TURKEY AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION: AN EMERGING MULTIDIMENSIONAL PARTNERSHIP
By Bulent Aras
Today’s Zaman
Aug 14, 2009
ABSTRACT — Turkish-Russian relations have been transformed in a
unique way since the late 1990s. Ever increasing economic relations
have paved way for better political relations, bringing cooperation
perspectives to fore while having competing agendas at the same time.
The past several years witnessed confidence building between the
countries as the relationship rose to the level of a multi-dimensional
partnership; however, there are also ideational and material
factors that limit Russian-Turkish partnership. The future of
multi-dimensional partnership will largely depend on both countries’
ability to set a strong structural base for mutual and long-term
beneficiary relationship.
Turkey and the Russian Federation: An Emerging Multidimensional
Partnership Bulent Aras Historically there were many wars between
Russia and the Ottoman Empire until the end of World War I. Both
countries have imperial legacies and have experienced post-imperial
trauma. Great imperial legacies and feelings of isolation which
followed the collapse of the respective empires are important factors
which shaped the national memory of both countries. The new attitude
of Turkish policy-makers has had a positive impact on foreign policy,
allowing them to consider better relations with Russia and the
possibility of cooperation to solve regional issues.
Turkish-Russian relations were transformed in a unique way during the
aftermath of the Cold War era and there was a dilemma in bilateral
relations in the early 1990s. The two countries were seemingly rivals
in the newly emerging geopolitics of the Eurasia, while cooperating
in the economic realm in an ever increasing manner. The relationship
between the two countries was shaped by a combination of cooperation
and rivalry. The strongest point of cooperation was the increase in
trade relations. At the core of the rivalry between Russia and Turkey
was the odd perception of the geopolitical roles pitted against each
other as well economic matters such as energy.
The new foreign policy orientation of Turkish policy-makers has
provided the impetus and the political will to develop better relations
with Russia. In their perception of Russia, Turkish policy-makers
emphasize adopting a good neighborhood and zero-problem policies
in the bordering regions. Turkish politicians have also made
developing bilateral political and economic relations with Russia
a priority. Furthermore, they also think of Russia as a necessary
partner for regional peace and stability in Eurasia. Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan mentions Russia "as an important country from the
perspectives of trade, investment, tourism, and energy security."[1]
>From Rivalry to Cooperation Political relations overshadowed the
booming economic relations and created a lack of trust and confidence
between the states for a long period of time. The volatile nature of
political relations was the main factor in the problematic history of
relations between the states with a record of several serious crises
in the 1990s. The policy-makers had to deal with the remnants of
the Cold War and were under pressure due to the Kurdish and Chechen
problems in their bilateral relations. Turkey’s Caucasian Diaspora was
active in supporting Chechens in their struggle against the Russian
army and in turn, the Russian administration was tolerant towards the
PKK activities in Russia. The all time record in economic relations
played a catalyzing role for balancing political relations.
Economic relations hit a high in 1997, which also witnessed the
visit of the Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin to Turkey in
December. There was further development of economic relations on the
agenda during this visit.[2] High level officials started to refer
to their relations as a "strategic partnership" during this visit.[3]
During Chernomyrdin’s visit, both sides signed the agreement for the
Blue Stream project, which would carry Russian natural gas beneath
Black Sea to Turkey. This agreement played a major role to reverse the
atmosphere of rivalry centered on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline,
and the search for cooperation prospects in the transport of energy
reserves. Blue Stream was the driving force behind the developing
relations in the following year. Blue Stream faced an opposition from
nationalist circles in Turkey with the allegations of over-dependence
to Russia. However, the Turkish administration decided in favor of
the project despite these criticis!
The international interest focus was an inviting atmosphere to the
develop relations despite the number of regional challenges presented
in both states. Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, once members of
The Warsaw Pact, stepped into the road of NATO membership in December
1997, despite Russia’s reservations. It was an unacceptable development
on the Russian side. The EU rejected to grant membership prospects
to Turkey during the Luxemburg summit in the same year. In addition
to political factors, Turkey and Russia were facing economic crises
in 1997 and 1998. The economic considerations and international
developments changed the character of the relations from one of a
competition to an era of cooperation.[4] Turkey’s then-Prime Minister
Bulent Ecevit’s visit to Moscow in November of 1999 was a turning
point in relations between Turkey and Russia. Ecevit’s visit resulted
in Turkey’s change of attitude on the Chechen question as an internal
problem of Russia, in exchange for Russia’s acceptance of a policy
of non-involvement in the Kurdish problem.[5] Ecevit’s visit laid
the groundwork for better relations.
