KARABAKH: THE QUEST FOR PEACE

news.az
Dec 3 2009
Azerbaijan

Map of Azerbaijan LINKS published a briefing paper on the conflict
over Karabakh.

The paper is written by Amanda Akcakoca, Policy Analyst at the European
Policy Centre in Brussels and Dennis Sammut, LINKS Executive Director.

The paper says that the international community needs to show it
is ready to carry more responsability to resolve the conflict, by
making a solution on the Karabakh problem a priority and by offering
continued support to the Minsk Process whilst not using the Minsk
process as an excuse for inertia.

1. Executive Summary

For fifteen years Armenia and Azerbaijan, with the assistance of
the international community have tried and failed to resolve the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Over this time politics in both Armenia
and Azerbaijan have been defined by the conflict with both government
and opposition political elites locking themselves into a corner from
which they have found it difficult to emerge. Both sides have sought
refuge in seemingly irreconcilable and maximalist comfort zones,
usually articulated around the principles of territorial integrity
by the Azerbaijani side and self determination by the Armenians. The
lack of people-to-people contacts, fragile civil societies and intense
hate propaganda and distrust between the two nations have, also acted
as a stumbling block to a solution.

On the ground the 1994 negotiated ceasefire – which is largely self
regulated – has remained pretty much intact although regular sniper
fire continues on an almost daily basis with human lives continuing
to be lost. Defence spending in both countries continues to increase
and the possibility of a new war cannot be ruled out.

However, recent developments in the region have challenged the
perception that maintaining the status quo is benefiting each side.

The 2008 war in Georgia demonstrated the risks of allowing so-called
frozen conflicts to simmer as well as demonstrating the human and
political costs of attempting to resolve conflicts through military
force. It also reminded the west of the vulnerability of investments
and projects in the region aimed a diversifying Europe’s energy
supplies.

The re-emergence of Turkey as an active player has also had a
considerable impact on the region. Ankara’s Caucasus Stability and
Cooperation Platform (launched in the aftermath of the Georgia-Russia
war) and Turkey’s groundbreaking rapprochement with Armenia has not
only brought Karabakh back to the international agenda but also has
the potential to change the regional dynamic in the South Caucasus.

Moscow was quick to draw a line separating events around the Georgia
conflicts from the situation in Karabakh and has taken a lead role in
encouraging the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan to make progress
in the process of resolving the Karabakh problem, sooner rather than
later, through negotiation and not war. This has been enhanced by the
change of leadership in Washington and President’s Obama’s willingness
to "reset" relations with Moscow, a more hands on approach from the
EU in its eastern neighbourhood; and a willingness by the West to
revisit the debate on European security. For the first time there
is a strong and collective drive from the international community to
bring this conflict to an end.

2009 has seen six meetings between the presidents of Armenia and
Azerbaijan and even usually sceptical diplomats are now expressing
cautious optimism. At the last meeting in Munich on 22 November
further progress was made towards reaching an agreement on the "Basic
Principles" document which the two leaders have been negotiating under
the mediation of the OSCE Minsk Group since 2004. With a final deal
apparently almost within reach the two sides, nudged along by the
international community, need to find the courage and political will
to overcome the remaining sticking points – including a formula on how
to deal with defining the eventual final status of Nagorno Karabakh –
and, crucially important, sell the deal to their societies.

With the end so close the international community needs to make the
solution of Karabakh a priority – speaking with one voice and in more
robust tones to both sides including the two populations.

Procrastination should not be excused further for the sake of behind
the scene deals on energy, military and security facilities or trade.

Benign pressure should be placed on the two leaders to ensure they
start the important process of bringing on board different elements
of their own societies as stakeholders in the peace process. Armenia
needs to be told that the continued occupation of Karabakh and
the seven surrounding Azerbaijani territories is not acceptable nor
sustainable. Azerbaijan needs to be told that any attempt to take back
these lands with force, without a UN Security Council Resolution, will
bring the country into direct confrontation with the international
community. The fact that both Azerbaijan and Armenia want to be
forward looking partners of the international community, wanting to
be at the heart of regional economic processes and not marginalised
in global and regional politics offers the international community
an opportunity to influence events.

Karabakh also represents an opportunity for the European Union foreign
policy, energised by the recently ratified Lisbon Treaty, providing an
early chance for the newly restructured EU diplomatic service to show
it can act quickly and effectively by bringing into play the combined
resources of the Union and the member states. Once an agreement on
Karabakh is in place the EU should act quickly to be present on the
ground, taking a lead role in a multi-faceted peace operation whilst
drawing on its experiences and lessons learnt in the Balkans. The EU
can also, as in Georgia, lead the way in co-ordinating the rebuilding
of the conflict region. All this can happen better if France can be
persuaded to allow its role as Minsk Group co-chair to operate under
an EU mandate.

