YEAR LATER, RUSSIA WIN OVER GEORGIA CUTS BOTH WAYS
By Megan K. Stack

Los Angeles Times
d/la-fg-georgia-russia7-2009aug07,0,7849593.story
Aug 6 2009

After its swift military victory over Georgia, the Kremlin seemed
poised for greater influence in nearby states, but they have been
bucking an economically weaker Moscow whose intentions worry them.

Reporting from Moscow — Last August, fresh off a swift,
decisive military victory over U.S.-backed Georgia, the Kremlin
basked in newfound international power and domestic prestige:
Oil was booming. Anti-Western taunts and propaganda crammed state
media. A dramatic message about resurgent Russian strength had been
unequivocally delivered.

One year later, the euphoria has evaporated. The war is still
discussed in tones of righteousness, but the military victory left
Russia isolated; made formerly compliant neighbors reluctant to do
Moscow’s bidding; and sparked a foreign capital flight that dovetailed
into the global financial crisis.

Most crushingly, the war has done serious damage to what is plainly
Russia’s top foreign policy priority: the reestablishment of what
the Russian president has called a "privileged" sphere of influence
in former Soviet states.

Today marks the first anniversary of the war’s outbreak, when an
overwhelming wave of Russian tanks and warplanes crossed the border
and roared to within 30 miles of the Georgian capital, Tbilisi. The
exact circumstances of the war’s onset remain in dispute, but the most
commonly held version of events is that Georgia launched a military
operation to reassert control over the rebel province of South Ossetia,
and Russia invaded, fighting on the side of the separatists.

Threats and accusations of renewed fighting are flying thick and
ominously this week, and there is concern that new battles could erupt.

Some analysts say Russia’s postwar isolation is fueling instability. In
Moscow, they say, there is a lingering discomfort over the war’s
failure to unseat Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, who is
openly loathed by Russian leaders.

"Many in Moscow believe this is the result of indecisiveness, that
we should have marched all the way to Tbilisi and finished the job"
said Pavel Felgengauer, a Moscow-based military analyst with the
Jamestown Foundation. "There’s a strong opinion here that a serious
mistake was made and that the answer is regime change. The situation
is very dangerous."

In Georgia, the U.S.-backed leadership has been left to grapple
with the painful reality of lost lands and shattered military
infrastructure. Political instability intensified this year as massive
demonstrations demanded Saakashvili’s resignation, pointing to the
war as evidence of his insufficiency.

But if Russia’s plan was to show its might, to strike a crushing blow
that would frighten former Soviet countries into greater compliance,
it backfired. The sight of Russian tanks crossing into a neighboring
country stirred dark memories of the Soviet past, and, analysts say,
shifted the psychology in the region.

Instead of being intimidated into submission, the neighboring states
have become defiant and have begun to buck Moscow. Resistance has
been bolstered by the global financial crisis and tumbling oil prices,
which abruptly dried up Moscow’s cash flow.

Signs of Moscow’s waning regional influence are coming at a furious
pace.

In July, five leaders of neighboring countries — nearly half the
invited luminaries — failed to show up at horse races hosted by
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev at the Moscow hippodrome. The races
are seen as an unofficial summit of the Commonwealth of Independent
States, the regional confederation of post-Soviet countries. A year
ago, many analysts agree, such a snub would have been unimaginable.

Kremlin efforts to create a "rapid reaction force" among former Soviet
countries to counter North Atlantic Treaty Organization military
strength have also met with surprisingly stiff opposition. Both Belarus
and Uzbekistan have refused to sign the agreements needed to create
the force. This week, Uzbekistan warned that a planned Russian base
in neighboring Kyrgyzstan would destabilize Central Asia.

Armenia, once Russia’s most stalwart ally in the Caucasus, has also
been distancing itself. This summer, to the intense irritation of
Moscow, Saakashvili was presented with Armenia’s Medal of Honor during
a visit to Yerevan, the Armenian capital.

Even impoverished Tajikistan is striving quietly for independence,
preparing to ban the use of the Russian language in government offices
and documents.

But nothing has so starkly crystallized Russia’s isolation as the
question of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both breakaway republics
inside Georgia’s internationally recognized borders. Russia had been
building ties with the two republics for years, including passing out
Russian passports to residents and taking on payment of pensions. After
the war, Moscow quickly recognized them as independent states and
dispatched heavy deployments of Russian troops to defend them —
presumably, from Georgia’s central government.

Yet not even Belarus, a country whose policy has closely twinned that
of Russia, was willing to recognize the independence of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia. In fact, only Nicaragua joined Russia in acknowledging
their independence.

Since the war in Georgia, sparring between Moscow and Belarus has
repeatedly erupted over trade and circumstances in Georgia. Analysts
say the sight of Russia’s invasion of a neighbor and onetime ally
threw a chill over Belarus’ relationship with Moscow.

"The Belarusian leadership does not want to see itself in Georgia’s
shoes," said Leonid Zlotnikov, an analyst with the Belarusian Market
newspaper in Minsk, the Belarusian capital. "[Moscow’s] idea of
pressure by force does not appeal at all."

As regional resistance mounts, some analysts are beginning to question
the conventional wisdom of Russia, as the government likes to put it,
"rising from its knees" under its longtime leader, Prime Minister
Vladimir Putin. Between the pro-Western inclinations in Ukraine and
Georgia; the moves by China to build better relations with Central
Asian states; and recent ripples of political rebellion across the
former Soviet Union; Russia’s power is badly diminished, they argue.

"We always say that in the 1990s Russia was weak and now it’s strong,
but actually, if you look at it, its sphere of influence and interests
has shrunk dramatically," said Felgengauer, who gained prominence
after predicting last summer’s war. "Russian power is shrinking. It’s
huffing and puffing under Putin, but it’s shrinking."

Sergei Markov, a ruling party lawmaker and political analyst seen
as close to the Kremlin, agreed that Russia’s regional standing had
suffered because of the war in Georgia.

"It’s true that Russian behavior during that period in August was,
you know, I wouldn’t say aggressive, I’d say maximum-style," Markov
said. "I think what neighboring countries are afraid of is exactly
this maximum style and unpredictability."

But he argued that any international loss had been offset by the
cohesion of popular support within Russia itself.

The line from state media is that only Russia had the moral rectitude
to step in to save the South Ossetians from the central Georgian
government. Russian television viewers were fed a drastically
exaggerated version of Georgia’s assault on South Ossetia, and many
Russians still believe the long-discounted Russian allegations that
Moscow intervened to stop a "genocide" that killed thousands.

"Russia gained the consolidation of society and the confidence that
the political leadership is ready to protect all Russian interests,"
Markov said. "And Russia got respect from the international community,
which understands that Russia is ready to take risks."