TURKISH-ARMENIAN PROTOCOLS: REALITY AND IRRATIONALITY
David Davidian
2009/09/30 | 12:04
The Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the
Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey officially announced
in Berne, Yerevan, and Ankara on August 31, 2009, has been brought to
center stage and not without controversy. In order to fully appreciate
and rationally analyze this yet-to-be-ratified document that is
meant to serve as the basis for further dialog between the parties,
its origins and accepted norms of international behavior regarding
it must be understood. The document exists, it is not going away,
and undoubtedly will be ratified by the Armenian Parliament in short
order. The Turkish Parliament may delay ratification. While this
article cannot cover every aspect in depth, the attempt is to provide
a foundation to understand what may or may not be transpiring between
Armenia and Turkey and why.
This Protocol is the culmination of at least five years of discussions
between Armenians and Turks at different official levels. Beginning
circa 2003, talks were underway between then Turkish and Armenians
foreign ministers Abdullah Gul and Vartan Oskanian respectively. While
these talks had the appearance of being non-productive, in 2005 Turkish
Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan suggested instituting a joint historical
commission to study what was termed "claims of genocide". Armenia
and Turkey are talking for many reasons; if for no other reason they
are neighbors, irrespective of the outstanding historical issues. Why
might Armenia deign talking with Turkey? Without talking, nothing can
be addressed between the two parties, including issues not related to
the Protocol, and these are the parties who are the internationally
recognized as players, in spite of an extensive Armenian Diaspora.
Neither Armenia nor Turkey is in a position to unilaterally act
completely independent of the interests of larger regional or
international states. Subordinate states have to constantly re-examine
their interests in order to adjust with those of major powers with the
aim of maximizing bargaining stand while understanding (and attempting
not to capitulate to) the interest of the other parties. In general,
this precludes these states from engaging in zero sum inanity, such
as demanding an all-or-nothing state of affairs.
If the combined political pressure from Russia, US, and EU "strongly
suggests" not only Armenia consider discussing with the Turks lifting
their border blockade but attempt to discuss historical issues, it is
not acceptable or even in Armenia’s interest to simply say "no". In
a crude analogy, Serbia’s Milosevic responded with the refrain "no,
no, no" in response to the demands of major powers to end the campaign
of ethnic cleansing regardless of the claim "we didn’t start it". His
country was bombed and its infrastructure heavily damaged.
Equivalent pressure was put on the Turkey to begin serious talks
with Armenia in spite of Turkish demands that Armenian forces
leave Nagorno-Karabakh and its environs, and that Armenia end
support for genocide recognition before discussions can become
substantive1. Interestingly enough, neither of these Turkish demands
is stated in the Protocol.
Interplay of Competing and Converging Interests
There appears to be a confluence of outcome in advancing
Armenian-Turkish relations despite major interests appearing orthogonal
to each other. The EU requires no border conflicts among any of its
members or those in ascension towards membership, such as Turkey. It
also has trade pacts and bilateral agreements with Turkey required by
EU’s ascension criteria. The Turkish blockade of the Armenian border
makes a mockery of many of their tenets. Moreover, the EU would like
to see a stable Caucasus to facilitate energy transport to Europe, as
parts of Europe froze last winter when Russia was forced to shut gas
through Ukrainian transport pipelines. Any stable routing is in EU’s
interest. Moreover, without an open border, Armenia cannot actively
engage in the European Neighborhood Policy which is an extension of
the European Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU
and Armenia. As of 20062 the resulting Action Plan for Armenia has
provided over 2 billion Euros in Community assistance. The EU would
like to see the fruits of their assistance grow through expanded
trade. While it is unclear if Armenia would be part of any future
or expanded energy transit routes, Turkey does want to expand its
role and Armenia provides a convenient and alternative pathway. In
the process, Georgia’s role as a forced transit route around Armenia
may diminish. This would be in Russia’s interest.