In the search for a final settlement on Karabakh the international
community will need to be flexible and creative in advancing possible
solutions. The straight forward black and white solutions of the
past may not be applicable. Already there are in Europe interesting
examples of unusual arrangements: for example Andorra, is a duumvirate
with two Heads of State; and Liechtenstein is an example of a state
that delegates some of its external representation to another state,
and for some purposes to two other states. In the interim creative
arrangements that will give those with a legitimate interest an
opportunity to interact with the international community will be
beneficial to the resolution of the conflict.

The international community needs to show it is ready to carry more
responsibility, by making a solution to the Karabakh conflict a
priority, and by offering continued support to the "Minsk Process"
whilst not using the "Minsk Process" as an excuse for inertia.

If the present process collapses it will take years for an alternative
to emerge and reach the point at which we are today. As 2009 comes to
a close we are at the end of the beginning in the Karabakh conflict
resolution process. It is vital that the window of opportunity that
is now open should not be allowed to slam shut.

2. Introduction – The elusive quest for peace.

The Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan have met six times in 2009
as part of a concerted effort to try to solve the conflict over
Nagorno-Karabakh. The Georgia-Russia War concentrated minds both in
the region and in the wider international community.

A terse statement by the co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, entrusted by
the international community to facilitate the negotiations described
the latest talks held in Munich on 22 November as "constructive" and
that "in some areas progress was made. At the same time some issues
still remain open" . It seems that once more agreement has eluded
them, and the two Presidents were obliged to refer the issues back
to their Foreign Ministers.

Both sides, as well as the facilitators, agree that the sides are
very close to an agreement that will take the negotiation process to
a new level, and that will result in important changes on the ground
that will hopefully make an eventual final solution to the conflict,
including on the all important sticking point of the final status of
Nagorno-Karabakh, possible.

There is now an urgent need to bring this phase of the negotiations
to a successful conclusion. Many consider that the credibility of the
OSCE Minsk process is already stretched to the limits and that any
further procrastination will make the continuation of negotiations
in this format difficult, if not impossible.

It is time that the international community ups the stakes. It must
tell Armenia that its continued occupation of Azerbaijan territory
around Nagorno-Karabakh is not acceptable or sustainable long term. It
must tell Azerbaijan that continued talk of regaining these territories
by force is counter-productive and goes against the wishes of the
international community. The international community must also engage
with the process more robustly, and be ready to show flexibility and
creativity in its engagement. Simply stating support for the work of
the Minsk Group at this stage is inadequate. .

We are approaching the end of the beginning in the process to resolve
the Karabakh conflict. The next days and weeks will determine if
the Caucasus region can look forward to a period of peace or whether
failure of diplomacy will open the way for further destruction and
loss of human life.

3. The domestic political context: The political elites and the legacy
of winners and losers

In many ways politics in Armenia and Azerbaijan have for the last
fifteen years been defined by the conflict in Karabakh in 1989-94. In
Azerbaijan the government led by the Popular Front collapsed following
the loss of Karabakh and adjoining territories and Heydar Aliyev
invited back into power. In Armenia, victory gave the leaders of
Karabakh a prestigious position in Armenian society. In 1998 Levon
Ter Petrossian was forced to resign, ostensibly for weakness in
the negotiations on Karabakh. The Karabakh elite led by Presidents
Robert Kocharian and Serzh Sargissian have dominated Armenian politics
ever since.

On the other hand the status quo on Karabakh that has prevailed ever
since the 1994 cease fire was the result of both the military actions
on the ground, but also of the political reality that emerged as a
result of those military events.

In Armenia, those that fought in the conflict are perceived as heroes.

The leaders of Karabakh, particularly the current President Serzh
Sargissian and the former President Robert Kocharian, are depicted as
the victors. The picture of the two presidents in military fatigues
talking to troops is prominently displayed on the web site of the
President of Armenia and often in public places. Armenia is constantly
described as having emerged from the conflict as the winner, having
achieved "all" of its objectives.

Underlying the discussion on the future, amongst both government
and opposition politicians, is the sense that anything else than the
present status quo is somehow less beneficial to Armenia. No serious
politician dares to offer an alternative scenario, at least in public.

In Azerbaijan the situation is the other way round. Azerbaijan emerged
from the conflict a loser, and the military defeats, as well as the
loss of territory and the influx of refugees and IDPs defined the post
conflict political landscape. The parties that governed Azerbaijan
immediately after its independence following the collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1991 are still tainted with the stigma of defeat. The
government of Heydar Aliyev is depicted as having saved the country by
negotiating a cease fire which gave Azerbaijan the chance to regroup
and prepare to regain back its territory either through negotiation
or, if that fails, through war. This configuration will change if
the government is seen negotiating a deal on Karabakh that will not
deliver on this promise. Opposition parties therefore see any sign
that the government may be ready to compromise in the negotiations
on Karabakh as a sign of weakness, and an opportunity to recover the
political ground that they lost when Karabakh was lost. Conscious of
this the Azerbaijan government has shown little desire to compromise
and its public statements are inevitably robust.

