INSIDE SAUDI SUCCESSION
Simon Henderson
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October 12th 2009
Factors Affecting Saudi Succession are a Family Affair
Washington Institute
The process by which government decisions are made in Saudi
Arabia remains obscure despite continual analysis by diplomats,
oil executives, foreign business executives, and others. The more
well-informed analysts believe that the number and identity of
the princes and nonroyal participants varies, depending on the
issue. Important decisions are made by the king alone but usually
once he feels a consensus has been reached. (The ulama-the senior
Muslin clergy–have a leading role in making religious decisions, but
since they depend on the king for their appointments, they are probably
reluctant to oppose a royal family consensus. They can dither, however;
when the Grand Mosque in Mecca was seized in 1979, the ulama reportedly
took thirty-six hours to approve the use of military force.) When
consensus remains elusive, decisions are delayed. This was the case
in the late 1990s when Crown Prince Abdullah was seeking to involve
foreign companies in the development of the kingdom’s natural gas
resources. The decision was postponed and the proposal eventually
dropped after opposition from the petroleum company Saudi Aramco and
the Saudi ministry of oil, assumed to be backed by Abdullah’s rivals
in the royal family. (The exception that proves this rule is said
to be Kind Fahd’s decision to ask for U.S. military support after
the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Other senior princes, including
then Crown Prince Abdullah, wanted time to consider other options,
but they were overruled by Fahd.)
This decision-making process owes its origins to the traditional
way decision are made in nomadic Bedouin Arab tribes–the so-called
bedoucracy–in which the ruling sheikh consults with the elders of the
tribe. The process is not one of equality, but it generally ensures
loyalty and acquiescence rather than protest and revolt.
Succession, however, is a special decision that tolerates little
delay. According to convention, a new Saudi king relies on the other
princes to confirm his position by swearing an oath of allegiance. The
ulama must then declare the new king an imam (Muslim leader). The
declaration can only be made on the basis of a fatwa indicating that
the decision is legitimate. The approval of the nation’s religious
leaders not only authenticates the succession on religious grounds
but also serves as a reminder of the historically close relationship
between the House of Saud and the dominant Wahhabi version of Islam
in the kingdom.
In theory, a danger exists that the ulama will be independent in its
judgment and issue a fatwa bequeathing leadership outside the normal
line of succession, but this has never happened. The ulama issuing the
fatwa comprises members of the Supreme Religious Council appointed by
the king. This group has never taken a view contrary to the wishes of
the senior members of the family, as part of what appears to be an
unwritten bargain in which the ulama can largely do as it wishes on
religious issues so long as it does not tread on areas th ntial for
national security. (It was perhaps Kind Saud’s mistake not to have
appointed religious leaders who were sufficiently loyal. This might
have prevented the fatwa issued again him in 1964 that legalized
his deposition.)
Thus, the choice of king is effectively the preserve of the royal
family, although the individuals involved and the relative size of
their "vote" has, at least in the past, varied substantially. Standard
books on Saudi Arabia refer to a decision making body loosely known as
the royal council or ahl al-aqd wa’l-hall (literally, "Those who bind
and loosen"). In reality, this group appears to be an informal body
of senior, important princes, wherein the weight of an individual’s
votes varies with age, closeness of relationship, and government
position. In the mid-1080s diplomats based in the kingdom said this
group comprised sixty-five people. This will change in the future if
the Allegiance council, announced in 2006, takes on the role of helping
select future kings, at least at the level of crown prince. By 2009,
the number of living sons of Ibn Saud had fallen to twenty. Prior
to the establishment of the Allegiance Council, the number of these
princes with crucial votes in choosing future leaders would probably
have been fewer than ten. The Allegiance Council, with thirty-five
members, has effectively given voting power to princes or their sons
who were otherwise thought to have been of little consequence within
the al-Saud family.
The role of the royal women. Despite a general belief to the
contrary, the women of the House of Saud play a role in the politics
of succession in at least three ways. First, they are the true
"Masters" of their homes; behind the privacy of the palace walls,
they are thought to let their husbands and sons know their views
in a forthright manner. Second, intermarriage within the al-Saud
means that alliances can be built up between different branches,
depending on the degree to which a wife has maintained strong links
to her original family and is liked within her new family. Third,
at least in the case of Kind Fahd, meetings occurred regularly with
the women of the Al-Saud so that the king could explain his views
and listen to those of the women. It was yet another example of the
importance attached to building consensus.
The role of the wider family. During the years of crisis in the reign
of Kind Saud, some of Ibn Saud’s brothers were influential in ensuring
that the ulama could issue a fatwa deposing Saud. By the time Fahd
became king in 1982, all of his father’s brothers had died. But a role
had opened up for the sons of Faisal, the one king since the death of
Ibn Saud who was respected universally within the family. Apparently,
one of Faisal’s sons, Saud al-Faisal, was at the gathering when Fahd
received the oath of allegiance, a presence perceived as opening the
door to future involvement by Ibn Saud’s grandsons in the choice of
king and crown prince.
An unknown is the extent to which other branches of the family, other
than the sons and grandsons of Ibn Saud, have any voice at all. One
of the legacies of more than 250 years of history is the emergence
of multiple branches on the family tree, at varying distance ritance
and thus from power. A key strength of the House of Saud for the past
century has been its ability to unite the family’s various branches in
the common purpose of running the country, rather than openly feuding
about which branch is paramount and where the line of succession should
run. Although many members do not have a direct role in government,
their unity and support are crucial in maintaining rule by the al-Saud.
