RUSSIA SEEN NEEDING SYSTEM-WIDE POLICY ON CAUCASUS

Gazeta.ru
Dec 23 2009
Russia

[Commentary by Sergey Markedonov, associate professor of the Russian
State Humanitarian University, under the rubric "Commentaries":
"The Year of Three Exacerbations"]

Russia needs a system-wide policy in the Caucasus. Without it nothing
will work out either inside the country – in the North Caucasus
republics, or outside it – in relations with the former republics of
the Soviet Transcaucasus.

In 2009 the Greater Caucasus has not been shaken by such high-profile
events as the "five-day war." But many tendencies and processes of
the outgoing year are no less important in terms of their impact on
the entire architecture of Caucasus geopolitics.

Independence "Behind a Line of Friendly Bayonets"

In 2009 the formation of the new order in a problematic region
of Eurasia taken separately continued. The reinforcement of the
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia occurred. Naturally it
is a matter of independence from Georgia "behind a line of friendly
bayonets" of Russia. However, be that as it may, Abkhazia held
its first presidential election in conditions where direct danger
from Tbilisi did not threaten Sukhumi for the first time since the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. There was no military-police fist
nor any "government in exile" in Kodori. But then there were the
friendly "recommendations" of the Russian ambassador on who should
be the future president, as well as a showing of the Russian Navy
boats Sokol and Mangust on the eve of election day.

The "merging" of small South Ossetia with big Russia in conditions
where the number of incidents from the Georgian side declined by an
order also continued. And the nature of the incidents changed. Today
the prospects of their escalating into a storm of Tskhinvali or even
a Tliakan operation (that took place in 2004) are practically nil. In
that way what is gradually becoming paramount are not problems of
the "Georgian threat," but the quality of the independence acquired,
the level of republic management, and Russia’s role as a guarantor
of security and internal political development.

There are fewer and fewer questions for Tbilisi, but then questions are
appearing for Moscow. How tolerant of the economic "independence" of
the South Ossetian authorities will the Kremlin be? Will Moscow be able
to respect those elements of democracy that were formed in Abkhazia,
and is it willing to listen to the opinion of the opposition? It
appears that the Kremlin still has not altogether realized that the
agenda in the two former Georgian autonomies differs significantly from
the one that existed a year or two ago. The statements and speeches
of various levels of officials devoted to the Abkhazian and Ossetian
problem area prompt us to that conclusion. Two topics continue to
dominate in them – ensuring Russian interests in the Caucasus, and
in addition an appeal to Georgian revanchism.

The "Impulses" for Recognition

In the outgoing year, only two states were added to the list of
countries recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia –
Venezuela and Nauru. At the same time, Nicaragua decided to establish
diplomatic relations with Abkhazia a year after the signing of
two presidential decrees on recognition. One should note that this
modest result was achieved not thanks to cunning diplomatic moves,
but because the Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez called Abkhazian and
Ossetian independence "imparting impulses." In one case the "impulse"
cost the Russian side $2 billion US, and in the other it was a matter
of only 50 million. At the same time, the non-economic price of these
recognitions is not too high. And in this case it is by no means the
point that Venezuela and Nauru are "second class" countries. It is
simply that the domestic situation in Latin American countries is
so changeable that only a naive optimist can hope to preserve the
current position in the medium term.

The history of this region has seen the conversion of partisans into
presidents, and popular presidents – into political outcasts. The
foreign policy of the changing countries also changed 180 degrees
with this conversion. But this is not the first year that Nauru
has been famous for converting the process of recognition into a
profitable business (the elite of this small island country already
changed their attitude towards the recognition of Taiwan and the PRC,
also basing it on the principle of financial "impulses"). Where is
the guarantee that tomorrow Nauru, after obtaining from Georgia (or
perhaps from the United States or Australia) 60 million or even 100
million, will not change its decision?

But no matter what pitfalls might accompany the process of recognition
of the two former Georgian autonomies, international legitimization
of the new Caucasian realities is important in itself.