The full extent of Russian interests in advancing this Protocol
itself could be the subject of a small book. However, it is clear
that Russian economic interests in Armenia, which are considerable,
amounting to nearly $2.5B3, can generate better returns with at least
a semi-open border and established relations between Armenia and
Turkey. Russia’s ability to bring Armenia to its knees in short order
is astounding. It could force the closure of the Armenian nuclear power
plant at Medzamor, for "technical reasons", eliminating about 40% of
Armenia’s electrical generating capacity. Russian gas, running through
Georgian pipelines to Armenia could easily be "damaged" during winter
months, cutting off gas and crippling Armenia. This combined with the
ability to enact restrictions on remittances from Russian Armenians; it
is clear Russia holds the keys in Armenia. Whether Armenia should have
sold off critical infrastructure to the Russians is now a moot point.
Russia watched Azerbaijan react in disbelief when Turkish President
Abdullah Gul traveled to Armenia for a soccer match a year ago. It
appeared to Azerbaijan that Turkey had forsaken it with Gul
stepping foot in Armenia. Turkey has been the champion in support
of Azerbaijan in the frozen conflict over the Armenian populated
enclave Nagorno-Karabakh.
Nagorno-Karabakh had been placed under Azerbaijani jurisdiction
during the Soviet era. Now it is basically an extension of Armenia
after Azerbaijan lost control of it in a war. Over the past year,
Azerbaijan made threats to stop gas shipments to Turkey and the use of
the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, and began auditing institutions in Azerbaijan
funded with Turkish money. Turkey maintained, until the Protocol
was made public, that it would not enter into border discussions
until Armenian troops vacated Nagorno-Karabakh. There could not have
been a more efficient way to create suspicion of Turkish intentions
towards Azerbaijan, brining Baku to a point where it could decide
to transport a larger percentage of its gas via existing Russian
pipelines. The Azerbaijanis may not like dealing with the Russians,
but at least the latter is predictable.
Georgia’s war with Russia changed the balance of power in the Caucasus
and in doing so became a catalyst in advancing Armenian-Turkish
talks and accelerating, by perhaps a year or so, the establishment
of the Protocols. Georgia became one of the two front-line states,
along with Ukraine, that became a battleground for influence between
the US and Russia. The United States can project power, but little
can replace the influence on Georgia and Ukraine of a neighboring
power. In the end, Georgia became a weaker state after the August
2008 Russian-Georgian conflict, not just because it effectively lost
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and is under partial blockade, but Russia
made a clear statement about its continued influence in the Southern
Caucasus. Azerbaijan was subsequently forced to re-think entertaining
notions of attacking Nagorno-Karabakh.
In the zeal to create rough parity with the increased Russian influence
moving south across the Caucasus, Turkey was forced to engage Armenia
by: accelerating diplomatic efforts, Gul attending the soccer match
in Armenia, and advancing a now-defunct Caucasian Initiative, all
at the expense of Azerbaijan. This exposed a flaw in Turkish foreign
policy by damaging relations with Azerbaijan. In addition, Turkey has
shown interest in actually buying Caspian Basin gas and reselling to
the EU, cutting into Azerbaijani profits. Individual state interest
trumps so-called brotherly relations.
The August 2008 Russian-Georgian war terminated Russia’s use of
Georgian transport routes to maintain activities at Russian military
bases in Armenia. Reports and quick Turkish denials claim the Russians
began working with Turkey to allow the use of their airspace to
maintain operations in Armenia4,5. Also, supply trains destined for
Armenia initially remained stalled in Georgia, creating enough worry
that Georgian routes to the Black Sea or to the North Caucasus are
simply not reliable for Armenian trade.
A closed Armenian border with Turkey would make any land transport of
Russian military items difficult – an open border would facilitate
this. Why might Turkey allow Russia to transport military equipment
to its base in Gyumri? For Turkey, the prospect of an arrangement,
especially on its terms, outweighed any potential threats from Russian
bases especially in light of greatly increased bilateral trade and
cooperation in potential energy transport to the EU. Besides, once in
operation, Turkey can always attempt to extract concessions from Russia
for the use of transport routes and can restrict passage any time.
