MEDVEDEV’S KARABAKH DILEMMA: AFRAID OF NOT PLEASING BOTH PARTNERS, RUSSIA CEDES INTERMEDIARY MISSION IN CAUCASUS TO THE UNITED STATES

Nezavisimaya Gazeta
Dec 1 2009
Russia

The population of Nagorno-Karabakh [Nagornyy-Karabakh] continues to
maintain its position of independence.

Aleksandr Valeryevich Karavayev is deputy general director of
the MGU [Moscow State University] Information Analysis Centre.
[translated from Russian]

Over the last few days the topic of Karabakh has not left the agenda
of international or regional international events. In particular,
it may be being discussed within the context of the meeting of
OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] foreign
ministers in Athens being held today and tomorrow. Previously it had
been assumed that immediately before and perhaps during the ministers’
get-together the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Edvard
Nalbandian and Elmar Mammadyarov, would meet and discuss the Karabakh
situation. Nor are Russian politicians giving this topic a wide berth.

One of the advances issued to the Medvedev-Putin tandem at the dawn
of their administration was the expectation of more complex foreign
policy mechanisms for Russia. Giving it a new resource of effectiveness
thanks to the appearance in the arena of two influential figures
of the first magnitude seems logical. While in domestic policy
we are observing their characteristic differences and alarming
ambivalences regarding the essence of "conservative modernization",
notable in foreign policy is their synchronicity and, where necessary,
a unique dividing up of foreign policy traffic "for two". Thanks to
the duumvirate, there is hope that a sufficiently effective system
will take shape that employs various strategies for untangling the
problem knots in post-Soviet Eurasia.

A true indicator of the effectiveness and maturity of this policy
may be Russia’s activity with respect to settling the first of the
ethno-territorial conflicts following the breakup of the Soviet Union:
Karabakh. This conflict always had many dimensions that went beyond the
boundaries of the Caucasus. Today as never before it is close to moving
from discussion to implementation of specific actions. Turkey has begun
gradually to lift the blockade on its Armenia policy, which was frozen
16 years ago. However, the chief intrigue lies in the difference in
the positioning strategies of the United States and Russia.

The Americans are actively pressuring Turkey on rapprochement with
Armenia. Understandably, they have serious geopolitical motives with
respect to Turkey and the Caucasus. But after all, on the substantive
and historical level Russia’s interests in this region are no fewer.
Washington, though, unconcerned about accusations of pressure,
has stated its position distinctly, and through its participation
in the fate of this historical conflict is pointing as well to the
depth of its interests in Turkey and Armenia. Whereas on our side
of this knot, in the post-Soviet Caucasus, we are not making direct
statements linking the Armenian-Turkish and Karabakh processes;
we are shy about trying to influence Armenia, as if rapprochement
between Armenia and Azerbaijan were not to our advantage. The logic of
this braking is understandable. Why should Russia hurry? The Caucasus
are complicated, and any open position might further complicate the
situation. This self-removal, however, bears serious limitations for
Russia’s future presence in this region. Turkey was not afraid to
shift its position towards compromise, knowing the insult to Baku,
but also understanding that on the long-term strategic level the
Armenian-Turkish rapprochement is to Azerbaijan’s benefit and the
geostrategic connection between Turkey and Azerbaijan will remain
constant no matter what the lay of the land. Moscow froze in the
face of the dilemma. On the one hand, blocking an Armenian-Turkish
rapprochement would look doubly strange given Russia’s economic
interests in Armenia and its major investments in transport and
the necessity of extensive trade traffic developing joint business
projects, including with companies of the Armenian diaspora. On
the other hand, the stereotype looms; if you support Azerbaijan,
then you lose influence on Armenia. But let us ask this question:
Where is Armenia going to defect? In spite of all their friction
over Karabakh and the gas trade, Turkish-Azerbaijani connections
are not being annihilated. Such is the nature of Armenian-Russian
relations, too. Russia’s presence in Armenia cannot be cut back in
connection with a more precise position with regard to the Karabakh
issue. The conflict will gradually begin to resolve itself in the
foreseeable future. The general agreement among the United States,
Russia, and the EU [European Union] with regard to a settlement
plan is notable. However, the intermediary who first establishes the
necessity of beginning practical steps in the occupied areas around
Karabakh will play a leading role, for example, in the process of
forming peacekeeping and police units.

Multiplying Russia’s foreign policy vertical by two has yet to
yield any achievements. Putin’s vertical and the government are
excelling increasingly in the development of behind-the-scenes forms
of diplomacy, and this is especially visible in natural gas issues.
Characteristic feature of Medvedev’s diplomacy are his modernization
enthusiasm and pretty liberal theses. The latest blatant example
of this is the reception for Ilkham Aliyev in Ulyanovsk. The Baku
guests were shown Russia’s technological capabilities – a miracle
bridge. At the same time, in mentioning Geydar Aliyev, correct
symbolic codes were selected to demonstrate both respect for their
shared nomenklatura roots and the national authority of the Azerbaijani
president’s family. All this is wonderful in an Oriental way. But what
does this have to do with Moscow’s position regarding the Karabakh
conflict? As before, Moscow is trying to distance itself from a clear
public position, indicating that the decision must be found by the
problem’s participants themselves. The most likely result of this
self-withdrawal is that bold Atlantic outsiders will come to the fore
and compel the sides to take the first step.