Both government and opposition political elites, in both Armenia
and Azerbaijan have therefore locked themselves into a corner from
which they do not seem able to emerge and this has been one of the
major obstacles to the peace process so far. Both sides have sought
refuge in seemingly irreconcilable and maximalist comfort zones,
usually articulated around the principles of territorial integrity
by the Azerbaijani side and self determination by the Armenian side.

This also means that whilst all sides – both the Armenian and
Azerbaijani governments and the Armenian and Azerbaijani opposition
forces want to emerge as winners if there is change to the current
stalemate, and see danger for their domestic political agenda in case
of a Karabakh settlement, they may not, on the other hand, quite
appreciate that the status quo is not so good for their interests
after all.

For the Armenian government the limitations of the victory in Karabakh
has long since become obvious. Whilst Armenia captured territory
it has paid for this with isolation. A lot of its limited resources
have to be dedicated to the military budget; its dependence on Russia
increases rather than decreases and its economic vulnerability has
been exposed by the Georgia-Russia war and the global economic crisis.

The efforts to normalise relations with Turkey, is part of an effort
to start addressing these problems, but not everybody understands
that only a resolution of the Karabakh conflict can address the
fundamental problem.

For the Armenian opposition the dangers of the status quo should
also be obvious. For as long as there is a Karabakh conflict those
who are perceived as the victors of the conflict will always have
the upper hand. The current authorities could always also justify
economic and social problems and blame them on the Karabakh conflict,
the Turkish-Azerbaijani blockade and the need to dedicate resources
to the military budget, rather than on corruption, mismanagement or
bad policies. By defending the status quo the Armenian opposition
is therefore narrowing its own chances of ever winning power. One
can argue that rather than oppose the peace process the Armenian
opposition would be much better served seen as part of a national
effort for peace which would create a level playing field and move
the political debate to other issues where the government does not
have such strong credentials.

Many similar arguments also exist on the Azerbaijani side. Fifteen
years after the cease fire Azerbaijanis are asking if the time for
Azerbaijan to regroup and regain its lost territory has not been
enough. Increased oil revenues, and in tandem, huge increases in
the military expenditure have increased people’s expectations. The
government is now under pressure to show results. After the war
in Georgia in 2008 the folly of the military option has become all
too apparent. The remaining option is progress through negotiations
and in this regard the options currently under consideration offer
Azerbaijan the best opportunity to regain its territory and repatriate
its refugees and IDPs.

For the embattled Azerbaijani opposition, already under considerable
pressure because of the heavy handed approach of the government,
the quicker Karabakh stops being the dominant factor in Azerbaijani
politics the better. If the opposition is able to present a united
front with the government on a peace deal on Karabakh it can than shift
the political debate to other issues and share some of the credit that
a peace deal can bring rather than wait for the government to make
a mistake on Karabakh that could trigger mass opposition against it.

The need for a broad based national consensus in support of an
invigorated peace process

Many are optimistic, that Armenia and Azerbaijan may be about to
enter a new phase in their relationship – one of engagement and
negotiations that would hopefully in the end result in a solution to
the Karabakh conflict and to the opening of a new era of peace in the
South Caucasus. This period is bound to be fraught with danger. Any
number of incidents or scenarios can undermine the process.

For the peace process to succeed and evolve at a reasonable quick
step there is a need of a broad political consensus around it in both
Armenia and Azerbaijan. This is easier said than done given both
the polarisation of politics in the two countries, as well as the
fragmentation of the opposition. However there may now be a convergence
of interests of all the sides which may offer an opportunity for this
to work.

Of course it is the governments that are better placed to reach out
to their opponents. In Armenia there have been some signs of this.

President Sargissian has initiated a dialogue with some of the
opposition parties on the issue of Karabakh. However the main
opposition parties are not part of this dialogue – either because
they do not want to or because they have not been invited. This
notwithstanding the fact, that the main opposition personality, and
former president, Levon Ter Petrossian has broadly been supportive
of a Karabakh peace deal and of rapprochment with Turkey.

Reaching out to the opposition is not something that the governments in
either Armenia or Azerbaijan do very well. There is scope therefore
for wider civil society – or the intelligentsia, as some of the
soviet trained elites persist in calling it – to take the lead in
developing the national consensus. This however can only succeed if
the governments make it clear from the outset that they are ready
to engage.