Russia and Turkey cannot project complimentary influence in the
larger region without a resolution of the Turkish blockade of the
Armenian border. The $500M Russian loan to Armenia6 earlier this year
reinforces the strategic importance Russia places on Armenia and with
clear ability to influence policies in Yerevan.
There is talk of Turkey warming up to the estranged Georgian region
of Abkhazia, which advances Russian interest at the expense of
Georgian-Turkish relations. In the words of a think tank associated
with the Turkish FM, "Ankara could no longer ignore the new reality
in the region"7. Armenian news outlets have quoted Cenk Baslamis
writing in the Turkish daily Milliyet, "Ankara will recognize
independence of Abkhazia in the near future, while Moscow will
recognize Turkish part of Cyprus". Apparently, this topic began
surfacing with an article by Paul Goble in the English Language
Georgian Daily8. While this could hardly happen overnight, the trial
balloon has been released. Ultimately, Turkey can simultaneously
give tacit approval of the "new reality" while fomenting anti-Russian
agitation in Abkhazia. Turkish-Russian political relationships have
been quite dynamic since talks began circa 1996 to reduce Turkish
involvement in Russia’s Chechen war and Russian support for the
PKK9. The Turkish-Russian relationship culminated with the historic
visit of Russian President Putin to Turkey in late 200410.
One can see a confluence of Russian and Turkish interest on one side
and US pressure on the Turks to "unfreeze" discussions with Armenians
and reach some interim agreement – the Protocol11.
The US has transitioned its policy objectives in the southern Caucasus
from those of the previous decade. In the last decade the US aimed to
secure the development of latent energy reserves and the ability to
securely move them westward. Much of this effort was centered upon
Azerbaijani oil and gas reserves and those on the eastern shores of
the Caspian, such as Turkmen gas and Kazakh oil. This effort required
the exaggeration of existing Azerbaijani reserves and tolerating a
series of despotic regimes in Baku. The US State Department claimed
that from 50 to 200 billion barrels of oil existed under Azerbaijani
sovereignty. It turned out to be from 5 to 20 billion barrels. In
fact, Azerbaijan will become net importer of oil by about 2021, with
peak output declining circa 2012, unless substantial new fields are
discovered12. Claims such as "The Deal of a Century" were touted in the
western presses, especially in the US and the UK. Clearly, the regional
competitor capable of transporting Caspian Basin energy resources was
Russia. As the decade proceeded various projects were proposed. The
largest was the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project signed in 1994.
This pipeline avoided Armenia and Iran, even though it was more
expensive to construct the line through Georgia. Being Russia’s
strategic partner in the region, Armenia was bypassed for political
reasons. Iran was not even considered, since Azerbaijan is a major
source of oil for Israel. US energy related companies have substantial
percentage interest in nearly every transport consortium and gas or
oil fields in Azerbaijan.
The latest gas pipeline proposed is the Nabbuco pipeline supplying
Azerbaijani and Turkmen gas through Turkey, to the Balkans and into
central Europe. Other projects include BlueStream bringing Russian
gas into Turkey via a pipeline under the Black Sea.
As western energy development and transport schemes became viable
alternatives to the Russian pipelines and with Russia architecting and
successfully negotiating with energy partners, by early to mid this
decade, US policy in the region moved from competition with Russia
to mild cooperation. Peace and stability were in both US and Russian
interest. As energy transportation requires deposits and contiguous
geography respectively, US (and European) efforts became focused
first on freezing armed hostilities, then onto solving existing ethnic
disputes. The closed Turkish-Armenian frontier must have been at the
top of that list, considering the zeal at which Turkey accepted the
soccer match invitation at the jaw dropping chagrin of Baku.
