PEACE PROCESS: WHERE WE ARE NOW: A SUMMARY OF PROGRESS ON THE ROAD TO A SETTLEMENT
By Kenan Guluzade

Institute for War and Peace Reporting IWPR
July 27 2009
UK

The Minsk Group, which is chaired by Russia, France and the United
States and aims to find a peaceful settlement of the Nagorny Karabakh
conflict, has laid out principles on which it believes the crisis
should be resolved.

The principles are occasionally adjusted to reflect changes on the
ground, but are still essentially the same as those agreed in a
meeting in Madrid two years ago.

"We are instructing our mediators to present to the Presidents of
Armenia and Azerbaijan an updated version of the Madrid Document
of November 2007, the Co-Chairs’ last articulation of the Basic
Principles. We urge the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan to
resolve the few differences remaining between them and finalise their
agreement on these Basic Principles, which will outline a comprehensive
settlement," the French, Russian and United States presidents said
in a joint statement after the G8 summit in Italy on July 10.

So what are the Madrid Principles, and what are the two sides’
positions on them?

RETURN OF THE TERRITORIES SURROUNDING NAGORNY KARABAKH TO AZERBIAJANI
CONTROL

Currently, Armenian forces control parts of the Aghdam and Fizuli
regions, and all of the Kelbajar, Zangilan, Jabrail and Gubadly
regions, which are all outside the Soviet-era boundaries of Nagorny
Karabakh and which they seized between March and November 1993. They
also control the Lachin area, but this is covered by a different
point of the Madrid Principles.

This principle is supported by Azerbaijan, which wishes to regain
control over its internationally recognised borders.

In Armenia, this point raises concerns, however, since it involves
surrendering the current "security belt" around Nagorny Karabakh
proper. Armenian strategists consider the regions to be a buffer
zone ensuring there cannot be a surprise assault on the self-declared
state. However, even in early rounds of talks between the two sides,
Armenian negotiators recognised that sooner or later these territories
would have to be returned to Baku’s control in some way.

AN INTERIM STATUS FOR NAGORNY KARABAKH PROVDING GUARANTEES FOR SECURITY
AND SELF-GOVERNANCE.

This point is tolerated by Azerbaijan, which has repeatedly announced
it is prepared to give Nagorny Karabakh "the highest possible autonomy"
consistent with its territorial integrity.

However, both sides have concerns about the definition of this
article. How long would the interim status last? The current
speculation in local media is that it could last for 15 years, by
which time a resolution of its status would have to be secured under
point 4 of the principles.

A CORRIDOR LINKING ARMENIA TO NAGORNY KARABAKH

This refers to the Lachin region, which separates the Soviet-era
borders of Nagorny Karabakh and Armenia, and which Armenians consider
to be a crucial lifeline, without which Nagorny Karabakh could be
blockaded. It is currently controlled by Armenian forces.

Azerbaijan’s negotiators do not seem to have a firm opinion on the
Lachin region, since conceding a corridor is a logical side-effect of
the other points, but could also raise doubts about their country’s
territorial integrity. The issue of the Lachin corridor is a
potentially serious sticking point for the two sides.

FUTURE DETERMINATION OF THE FINAL LEGAL STATUS OF NAGORNY KARABAKH
THROUGH A LEGALLY BINDING EXPRESSION OF WILL.

This point also divides opinion among Azerbaijan’s
negotiators. Conceding a final referendum also risks
conceding independence for Nagorny Karabakh, which is considered
unacceptable. However, some commentators have expressed the opinion
that, in a popular vote, ordinary Armenians in Nagorny Karabakh might
prefer to remain in oil-rich Azerbaijan.

THE RIGHT OF ALL INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS AND REFUGEES TO RETURN
TO THEIR FORMER PLACES OF RESIDENCE.

Although this is theoretically accepted by all sides, it is a
point that could prove very hard to implement. If it addresses
all the victims of the war, it cannot only apply to Nagorny
Karabakh itself. There are refugees from Armenia in Azerbaijan, and
refugees from Azerbaijan in Armenia, without beginning to consider
Nagorny Karabakh and the other territories where actual fighting
occurred. Would this point include Armenians returning to Baku or
Azeris to Yerevan? How would these people regain their old houses of
flats? Who will guarantee their security?

If this point only addresses Nagorny Karabakh itself, then there
is a potential sticking point concerning the town of Shusha, which
Armenians call Shushi), that was predominantly ethnically Azeri before
the war and which controls the heights above Khankendi, the main town
in Nagorny Karabakh and which Armenians call Stepanakert.

Before the war, the population of Nagorny Karabakh was 76.9 per cent
Armenian (about 145,000 people), 21.5 per cent Azeri (about 40,000
people) and 1.6 per cent other (about 3,000 people). There are around
a million refugees and internally displaced persons in Azerbaijan.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY GUARANTEES THAT WOULD INCLUDE A PEACEKEEPING
OPTION.

Both Armenia and Azerbaijan boast that, even without peacekeepers,
the ceasefire agreed 15 years ago has been observed. However, there
are regular exchanges of fire over the line of control. Soldiers
and civilians are still occasionally killed, and peacekeepers would
almost certainly be required to ensure the safety of refugees allowed
to return under point 5.

Different peacekeeping forces have been mooted, although the co-chairs
of the Minsk group are banned from providing troops under the terms
of their mandate. Italian, British, Ukrainian, Hungarian, Romanian
and other forces have all been suggested, but there is no clarity on
this issue.

Kenan Guluzade is a regional expert from the South Caucasus think
tank and editor-in-chief of the website.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress