First Step-Capitulation
Aravot
October 14, 2009
By Vartan Oskanian
Armenia-Turkey Protocols Signed
*First Step – Capitulation:* The ill-constructed protocols signaling the
beginning of formal relations between Armenia and Turkey received an
uncertain and inauspicious signing in Zurich. The parties themselves and the
representatives of the world powers, all were present but all remained
silent. When such a `historic’ moment goes by with none of the sides or the
witnesses able to say anything acceptable to the rest, either about the
long-awaited event itself or the content of the documents being signed –
it
becomes obvious that these documents are in fact full of the contradictions
and expectations that do not engender the serious trust and respect
necessary for stable and respectful relations between countries.
Those within and outside Armenia who support this process label all those
against it as nationalists, extremists or those who categorically reject all
relations with Turkey. But I, and others like me, who have for decades
wanted and continue to believe in the importance of Armenia-Turkey
rapprochement are neither extremists or nationalists.
We are not afraid to recognize the enormous challenges of creating a new
relationship in the context of overwhelming political, psychological,
practical challenges. It is for fundamental political and security reasons
that we oppose these protocols. We want the documents that define our
reciprocal relationship to be respectful, farsighted and most of all,
sustainable. These protocols are not. We want the documents to define a 21st
century relationship that is as honest about past grievances as it is about
contemporary political realities. These protocols are not.
Instead of an acknowledgement of the historic divide and mutual distrust
that separates us, or at the very least circumventing that topic, the
documents place one-sided conditions and receive one-sided concessions.
Normalization has thus begun with the capitulation of the Armenian side.
Indeed these protocols – barely signed and not even ratified – have already
damaged, possibly irrevocably, Armenia’s positions on the three most
significant issues of national security and national identity.
First, they will hamper the resolution of the Karabakh conflict. The reason
for this is simple. Any Armenian insistence of no-linkage between
Armenia-Turkey and Armenian-Azerbaijani is not credulous. The linkage
between the Turkey border opening and the resolution of the Karabakh
conflict was clear from the beginning. Now, it’s inarguable. If the presence
of the Minsk Group co-chair countries’ foreign ministers at the signing
wasn’t enough, there were the last minute frantic attempts at the signing
ceremony to prevent Turkey from speaking of that linkage at that forum. But
the coup de grace was the Turkish Prime Minister’s unequivocal conditional
announcement the day after, buttressed by the strength of his ruling party
whose meeting had just concluded, that the Turkish Parliament won’t ratify
these protocols until territories are returned.
Any acceptable resolution will require certain compromise on the Armenian
side – including compromise on the territories surrounding Karabakh. Many
would say that such compromise would have been necessary eventually
regardless of Armenia-Turkey relations. This is true. But in this
conditional environment, when Turkey at every opportunity refers to the
return of territories without the resolution of Karabakh’s status, even the
most reasonable compromise that Armenia would have been prepared to make
will be more difficult for this or any administration to make, because it
will be viewed domestically as a concession made under pressure, in exchange
for open borders, not for the independence of Karabakh. Even if the Turkish
parliament ratifies the protocols and opens the border with the mere
expectation that Armenians will return those territories in the near future,
still, in the context of the forceful and repeated admonitions by the
Turkish leadership, those expectations will themselves become conditions
that the border opening was in exchange for possible future concessions.
Second, the nature of the genocide debate has been deeply altered. The ink
on the protocols was not even dry before major news outlets and
international figures began to couch their terminology, retreating from the
use of the term genocide, citing the protocol’s provisions that a commission
will determine what the events of 1915 really were. In other words, we have
offered the international community the formalization of official Turkey’s
position. If earlier, Armenians and international experts had defined the
political and historical events as genocide, while the official Turkish side
insisted on denying the term and the history behind the term, today, the
official Turkish `doubts’ have been sanctioned and will internationalize the
denial of the events, their causes and consequences, and thus strengthen the
historic and demographic status quo. Armenians will now be dragged into a
new cycle of denial – struggling against the machinery of a state bent on
rewriting history and consolidating the consequences of genocide.
Finally, this document succeeds in touching what had heretofore been a
dormant but sensitive issue – the subject of borders and territorial claims.
No Armenian administration had ever made such a claim of Turkey. Today, this
sensitive issue has become a front-line issue. When Turkish Foreign Minister
Ahmet Davutoglu says these protocols reaffirm the provisions of the Lausanne
Treaty, that means the issue of reparation and compensation is now on the
table. I do not demand my ancestral home in Marash, but if that demand were
really so illusive, then why is Turkey forcing me to renounce my historic
links with that home?
It is important to understand that the claim on land is not merely a
sentimental issue having to do with Armenian properties in Turkey 100 years
ago. The issue of lands is also an important element of the Karabakh
conflict. If a mere 100 years later, Turkey is able to formalize and
legalize its control of lands taken forcibly, then what’s to prevent
Armenians from waiting if that offers them the opportunity to formalize
their control of the lands surrounding Karabakh?
On Saturday, October 10, we heard President Sargsyan’s address to the
Armenian people, issued just hours ahead of the scheduled signing, the
content of which was directly contradictory to the content of the
protocols. It can even be said that the president’s arguments were
the best reasons to reject the protocols. The address insisted that
there are irrefutable realities and we have undeniable rights; the
protocols on the other hand question the first and eliminate the
second. Armenia, without cause and without necessity, conceded its
historic rights, both regarding genocide recognition and what the
address so justly called `hayrenazrkum’ – a denial and dispossession
of our patrimony.
The administration said one thing and signed another. Normalization of
Armenia-Turkey relations, as an idea even, has been discredited.
The processes – both Armenia-Turkey, and the Karabakh peace talks – are
going to become more complicated and more intense, and not at all to our
advantage. If Armenia does not bring this process to a halt, and return to
square one, the consequences will be grave not just for the administration,
but for the Armenian people.