US officials have stated that an open border with Turkey would
reduce Armenia’s dependence on both Russia and Iran. However,
any reduction in Russian influence on Armenia with an open Turkish
border is questionable since Russia owns major segments of Armenian’s
strategic infrastructure, such as the electrical grid, the operation
of Armenia’s nuclear power station, the rail system, and has interest
in the Armenian-Iranian gas pipeline, among other things.
If steady energy transport and revenues generated are at the basis
for current US policy, it may not be surprising that a change in the
political status quo of Nagorno-Karabakh may now be in the interest of
major powers. Until now the status quo with respect to Nagorno-Karabakh
was in the interest of major players except for those in Baku who
daily bellicose vocabulary would have one expecting an Azerbaijani
attack on NK any day for the past several years. This frozen status
was used by Moscow to influence policy in Azerbaijan.
The "new regional realities" and political transformations have
taken place with the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh conducting their
own affairs outside of Azerbaijani sovereignty. The existence of
Nagorno-Karabakh in any form does not affect the transport of energy,
for there would be no logical reason to run any pipelines over its
mountains when that region is surrounded by relatively flat lands. In
addition, NK does not have any hydrocarbon deposits. A real resolution
to the NK conflict may be possible in the near future in light of these
"new regional realities".
With an open or semi-open Turkish-Armenian border, Georgia will
quickly lose much of its overland transport fees from Armenian
wholesale importers. Reduced importance of Georgia on Armenia also
serves Russian interests. Russia would prefer to see Georgia in its
sphere of influence. Until that time, Russia would like Georgia simply
wither on the vine.
The Protocol
Other than state institutions and the negotiators themselves, no one
knows under what conditions, stated or perceived interests, principles,
etc., the Protocol discussions proceeded. The process was not at
all transparent. It is clear that a unique confluence of political
resolve exhibited between the US and Russia across the Atlantic and
between Turkey and Russia regionally, had a strong influence on both
parties to reach a framework for further negotiations. It is not
accurate to assume that Turkey, Armenia or both could simply ignore
these international pressures.
Before the Protocol was made public, Turkey maintained two basic
preconditions that had to be addressed before formal negotiations
could proceed: Armenia end its support for expanding international
recognition of the Turkish genocide of the Armenians, and Armenian
forces withdraw from Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding regions. In
addition to these two basic preconditions, references were made
regarding Armenia specifically stating it has no claims on any
lands in eastern Anatolia and by default recognizing current
borders as inviolable. None of these items are mentioned in the
Protocol. There are only three actionable items in the Protocol,
the rest is procedural13. These are:
1. Agree to open the common border within 2 months after the entry
into force of this Protocol,
2. Agree to conduct regular political consultations between the
Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the two countries;
implement a dialogue on the historical dimension with the aim
to restore mutual confidence between the two nations, including
an impartial scientific examination of the historical records and
archives to define existing problems and formulate recommendations;
make the best possible use of existing transport, communications
and energy infrastructure and networks between the two countries,
and to undertake measures in this regard;
develop the bilateral legal framework in order to foster cooperation
between the two countries; cooperate in the fields of science and
education by encouraging relations between the appropriate institutions
as well as promoting the exchange of specialists and students, and
act with the aim of preserving the cultural heritage of both sides
and launching common cultural projects;
establish consular cooperation in accordance with the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations of 1963 in order to provide necessary assistance
and protection to the citizens of the two countries; take concrete
measures in order to develop trade, tourism and economic cooperation
between the two countries;
engage in a dialogue and reinforce their cooperation on environmental
issues.
3. Agree on the establishment of an intergovernmental bilateral
commission which shall comprise separate sub-commissions for the
prompt implementation of the commitments mentioned in operational
paragraph 2 above in this Protocol. To prepare the working modalities
of the intergovernmental commission and its sub-commissions, a
working group headed by the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall
be created 2 months after the day following the entry into force of
this Protocol. Within 3 months after the entry into force of this
Protocol, these modalities shall be approved at ministerial level. The
intergovernmental commission shall meet for the first time immediately
after the adoption of the said modalities. The sub-commissions shall
start their work at the latest 1 month thereafter and they shall work
continuously until the completion of their mandates. The timetable
and elements agreed by both sides for the implementation of this
Protocol are mentioned in the annexed document, which is integral
part of this Protocol.