These developments at the end of the 1990’s paved the way for the
better relations in the next decade. The center of gravity in the
relationship shifted to a focus on economic relations and cooperation
schemes in the energy sector.[6] The partnership started to gain depth
under a new approach: a diversified focus on energy security, economy
and regional security. Russia adopted a new attitude of cooperation
with regional and international actors under the condition that it will
not serve against their interests under Vladimir Putin’s Presidency.[7]
Turkey appropriated a new dynamic and multidimensional foreign
policy line with a specific focus on minimizing the problems with the
countries in the neighboring regions.[8] The visible increase in the
number of mutual visits and the new channels of political dialogue
showed the prospect of development of relations between Russia and
Turkey.[9] The September 11thattacks led to a number of U.S. invasions
and designs in Eurasian geography. The immediate aftermath of the
terrorist attack created an environment for cooperation in the struggle
against terror, which was facilitated the rapprochement between Turkey
and Russia; which led to the Foreign Ministers of the two countries
to sign a document for regulating an action plan for cooperation in
Eurasia.[10] The action plan was targeted at elevating relations to
the level of strengthened constructive partnership.
Tayyip Erdogan, as leader of the Justice and Development, visited
Moscow and was accepted by President Putin and Prime Minister Kasyanov
in 2002. The most important development in the relationship this
period was Turkish Parliament’s refusal of March 2003 motion, which
designed to grant permission to American soldiers’ access to Iraq
through Turkish territories. As reported by Russian Interfax news
agency Russian President Putin underlined the importance of the March
motion as a significant event on the eve of the Iraq invasion.[11]
After Turkey’s refusal of the motion, Russian policy-makers started
to perceive Turkey as a more independent actor in foreign policy in
contrast to the Cold war definition of a loyal U.S. ally. Turkey’s
independent attitude created trust and confidence to Russia that it
will not automatically endorse U.S. interests in the neighboring
regions. In addition, the Iraq and Afghanistan invasions kept the
U.S. administration busy in these countries and!
both Russia and Turkey had more room to maneuver in the Caucasus and
the Middle East.
Russian President Putin’s visit to Turkey on 5-6 December 2004 was
the first of its kind in the 32 years. Putin’s visit created a new
energy for strengthening and deepening the relations. Putin signed six
agreements in the areas of military and economic cooperation. After
the Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit, Turkey’s prime minister
paid a one-day official visit to Russia in January of 2005. Russia
supported Turkey’s EU membership and Turkey supported Russia’s observer
status in the Organization of Islamic Conference. Erdogan and Putin
met ten times in five years. Turkish President Abdullah Gul paid an
official visit to Russia in February 2009. Gul has been the first
Turkish President to visit the Autonomous Republic of Tatarstan. The
positive Russian attitude toward Turkey’s contact with a Turkic-Muslim
populated administrative unit in Russia was interpreted as a sign of
confidence from the Russian side.[12] Emergence of a Multi-Dimensional
Partnership For Moscow, the existence of a conflicted national memory
and an East-leaning geopolitical orientation makes it difficult
to determine a fixed and well-functioning foreign policy towards
Turkey.13 Like Russia, Turkey has Caucasian, Balkan, Middle Eastern,
and European identities and different interests at stake in all of
these regions. Another significant factor is that both countries are
going through dynamic domestic and economic transformations. The
changes that have occurred during the nine years of the current
decade are dramatic at both societal and state levels. High-level
reciprocal visits in the recent past have highlighted a number of
important issues of concern for bilateral relations. Officials on both
sides have signed several agreements that are likely to facilitate
the establishment of a more constructive relationship. These include
trade and investments by Turkish and Russian businesspeople, tourism,
natural gas purchases, joint pipeline projects, and Russian arms
sales. The volume of bilateral trade reached USD 38 billion in 2008,
and both sides aim to increase the annual trade volume to USD 50
billion.14 Russia has been the largest trade partner of Turkey.
Turkey’s construction sector is active in Moscow and has continually
increased its market share in Russia since 2005. Turkish contractors
finished 59 construction projects worth USD 3.6 billion in Russia
in 2007.15 Further, Turkey’s construction sector was involved in
20 billion USD worth business in 2008.16 Also, it is to be noted
that thousands of Turkish workers are employed in Russia. The
number of Turkish workers sent to Russia through Turkish Employment
Organization is 15.696.17 Turkey bought 63% of the natural gas and 29%
of the oil it consumed in 2008 from Russia.18 Russian businesspeople
closely follow Turkey’s privatization process and are involved in
Turkish telecommunication and energy projects.19 Russian company,
Atomstroyeksport, participated in Turkey’s nuclear reactor bid,
and the Russian administration pays special attention to Turkey’s
nuclear contract for possibilities to expand economic relations. The
nuclear deal may pave way for a more structured relationship between
the two countries.