No matter how events develop in the future, the precedents of foreign
recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (even
ones that are generously paid for) objectively distance them from
Georgia.

The format of the Geneva consultations on the situation in the
South Caucasus also works towards the legitimization of Georgia’s
two former autonomies. No matter how much American and European
politicians say that they will never sign off on the recognition of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the participation of the delegations of
these republics in the work of the international conference promotes
their at least partial perception as separate political entities.

The "Geopolitical Capitalization" of Armenia

In 2009, to use the language of economists, there has been a build-up
in the "geopolitical capitalization" of Armenia. This republic
over the course of the entire year formed fundamental questions for
the regional agenda. It is specifically in the outgoing year that
Armenia for the first time since acquiring independence decided to
sign legally binding documents with Turkey.

The two protocols on normalizing relations with Ankara became not
simply a gigantic step for the two neighbouring countries. They
created the prerequisites for serious transformations throughout the
entire region.

Among them are Georgia’s loss of the status of a country of exclusive
transit, the weakening of the strategic Baku-Ankara axis, Turkey’s
changed role in the region (its departure from the role of the
United States’ younger brother and Azerbaijan’s older brother and
its establishment as an independent regional Caucasian power), and
the major diversification of Armenia’s foreign policy.

And although ratification of the protocols has dragged out and the
prospects of their final passage through parliament are not evident,
even now these documents have caused significant changes in the
South Caucasus.

Bearing in mind all the complexity for Turkey of reconciling with
Armenia, the leading world players (particularly the United States
and Russia) accelerated the peacemaking process on Nagornyy Karabakh
(in order to provide Ankara with some compensation for losing the role
of Baku’s geopolitical patron and an interested party in the conflict).

In the end in July 2009, there appeared a document that has
no less significance for the entire South Caucasus than the two
Armenian-Turkish protocols. I am referring to the so-called Updated
Madrid Principles (so named in honour of the OSCE Madrid summit
meeting in 2007). Unlike the "old principles," it was not three
diplomats taking the roles of the cochairmen of the Minsk Group of
the OSCE who signed the "updated" version, but the three presidents
heading the mediating countries. And for Russia and the United States,
the accelerated Karabakh peace process is the result not only of
the Caucasian interests of these states per se, but also of broader
geopolitical ones (and even personality factors).

The Russian Federation needs to show its Western partners that the
revisionism of the times of the "five-day war" is a situational
phenomenon and it will not be used for other spots on the territory
of the former Soviet Union. For the United States, Nagornyy Karabakh
is one of the numerous fields for the possible "reset" of relations
with Russia, as well as for testing the "new course" of American
foreign policy.

And although the "Updated Madrid Principles" text itself is an
unpolished document that has internal contradictions, it is important
because it establishes the framework of a future settlement of the
conflict. That means abandonment of the maximalist standards of the
parties and offering in veiled form of the formula "peace and the
status of Karabakh in exchange for territories." However, it may take
a considerable amount of time to reconcile the details (and above all,
possible losses to the images of the two presidents).

Between "Uzbekistanization" and "Dynamic Equilibrium"

In the meantime, the year 2009 proved to be memorable not only on the
geopolitical level. The internal development of all the Caucasian
states (including Russia too) was marked in the outgoing year by
many important events. In Azerbaijan yet another step towards the
establishment of the regime of the personal power of the incumbent
president occurred. The Baku political analyst Arif Yunusov [as
transliterated] called this "Uzbekistanization." On 18 March 2009,
a constitutional referendum on 41 amendments to 29 articles of
the fundamental law was held in the largest republic of the South
Caucasus. But the most important in this series was the lifting of
restrictions on the number of presidential terms in office permitted
for one person.

In addition to the amendment prolonging the term in office of the
head of state, such an important and dangerous innovation as the
possible postponement of the election of the president and parliament
in the event of military actions was introduced into Azerbaijan’s
constitution.