Both Turkey and Armenia must ratify the text before this Protocol
becomes actionable.
Item 1 is the clause that serves as the basis for opening the
border. However, how open it would be and restrictions of its use by
the parties, is not stated.
Item 2 refers to the furtherance of bilateral relations, but in
particular notes a bilateral commission to be established to examine
the "historical" record. While not explicitly stated, the overarching
historical issue is the genocide of the Armenians. It is generally
understood this is the paramount issue that will be examined.
Item 3 is a procedural item referring to implementing Item 2.
Since Armenia has long stated its desire to enter into discussions with
Turkey without any preconditions to affect a resolution of Item 1 –
lifting the Turkish border blockade – it can be assumed that Item 2
was a Turkish initiative. It is also assumed that Turkey was never
strategically or fundamentally against opening the border, judging
by its current tactical interests.
Thus, we can tabulate the preconditions that were suggested, agreed
to or dismissed throughout discussions, post 2005, especially after
the election of Armenian President Serge Sarkisyan in 2008.
Roughly speaking, the outcome of the agreement is the promise of
an open border in exchange for the establishment of the historic
commission.
The "winning" and "losing" party has been spun by both sides. Typical
of Turkish spin is read in the pro-government daily Hurriyet, September
15, 2009, in an article written by Yusuf Kanli14 where he states,
"First of all Armenia has accepted for the first time ever the
creation of a history commission that might feature historians from
interested third parties in examining the genocide claims. That is,
without saying so the Serge Sarkisian administration of Armenian has
conceded from the "Genocide is a fact, there is no need to verify it
through scientific research or to discuss it" position."
What appears to be an Armenian concession to the Turks is at best
a method for Turks to delay international debate on genocide
recognition. It is unclear why the Turkish side sees this as a
victory unless delaying recognition was their original goal. Using
such a commission as a delay tactic will ultimately result in a
strategic blunder as Turkish disingenuousness will be clear to the
international community. Whether the Turkish end game is gaining a
few years of leeway or denying consent to an unfavorable commission
outcome, or both, can have negative repercussions with EU countries,
highlighting Turkish resistance to reforms expected of it. This may
be the case with EU states that have recognized the genocide, such
as Switzerland. Switzerland is a party to this Protocol process.
Turkey may have made another mistake in misreading Armenian opposition
to a historical commission since Erdogan suggested it in 2005. Armenian
opposition to an historical commission, mainly seen in the Diaspora,
is based on the assumption that any inquiry into the historical
record regarding the genocide is tantamount to questioning the
veracity of the genocide. Over twenty countries have recognized the
Turkish genocide of the Armenians as an indisputable fact and the
Society of Genocide Scholars have stated without reservation that
the Armenians were subject to genocide. Scores of renown historians
agree it was genocide and the International Center for Transitional
Justice (ICTJ), commission by the Turkish Armenian Reconciliation
Commission, in their study concluded the Armenians were subject to
genocide15 What other possible outcome could such an honest historical
commission as stated in Item 2, be other than a reiteration of what is
an accepted fact. Unlike the Jews in the aftermath of the Nuremberg
Trials, Armenians do not have the luxury of completely rejecting any
inquiries into confirming the genocide. The Jews have the ability to
reject as blasphemous, for example, somebody publishing an analysis
of the gas used in gas chambers as being not really Zyklon-B, but
perhaps Zyklon-C, or -D.
Recent Armenian protests16 and proclamations against this commission
certainly give the Turks reason to assume they extracted some sort
of a concession from the Armenians. Protests since 2005 against
any historical commission may have unwittingly helped Armenia’s
negotiators.
