PROSPECT FOR TURKISH-ARMENIAN RAPPROCHEMENT: A NEW BEGINNING OR A DEAD END? (1/2)
By Guner Ozkan
Journal of Turkish Weekly
/prospect-for-turkish-armenian-rapprochement-a-new -beginning-or-a-dead-end-1-2-.html
Oct 23 2009
The Turkish-Armenian Protocols, concurrently announced by Turkey and
Armenia on 31 August on the establishment of diplomatic relations and
the development of relations, were signed on October 10 in Zurich by
the foreign ministers of the respective countries. Few days later,
on October 14, the Presidents of two countries, Abdullah Gul of Turkey
and Serzh Sargsyan of Armenia, watched their national football teams
in Bursa in Turkey in the World Cup group qualification game.
Unfortunately, there was not a man of the match on the pitch (the best
player in a game chosen by viewers for his outstanding performance)
as both teams had already lost their chances for going to South Africa
next summer. There were, indeed, not one but two best players of the
game, this time not on the pitch but among the spectators; they were
Gul and Sargsyan. Inside and outside the stadium all eyes were on
the two of them. How did they look one another? How did they shake
each other’s hands? Did they talk? Did they make any jokes? These
were the evaluation criteria for choosing the man of the match, and,
‘according to votes’, they performed very successfully.
But, when the time soon comes to talk over the hard topics, just
like the agreed Protocols and disagreed NK issue, this serenity on
the faces will likely be replaced with moody feelings, accusations
and quarrels. Such acts of mutual disfavour between Turkey and
Armenia seem to be evident. As a matter of fact, a last minute
squabble over what the parties would say after the signature of the
Protocols entails that discussions, legalizations and applications
of these documents will face great challenges in and between Turkey
and Armenia. Nevertheless, there are a lot at hand to be optimistic
for the success of the Protocols and removal of the NK problem from
the agendas of the states involved one way or another. For instance,
just looking at the picture frame of the signing ceremony in Zurich
signifies how important the international dimension of the Protocols
is. Certainly, there are a lot of pros and cons of the reconciliation
effort of Turkey and Armenia for all major actors. Thus, in order to
test the prospect for the new Turkish-Armenian rapprochement attempt,
one needs to look at who understands what and who wants what from
these Protocols.
Armenia’s Expectations
Armenian government’s expectations from the Protocols are mainly based
on economic reasons. Armenia has been suffering greatly from being a
landlocked country leaving it to the mercy of limited economic and
financial opportunities offered by Russia and Iran. At the time of
global economic crisis, Armenian economy is predicted to shrink up to
15 per cent by the end of 2009. There are already 60 to 70 thousands
Armenians from Armenia and Georgia currently living in Turkey as
migrant workers and indirect trade level between the two countries
is around $270 million.
Though not known who will benefit how much, and whether the Armenian
economy will be able to compete with the Turkish goods, are open
to debate when the borders are opened, Yerevan government has no
longer wanted to be isolated from regional energy and transportation
corridors in the direction of East to West. Last war between Georgia
and Russia has further hardened the economic situation in the country,
and Armenian government has no longer wanted to be too much dependent
on unpredictable and volatile political and military risks along its
northern border between Tbilisi and Moscow. It is also mainly the
economic problem of the country that Armenia has faced a serious
demography problem as the people leave their home to abroad for
seeking jobs.
On the issue of alleged Armenian Genocide issue, Sargsyan government
appears to leave the effort of its international recognition to
the Armenian Diaspora. On the other hand, at the same time, Yerevan
government thinks that it can defend the ‘Genocide’ claims in the
proposed sub-commission on history to be established after diplomatic
relation and border opening are accomplished. Perhaps, for soothing
Diaspora’s protest against Armenian government’s acceptance to sign
the Protocols or pointing out his real intention, Sargsyan expressed
during his recent visits to Diaspora communities that he would
never allow the dilution of the reality of the ‘Armenian Genocide’
by accepting the re-examination of the facts of ‘the Genocide’ in
the sub-commission in the Protocols.
As he should be found accountable about what he is saying rather than
what he has in his mind, it can be said that, as he reiterated to the
Armenian Diaspora, Sargsyan only sees the sub-commission on history
as a platform "to discuss the steps necessary for the removal of the
consequences of the Genocide"…and "educate the Turkish public about
the Armenian Genocide". So, Sargsyan’s view on the alleged Armenian
Genocide regarding the Protocols is that he will not give up his
efforts for further international recognition of ‘the Genocide’,
and even ask Turkey to recognize it and to pay compensation. Also,
Sargsyan has seen the sub-commission to be set up as an opportunity
to reveal all the details of ‘the Armenian Genocide’ for the wider
Turkish public.
The other problem is Nagorno-Karabakh, what Armenians call it
‘Artsakh’ so as to emphasize that it historically belongs to the
Armenian people. As known, Armenian government separates opening up
the relationship with Turkey from the NK issue and strongly objects
Turkish view on the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied
Azerbaijani territories. Obviously, as well as the alleged Armenian
Genocide, the NK problem seems to be the most challenging issue to
force Yerevan in the discussions in Armenia and later on with Turkey.
What Turkey Wants
Obviously, Turkey has fed up with ‘the Armenian Genocide’ issue being
put in front of her every year on the 24th of April. Ankara, as anyone
else, knows well that Sub-Commission on History in the Protocols will
not stop Diaspora Armenians’ effort to seek recognition of ‘Genocide’
at the US Congress and many other international platforms alongside
those which have already done so. Then, what is the objective of Turkey
to discuss the ‘Genocide’ issue in the expected history commission
if she is not going to get the desired aim of the drop of it from
the agendas of various important country’s legislative organs and
platforms?
Turkey seems to get two objectives to be realized by doing that:
first, she can now say to any government, legislative organs abroad
and authority dealing with ‘the Genocide’ issue that her counterpart
on this matter is the Armenian government and working with Yerevan in
tandem to reach a judgment. Also, discussing the issue with Yerevan
will ease the pressure the American governments feel from Armenian
Diaspora on the mentioning of the word of ‘Genocide’ each year on the
24th of April. Obama and his successors may now tell to the Armenian
Diaspora that they had great progress on the issue and the parties
were discussing ‘the Genocide’ matter.
Some governments in the EU may also be told by Turkey that ‘the
Genocide’ is being discussed with the Armenian government and wait the
findings of the history commission. Whether the US government and some
EU states will satisfy with Turkey’s responses cannot be said now,
at least for those pro-Turkey governments can use the progress as a
reason for not pressurizing Ankara in the EU accession process.
Turkey also hopes that the Protocols help resolve the NK dispute. The
Turkish government insists that without ending the occupation of the
Azerbaijani territories by Armenia, the border with the latter will
not be opened. Although the Protocols do not include any reference
to the NK problem, Turkey has its own condition. This can be all
along seen in the speeches of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu since the Protocols were announced
to the public. How this impasse will be overcome by the sides is a
big question waiting an answer.
If both Armenia and Turkey stick on their arguments on the NK issue
in weeks ahead, both sides may not be able to move on from the point
where they are now in the implementation of the Protocols. If this
is the likely scenario, then both Turkey and Armenia will use their
diplomatic muscles abroad to exert pressure against one another or
directly face the same pressure from the same centres, which are of
great interests in the Caucasus and Caspian region. This then means
either to go back to the same point of pre-Protocols situation or
to give up some of the conditions both sides have insisted on the
NK problem.
*Dr. GUNER OZKAN is an expert on the Caucasus Region at the
Ankara-based International Strategic Research Organisation (ISRO)
and a Lecturer at Mugla University