TALKS CONCLUDE AS AZERBAIJAN THREATENS ARMENIA WITH MILITARY ACTION
Lilit Gevorgyan
World Markets Research Centre
Global Insight
Nov 23 2009
Armenian President Serzh Sargsian and his Azerbaijani counterpart,
Ilham Aliyev, met on 22 November 2009 in Germany for Organisation for
Security Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)-mediated talks over the status
of the breakaway Azeri region of Nagorno Karabakh. One day earlier,
Aliyev stated that if this round of talks fails to bring concrete
results, Azerbaijan would resort to military action to reclaim its
breakaway region. The talks, chaired by OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs from
Russia, France and the United States, lasted four hours and ended with
no comments from either president. However, the OSCE French co-chair,
Bernard Fassier, noted that the parties were actively engaged during
the talks. Neither the OSCE nor the Armenian side commented on Aliyev’s
threats of military action.
Significance:It is not the first time that Aliyev has issued threats of
a military resolution in Nagornon Karabakh, an Armenian enclave within
Azerbaijan that declared independence over 15 years ago to become
a de facto part of Armenia. However, unlike his previous statements
mainly aimed at bolstering his militaristic image domestically and
with little chance of happening, Aliyev’s recent threats of war may be
more dangerous. The statement comes in the wake of a shifting balance
of power in the South Caucasus, most notably the Armenian-Turkish
protocols on establishing diplomatic relations and opening the common
border closed by Turkey in solidarity with Azerbaijan over the Nagorno
Karabakh conflict (seeArmenia-Turkey: 12 October 2009:). There are
a number of motivations behind Aliyev’s war threats. First, it is an
attempt to stall the OSCE Minsk process, which has made little progress
since the early 1990s, but at least achieved a detailed peace roadmap
that envisages concessions from both Armenia and Azerbaijan. By issuing
an ultimatum to the OSCE, Aliyev hopes to rearrange the peace talks
format by bringing in Turkey, Azerbaijan’s closest ally and ethnic
kin, and thus increase the pressure on the Armenian side in the hope
of a resolution with no concessions. Secondly, Aliyev is unhappy with
the recent diplomatic thaw in relations between Armenian and Turkey;
as a result he may try to sabotage the Armenia-Turkey process. By
resuming the military conflict in Nagorno Karabakh, Aliyev may try
to block the reopening of the Armenian-Turkish border by bolstering
anti-Armenian sentiment among Turkish secularists and the military
(seeAzerbaijan: Turkey: 5 November 2009:). While an all-out war is
unlikely in the immediate term, at least during the winter months,
the frequency of border incidents and small-scale military clashes
between Armenian and Azeri soldiers is likely to intensify. Aliyev,
who has been pouring millions of dollars into strengthening the Azeri
army over the past decade, has to consider more carefully the economic
impact of a possible war–Azerbaijan’s most profitable Baku-Ceyhan oil
export pipeline runs only 30 kilometres away from the conflict zone.