The international community should also be more vocal in supporting
a broad based consensus on Karabakh in its dealings with both the
governments and the opposition forces in the two countries.

4. Civil society and Communities as stakeholders

For a long time the Karabakh peace process has been a top down process,
with only a very small group within the ruling elites involved in
any way in developing policy or strategy around it. Public engagement
with the process was, with some small exceptions, discouraged. This
may have worked for as long as negotiations were taking place in
distant places on broad principles or abstract issues.

However once a peace process starts involving the movement of people
and discussions that will have immediate impact on people’s lives,
a much broader process will need to emerge, one in which communities
may help determine the momentum of events.

Both governments will have to go through a steep learning curve
with regards to how to involve their populations in this process
and make them stakeholders of a peace deal rather than passive
recipients. If they do not understand this challenge than they will
only have themselves to blame if the problems that will invariable
arise spiral out of their control.

People to people contact – Civil society and the peace process

The lack of people-to-people contact is also a burden given the
younger generation in particular has grown up without having any
contact and been subjected to intense hate propaganda. Efforts by
the international community to increase contacts have not always been
consistent and neither has been the attitude of the two governments
towards such initiatives.

Initially Azerbaijan opposed any efforts to improve contacts as
long as Armenia continued to occupy its territories. They regularly
chastised representatives of civil society, academia, or the media for
visiting Karabakh or even for meeting Armenian or Armenian Karabakhi
representatives in third countries. Over the last five years however
there has been some softening of this position.

On the other hand Armenia was initially in favour of people to people
contacts. Recently however Armenians and Armenian Karabakhis have
increasingly made these contacts conditional on arrangements and
contexts that were not always possible for even the Azerbaijani civil
society representatives to accept.

In both countries civil society remains fragile and there is deep
distrust between government and civil society organisations. In
an attempt to defuse criticism that they were not doing anything
to prepare their societies for a resolution of the conflict the
governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan have subsequently resorted
to artificial confidence building measures, using the old style ex
soviet intelligentsia.

Given the pains of the conflict – including the tens of thousands
of bereaved, the suffering of hundreds of thousands of displaced,
and the vehemence of the enemy imagery that has now sunk deep in both
Armenian and Azerbaijani societies, especially amongst the young any
peace process to have a chance to succeed needs to be accompanied by
a very intensive and concerted effort to heal the wounds and improve
understanding.

Civil society has an important role to play in this process. However
it should not be taken for granted that this will happen. Many civil
society organisations are part of the problem rather than part of
the solution, and in this they are just reflecting the unpleasant
reality of the current perceptions amongst the populations at large. A
lot of work needs to be done by both the local governments and the
international community if any peace process is to have enough popular
support to make it sustainable.

5. Towards a solution – Time for the Minsk Process to deliver

For some time diplomats close to the OSCE Minsk process have been
expressing cautious optimism about the conduct of the negotiations and
the likelihood of a breakthrough. However, because Nagorno-Karabakh is
an issue of national identity for both parties, neither Armenia nor
Azerbaijan has been willing to let go of their maximalist ultimate
goals.. For a time each side believed the status quo was working
in their favour. Recent developments in the region seem to have
challenged this perception. The 2008 Georgia Russia War demonstrated
the risks of allowing so-called frozen conflicts to simmer, and also
exposed Armenia’s vulnerability as a result of its isolation. The
recent warming of relations between Turkey and Armenia, and increased
pressure from the international community – particularly Russia and
the US – have given new momentum to the talks. During 2009 the two
Presidents have already met a record six times, the most in any year
since the end of hostilities.

The Minsk Group co-Chair have been trying to get the sides to agree
to a set of "basic principles" that will start the process of actually
unpacking the various issues around the conflict. At the last meeting,
in Munich on 22 November 2009 the co-Chair reported that "progress has
been made. At the same time some questions are still open". In Athens
on 1 December 2009, after meeting on the margins of the OSCE Foreign
Ministers meeting "The Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan
reported on progress during the course of this year in achieving
common understanding on points of the basic principles. They stated
the willingness of their countries to complete work on the Basic
principles, as stipulated by the Presidents of the co-Chair countries
in l’Aquila. The Ministers reaffirmed their committment to work
intensively to resolve the remaining issues, to reach an agreement
based, in particular, upon the principles of the Helsinki Final Act
of non use of force or threat of force, Territorial Integrity, and
the equal rights and self determination of Peoples".