Paraphrasing Turkish professor Taner Akcam17, what previously unknown
document could possibly exist that will allow one to negate the
genocide of the Armenians in light of all the research that has been
done and the clear recognition it has received.
It is entirely possible that Armenian historians would be so
inept so as to allow Turkish denialists to re-write history. The
chance of this happening with the entire concerned world watching is
doubtful. Moreover, if the commission becomes a mockery of the facts,
any conclusions it makes would be considered effectively null and
void. Besides, chances are high that many of the commission sessions
will be hosted in Switzerland, which not only has recognized the
crime of genocide committed against the Armenians, but should arrest
any deniers on their territory. However, even if the outcome of the
historical commission’s "research" reiterates the fact of genocide,
subsequent redress may remain unresolved.
Yusuf Kanli continues:
"Secondly, for the first time ever in the post-Soviet era, Armenia has
agreed to recognize the joint border with Turkey as was defined in the
Kars treaty, though there is no reference in the protocols to the Kars
treaty. Such recognition by Armenia is no less than declaring it has
no territorial claims from Turkey or it has turned a cold shoulder
to Diaspora’s land claims from Turkey."
There is a border that exists between Armenia and Turkey. On one side
are Turkish guards, on the other Russian and Armenian ones. Recognizing
the current border is required in order to open it. Hurriyet and its
editors engage in extreme spin when they claim that border recognition
requires recognizing the process that created that demarcation. No
where in the Protocol does it mention the Treaty of Kars, the Treaty
of Moscow, or the Treaty of Alexandropol for that matter. This
is because there is no international obligation for Armenia to
recognize such previous treaties in this case. This is well defined
in Villiger’s Customary International Law and Treaties18 and in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties19, ratified by Armenia20 in
May 2005. The latter clearly states in Section 2,
APPLICATION OF TREATIES
Article 28: Non-retroactivity of treaties
Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise
established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any
act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist
before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect
to that party.
Article 29: Territorial scope of treaties
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise
established, a treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its
entire territory.
Article 30: Application of successive treaties relating to the same
subject-matter 1. Subject to Article 103 of the Charter of the United
Nations, the rights and obligations of States parties to successive
treaties relating to the same subject-matter shall be determined in
accordance with the following paragraphs.
2. When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not
to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty,
the provisions of that other treaty prevail.
3. When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the
later treaty but the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended
in operation under article 59, the earlier treaty applies only to
the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the
latter treaty.
4. When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties
to the earlier one:
(a) as between States parties to both treaties the same rule applies
as in paragraph 3;
(b) as between a State party to both treaties and a State party to
only one of the treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties
governs their mutual rights and obligations.
5. Paragraph 4 is without prejudice to article 41, or to any question
of the termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty under
article 60 or to any question of responsibility which may arise for
a State from the conclusion or application of a treaty the provisions
of which are incompatible with its obligations towards another State
under another treaty.
At the time of this writing Turkey still has not ratified this
convention21. Armenia has and is under no obligation to recognize
the Treaty of Kars or Moscow that basically resulted in the current
Turkish-Armenian border. The United States ratified this convention
on April 24, 1970.
Positions
Armenia is in an interesting diplomatic position at the publication
of this Protocol. The only item that changes anything is the physical
lifting of the Turkish border blockade. Armenia should ratify this
Protocol without delay and put pressure on Turkey not to delay or
will pay the PR consequences.
Turkey is in a situation where it has alienated its ally Azerbaijan by
appearing to cut a deal with Armenia and has been making deals with
Russia. It may also be under the false impression it has extracted
concessions from Armenia. Turkey cannot appear overtly pan-Turkic in
rhetoric in its support of Azerbaijan, as it will be used by opponents
of Turkey’s EU ascension. Turkey may try to drag out the mandate of an
historical commission but that has its time limits as well. Armenian
diplomacy can consistently point to Turkish delay tactics.