In Georgia throughout all of 2009, the opposition tried to overthrow
President Mikheil Saakashvili, whom they hated. Their actions reached
three peaks during the year (9 April, 26 May, and 7 November). But
the opponents of the incumbent president of Georgia were unable
to completely turn the situation in their favour. Ultimately, by
the end of the year, a situation of dynamic equilibrium had become
established in Georgia. The government cannot destroy the opposition,
nor the opposition – the government.

The opposition is showing its strong protest potential and ability to
build it up, but even so a clear shortage of new people and new ideas
is evident in its ranks. Moreover, the oppositionists are waging the
fight on two fronts – against Saakashvili, and against one another.

Allow me to note that the mutual accusations, intrigues, and plots
within the ranks of the government’s opponents are no less serious
than in interrelations between the president and the opposition.

Not Everything Is Peaceful in the North Caucasus

A special point in the 2009 Caucasus agenda is the situation in the
Russian North Caucasus. The outgoing year in the Caucasus was for
Russia a year of three "exacerbations."

The first was the increased political violence noted even by
officials. In 2009 both well-known politicians and administrators,
and human rights activists, heads of municipal formations, soldiers
and security officers, and civilians were the "targets." At the same
time, North Caucasian political violence is difficult to measure
with one ruler. On the one hand, it is the stepped-up activity by the
radical Islamist underground, but on the other, it is the increased
number of showdowns between clans (which sometimes are "concealed" as
"Wahhabism"). But no matter how varied the reasons for one particular
murder or another are, the result is the same. The level of political
culture is falling catastrophically, and so of all the possible
formulas, "If the person is gone, the problems are gone" seems the
most effective. Given the Federal Centre’s effective absence of a
public policy and strategy, this formula is not difficult to realize.

The second exacerbation deals with nationalist sentiments. It would
seem that by the start of the 2000s, different latent interethnic
confrontations had become a matter of history. But in 2009 we were
witnesses to a whole series of nationalist actions (the Balkar mass
actions in the KBR [Kabardino-Balkar Republic] and Moscow, the Cherkess
actions in the KChR [Karachayevo-Cherkess Republic], and tension in
relations between Lezgins and Azeris in Southern Dagestan).

And unlike the 1990s, it is not left over from Soviet history. It is a
response to present events (the realization of municipal reforms, land
issues, and corruption based on personnel preferences for "insiders").

In some republics the elites can find nothing better to do than try
to extinguish the Islamist fire with ethnic nationalism. Allow me to
mention that an appeal to Russia and Russian political-legal space
is typical (at least in the present stage) of nationalist actions
(unlike the Islamist struggle). But there is no reason for complacency,
since the lack of a space for dialogue around these trends and actions
does not permit them to be absorbed in a civilized manner, but then
it does promote the appearance of radical sentiments.

And finally, the third "exacerbation" deals with the behaviour of
the Russian supreme power.

It was specifically this year that through President Medvedev,
the Kremlin declared the North Caucasus a crucial domestic policy
problem of the country. For the first time in the last 10 years or
so, at the "very top," they began to speak of this region not as a
resolved problem but as an acute challenge to the security of the
entire country.

In the meantime, the quality of such statements leaves something to be
desired. In places a sober analysis gives way to primitive propaganda
and "glossing over" of reality.

But just before the curtain falls on the outgoing year, an event that
inspires cautious optimism has occurred in Russian North Caucasus
policy. On 17 December the leaders of North Ossetia and Ingushetia
signed an agreement where for the first time in the post-Soviet
period, they found a compromise formula for resolving the conflict
over Prigorodnyy Rayon (abandonment of territorial claims in exchange
for returning the forced resettlers to their places of residence). In
that way for the first time during the conflict, the leaders of the two
neighbouring republics abandoned the principle of "ethnic ownership
of land." But a great deal more must be done for this compromise
to become historic and presented as a positive example for all the
Caucasus. But the most important thing is that it must be understood
that without a system-wide policy in the Greater Caucasus, nothing
will work out for Russia either within the country – in Chechnya,
Dagestan, or North Ossetia, or outside it – in relations with Armenia,
the two, in part recognized republics, Georgia, or Azerbaijan.