Basic Principles and Sticking Points

The Basic Principles were officially filed at the Madrid OSCE
Summit in November 2007. The principles encompass four basic
elements – status of Nagorno-Karabakh; the return of the occupied
territories; return of refugees and security guarantees. They include
a phased withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied territories
surrounding Nagorno-Karabkah and the return of these territories to
Azerbaijani control (five immediately and then Kelbajar and Lachin
approximately five years later); a secure corridor (a strip of
Lachin) linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh; interim international
status for Nagorno-Karabakh; providing guarantees for security and
self-governance; the right of all IDP’s and refugees to return to
their former homes; international security guarantees and peacekeeping
mission; determination of the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh through
a referendum/plebiscite.

Although the Presidents have apparently reached an understanding on
a number of these points, including the eventual pull-out of Armenian
forces from the districts of Azerbaijan – excluding Nagorno-Karabakh
itself – a number of sticking points remain which have been the main
focus of the negotiations over the last year..

â~@¢ The most controversial issue remains the eventual status
of Nagorno-Karabakh and when this should be decided upon. The
Basic Principles foresee this being determined by a referendum in
approximately 10-15 years time. However, it is clear that each side
wants a different outcome from any such plebiscite – Azerbaijan wants
to achieve a confirmation of its territorial integrity and sovereignty
within its internationally recognised borders while Armenia is seeking
the continuation of a status for Karabakh outside the jurisdiction of
Azerbaijan. To this end Azerbaijan believes that any such plebiscite
or referendum should be nationwide (as is stated in the Azerbaijani
Constitution) while the Armenian side presses for it to be limited only
to the Nagorno-Karabakh province but include the expelled Azerbaijani
community. Given the last census showed the population before the war
to be at 189 000, of which 76% identified themselves as Armenian and
23% Azerbaijani, the outcome would clearly reflect this.

â~@¢ Differences also remain on the timetable for the return of
the Azerbaijani refugees to Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding
territories: What would be the precise time frame? A quick return
or phased over several years? To what would they return, given many
of their original homes have either been demolished or are inhabited
by others.

â~@¢ The return of Kelbajar and Lachin, the most strategically
important regions, also remains a thorny issue for the Azerbaijani
side as there is still no agreed precise time frame for their
return which is linked to Armenia securing the land corridor between
Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia

â~@¢ On the "Lachin corridor" although both presidents seem to
have agreed on the need for a secure corridor linking Armenia to
Nagorno-Karabakh there are still problems concerning the functioning
of the corridor, its status and the precise width. While it would
seem that Armenia is keen for this corridor to become "de facto"
Armenian, Azerbaijan wants it to be a type of international secure
zone. It is envisioned that the corridor will be used by both sides
on a 12 hour-12-hour rotation basis (at least in the beginning to
avoid incidents and build trust). While Armenians would use it as
a bridge between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabkah, Azerbaijan envisages
it to extend across Armenia proper to the Azerbaijani territory of
Nakhchivan. Disagreement continues over the size of this corridor.

The Armenian side is pushing for the corridor to encompass the maximum
territory (at least 100 km in width) while the Azerbaijan side want
the opposite in order to have the remainder of Lachin returned to
them sooner rather than later.

â~@¢ Differences also remain on the interim status of Nagorno Karabakh
as any system that would be seen as predetermining the "final status"
is certain to be unacceptable to one of the two sides.

â~@¢ Armenia is anxious about the security implications and fears
the possibility that once it begins to withdraw from the occupied
territories Azerbaijan will attempt to take back Nagorno-Karabakh
by force. Therefore even though the Basic Principles are meant as a
step-by-step approach Armenia still seems to be advocating a package
approach meaning that nothing will be agreed until everything is
agreed. This is in part due to lack of trust and fear that a change
in the status quo could create new security threats. Therefore,
this could imply that as long as there is no agreement on status an
agreement could still be years away.

Additionally, without the support of the two societies it will be very
difficult to secure a deal and unfortunately the Basic Principles
have not been sold positively in either nation. In Azerbaijan they
are seen as a tool to legitimise Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence while
in Armenia they are viewed as a mechanism to push Armenia into giving
up the strategically valuable territory adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh
without defining the future of the territory itself.

The credibility of the "Minsk Process" and its capacity to deliver a
peace agreement, has been stretched to its limits, both within Armenia
and Azerbaijan, as well as in the wider international community. Many
fear that if once more the sides fail to bring the current negotiations
to a conclusion, the Minsk process in the present format will no longer
be sustainable. If the "Minsk Process" collapses re-inventing it will
not be an easy task, and may take years. Efforts for a breakthrough
in the present format must therefore be intensified.

6. The International and Regional Context: What is now expected of
the international community in support of the Karabakh peace process.

