ARMENIANS OF GEORGIA: NEW FLASHPOINT LOOMING IN THE CAUCASUS?
By Alexander Jackson,

APA
12 Oct 2009 14:50

Published in the framework of cooperation between APA and Caucasian
Review of International Affairs

Caucasian Review of International Affairs

As Turkey and Armenia prepare to open their mutual border and begin a
thaw in their relationship, there are fears that a recent spat between
Tbilisi and Yerevan could heighten regional tensions once again.

In early September, Armenia’s President Serzh Sarkisian set out plans
to improve the situation of Georgia’s ethnic Armenians. He called
for the preservation of Armenian national monuments in Georgia,
registering the Armenian Apostolic Church and – most importantly –
recognising Armenian as an official language in Georgia.

The series of measures followed a visit by Georgian President Mikheil
Saakashvili to Yerevan in June, when Georgia’s Armenians formally
called on President Sarkisian to raise their demands – for greater
cultural and political rights – with President Saakashvili (RFE/RL,
June 18). Not wishing to antagonise a vital ally when the ‘Turkish
thaw’ still seemed distant, President Sarkisian quietly ignored the
demands. Indeed, he actually praised the Georgian leader for his
efforts at improving the social and economic welfare of Javakheti,
a region mostly populated by ethnic Armenians in southern Georgia
(RFE/RL, June 25).

The package of measures which President Sarkisian proposed in September
therefore came as something of a surprise to Tbilisi. Georgian
officials reacted with scorn – State Minister for Reintegration Temur
Iakobashvili remarked that he was "very glad that Armenian language
is the only state language in Armenia", but that it would not be
adopted in Georgia (Georgia Times, September 3).

Analysts have linked the timing of the move to the Turkish thaw. The
imminent opening of the Turkish-Armenian border (if both parliaments
ratify the move, which is still not certain) mea s position as
Armenia’s only easy transport corridor to the West is at risk. With
the option of moving goods west through Turkey, rather than north-west
to Georgia’s coast and then across the Black Sea, Tbilisi’s vital
role as an economic lifeline for Yerevan will be lost.

This increases Armenia’s bargaining position regarding Georgia,
and particularly the Armenians of Javakheti. The issue has been a
matter of contention for years between the two sides. The Javakheti
Armenians complain that their cultural and political rights are
being ignored by Tbilisi, and frequently appeal to Yerevan for
aid. Unwilling to irritate Georgia, Armenia has so far been muted in
its response. Tbilisi, for its part, fears that any movements towards
‘autonomy’ could turn Javakheti into another Abkhazia or South Ossetia
– a rebel region outside the control of the central government. The
Georgian government is fully aware that it rules over a fractured
patchwork of different ethnic groups, all of which could – in theory –
revolt against Tbilisi’s control.

The Abkhazia/South Ossetia parallel is instructive for another
reason. Georgia, perhaps understandably, sees the hand of Russia
behind every call for autonomy in Javakheti. A large Russian military
base was located in the region until 2007, and Armenia is Russia’s
strongest ally in the South Caucasus. Both factors created suspicion
that Russia is using its regional influence to stir up opposition to
Georgian rule in Javakheti.

There have been numerous protests against Georgia’s rule in
Javakheti. In April 2005, several thousand Armenians protested
against the planned closure of the Russian military base (Central
Asia-Caucasus Analyst, April 6 2005). The base, a Soviet legacy,
brought much-needed employment and economic assistance to the region.

Is Moscow behind protests against Georgian rule? It should not be
ruled out. Georgia has sometimes arrested local Armenian activists,
accusing them of stirring up separatism on behalf of foreign powers,
presumably Rus ed-up charges. Georgia can also dismiss demands to
improve the social and economic conditions in the region, by claiming
that every complaint and call for autonomy is a ‘Russian plot’.

It is unclear whether the government in Yerevan would attempt to
provoke Georgia on Russia’s behalf. Armenia now needs as many friends
as possible, especially whilst its cold war with Azerbaijan continues,
and will not actively provoke Georgia. Georgian territory remains
the shortest route to Russia, particularly for vital gas pipelines,
which will still be needed for years, until Armenia’s energy needs
can be met by Turkey and Iran.

The real explanation behind Armenia’s criticisms of Georgia is
domestic. With the Armenian diaspora increasingly coming to view
President Sarkisian as a ‘traitor’ for his rapprochement with Turkey,
he urgently needs to shore up his credentials as an Armenian patriot.

What better way to do so than to issue a low-risk criticism of
Georgia? The package of measures he proposed does not contain
recommendations for improving the region’s economic situation, its
most urgent priority. The measures are cultural – church, history,
and language, all important signifiers of Armenian identity. Javakheti
is viewed by Armenian nationalists as part of ‘Greater Armenia’,
which they believe should be united in a single state, so being seen
to support Armenian identity there acts as ‘compensation’ for peace
with Turkey.

Nonetheless, the issue of Javakheti remains tense. It will only become
more important for Armenian identity as the historical animosity
towards Turkey begins to fade. It could become a lightning rod for
Armenian nationalists, provoking a counter-reaction from Georgia,
and creating a new flashpoint in the Caucasus.