Another major cooperation area is Russian arms sales to Turkey. Turkey
is the first NATO country to develop a technical cooperation
scheme in the sphere of Russian military. However, Turkey’s NATO
membership restricts the variety and volume of military relations
with Russia. Despite this difficulty, Russia and Turkey are in a
continuous search for expanding cooperation in this realm. Turkey
looks to Russia for a number of military procurement projects,
such as a medium-range anti-tank weapon system. The Russian S-300
or S-400 missile systems are attractive to the Turkish military
industry’s proposed multi-billion-dollar long-range missile defense
project.20 Finally, 2.8 million Russian tourists visit Turkey annually
and increasingly prefer Turkey’s Mediterranean coast for their
vacations. The degree of interdependence between Turkey and Russia
is higher than ever since the establishment of the Turkish Republic.
Although there is much talk about the convergence of interests
between Turkey and Russia, contentious issues remain. In Mid-August
of 2008, Russian customs officials began inspecting Turkish trucks
with exceptional diligence; the trucks were taken to a "red lane"
and checked one by one for extensive lengths of time. Although this
act was interpreted by many as Russia’s punishment for Turkey’s
decision to permit American and European naval ships to pass through
the Black Sea to Georgia, this was in fact the result of deadlocked
customs regulations negotiations between the two countries, which had
started earlier in the year but coincided with the Russian-Georgian
conflict.21 On the verge of losing its long-standing and beneficial
commercial relations with Turkey, the Russian Foreign Minister
Sergey Lavrov insisted during a joint news conference with his
counterpart, then Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan, that "this
is not an action directed against Turkey. Turkey is not being singled
out." He added, "[t]here can be no politics involved in trade."22 The
customs crisis between the two countries came to an end when Russia
and Turkey signed an agreement on a simplified customs procedure
in mid-September.23 Despite this agreement, Turkish products in
Russian customs continued to face similar problems. The custom
regulations also apply similar difficulties with Turkish products
going through Europe to Russia. President Gul brought this issue to
the table during his visit to Russia, and sides agreed to form a joint
technical commission to deal with this problem. Director of Russian
Federal Custom Service Andrey Belyaninov was invited Turkey on 18-20
February to activate the commission.24 Turkish-Armenian relations,
which have been and continue to be determined by historical enmities
and Turkey’s Azerbaijan-leaning policies in the Caucasus, constitute
another concern in bilateral relations and regional politics. Russia
is currently Armenia’s main ally, and it’s possible that Russian
mediation between Turkey and Armenia on a number of issues could be
expected. Russia has adopted a new activism towards a solution of the
Karabakh problem. To this end, Sergei Lavrov met several times with
his Azerbaijani and Armenian counterparts. The Russian administration
brought the Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents together in Moscow to
discuss the Karabakh issue.25 Here, Turkey emerged as an unexpected
partner for Russia in the attempt to solve the chronic problems in
the countries of the Caucasus. Following recent positive developments
on this front, the future may see joint Russian-Turkish attempts to
solve the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.
The mutual agenda for Russia and Turkey is extensive. It
revolves around Russia’s energy policy, its foreign policies, the
Russia-Georgian crisis, the future of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
Turkey’s rival pipeline projects, ethnic secessionist movements in the
Caucasus, the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations, finding a
solution to the Karabakh problem, the reduction of Russian military
forces in the region in accordance with international agreements,
the Chechen question, and the actions of Kurdish separatists on
Russian soil. Russia dislikes the BTC pipeline, which bypasses its
territory to transport Azeri and Kazakh oil to the West. Moscow
regards this pipeline as a challenge to its status in the Caspian
basin and an obstacle to its oil trade. Although the major conflict
surrounding the BTC pipeline has been between Russia and a number
of former Soviet states, it has also influenced Turkish-Russian
relations. The Blue Stream, a natural gas pipeline that runs
from Russia to Turkey underneath the Black Sea, and several other
Turkish-Russian oil pipeline projects have led to the emergence of
some degree of tolerance towards the BTC pipeline. Russia also aims
to carry more Turkmen gas to the European market, which may stymie
the projected Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey-Europe pipeline. Although
Turkey and Russia cooperate in the Blue Stream projects and although
there are potential joint projects, they also compete in providing
alternative routes for oil and gas transfer to Europe. A number
of Eurasian and European actors interpreted Nabucco project, a new
artillery of East-West energy corridor, which aims to transfer Caspian
energy reserves to Europe, as an attempt to by-pass Russia. However,
Turkey does consider Russia’s involvement in this project and do not
see the project with any anti-Russian sentiments. Although the general
perception is that Russia does not participate in the projects without
its control or dominance, the Russian admini!
