RUSSIA PROFILE WEEKLY EXPERTS PANEL: A YEAR AFTER THE FIVE-DAY WAR
Russia Profile
August 14, 2009
Introduced by Vladimir Frolov
It has now been a year since the Russian army rolled back Georgia’s
forces following their attack on South Ossetia in August of 2008-the
first real war between Russia and a former Soviet state. It is
about time to take a serious look at what Russia gained or lost from
this operation. Has Russia accrued prestige and power as a result
of this war, or has it suffered deterioration in its international
position? Is it now treated with more respect or more caution in Europe
and in the post-Soviet space? Has the war with Georgia stopped NATO
enlargement? Has the war weakened Saakashvili’s regime in Georgia? Has
it strengthened Medvedev’s presidency?
On the political front, the gains seem to balance out the
losses. Russia defended its own citizens and key allies in the
region. It crushed the Georgian army and destroyed the political
credibility of Georgia’s President Mikheil Saakashvili at home and
abroad, by exposing him as a reckless adventurer who could draw the
West into a military conflict with Russia.
It sent a powerful signal to Europe and the United States that Russia’s
interests and sensibilities should not be ignored, particularly in the
former Soviet Union, which President Dmitry Medvedev called "the zone
of Russia’s privileged interests" after the war. And indeed, the war
basically destroyed any prospects of Georgia’s membership in NATO,
making it abundantly clear to the alliance that as a NATO member,
Georgia will be a huge security liability. Most observers agree
that Georgia’s chances for joining the alliance are now virtually
nonexistent, and in private, many NATO governments accuse Saakashvili
of adventurism last August.
Russia’s unilateral recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as
independent states and the deployment of Russian military bases there
helped secure their borders against attacks by Georgian forces, but
it has failed to bring Moscow the much-desired international support
for this action. Only Nicaragua for some strange reason recognized
their independence, while even the Union State member Belarus refused
to do so. Russia has essentially been isolated on this issue.
In military terms, the results are mixed. Although the Georgian army
disintegrated and withdrew as the Russians advanced, major deficiencies
in operational planning, personnel training, equipment readiness and
conducting modern joint combat operations became evident. Up to six
Russian combat planes including one strategic bomber were shot down
(half of them by friendly fire).
Intelligence gathering and target recognition were poor, resulting in
serious collateral damage from air attacks in major population centers
like Gori. All of these problems exposed by the war had the positive
effect of expediting much-needed reforms in the Russian military. The
army, however, managed to shore up its image by quickly achieving
its objectives, and exhibiting a significant degree of discipline
and self control. It proved that it remains a viable fighting force.
In economic terms the losses outweigh the gains. The military operation
itself cost Russia about $500 million. Capital flight from Russia
during the war reached $10 billion and currency reserves decreased by
$16 billion (not counting the ensuing financial crisis). Reconstruction
aid to South Ossetia and Abkhazia cost about $1 billion, not including
the construction costs for the two Russian military bases there. The
Vedomosti newspaper estimates that overall, the war cost Russia $27.7
billion, making it an enormously expensive venture.
So what is the balance sheet for Russia’s war with Georgia a year
ago? Has Russia gained prestige and power as a result of this war,
or has it suffered deterioration in its international position? Is
it now treated with more respect or more caution in Europe and
in the post-Soviet space? Has the war with Georgia stopped NATO
enlargement? Did Russia miscalculate in unilaterally extending its
recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states? Why
has Russia become isolated on this issue? Has the war weakened
Saakashvili’s regime in Georgia? Has it strengthened Medvedev’s
presidency?
Alexander Rahr, Director, Russia Studies Program, German Council on
Foreign Relations, Berlin: The West has forgotten the Georgian war
quickly. Georgia and Saakashvili are not important enough to start
a new Cold War with Russia. The West needs Moscow’s support on many
other issues, like Iran. The West has therefore forgiven Moscow for
the annexation of Georgian territories-rightly so, because the West
is not capable of solving the territorial-ethnical conflicts in the
post-Soviet space on its own. The present status quo suits everyone.