Although the dust from the short Georgia-Russia War fought in August
2008 has barely settled it is possible to already see that this was
a defining moment for the Caucasus region. It showed how the low
intensity conflicts that had plagued the post Soviet space for the
previous two decades could easily turn into a major international
crisis as well as being a salutary reminder of the human and political
cost of attempting to resolve conflicts through military force

Both Armenia and Azerbaijan sought to draw some conclusions from the
war and the events that followed. In public Armenia pointed out the
inexpediency of resorting to war to resolve the conflicts, whilst
Azerbaijan highlighted the danger of leaving the conflicts unresolved.

As consequence of the war the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict reappeared on
the radar of the international community. While avoiding another human
tragedy was a significant element in this drive there is also another
broader and more materialistic consideration linked to a region of
great geostrategic significance, namely energy security and western
projects for diversification of energy supplies. The ceasefire line
in Georgia and the Line of Contact in Nagorno-Karabakh are only 15 km
from the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline that connects Caspian oil fields
to European and global markets. In addition, in Azerbaijan, as well as
in Georgia and Turkey there are pumping stations along the length of
the line which are exposed and very vulnerable to attack. Therefore
if a new conflict were to breakout it would have a serious impact
on these existing pipelines and put into question the West ambitions
for further projects such as the Nabucco natural gas pipeline.

Russia redefines its role in the Karabakh peace process

At the end of 2008 Russia moved quickly to draw a line separating
events around the Georgia conflicts from the situation on Karabakh.

After some considerable political arms twisting President Medvedev
summoned the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan to Moscow and
convinced them to sign on 2 November 2008 a declaration that in
essence committed all sides to resolve the Karabakh problem soon,
but through negotiations. Whilst this declaration has been dismissed
by some as political posturing it did several things. It asserted
that Russia sought to play the role of primus inter pares amongst
the three co-Chair of the Minsk group; it reassured both sides that
Russia wanted to play the role of honest broker in the negotiations,
and it laid out (or some say reconfirmed) the parameters in which
future negotiations would be held.

Turkey "returns" to the Caucasus

The Georgia-Russia war also steered the other major regional player,
Turkey. Up to that point Turkey had been self conscious of the baggage
it carried in the region. Its policies were not only counter-productive
but also added to instability in the region – cool relations with
Russia; the decades long problem of relations with Armenia and a
policy of unquestioned support for Azerbaijan. These policies were also
detrimental to Turkey’s long term aim of not only being a significant
regional power but also a major energy and transport hub. To achieve
this Turkey not only needs to move away from its image of a "problem
creator" but also needs to build a secure and stable neighbourhood .

In 2008 Turkey embarked on two initiatives. In the immediate
aftermath of the Georgia Russia War it launched an initiative to
create a Caucasus Stability and Co-operation Platform, a forum to
bring together Russia, Armenia Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey into
a regional arrangement that will help solve the problems of the region.

Although dismissed by some as a half baked idea, the initiative
indicated a new Turkish readiness to play a role in the region and
an example of a new trend in Turkish Foreign policy, one that uses
soft power rather than projecting military might.

The second, more ambitious initiative was to normalise relations with
Armenia. After more than eighteen months of negotiations, several
"historical moments" which saw the presidents of the two countries
visiting each other to attend football matches, and some last minute
brinkmanship the two sides have now agreed, subject to ratification
by their parliaments, to establish diplomatic relations, open the
borders and generally deal with each other through the civilised
tools of diplomacy. Although there are still some obstacles ahead, and
despite Azerbaijan’s discontent with this process, the Turkey-Armenia
rapprochement has greatly contributed to make a Karabakh peace process
not only achievable in theory but also doable once it has been agreed.

Of course, Turkey’s progress has also been facilitated by its
increasingly warm ties with Moscow both economically and politically
and for the present time, at least, Moscow does not view Turkey’s
increased role in the South Caucasus as threat.

Although there is no mention of Nagorno-Karabakh in the two Protocols
that were signed on 10 October 2009 Turkey has continued to make strong
statements linking their eventual ratification and implementation
to progress on the resolution of the conflict. It seems that Turkey
is expecting some sort of symbolic gesture from Yerevan that would
appease Baku. Indeed if Turkey continues to link the two process
over a longer period of time it may result in Armenia hardening its
position in the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations.

Reset Relations between Russia and the West help the Karabakh peace
process too

The Georgia-Russia War marked an all time low in relations between
Russia and the US and the EU (together still sometimes referred to as
the "West".) Despite this chill, relations between the three co-Chair
in the framework of the Karabakh conflict resolution process remained
largely good, except perhaps for a few weeks immediately after August
2008 when senior diplomats from the conflict parties joked that they
soon have to start mediating between the mediators.

