mir-kazimirov-it-s-time-to-deal-with-aliyev-s-war- threats
Vladimir Kazimirov: It’s time to deal with Aliyev’s war threats
Azerbaijan needs to learn from the past, respect international obligations
by Vladimir Kazimirov
Published: Wednesday December 02, 2009
Vladimir Kazimirov: `In Karabakh, the overriding priority is to
prevent a new war’
Moscow – Meeting in the capital of Greece this week, foreign ministers
from countries of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) discussed the most pressing problems of Europe.
The Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers, Edward Nalbandian and
Elmar Mamedyarov, met in Athens on November 30 and their talks
continued on the following day, drawing special attention.
Just days earlier, on November 22 in Munich, Presidents Serge Sargsyan
and Ilham Aliyev made some progress toward the development of the
basic principles of a Karabakh settlement, instructing their ministers
to work to smooth over some of the differences.
Threats from Baku
But the echoes of Ilham Aliyev’s speeches on November 17 and 20, in
which he threatened to end the long-running negotiations and opt for a
military solution to the conflict, have not yet dissipated.
Threats continue to be heard from Baku, some of which are also warning
Turkey against ratification of the protocols on normalization of
relations with Armenia. Defense Minister Safar Abiyev again predicted
the inevitability of the use of force in the Karabakh conflict.
Azerbaijani mass media carry similarly threatening comments aired by
members of parliament, political commentators, and journalists.
All of this amounts to a campaign of zombification of the population,
especially the youth, which is unfamiliar with realities of war.
To inflame passions two interconnected justifications are used. The
first is that Armenians have not fulfilled four U.N. Security Council
resolutions that demand a withdrawal of Armenian forces from foreign
territories. The second is that a continued occupation cannot be
tolerated.
But this picture is presented out of context. In fact the continuing
occupation is a direct product of the drawn-out war of 1991-94.
The Security Council resolutions
Following the Armenian capture of the Kelbajar district, Azerbaijan
initiated a session of the U.N. Security Council on April 30 1993. But
Azerbaijanis were not satisfied with Resolution 822 adopted as a
result, [because] its call for an immediate withdrawal of forces was
preceded by a demand to first end all military operations.
Baku at the time did not respond to a call by Russia, the United
States, and Turkey to confirm its readiness to implement Resolution
822, whereas Yerevan and Stepanakert communicated that readiness.
After the fall of Aghdam on July 23, 1993, Security Council Resolution
853, dated July 29 of that year, demanded an immediate cessation of
all hostilities and then an immediate, complete, and unconditional
withdrawal of occupation forces.
That resolution also demanded a firm agreement to cease fire that
would be respected by the parties. (Previous cease-fire agreements
were violated, as Azerbaijan appeared unwilling to end the war.)
Changed Security Council demands
Security Council Resolution 874, adopted on October 14, 1993,
similarly called for making the cease-fire effective and permanent.
Calls for a withdrawal of forces from occupied territories and other
demands were no longer placed front and center.
[Resolution 874] and the final resolution [dealing with the Karabakh
conflict,] numbered 884, and adopted on November 12, 1993, no longer
demand an "unconditional" withdrawal. In effect [withdrawal] became a
subject of negotiations between the parties. The Security Council
simply could no longer reward the violator of cease-fires.
>From Resolution 884 it is obvious which side violated the cease-fire,
and which side retaliated. This author had an opportunity to learn
that first-hand from all parties.
[Baku’s] purported commitment to the four Security Council resolutions
is therefore clearly false. The cease-fire deal is the only
implemented element of these resolutions.
And Baku was first to violate immediate implementation of their key
premises. Opting to use military force, for more than a year
[Azerbaijan] delayed agreeing to a cease-fire and . . . lost one
district after another.
>From the middle of November 1993, the Security Council stopped
adopting resolutions on Karabakh, wishing not to devalue its past
decisions.
A call for a cease-fire by the council of heads of states of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) adopted on April 15 1994, was
followed by Heydar Aliyev’s agreement to a cease-fire, but only as
[Azerbaijan] was pushed to the brink of [military] collapse.
Baku’s commitments
Today, each side selectively picks and chooses those aspects of [U.N.]
resolutions that suit its propaganda needs. Could it be that a
resumption of war is consistent with the resolutions’ letter and
spirit? It would in fact violate the entire premise on which the
Security Council operates.
Proponents of a new war compromise themselves by either not knowing or
ignoring basic facts.
The past Azerbaijani governments’ irresponsible behavior cost its
people dearly. The May 1994 agreement was signed by all parties to the
conflict – Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Armenia – as a permanent
cease-fire. Leaders of the three sides publicly swore to respect the
cease-fire until a "grand political agreement" is concluded.
When Azerbaijan and Armenia joined the OSCE in 1992, their membership
was immediately linked to a peaceful settlement of the conflict. And
when the two countries joined the Council of Europe, they directly
pledged to resolve it peacefully.
Peaceful resolution of disputes and the nonuse of force or threats to
use force are among the basic OSCE principles.
Azerbaijan’s own Constitution, in Article 9, rules out war as a method
to resolve international conflicts.
Undermining credibility
But in practice, Baku has failed to uphold the February 4, 1995,
agreement on settling incidents [along the cease-fire line, and
recently] refused [an OSCE proposal] to pull back snipers [from the
Line of Contact].