If Moscow decides to stay in Sevastopol after 2017, there will be
no conflict over this issue with the West. The West is not Russia’s
problem, though. The other CIS states were not willing to support
Russia in its Caucasus policy, either. Russia’s authority in the CIS
has been undermined.
Ethan S. Burger, Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center,
Washington, DC: It is difficult not to have sympathy for the more than
250,000 persons who have been displaced as a result of the fighting
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the last 20 years. We must not
forget that those soldiers who died in the fighting, irrespective
of their citizenship, are human beings, with families and loved
ones. Ultimately, ordinary persons are the victims of the decisions
made by political and military leaders. It is a shame that those
persons in Moscow and Tbilisi (specifically Putin and Saakashvili)
are not forced to spend their nights in the "communities" where these
people have been "settled." Maybe having these two "leaders" resolve
their disagreements by having a chess or fencing match might not be
a bad idea.
Without a doubt, Russia’s "incursion" into Georgia one year ago
might have a similar impact to the [Nazi] Germany’s annexation of
Czechoslovakia. In the near-term, the Western democracies seemed
impotent. In the years immediately following they took ineffective
steps aimed at enhancing their security, such as increasing defense
spending and the production of their weaponry. They thought they were
buying time. They entered into alliances, which rather than deterring
aggression, had the effect of expanding the geographic scope of any
conflict that might arise. What they did gain was an evolution in
the thinking of key individuals, both those exercising power and
those willing to fight to defend their homelands and friends (while
hopefully avoiding getting killed in the process).
Declarations of principle in the absence of action do not alter
behavior. Russia is currently an observer to the Organization for
Cooperation and Development in Europe (OECD). Unlike the WTO, the
Russian government has not declared that obtaining full membership
in the OECD is a priority. Its members, especially those who are
also members of the Council of Europe, the European Union, NATO,
and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, should
ask themselves whether a country that does not accept the sovereignty
of its neighbors should be allowed to join the "club." Where are the
people who can speak with moral authority today? Could we even hear
or read them, given the information flood we are subjected to on a
daily basis?
The benefits to Russia of severing Abkhazia and South Ossetia are
not entirely clear. There is considerable violence in the Caucasus
targeted against Russian authority. Some may choose to describe this
as terrorism; others might use the term "insurgency," but a few might
describe it as a civil war. In any case, this situation is a drain
on the Russian economy at a time when the Russian economy has just
experienced a ten percent decline in GDP during the first six months
of the current year.
The world economic crisis occurred due to a large number of assumptions
that proved fallacious: the misguided belief that corporations and
persons acting in their own self-interest produces positive results
(or, to put it in a more crass way, "greed is good"), that governments
could effectively regulate their country’s economic actors; that
criminal laws could deter "white" collar crime; and that international
organizations could respond to critical situations.
The thinking underlying Russia’s policy toward Georgia may be based
on similar false assumptions. Few neutral observers will contend that
the Russian military is an effective fighting force. The concept of
"deterrence" does not apply with respect to the countries in the
"near abroad" (with the possible exceptions of the Baltic States
and Ukraine).
President Barack Obama was entirely correct when he said off the cuff
that prime minister Putin still has one leg in the Cold War. When the
two met, there apparently was no dialog: Obama politely sat through
a lecture that reflected a thinking of a different era.
With time, the price of energy may increase, but conservation measures
and technology will make Russia less important as an exporter of
raw materials, particularly as new supplies are discovered. Canada’s
one-page supplement describing its importance as an energy supplier
to the United States probably had much greater impact than all of
the special "advertising" supplements the Russian government placed
in the Washington Post.
The more sophisticated members of the Russian elite, either in the
government or the business community, need to demonstrate leadership —
convincing the Russian population that so long as Russia is viewed as a
threat and not a partner, its long-term economic outlook is not bright.
Sergei Roy, Editor, , Moscow: A year on, the Five Day
War in the Caucasus still touches raw nerves. The ruins of Tskhinvali
are still there, the memories of the dead are unbearably fresh, and
the lies about who struck the first blow are as brazen as ever. Enough
time has passed, though, to fit the events within a broader frame.
