GERMAN RELUCTANCE TOWARDS TURKEY JOINING THE EU

Spero News
ctance-towards-Turkey-joining-the-EU
Nov 9 2009

Angela Merkel and Nicholas Sarkozy have both voiced opposition to
full admission of Turkey into the EU, the only majority Muslim country
seeking to do so. At risk is NATO’s cohesion.

On October 25, a coalition government in Germany, comprising the
Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Christian Social Union (CSU),
and Free Democrat Party (FDP), formed a new cabinet. The following
statements by prominent representatives of Germany’s new coalition
partners — voicing both strong opposition to Turkey’s EU accession by
the CDU-CSU and a milder but skeptical anti-Turkish stance by FDP —
demonstrate the serious challenges for U.S. policy posed by Turkey’s
push for EU membership.

German statements strongly against Turkey’s EU Membership include:

"Not membership, but privileged partnership," said Angela Merkel (CDU),
German chancellor, May 11, 2009. The day before in a conference with
French president Nicolas Sarkozy, she said, "Accepting Turkey to the
EU is out of question."

"Turkey’s accession would overtax the EU," was the position of
Wolfgang Schauble (CDU), German minister of finance on October 28,
2009. Schauble on his website has enunciated "Six reasons against
Turkey’s EU accession:"

1. Germany’s primary interest is the success of European integration
… Europe has geographic borders. Nobody would feel like they are
in Europe if they border Syria, Iran, and Iraq.

2. Nobody wants to repel our Turkish friends. We are highly interested
in a strong partnership with Turkey. But that does not mean, therefore,
that all of our strong partners should belong to the European Union.

3. That Turkey is a great example of a democratic Muslim country has
nothing to do with the question of Turkey’s EU membership. If so, we
would have to think about Pakistan or Indonesia’s EU membership next.

Even now, Turkey’s changing role in the Arab world is suspicious. As
a full member of the Union, Turkey could not perform its role as a
bridge — because a bridge does not belong to one of the sides.

4. People who say that Turkish integration in Germany would
be endangered if Turkey were not to become a part of the EU are
endangering peaceful social coexistence between Turks and Germans. The
integration of Turks in Germany would succeed without Turkey’s EU
membership.

5. We do not help Turkey by concealing problems. As long as it
prohibits the building of churches or having priests for its Christian
minorities, no one can really talk about freedom of religion in Turkey
as we know it in Europe. [Turkish] prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
easily scored a goal on his own team with his defamatory bluster
"Club of Christians" [in reference to the EU].

6. It would be better if we keep offering Turkey a privileged
partnership. A failure after ten years of accession talks would be
as disastrous as the failure of Europe’s political unity."

NATO says that Turkish-Armenian rapprochement not only helps to
reconcile the two nations, but also fosters closer cooperation with
Armenia and improves the country’s image, RFE/RL’s Armenian Service
reports.

Christian unity is slow and painful"Turkey’s EU accession is and
was an illusion," Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg (CSU), German minister
of defense, on October 28, 2009." He added, Turkey has insisted for
years now on an automatic pilot [for accession talks], instead of doing
extensive reforms in order to fulfill the criteria for EU accession.

This permanent insistence turns more and more into an empty promise.

Turkey should recognize that neither the Europeans nor the Turks
would accept Turkey’s full membership. Turkey should cooperate with
the Union in economic and security policy. This could happen best
within a privileged partnership."

He continues, "Christians are still discriminated against…. In
Turkey, freedom of religion is still understood as tolerance, rather
than a fundamental part of human rights."

Ronald Pofalla (CDU), German chancellor’s chief of staff, stated on
his official website: "We do not want Turkey’s EU accession…. Not
even being allowed to say that religious-motivated violence is a
particular problem for Islam is worrying. And calling Christians
"unbelievers" is a form of an insult. I ask myself how a country that
discriminates against Christian churches could be a member of the EU.

It is obvious that Turkey has made some progress, but it will not be
able to join the EU."

Pofalla adds: "A clear ‘yes’ to Europe, but also a clear ‘yes’ to
European borders. No full membership, but privileged partnership. We
want open-ended accession talks."

Peter Ramsauer (CSU), German minister of transportation, building,
and urban development, declared on his official website: "Brussels
again surrenders to Turkey…. A new chapter for the desired accession
will be opened. Prime Minister Erdogan has shown again how easy it
is to make use of the EU’s tiredness, which is tired from enlargements.

Through additional allegations against France and Germany, he has
achieved acquiescence from the EU."

He adds, "Turkey is not ready for accession; the EU is not ready for
Turkey’s accession either. But we want to keep Turkey as an ally and
NATO partner. We have a strong interest in avoiding Turkey’s slipping
to the East and to religious fundamentalism…. We seek a solid and
excellent relationship with Turkey…. Turkey has to show democratic
reforms, in order to achieve a democratically strong Turkey under the
rule of law with a strong civil society. These will show that Turkey
is on the right way to full membership."

Ramsauer continues, "It is possible that accession is not what will
come out in the end, but rather a privileged partnership. Turkey,
for its part, does not expect to be given a date for its membership.

However, it does expect, and justifiably so, that Europe does not
fundamentally reject its desire to join the EU."

He has also stated, "Turkey is not in a position to join at the moment,
nor is the EU in a position to accept it as a member. But I do expect,
of course, that existing agreements will be upheld in a coalition
government with the conservatives. Under the agreement with Turkey,
accession will be examined in an unbiased manner. This process will
continue for several years. Turkey is trying to satisfy constitutional
and economic criteria, and to orient itself toward the West and not
toward fundamentalism. Despite all setbacks, we can only encourage
them in this effort."

Earlier this year, Guido Westerwelle (FDP), German foreign minister,
on May 5, 2009, took a mid-stance saying, "Stopping Turkey’s accession
process will be the end of an intelligent foreign policy." His party
associate Dirk Niebel, German minister of economic cooperation and
development, on October 28, 2009 added, "In the foreseeable future,
Turkey will not become a member of the EU. Currently, Turkey is not
ready to join the EU, and the EU is not ready to take Turkey as a
full member. The FDP is for an open-ended accession process."

Based on the rhetoric of its members, the new German government will
either block Turkey’s EU membership or, at best, show benign neglect
toward the process. The new German cabinet’s vehement-to-mild
opposition to Turkey’s EU accession challenges U.S. policy,
which views Turkey’s EU membership as a strategic goal for both
the United States and Turkey. Turkey’s EU accession is not only an
important step in pulling the country toward the West, it is also
a fail-safe that guards Turkish democracy — as it spasms between
the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its opponents —
and promotes Turkey’s halted liberalization process. In this regard,
Washington could implement the following policy suggestions to break
the German impasse and to jumpstart the Turkish drive toward the EU:

â~@¢ Prod the Turkish government to re-embrace the EU process. The
AKP should not only be legislating reforms, it should also be
implementing those reforms; â~@¢ Pressure the AKP to drop its anti-EU
and anti-Western rhetoric, a problem that is becoming a key concern
in German political rhetoric.

â~@¢ Make Turkey’s EU accession a part of the U.S. strategic
conversation with the German government.

Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow and director of the Turkish Research
Program at The Washington Institute, from where this article was
adapted. Rueya Perincek is an intern in the Institute’s Turkish
Research Program.
From: Baghdasarian