A number of factors, including a new administration in Washington ready
to "reset" its relations with Russia, and a more hands on approach
by the European Union in its engagement with its eastern neighbour
has seen a marked improvement in the relations. An initiative close
to the heart of Russian diplomacy, aimed at revisiting the debate
about security in Europe, was finally given a cautious hearing by
the US and the EU and in June 2009 the so called Corfu process was
launched as a reaction to Russian President Medvedev’s security
proposals Although this is meant to be an all encompassing process
likely to take a number of years before it comes to a conclusion, it
is bound to impact the resolution of the conflicts in the OSCE space,
such as the one over Karabakh.

There is thus a major change in the international context around the
Karabakh conflict and this has undoubtedly helped the momentum of
the negotiations to resolve it.

Time for plain talking

It is now time for the international community to speak with one
voice and in more robust tones to both sides. Some messages that have
been transmitted before, but in cautious diplomatic language need to
be repeated in more clear terms and without ambiguity in such a way
that not only the leaderships, but also the populations of the two
countries, will understand clearly. Armenia needs to be told that the
continued occupation of the Azerbaijani territories around Nagorno
Karabakh is neither acceptable nor sustainable. Azerbaijan must
be told that any attempt or talk of regaining these territories by
force without a UN Security Council resolution will bring Azerbaijan
in direct confrontation with the international community. Both sides
must be reminded of the right of all refugees and IDPs to return to
their homes in safe and dignified conditions.

The international community must now use the leverage it has

Unlike many other conflict situations and despite claims to the
contrary, the international community has considerable leverage in the
Karabakh conflict, especially if it decided to act in harmony. This
leverage stems from the wish of the Armenian and Azerbaijan governments
to be responsible and forward looking partners of the international
community. Both countries are keen to put themselves at the heart of
regional economic processes and not to be marginalised in global and
regional political fora. This gives the international community an
opportunity to influence events.

How to use this leverage constructively and sensitively in support of
the Karabakh peace process is an important challenge for the coming
one or two years.

(a) Peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan cannot be imposed by
the international community. However now that the two sides are
so close to at least moving the peace process to the next level,
the international community must also rise to the occasion and
help the sides make the next few difficult steps. This may entail
the personal involvement of key leaders of the US, Russia the EU,
and where appropriate, Turkey. It may also mean sharper use of the
sticks and carrots approach to help see the process through. For
example the international community may need to offer Armenia an
extensive economic aid package as a sweetener for progress linked to
withdrawal from Azerbaijan’s occupied territories.

(b) There is also a need to lean more persuasively on the leaders
of both Armenia and Azerbaijan to ensure that they start the all
important process of bringing on board different elements of their
own societies as stakeholders of the peace process. In both Armenia
and Azerbaijan, public opinion on key issues, including peace in
Karabakh, is only tolerated in pre determined "spaces". It is now
time that these spaces are expanded and that a true debate on the
issue be allowed to take place within both societies.

(c) In pushing for a solution to the Karabakh problem to be prioritised
by the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan, the international
community must also lead by example. In the dealings with Armenia
and Azerbaijan solving the Karabakh conflict must be brought to the
forefront of the agenda and procrastination not excused further for
the sake of behind the scenes deals on energy, military and security
facilities or trade. In other words a solution should not be based
on a fight for control of the South Caucasus by the West and Russia.

Karabakh: – for the European Union an early test for the mechanisms
of the Lisbon Treaty. Soft power with a firm approach.

In 2010 Karabakh is more likely to be an opportunity rather than a
crisis. If the appropriate political can be mustered from EU member
states, it could provide one of the early tests for the new mechanisms
for a more harmonised and effective EU foreign policy that came into
force with the recently ratified Lisbon Treaty. It needs to become
a priority for the new EU High Representative on Foreign Policy
and it could provide one of the first opportunities for the newly
restructured EU diplomatic machinery to show that it can act with
efficiency, speed and effectiveness. Such a response would represent
a change in EU policy towards the conflict which has received the
least attention from the EU in comparison to other such conflicts
in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood even though it is by far the most
dangerous. Until now the EU has preferred to limit its role largely
to supporting the efforts of the OSCE Minsk group.

Karabakh can allow the European Union to do what it can do best,
namely project soft power. Under the new Lisbon Treaty arrangements,
rather than do this in a disjointed and somewhat chaotic manner,
it has the potential to do so firmly and in a timely fashion with a
harmonised approach between the efforts of the Brussels institutions
and those of the member states.

At the very least the European Union must be ready to be present on
the ground and to take the leading role in any eventual peacekeeping
or peace-monitoring force. However it needs to keep in mind that
the kind of peacekeeping operation that is going to be required
in Karabakh will be less dependant on tanks and guns and more on
creative diplomacy and tact. The EU needs to prepare for a presence
that will rely on diplomats in jeans who are ready to travel away from
the comfort of their embassies to remote villages and communities,
and on soldiers who are able to talk and communicate as much as they
are able to carry and use arms. The EU should draw on its experience
and the lessons it has learnt in the Balkans.