stration may decide to participate in projects in future as an equal
partner in Nabucco project; and as would be witnessed during Putin’s
visit to Turkey in early August in 2009, Turkey and Russia have Blue
Stream II and Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline projects on the table in
the ongoing talks.
Limits of the Turkish-Russian Partnership Russia’s regional profile
has been to maintain its sensitivity over its dwindling influence in
the former Soviet territories. Since 1991, Turkey has emerged as a
significant regional player, pursuing a special relationship with the
EU and emphasizing the importance of building good relations in the
Caucasus and Central Asia. During Erdohan’s visit to Moscow in January
of 2005, then-President Putin said: "I hope that Turkey’s integration
in the European Union will open up a new horizon for Russian-Turkish
business cooperation."26 Putin’s support is meaningful in terms of
showing the potential for bilateral relations, but the situation
is more complicated at the regional and international level. After
receiving a negotiation date for EU membership, Turkey has emerged as a
"European" actor in the region. There is no guarantee that the Turkish
politicians’ projection of good relations with Russia will be possible
without endangering its relations with the EU and the US.27 Thanks!
to the dynamic nature of regional politics, Turkey’s new orientation
was tested during the subsequent domestic transformations of Georgia
and Ukraine.
Turkey adopted a low-profile attitude towards Russian policies
vis-a-vis Ukraine and Georgia and with sensitivity displayed a
constructive outlook by pointing to relevant international norms
and agreements as a way to resolve the crises. Under the strong
influence of its new geographic thinking toward Russia, Ankara tries
to avoid taking sides in any "Russia versus the West" struggles, while
developing its own relations with Moscow. Turkey pursued this policy
also during the Russia-Georgia crisis in August of 2008. Turkish
policy-makers acted carefully in order to minimize tension during
the crisis and launched the idea of a regional platform to settle
regional problems. During the crisis, Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip
Erdoðan pointed out the importance of relations with Russia in the
following way: "America is our ally and the Russian Federation is an
important neighbor. Russia is our number one trade partner. We are
obtaining two-thirds of our energy from Russia. We act in!
accordance to our national interests. […] We cannot ignore Russia."28
Turkish policy-makers aim to contain the Russian-Georgian crisis in
the Caucasus region and to prevent its expansion to the wider Black
Sea region. Turkey’s strict adherence to the Montreux agreement, which
regulates the passage of military ships through the Bosporus, helped
it to play a constructive role in the conflict despite its Western
orientation and NATO membership. As the Montreux Convention dictates,
non-littoral states may have up to nine military ships in the Black
Sea for 21 days with a total weight of 45,000 tones. Turkey limited
the entry of U.S. military ships to the Black Sea by applying the
binding regulations of the Montreux agreement. At present, there is a
clear tendency to seek support from outside actors and wider regional
alliances to providing greater security in the region. Azerbaijan and
Georgia rely on NATO and the Western powers and seek regional alliances
with Ukraine, Moldova, and Turkey. Armenia relies on Russia. Moreover,
Russia calls on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to support
the Russian cause in the Caucasus.29 In contrast, Turkey has suggested
a Caucasian Stability Platform to configure a dialogue between the
three Caucasian states, Russia, and Turkey in order to contain any
crises in the region.
Turkish policy-makers stress the need to create a confidence-
and trust-building mechanism to foster a regional understanding
of security. The U.S. administration was reluctant to endorse with
a criticism that they were not informed about the platform. The EU
gave the green light to this initiative and the EU progress report on
Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU positively mentioned the
project.30 Furthermore, NATO supported the platform as a constructive
step for security in the wider Black Sea region with reference to
Turkey’s constructive policy line during the crisis.31 The current
developments indicate that Turkish and Russian policy-makers have
the political will to improve bilateral relations in the realm of
politics, economy and security. However, these relations are not
free of a number of serious problems that could threaten a derailing
in the growing ties; both countries have converging and conflicting
interests in neighboring regions. This fact, in combination with the
high-profile status of both countries, makes Turkish-Russian relations
promising, yet difficult. Turkey and Russia are two influential actors
in Eurasian geopolitics, and their relations have implications for the
whole region. For this reason, if Turkey’s new approach for developing
multi-dimensional relations with Russia succeeds, this policy may
have far-reaching positive consequences for the Eurasian region.