Of additional importance is the sheer number of princes in these
branches (distinguished by the honorific "HH"–His Highness–rather
than the "HRH," meaning "His Royal Highness," conferred on the
sons and grandsons of Ibn Saud). The main line of the House of Saud
numbers in the hundreds (King Saud alone had more than fifty sons),
but the cadet branches, sometimes known as the collateral branches,
multiply that figure by many times. In the early 1990s, an estimated
twenty thousand males were entitled to call themselves "prince,"
with the prefix HH or HRH. (Confusingly, Saudi tribal leaders can
also use the title amir [prince] but not the honorific prefix.)
The senior of the cadet branches, and nominally the titular senior
branch of the family, is the al-Saud al-Kibir, the descendants of
Saud, the elder brother of Ibn Saud’s father. In 1903, the son of this
elder brother contested the right of Ibn Saud to become the head of
the al-Saud. The feud was only smoothed over when Ibn Saud arranged
for his sister Nura to marry the most powerful surviving member of
the clan, Saud al-Kabir. Since then, the al-Kabir clan has become an
influential branch of the Saudi royal family, but it tends to be kept
away from political power.
Another branch is the Bani Jiluwi, descendants of the younger brother
of Ibn Saud’s grandfather Faisal. The Bani Jiluwi allied themselves
with Ibn Saud to defuse the threat posed by the al-Kabir clan. Abdullah
al-Jiluwi served as Ibn Saud’s deputy commander and helped conquer
the eastern region of Arabia. The members of a third branch, the
al-Turki, descend s the Thunayyan, who descend from a brother of
Muhammad, first ruler of the al-Saud, and who have the additional
legitimacy of providing the ninth ruler, Abdullah. A fifth branch,
the al-Farhan, descend from one of Muhammad’s other brothers.
These cadet branches were represented in a family council established
by then Crown Prince Abdullah in 20000. Its eighteen members included
Abdullah and Prince Sultan along with a spread of princes across the
family tree. At the time, there was speculation that the council
would be involved in a decision to allow then-ailing King Fahd to
retire and be replaced by Abdullah. A different line of speculation
held that the council would have a private role, internal to the
royal family, perhaps tackling vexing issues like establishing
guidelines for royal involvement in business and allowing al-Saud
princesses to marry commoners. Perhaps significantly, Prince Salman,
the governor of Riyadh province, known as a family conciliator, was a
member. Interior Minister Prince Nayef was not named to the council,
but any thought that he was being sidelined was blunted by his public
statement at the time that the council would have no political role.
What Makes a King?
Age. Whether Ibn Saud ever said his sons should success him by order
of birth (given fitness to rule) is doubtful. But since the al-Saud
respect age more than almost any other attribute, order of birth
remains the preeminent qualification.
Being a good Muslim. Ibm Saud is said to have decreed that a future
king must be a good Muslim. By this he is supposed to have meant that
the person should not drink alcohol. Yet this condition would narrow
the field considerably, and so it has been ignored.
Having a Saudi mother. Ibn Saud supposedly said that a king should
not be the child of a foreigner. This is a probably reference to the
fact that many of his twenty-two wives were not Arab. (In keeping
with Islamic tradition, Ibn Saud had only four wives at any one
time.) Excluding the children of Ibn Saud’s foreign wives would subs
sons still eligible to be king. The mother of Bandar bin Abdulaziz
was Moroccan, while the mothers of Miqrin and Hidhlul were Yemeni. At
least these mothers were Arab: the mothers of Mishal, Mitab, Talal,
and Nawaf were Armenian. Excluding these princes reduces the pool
of those now eligible from twenty to just thirteen. Another ways
of looking at the need to have a Saudi mother is the importance of
having maternal uncles (akhwal) to back ones’ candidacy.
Experience. Whereas King Khalid had neither experience nor interest
in governing, administrative capability is increasingly cited as
necessary. Many of Ibn Saud’s sons have had government experience, but
their competence has varied. Those with current official positions
are few. Apart from Abdullah Sultan, and Nayef, office holders
today are Mitab (minister of public works and housing), Abdulrahman
(vice minister of defense), Ahmad (ice inister of Interior), Salman
(governor of Riyadh province), Sattam (vice governor of Riyadh
province), and Miqrin (head of General Intelligence Directorate).
Acumen. It is not surprising that Saudis want kings with prudence and
a steady touch. However, with the exception of Faisal, who combined
these qualities with intellectual ability, acumen has often been more
evident in the public relations presentation of kings than in reality.
Popularity. Since consensus is central to Saudi decision making, the
ability to achieve it rates high. The simplest measure of popularity
is the style of majlis–a forum for listening to ordinary people’s
concerns–held by a prince. Is he generous? Is the food good? Is
there plenty of it? Will favors be granted? Sultan reportedly gives
a good majlis, but Saud al-Faisal has not been known to hold such
gatherings. (Perhaps this is an indication of his total lack of
ambition to be king, despite being named often by foreigners as a
possibility.) A prince with ambition likes to know what the people
are thinking, and he gets a feel for that by allowing ordinary people
to see him.
Simon Henderson is Ba r of the Washington Institute’s Gulf and Energy
Program, from which this article is adapted.