Financing peace and rebuilding the destroyed territories will also
be extremely costly. The EU should take the lead in making a cost
estimate and when the time comes be responsible (as it did in Georgia)
for the organisation of a donor conference.

Many also consider it expedient that the role of France as co-Chair
of the "Minsk process" evolves into one that carries with it the
clout of the whole European Union. Whilst France jealously guards
its role of co-Chair, and French diplomats have traditionally done
an excellent job of it, this may not be what will be needed in the
future. A possible solution will be for an agreement for a French
diplomat to replace the current French co-Chair when the time for
the normal rotation comes, but to give the new appointee an EU mandate.

Time for flexible and creative diplomacy

With Karabakh, as indeed with the other conflicts such as Abkhazia,
South Ossetia and Transdniestria the international community is faced
with a further challenge – that of coming up with flexible and creative
solutions to address some of the outstanding, seemingly insurmountable
obstacles to conflict resolution. The apparent contradiction between
the principle of territorial integrity of states, and that of the right
of nations for self determination, has been used on many occasions as
proof that the Karabakh problem has no solution. It may be that the
straight forward black and white solutions of the past are no longer
applicable in the current international context. Defining sovereignty
in a world of interdependence has stopped being simply a question of
whether or not a state has a seat in the United Nations. Even that
in the past has had its shades of grey.

It is neither logical nor fair to expect the parties to the conflict
to come up with solutions to these international rules that are not of
their own making and it is appropriate that on these issues solutions
are offered. There are already in Europe examples of small states that
because of a mix of size, history and geo-political context have been
accepted as part of the European family with unusual arrangements. For
example the tiny principality of Andorra is a sovereign state, member
of the United Nations and the OSCE, but it is also a duumvirate, with
sovereignty shared between the President of France and the Bishop of
Urgell in Catalonia. The Principality of Liechtenstein provides another
example of creative diplomacy, Lichtenstein foreign relations was
until recently shared between Switzerland, responsible for political
and consular matters, and Austria, responsible for trade and commercial
matters. None of these examples offer a "cut and paste" solution to the
Karabakh problem, but they do show that creative diplomacy is possible.

Flexible Seating Arrangements

The issue of diplomatic flexibility will also arise as to arrangements
prior to the status of Karabakh being defined, particularly with
regards to how to bring in the self declared "Nagorno Karabakh
Republic", which de facto administers the territory in the
negotiations, as well as to how to give a voice to the expelled
Azerbaijani Karabakh community. The question of how the international
community should deal with unrecognised or partly recognised entities
is one that is now troubling diplomats and analysts. The OSCE can be a
good first place where a creative "seating" arrangement can be looked
at, where entities such as the current "Nagorno Karabakh Republic",
and indeed entities such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Kosovo, which
are not recognised or are only partly recognised, can be invited to
sit without prejudice with the rest of the international community,
ending the misguided policy of isolation that has been the cause of
much misunderstanding and misperception. Seating arrangements may be
an issue for some discussion but the idea of constructive engagements
with the separatist entities has much value, and indeed already takes
place in other conflict contexts, such as the Transdnistria conflict
in Moldova.

Next steps now

The international community has throughout the whole period when the
search for a solution to the Karabakh problem was ongoing, largely
held Armenia and Azerbaijan responsible for finding a solution to it.

In doing so it has opened itself to criticism and cynicism amongst
both the Armenian and the Azerbaijani communities who see this as
a means through which the international community was abrogating
its responsibility.

In this important moment in the negotiations the international
community must show that it also is willing to carry responsibility by
engaging more, by showing that a Karabakh solution is a priority and
by offering new frameworks from which a mutually acceptable solution
can emerge.

7. The end of the beginning

The process to resolve the Karabakh conflict is entering a new phase.

The continuation of the process in the present mode is no longer
sustainable. We have reached the end of the beginning. If the present
negotiating process within the framework of the OSCE Minsk process
collapses it will take years for an alternative to emerge and to
reach the point where we are today. This scenario must be avoided at
all costs. The alternative however is not stalemate but progress. The
last steps are needed to move the process to a qualitatively improved
level, enabling changes on the ground to take place and opening the
way for a final solution. This objective is now within reach and this
opportunity must not be squandered.

An agreement in the next weeks will however not be the end of the
story. There is a lot of work to be done by both governments, and by
the international community for an agreement on paper to be turned into
a proper peace process, not least to help ensure that the ownership
of such an agreement does not remain a monopoly of a tiny political
elite but is shared within the wider community on both sides.

A solution to the Karabakh conflict will bring a new dawn to the
Caucasus region and will start the process of finally fully integrating
the region within the global processes for the benefit of both the
people of the region and of other nations with a stake in its success.