid principles deny the fact of the NKR self-determination
and Armenia joining these principles does the same. I think that having
agreed to such logic of the process put itself in an extremely
unfavorable position and deprived itself of many solid arguments to
reach its goals. For instance, the changed principles say not about the
Azerbaijani refugees but about refugees in general, that is to say, it
is supposed that Armenians may also return to the places of their
permanent residence.

This is stated in the principles and what about the reality?

The reality is that Azerbaijan is preparing a program of returning.
According to this program, hundreds of thousands of people are to
populate the liberated territories. It is noteworthy that the program
is financed by both Azerbaijani Government and international financial
organizations. Judging by who is at power in Baku today, I have no
doubt that Aliyev will manage to force these people to populate these
territories. But the most important thing is that international
organizations are ready to finance this while the matter doesn’t
concern Armenian refugees. For unknown reasons nobody says that
Armenians should return to Khanlar, Getashen, Artsvashen, Shahumyan.
Moreover, nobody speaks of the material sponsorship of this return. All
this demonstrates a number of mistakes made by Armenia throughout the
whole peace process. It is possible and necessary to correct them, but
for this purpose the people responsible for the peace process just
should make relevant conclusions.

You have mentioned that the Karabakh process is a part of a big
geopolitical game while no consensus between the game participants is
expected. Does this mean that the Madrid principles will remain on the
paper?

There is consensus at least around one point. The USA, France and
Russia agree that the Armenian parties should return the liberated
territories to Azerbaijan. They see an opportunity of being fixed in
Azerbaijan in this way. The country with the help of which Azerbaijan
will get the territories back, will be able to deploy in that country,
create a military base and to get some preferences, i.e. to get
exclusive. The situation may be corrected until we did not cede the
territories. We have not returned the territories but we have not
populated them either. And they will be a cheesecake for everybody as
long as they are unpopulated and ruined.

Does Turkey play any role in the Karabakh peace process?

No, Turkey plays no role in the Karabakh settlement, though Ankara has
a serious influence in
Azerbaijan. Today it is the Turks that turned out to be in a somewhat
suspended state, so Turkey is not wished to be seen in the European
Union, and it lost its strategic importance. For Russia, Turkey is just
an economic partner, however, there is no fundamental positive in
Ankara-Moscow relations, and I think there may be no such relations in
the near future.

What about Turkey’s aspiration to tie the Armenian-Turkish process with
the Karabakh one?

This aspiration is quite clear as this is a factor for Turkey in its
relations with EU which needs alternative communications. While
Armenia-Turkey border is closed and the Karabakh conflict may break out
any time, Europe cannot hope for stable functioning of these
alternative communications. In this sense, Turkey uses the Karabakh
conflict as a precondition of its joining EU. In fact, Turkey needs the
opened border to Armenia most of all, as it is obvious that opening of
the Armenian-Turkish border will become the start for the Russian
frontier guards and Russian military base to leave the territory of
Armenia. And those who say that this is not obvious are cunning.

Then why does Moscow support the Armenian-Turkish process at least
externally?

I think that finally even if Turkey wants to open the border to
Armenia, in Moscow they will find a reason to keep the border shut
down, this time by the initiative of the Armenian party.

Thanks