One of the results, perhaps the main one, of that conflict is greater
clarity or, to use a converse formula, less indeterminacy both in the
international relations and domestically. Of the entire plethora of
statements and counterstatements in the wake of the war, I was struck
most forcibly by Putin’s revelation that, when news of the bombardment
of Tskhinvali came, Russia’s leaders tried to get in touch with those
of the United States, using the hotline that is specifically laid for
such crises. There simply was no response from the other side. Dead
silence at the other end.
This certainly looks like a definite sign of that "other side’s"
direct complicity in Saakashvili’s bloody gamble. The United States
knew of it beforehand, and whether it encouraged it by inaction or
vigorous prodding is of academic interest only. The latter option
suggests itself most powerfully. After all, no one pours in money,
weapons, instructors, advisers, etc. to no purpose. There was a
purpose, and it was ugly.
Then there was the absolutely unanimous reaction of the Western
media, which took Georgia’s side automatically and unquestioningly,
even resorting to slimy tricks like passing pictures of destroyed
Tskhinvali for those of Gori. This reaction may have been reflex
Russophobia, but the overriding unanimity in the teeth of factual
evidence still suggests careful conditioning and "embedding" as well.
Information-wise, it was Russia contra mundum for quite a while. It
took the BBC three months to produce a more or less truthful film,
when all it would have taken to show who the criminal aggressor was
a single BBC reporter with a camera on the spot. However, for them
"on the spot" was at Saakashvili’s side, in Tbilisi and in Gori.
Clearly, the battle lines drawn at the time of superpower rivalry,
though they have since shifted geographically, are still there,
though one of the rivals is gone and its successor, Russia, has
done everything it realistically could (ideologically, politically,
militarily, economically, culturally) to embrace and please the
West. Everything, that is, except disappearing entirely.
But disappear it must. To that end, all options are apparently "on
the table," including the employment of a lunatic client for what is
militarily known as reconnaissance in force.
One shudders to think what would have happened if Boris Yeltsin and
his coterie had been still in power at such a juncture. Russia would
have eaten humble pie again, as a prelude to indefinitely continuing
to consume the same nourishment in the future.
Thank God (and Putin/Medvedev) things happened the way they did. To
quote Mikhail Lermontov’s apt line, "Bezhali robkie gruziny" (The
timid Georgians ran away). Nicolas Sarkozy did a fine damage-limitation
job for the West, but defeat is defeat. Joe Biden may talk as loud as
he pleases, but Russian military bases in South Ossetia and Abkhazia
are there to stay.
Now Russia is safe from similar assaults, at least for some time,
and that time is best employed by licking its armed forces into shape,
or at least bringing to an end this continual orgy of defense "reform."
Yet another obvious result of the war makes one recall a Soviet cliche,
"the nation’s moral-political unity," the sort the United States
is justly proud of. The people were solidly behind the country’s
leadership, with the "Georgiaphiles," a.k.a. domestic Russophobes,
in the usual tiny, if vociferous minority.
One can only feel sad that it takes a great misfortune like war to
produce this unity. Yet it is a hopeful sign for future tribulations-of
which Russia is sure to have more than its fair share.
Vladimir Belaeff, Global Society Institute, Inc., San Francisco,
CA: On the night of August 7 to August 8, 2008, the army of the
Republic of Georgia initiated its assault on the South Ossetian
city of Tskhinvali. Video clips of the intense artillery barrage
are widely available on the Internet. Tens of "building killer"
Grad rocket launchers, each with a capacity of up to 40 missiles,
blanketed a sleeping non-combatant urban population, ethnically mixed:
Ossetians, Georgians, Armenians, Jews and Russians. Simultaneously,
Russian peacekeepers, present in the city under international auspices,
were attacked by the Georgian military.
Just a few hours earlier the president of Georgia had assured on
television his entire country, and the people of South Ossetia, of his
government’s peaceful intentions. Given the logistics of assembling
weapons and personnel for the nighttime attack, these assurances
by Saakashvili were being made even as preparations for assault
were in full action. On August 8, the Georgian media reported the
"military conquest of Tskhinvali"- they were not yet bashful about
their aggression.