Policy Recommendations The growing number of mutual high level visits,
booming economic relations, cooperation in energy related projects,
agreements for military-technical relations and arms sales, and the
diversity of activities designed for the region are strong signs of an
emerging multidimensional partnership between Turkey and Russia. The
new partnership, however, has its own limits due to the burden
of past negative memories, difficulties of regional geopolitics,
growing pains in the relationship, and approaching challenges. The
future of the multidimensional partnership will be determined by
the ability of the sides to tackle these challenges. The following
points may help policy-makers in formulating policy in bilateral,
regional and international level.
1- Turkey’s Western orientation and Russia’s assertive policies
in Eurasia are likely to be confronted by a number of regional
issues. The result of such confrontation would be reproduction of
Cold War era security dilemmas. Russia’s unilateral actions in the
former Soviet geography should be balanced through Turkey’s bilateral
relations with Russia and Turkey’s multidimensional foreign policy
in regional and international terms. In addition, Turkey should use
its relations with Russia as well as the EU as leverage to both of
them and as means of easing tension between them if necessary.
2- The perception of relations with Russia in domestic politics should
shift away from considering Russia as an alternative to the EU, toward
an important policy within the framework of Turkey’s multidimensional
and integral foreign policy. In this sense, Turkish-Russian relations
should be named a multidimensional cooperation to reflect a realistic
account of the current status of the partnership.
3- Russia has a tendency to manipulate economic interests in order
to create pressure on the political relationship. It should avoid
applying this policy in relations with Turkey. Such measures may
seriously damage Russian image in Turkey, which is still in the
process of recovering from past negative perceptions. The custom
problem does not fit into the future projections of the relationship,
having regional and international weight.
4- The current high level political dialogue should continue with an
exemplary attitude toward the rest of the Eurasian countries. The
mutual official visits create a mechanism of early warning of any
problems and of conflict resolution in a timely manner. Turkey’s
regional policy is based on an all-inclusive policy with particular
reference to Russia as a necessary partner of political and economic
initiatives in the area. This policy is well received in Russia so
far and the Russian side should develop a similar understanding of
Turkish involvement of the solution of the regional problems.
5- Caucasian Stability and Cooperation Initiative is a useful platform
for Russia and Turkey to raise a regional consciousness of peace in
the region. This platform should be supported by a dynamic involvement
between Russia and Turkey. A dynamic cooperation in Caucasus is likely
to trigger further cooperation in the Middle East and Afghanistan.
6- Russian academy still interprets Turkish foreign policy through
the prism of a Cold War understanding, while Turkey suffers a
lack of experts who follow Russia’s complex domestic and foreign
policies. There is need for developing further academic interest on
countries, joint research platforms, think-tank dialogue and other
activities to constitute the necessary framework of knowledge required
on both sides.
7- The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was a source of contention in
bilateral and regional relations between Turkey and Russia. Turkey
should follow a careful policy toward the Nabucco Project to prevent
such damage in the multidimensional cooperation with Russia. Turkey
should have a firm position in its invitation of Russia to Nabucco
Project.
8- Although the strongest side of Turkish-Russian relations is on
economy, it is still not free of major problems. The new projects
in arms transfer as well as energy related areas have potential to
further expand economic relations. Turkish experience in medium and
small size industry promises technical aid to Russia.
9- The status quo with existing inter-state conflicts, ethnic tensions,
and de facto states is not sustainable in the Caucasus region. The
Black Sea is also a sensitive region with the potential threat of
becoming a battleground of international forces. Turkey and Russia
should express a strong political will and, and undertake region-wide
and international responsibilities in order to achieve peace and
security in the region.
10- Russia has a Kurdish and Armenian Diaspora, and Turkey has a
Caucasian Diaspora. Both sides should designate and adopt a zero
tolerance policy toward illegal activities emanating from these
communities and should limit damaging initiatives based around the
ethnic lobbies.
11- Turkish and Russian officials’ attempts for developing relations
should be supported by broader societal activities. These activities
would not only help consolidation of official relations but would also
begin to fade negative historical memories on both sides, into the
background. The way to foster societal dialogue is to foster joint
activities in culture, education, arts and sports. Civil society
dialogue is also a necessary component in this regard.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress