‘The Next 100 Years’ May Not Bode Well For Armenia

‘THE NEXT 100 YEARS’ MAY NOT BODE WELL FOR ARMENIA
By Andy Turpin

%e2%80%98the-next-100-years%e2%80%99-may-not-bode- well-for-armenia/
July 16, 2009

Corporate Intelligence Guru George Friedman’s Latest Book Predicts
Turkish Superpower

WATERTOWN, Mass. (A.W.)–To personify the tone of George Friedman’s
newest book of speculative geopolitics, The Next 100 Years: A Forecast
for the 21st Century (Doubleday, 2009), I shall quote F.D.R. when he
allegedly said of Nicaraguan despot and U.S. proxy Anastasio Somoza
García: "Somoza may be a son of a bitch, but he’s our son of a bitch."

Likewise, I will say of Friedman that while I’d probably disagree with
his personal social views if seated beside him at a dinner party,
there was little in his book’s research or analysis that I–nor,
I’m assuming, any charter member of the ANCA–would disagree with
that staunchly.

Friedman is the chief executive of STRATFOR, the leading private global
intelligence firm he founded in 1996. The son of Hungarian Holocaust
survivors and raised in New York City, he spent almost 20 years in
academia prior to joining the private sector, teaching political
science at Dickinson College. During that time, he regularly briefed
senior commanders in the armed services on security and national
defense matters, as well as those in the Office of Net Assessments,
the=2 0 SHAPE Technical Center, the U.S. Army War College, the National
Defense University and the RAND Corporation.

For all intents and purposes, I have honed my review to focus
on Friedman’s predictions for Armenia, Turkey, and the Caucasus,
although his general outline for a realistic 21st-century timeline is
as ruthless and American-interest driven–never to be confused with
the goals of true American values–as any State Department report
I’ve ever perused.

Keenly, of all U.S. foreign policy decisions, Friedman writes
with veritas that the U.S. "has no key interest in winning a
war outright. As with Vietnam or Korea, the purpose of these
conflicts is simply to block a power or destabilize the region,
not to impose order. In due course, even outright American defeat
is acceptable. However, the principle of using minimum force,
when absolutely necessary, to maintain the Eurasian balance of
power is–and will remain–the driving force of U.S. foreign policy
throughout the 21st century. There will be numerous Kosovos and Iraqs
in unanticipated places at unexpected times… But since the primary
goal will more likely be simply to block or destabilize Serbia or
al Qaeda, the interventions will be quite rational. They will never
appear to really yield anything nearing a ‘solution,’ and will always
be done with insufficient force to be decisive."

In short, Friedman predic ts that following the August 2008 war in
Georgia, conflicts in the Caucasus will remain relatively stable until
roughly 2020, at which point "Americans will see Russian domination of
Georgia as undermining their position in the region. The Turks will
see this as energizing the Armenians and returning the Russian army
in force to their borders. The Russians will become more convinced of
the need to act because of this resistance. A duel in the Caucasus
will result… But it will be Europe [namely the Polish border and
the Baltic states], not the Caucasus that will matter."

He continues of this proposed conflict: "The Turks will make an
unavoidable strategic decision around 2020. Relying on a chaotic
buffer zone to protect themselves from the Russians is a bet they
will not make again.

This time they will move north into the Caucasus, as deeply as
they need to in order to guarantee their national security in that
direction… The immediate periphery of Turkey is going to be unstable,
to say the least. The United States will encourage Turkey to press
north in the Caucasus and will want Turkish influence in Muslim areas
of the Balkans."

In Friedman’s view, the opening of the border between Turkey and
Armenia can be postponed but is inevitable. And when it finally occurs,
the Tashnag nightmare scenario–of the Armenian market being flooded
with Turkish goods, and Turkey taki ng over all industrial sectors,
leading to Armenian economic serfdom and client state status–will
also be unavoidable.

The difference is that like a therapist objectively and impassively
listening to someone’s problems, Friedman comments but doesn’t care
about Armenia’s interests. He simply notes that such an outcome will
be deemed by the U.S. to be in America’s interest, before the country
makes adequate progress in transitioning to more sustainable "green"
energy policies.

By 2040, Friedman writes, an Armenian, Greek, and pro-West anti-Turkish
movement will begin to coalesce as the U.S. and Britain no longer
regard Turkey as a friendly ally but as the rival superpower against
the U.S.

alongside a rejuvenated militant Japan.

"Turkey will move decisively northward into the Caucasus as Russia
crumbles. Part of this move will consist of military intervention,
and part will occur in the way of political alliances," he writes.

"Turkey’s influence will be economic–the rest of the region will need
to align itself with the new economic power. And by the mid-2040’s, the
Turks will indeed be a major regional power. There will be conflicts.

>From guerilla resistance to local conventional war, all around the
Turkish pivot. Turkey will wind up pushing against U.S. allies in
southeastern Europe and will make Italy feel extremely insecure with
its growing power.0

In Friedman’s view, such a build-up will eventually lead to a
limited-World War conflict between the U.S. and Poland against Turkey
and Japan for divided world hegemony around 2050, with any actual
ground combat occurring primarily in the vicinity of the Balkans and
the Polish border areas surrounding U.S. and Turkish military targets.

Naturally it remains to be seen what will occur on the world stage,
but like Groopman’s How Doctors Think (Mariner, 2008), Friedman’s Next
100 Years is as best an educated guess as anyone in the geopolitical
analysis field can give, pending all variables–and that’s something.

Though to my chagrin, no travel agency will take reservations to
Armenia for my personal Nuevo-Lincoln Brigade 38th and 68th Birthday
Party Artsakh Liberation Extravaganza this far in advance. I checked.

http://www.hairenik.com/weekly/2009/07/16/