This attack by Georgia violated a 14-year truce, which had been
implemented to develop a peaceful solution to a problem which itself
was the result of ethnic suppression by the Tbilisi authorities in
the early 1990s.
Under the circumstances, Russia’s response was consistent with actions
of other countries in similar situations, for example the United States
in Grenada (1983) and after the terrorist attack of September 11,
which resulted in the invasion of a sovereign country (Afghanistan),
identified to be a terrorist haven.
The above facts are mentioned to explain that Russia’s alternatives
under the circumstances were nil. Russia was presented by Tbilisi
with a military attack against its own soldiers, the destruction
of defenseless cities and an incipient ethnic cleansing (or worse)
on her own doorstep. One must wonder what delusions of impunity were
preying on Georgia’s leadership and its consultants when they prepared
and launched their military attack.
Did Russia gain or lose overall from these events? Given the lack of
realistic alternatives, the question is moot.
The current lack of wide recognition of the sovereignty of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia is not without precedent in other parts of the
world, including the bosom of NATO itself. What has happened is the
waste of 14 years of diplomacy, and effectively a re-definition of the
original problem. There are many novel forms in which this matter can
be resolved peacefully, over time. Evidently, a change of government
in Tbilisi is a prerequisite: one does not see Saakashvili as willing
to admit the failure of his adventure.
As to the other aspects of the 5-day war, it is definitely
a watershed. Russia has demonstrated with force that there are
limits to its forbearance and reliance on diplomacy alone. What is
surprising is that until August 2008, there was a widespread view
that such a limit did not exist, or was purely theoretical. Again, as
noted before, all sovereign countries have such limits, beyond which
they are tested only at peril. As noted above, the United States has
repeatedly demonstrated such a limit, so did the UK (the Falklands’
War) and other nations, as well.
Although hostile anti-Russian propaganda regarding these events
continues in some quarters, possibly due to inertia (or clinical
obsessive psychosis) the world community of nations is applying here
the timeless and unsurprising axiom: every sovereign country will
exercise power to protect its citizens, its military and its vital
national interests.
Previously, Russia had displayed numerous public signals of its limits
and determination (and surely made even more clear representations
privately). Apparently, these signals were not heeded by some. Those
folks will have to be more attentive in the future.
Professor Stephen Blank, the U.S. Army War College, Carlyle Barracks,
PA: I would take severe issue with Frolov’s characterization of the
gains for Russia. Even before this war there was no way Georgia was
going to get into NATO. Saakashvili’s failings were well known in
Brussels, Paris, and Berlin, and so there was no point to the war. As
for the other gains, demanding a sphere of influence in the CIS (which
Russia in any case cannot sustain) was counterproductive and has
antagonized every member of the CIS, reigniting suspicion in Europe.
The situation in the Russian military is much worse than Frolov
says, because as the Russian press has made clear, the money is not
there to consummate the desirable defense reforms, and corruption
and criminality in the armed forces is through the roof. The money
to rebuild South Ossetia and Abkhazia was predictably stolen, and
Russia is saddled with its own version of Georgia irredenta that
causes permanent tension throughout the region and makes the fire in
the North Caucasus even more dangerous.
The EU is now vigorously contesting Russia over energy, and the
United States will not acquiesce to the idea of a sphere of influence
either, although Moscow seems to think that the "reset" button means
just that. This, as I have already written elsewhere, was a war that
nobody won, and it was a war that did not have to be fought. Rather,
it was a war that Moscow wanted and incited, not Georgia, and the
evidence is overwhelming if one reads the new book by Frederick Starr
and Svante Cornell, "The Guns of August 2008."
Unfortunately, Moscow suffers from the same delusion that George Bush
did, namely that it suffices to be tall in the saddle and that this
constitutes a victory even if you neglect the building of support for
your policy. This isn’t true in Russia any more than it is true here,
and as Frolov notes, the bills that Moscow accrued have long since
started to come in and outweigh the benefits of this war.