Turkey also has an issue with ratification. Some opposition parties
object to opening of the border without a resolution of the NK
conflict. Turkey might use this as an excuse to re-work the Protocol,
but that would come at a loss to Turkish diplomacy. Armenia can
use this period to press Turkey publicly with actual preconditions
if Turkish non-ratification is being used as a technique to gain
concessions from Armenia. If Turkey does indeed ratify the Protocol,
the pro-Islamic AK party will be on the carpet to deliver the goods
for Turkey. They have to end alienating Azerbaijan, not appearing
too overtly helpful to Armenia while trying to convince the EU it
is sincere in solving its ascension demands, and work with its new
energy partner, Russia. If Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu, Prime
Minster Tayyip Erdogan, and President Adbullah Gul fail to convince
the Turkish public and the military that engaging Armenia using the
guidelines agreed to in the Protocols, there may indeed be early
elections in Turkey before 2012. The AK party could be swept from
power, leaving the Protocol in the hands of nationalists which could
face public pressure to declare it null and void.
Turkey will be in a diplomatic disadvantage if Armenia makes no errors.
Trade Issues
There appears to be no official public study commissioned by the
government of Armenia having as its basis a political and economic
analysis demonstrating that opening the border between Armenia and
Turkey will benefit anybody. Armenia may actually have an argument and
not even know it. What has been stated publicly are simply guesses,
usually positive, by members of the Armenian Parliament, Turkologists,
"experts", or oligarchs. An open border isn’t binary as almost
all simple guesses have been based on. An "open border" may simply
mean it is not totally closed and only allow products and material
to traverse a limited number of hours or days a week or may mean
automobile and bus traffic allowed on a weekly basis. There may never
be a completely open border. It could also be completely open. This
is an unknown at this time, but its answer lies at the center of the
affects of an open Turkish-Armenian border on the Armenian economy.
This missing study must include a competitive analysis of all major
Armenian industries covering at a minimum: management team expertise,
product sales & marketing, product planning, market channels and
development, government relations, cross-border transportation,
international business planning, credit and banking reviews, and yes,
accounting practices. One must then compare these industries with
their Turkish counterparts and using Armenian and Turkish demographic
buying patterns, determine the viability probability of each Armenian
industry assuming free and open competition with the added affects of
partial and severe protectionism. Past, current and projected trading
patterns must be evaluated. In parallel, a comparative study must be
done with the only other country having a similar geo-political and
economic position and that is Georgia. Such a study must determine
why Georgia’s GDP is down nearly 40% from a year ago considering it
has free and open trade with Turkey, Azerbaijan, and has many Black
Sea ports.
Solid conclusions cannot be made without studies. If the studies
are skewed (such as not taking into account: general corruption,
influence peddling, nepotism, fraud, racketeering, graft, extortion,
cartels, blackmail, potential EC-centric liability and product quality
issues, engagement and exit strategies adjusting for changes in the
Turkish government policies, Georgian and Iranian reaction, changes
in employment patterns and the consequences of any subsequent brain
drain, etc.) there is every chance of a failed evaluation. Perhaps
the reason none of these studies seem to exist is because they would
expose too much of Armenia’s black economy.
If history is any guide, Armenian oligarchs and those aspiring to be,
may simply attempt to sell assets to Turks. An easy way to personal
wealth is to replace the "headache" of producing domestic products with
those made in Turkey, considering local distribution channels exist and
are near monopolies. Armenians emptied out factories in the country in
early and mid-nineties and sold their contents, including machines, to
the Iranians. Apparently no accounting was made of those transactions.
It will be interesting to note if laws will be enacted to protect
indigenous Armenian industries. Unregulated trade, combined with 90
years of Turkish experience in the mechanisms of market economics,
could easily destroy Armenia’s economy and return the Armenian people
to the specter of Turkish domination.
However, with Russian control of major segments of Armenia’s
infrastructure, unfettered Turkish inroads into the Armenian economy
will presumably be moderated. In addition, EU analysis will be watching
closely over Turkish treatment of its neighbors.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
